Tuesday, August 31, 2021

From the darkness


From the darkness

In august 1968 most adults sensed that something terribly wrong had come upon America. Assassinations, riots, economic uncertainty and a dread that the war in Vietnam would chew up more young men. Richard Nixon offered a promise of getting back to normal and stopping the war. He did neither. Teenage boys felt that life was a cheat, no good options. China was drifting into madness, Russia considered war in Europe. Such misery. 

Covid 19 has shown us that even vaccines can fail and that people will continue to die, and they will. 

We can surrender to despair or understand that we've always danced along the edge and every year seems futile. Imagine 1939 and the world descending into a horrific war that would take 55 million lives.

2025 is coming and life will go on. 20 year olds dream of the 2030's as 10 year olds imagine the 2040s. Kids born in 2030 will likely see the first years of the 22d century. Imagine that!

Right now we're depressed and afraid and we should be. But we will get through it. 50,000 years ago humans were pushed around by the onset of an ice age. 10,000 years ago humans watched as north Africa dried out and started to become a desert.

Two Japanese cities were reduced to radioactive ash, and they recovered.

Human imagination can frighten us or inspire us.

It is better to be cynical about doom and sure that we will survive and prosper.

David A Fairbanks

31 August 2021


Monday, August 23, 2021

Whistling Past The Graveyard Of Empires

 

Whistling Past The Graveyard Of Empires

by Ali Minai 3 Quarks Daily

The events in Afghanistan over the last week are being seen as yet another “hinge moment” in history. The images of helicopters evacuating personnel from embassies and people chasing aircraft in desperation to get on them have been seared into the memories of all who have seen them. As a person from the region (Pakistan), a student of history, and as someone interested in the current state of the world, I too have watched these events with a mixture of amazement, trepidation, horror, and perplexity. It is not clear yet whether “hope” or “fear” – or both – should be added to that list. The things I say in this piece are just the thoughts and speculations of a non-expert lay person trying to make sense of an obscure situation. As will be obvious from the rest of this piece, for all the pain and suffering the new situation in Afghanistan will bring to people in Afghanistan, I think that the American decision to withdraw was the only rational choice. The alternative of staying on for years – perhaps decades – to build a better Afghanistan would just be another exercise in paternalistic colonialism. However, the way the withdrawal is happening is a great failure of American leadership and the blame for that lies mainly with the American policies of the last two decades. Perhaps its biggest failure was in not preparing Afghanistan for this day that was sure to come sooner or later. Now the Afghan people – especially women – will pay a price for that failure, but it may also come back to haunt the United States and other great powers. It has happened before….

It is tempting to see the fall of Afghanistan to the Taliban as a bookend with the events of 9-11. What happened that fateful morning in the US began a series of world-altering events that, it seems, have come full circle in Kabul today. The Taliban, ousted shortly after 9-11 by the US and NATO, have now ousted the US and NATO from Afghanistan to retake control. The wreckage of the intervening period lies scattered all over the world in broken societies, shattered lives, and altered states of mind. But are we done with all that? Has the humiliation of another great power – and it certainly is a humiliation – by another guerilla force broken the fever? Almost certainly not. Yes, Afghanistan seems to have returned to an approximate status quo ante. Yes, the United States seems to be turning inward to its own problems and westward to look warily at emerging Chinese power, seemingly writing off the regions that previously engaged its attention. But if there’s one lesson that can be learned from the events of this week, it is that the plans even of great powers are built mostly on hope and prayer. History always has other ideas.

Nor should it be taken for granted that what we see on the ground in Kabul today presages any sort of stability. The Taliban are the dog that have caught the car. It is far from clear if the car will stop, though it may slow down briefly. Afghanistan’s history over the last several decades – indeed, over the last two centuries – should make us skeptical. But that famous rhyming of history that is supposed to inform our surmise does often lapse into blank verse. Sometimes, things are different. To that end, consider two things. First, when the Taliban came to power in 1996, they were literally a ragtag Lord of the Flies bunch conquering the devastated landscape of a long civil war. This time, they are returning as a politics-savvy, battle-tested, well-organized group with a distributed leadership, a PR operation, and – very importantly – a rolodex worth of international diplomatic contacts. This is unlikely to turn them into benign liberals, but it can turn them into much more polished autocrats, which is a very dangerous species. Second, they are going to inherit the fruits of all the infrastructure, organization, and workforce development that has occurred – however imperfectly – under the US and NATO occupation in the last fifteen years or so. The Kabul the Taliban are walking into is a functioning modern city. If they just have the wisdom to exploit this gift rather than destroy it, they will start light-years ahead of where they began in 1996. But does any of this guarantee that their hegemony will last? Not at all! The other forces who have tasted power in the preceding decades are already gathering to regain some of it. The world should keep its eye on cities like Mazar-e-Sharif and Herat, and on the Panjshir Valley. The embers of resistance are surely alive in such places, and you never know where a wind might come from to fan them into a fire. That is why the moment at hand is not necessarily a hinge moment in history. It may turn out to be one in retrospect, but it is far too early to conclude that.

The Choice

Let there be no doubt on two points. First, that the US and President Biden had no option better than the choice that was made. And second, that because of the way the withdrawal has gone, it is an utter humiliation for the United States and for President Biden. Both are diminished in the world, and in the zero-sum game of geopolitics, that means that their adversaries are strengthened.

It is now clear that, while twenty years of occupation at an immense cost of life and treasure did help stand up a more open civil society in Afghanistan, it made no difference in terms of weakening the grip of the Taliban. If anything, it accomplished the opposite: Giving them the time and practice to organize into a more sophisticated force. When Biden took office in January 2021, Trump’s agreement with the Taliban was a fait accompli, and a huge drawdown of forces had already taken place, leaving only 2,500 US and NATO troops in Afghanistan. Biden faced a simple choice: Stay or leave. But each of these had their nuances.

Those who support the “stay” option give two reasons for this: a) Preventing terrorist organizations from using Afghanistan as a base, and b) Continuing to help build a free, democratic Afghanistan. The claim is that either or both could have been done by keeping a small number of American troops in the country. The relative calm in Afghanistan since Trump’s troop withdrawal is presented as evidence of that. What is not mentioned is that the calm occurred precisely because a withdrawal date had been set, and the Taliban could afford to bide their time until all US troops were out. Had the US rescinded the decision to withdraw, the Taliban would have renewed full-scale hostilities, requiring the US to put in more troops, and the war would just have resumed. The “stay with the small footprint” idea is just a fantasy, or a ploy by those who prefer perpetual war. And there is absolutely no public support in the US for a longer war.

Then there are those who agree with the “leave” choice but criticize Biden for how the leaving was done. There is clearly much to criticize, but some of the criticism is absurd. One is that the US should have used its troops well in advance of the departure to gather up all who would need to leave the country, process their visas, get them out, and then withdraw the troops. There is a glaring logical problem with this. Beginning a massive evacuation in May or June would be to signal that the Afghan government was not expected to survive the US departure in August. That would have caused the Afghan government to fall immediately as a self-fulfilling prophecy. The 2,500 troops that could not prevent its fall in August could not have prevented its fall in May or June either. Preventing that would again have meant surging US troops all over the country to gather up the evacuees over several weeks or months, bring them to Kabul or Bagram, and get them out. Throughout the process, these caravans of evacuees and soldiers (or helicopters full of them) would have been ripe targets for Taliban attackers and others. In effect, this recipe calls for restarting the war to end it!

Basically, Biden’s options after Trump’s troop reduction and agreement were to either reignite the war or to leave by a deadline, relying on Afghan troops to provide enough space to do the evacuation. The chaos we see now is partly the result of the Afghan forces’ inability to withstand the Taliban. But it is also the result of poor planning and political calculations by the Biden team – especially the symbolic but arbitrary decision to withdraw before September 11 and the slow-walking of the special immigrant visas for Afghans. The latter policy was apparently driven more by fear of anti-immigrant sentiment in the US than by security considerations. There should also have been better planning for the contingency of a rapid Taliban advance – though, of course, we cannot know if such plans do exist and may yet be deployed. A big question that remains unanswered on that last issue is whether US intelligence anticipated the Taliban’s lightning victory. There have been contradictory reports on that, but there was clearly a problem somewhere. Indeed, there were a lot of other problems too, as discussed in the next section. Failure to address these in time is a big reason for the images being seen around the world. Setting the strategic failure aside, the most powerful country in the world should not have to be in the tactical position it finds itself in today.

Explaining the Afghan Collapse

Two critical questions are of immediate interest at this time: 1. Why did the US and NATO fail in their mission? and 2. How could the Taliban take over the country so easily?

The first question was, in fact, being addressed long before the American failure became final, and will, no doubt, elicit many thousands of pages of expert analysis in the future. This is not the place to get into that. The second question is new, and it is interesting to dwell on it briefly, though most of what needs saying – and a lot besides – has now been said by many.

US leaders from President Biden down had assured the world that the Afghan military of 300,000 American-trained and equipped soldiers would withstand any Taliban onslaught, but when that onslaught came, the Afghan National Defense and Security Forces (ANDSF) were not up to the task, though the popular notion that there was no resistance is incorrect. For a takeover of a country by a militant group, the Taliban’s takeover has been remarkably bloodless. Why? There could be a hundred different reasons for this, but the most plausible explanation is that it was the result of collusion, calculation, and fear.

Collusion refers to the possibility that some understandings had been reached ahead of time between the Taliban and some Afghan commanders. There are tantalizing indications that, even when ANDSF soldiers resisted the Taliban, orders came from higher up the chain of command to capitulate. How deep and how far these understandings went is impossible to guess, but it was likely based on a calculation that, with the Americans gone, it was better to be the Taliban’s partner than their adversary. In the thirty years since the Taliban first entered the picture in Afghanistan, they have become a major part of the country’s political and social fabric. They also have a prior record of defeating the warlords that emerged from the anti-Soviet jihad, and the warlords of today – many of them the same ones – might well have calculated that mounting a jihad against the Taliban would be futile. And that, surely, was driven in part by fear of what the Taliban might eventually do to those who resisted too much. The Taliban seem to have used the old Mongol tactic of giving cities a choice between peaceful surrender and annihilation. That worked at least in Kabul, when the President fled citing risk of bloodshed if he stood and fought.

Other plausible explanations have been offered by analysts. One is that, while the Afghan security forces were trained extensively by the US, they were poorly led and equipped, still critically dependent on American intelligence and tactical air support. The lack of advanced equipment was probably driven by the American fear that it could fall into the hands of the Taliban – a fear that seems well-justified now. But this meant that, with the abrupt American withdrawal and the disappearance of tactical support, the ANDSF were unable to put up a fight on their own. Another factor may have been an optimistic estimate of the size of the Afghan forces. And finally, there is no doubt that general demoralization among Afghan soldiers – many of whom apparently had not been paid for months while the leaders accumulated fortunes in bribes – was a major factor in their capitulation. Abandonment by the US was the final straw in this process.

A more interesting and subtle explanation has been advanced by the Pakistani strategic analyst, Major A.H. Amin. It is based on the insightful assertion that militaries cannot be created by consultants; they must emerge organically from within a society through a martial tradition developed over generations. Based on this, he suggests that the forces comprising the ANDSF were not the traditional Afghan military with deep historical roots, but an artificial thing put together through what he terms “a shallow exercise”. The reason he cites for this is that the real Afghan army with centuries of history behind it had been the fighting force of the Soviet-client Afghan state in 1978, and was destroyed by US and Pakistan-supported Mujahedin in the anti-Soviet jihad between 1978 and 1989. The implication seems to be that the vacuum left by that destruction has been filled more by the locally-rooted Taliban than by the artificially concocted ANDSF in the service of an artificially installed puppet government. Whether this analysis is correct or not, it has the ring of plausibility – and matches well with what happened in Iraq when the US disbanded Saddam Hussein’s army.

All these explanations are plausible, but they add up to one thing: The failure of American leadership to address the underlying problems. This applies not just – or even mainly – to the Biden Administration, but to the prior administrations that had allowed these problems to build and fester for years, often lying to Congress and the public in the process. The American defeat in Afghanistan may have occurred on Biden’s watch, but its origins run deep into the last two decades. Biden’s failure is not seeing that, or, having seen it, not accommodating to it with flexibility, empathy, and better planning.

The Wider Context

In hindsight, the Taliban capture of Afghanistan is not difficult to explain. A more interesting question is how the other powers involved might see the situation, and how this might shape things to come. This will, of course, become clearer over the coming weeks and months, but here are a few facts to consider:

The Americans, in their “wisdom”, did little to resolve the traditional ethnic rivalries of Afghanistan, leaving in place local power centers throughout the country with warlords and their ilk in charge of many things. This seems to have emerged from a neo-colonialist conceptualization of Afghans at large as irredeemably backward tribal people living in “the graveyard of empires” (more on this later.) Ashraf Ghani’s government in Kabul was seen – even by many of its supporters – as a hyper-corrupt, ineffectual US puppet, with no roots in the society. As such, the only transregional, well-rooted power in Afghanistan today are the Taliban.

In recent years, China has developed a lot of important assets in the region – notably in Pakistan with the CPEC project and a host of others. Their security requires stability in the region. The fact of Afghanistan’s mineral resources has surely not escaped Beijing’s eye either. China has also had a long-running problem with separatist sentiment in the Muslim-majority Xinjiang province, which has recently come to a head with the issue of the Uighurs. Any further injection of jihadi sentiment into this area from neighboring Afghanistan would be intolerable to China.

Pakistan, in addition to being the origin of the Taliban movement, has long seen them as a way to achieve its dream of “strategic depth”, i.e., a safe western buffer behind it in case of an assault by India from the east. Unfortunately, the Taliban have not been a docile asset, and, among other things, have created extremely violent spin-offs within Pakistan.

India has cultivated relations with Afghanistan for decades as a way to pressure Pakistan from the west, thus putting it in a vise for geostrategic purposes. Virtually every present and past power center in Afghanistan has had a pro-India tilt, other than the Taliban. Thus, for all their hazards, they are the power that is strategically most acceptable to Pakistan as long as they do not export their ideology over the border.

Russia does not border Afghanistan but its sphere of influence still does. It has had a longstanding problem with jihadist elements in the Caucasus but has managed to suppress them quite well of late. It also has an increasingly adversarial relationship with the US, and is certainly interested in keeping the US off-balance. As such, Russia probably sees the Taliban as a promising strategic knob to turn in its machine of mayhem, but is also wary of any jihadi sentiment they might inspire.

The memory may have faded, but when the US first invaded Afghanistan in 2001, many speculated darkly that it had something to do with getting oil from Central Asia piped to the Arabian Sea via Afghanistan and Pakistan. The name “Unocal” was often muttered under the breath. While the US invasion was surely driven most by the 9-11 attacks, the fact of Afghanistan’s utility in bringing oil to convenient ports – and even to India – is still there, and this time the Taliban seem interested in it.

Finally, the political climate in the US has become increasingly hostile to the Afghan adventure. It is America’s longest war, and though the number of deaths has been relatively low by the standards of past wars, the human and financial cost has been catastrophic. Both Trump and Biden were, thus, understandably committed to departing Afghanistan. The only question was how to do it in a politically viable way. Trump decided to do this abruptly, and Biden concurred. The calculation may well have been that a slow exit would always get bogged down in politics at home.

Given these facts, it is quite plausible to think that the powers with interest in Afghanistan might be willing to accept a Taliban government in Afghanistan for now as the best of many terrible options – and one with intriguing payoffs if played well. The US was already negotiating with the Taliban in Doha, and the first statement from a US official after the Taliban took Kabul was Ambassador Zalmay Khalilzad telling the Taliban to be good boys if they wanted international recognition. Perhaps even more interesting was the very high-level Taliban delegation that was received in Beijing by Foreign Minister Wang Yi with smiles all around on July 28 – even before the Taliban began their blitz. And that came full circle on August 19 with a statement by the Taliban inviting China to “contribute to the rebuilding of Afghanistan”. All one can say is “No kidding!” Russia too has made friendly noises and, like China, kept its embassy in Kabul open. Clearly, neither power sees any need to fear the Taliban, which could be the beginning of a beautiful friendship.

What does all this portend for the near future? For one, it shows that the Taliban are looking to settle in and try to look like a normal government that schmoozes with foreign potentates. A lot of people – especially in the West – are hoping that this also means a less cruel government with no public beheadings and lashings, respect for women, and keeping terrorist organizations out of Afghanistan. There is also some hope that, to consolidate their legitimacy, the Taliban may form an “inclusive” government with some of their former opponents. Significantly, both former President Hamid Karzai and former Foreign Minister (and Chief Executive) Abdullah have stayed visibly in Kabul, probably expecting to be included in the new regime. At the very least, this suggests some very artful prior diplomacy by the Taliban. Another interesting development is the arrival of a non-Taliban Afghan delegation in Pakistan to meet with Prime Minister Imran Khan, Army Chief Qamar Javed Bajwa, and Foreign Minister Shah Mahmood Qureshi. By all accounts, they came to bury the hatchet, not to hone it. Positive noises were made, and it was decided that peace was to prevail. The clear signal is that everyone involved would like the American withdrawal to be followed by a stable Afghan government, and everyone is resigned to the fact that the Taliban are the only group that can lead it for now.

Will this hope bear fruit? Who can say, but my gut feeling – and the lesson of recent Afghan history – is that any fruit that appears will rot very soon – either because the Taliban will revert to their true nature, or those left out of power will start another insurgency. Also, as pointed out earlier, the Afghanistan of today is very different from that of 1996. The Taliban can expect at least initial pushback from civil society. Indeed, there have already been demonstrations that the Taliban have had to break up violently. Of course, internal and external adversaries of the government will also promote destabilizing activities. Given the ideology and culture of the Taliban, they are very likely to respond to these challenges with brutality, thus unraveling any semblance of benign governance.

Yet another factor is that the new Taliban government begins its term destitute. Almost all the funds of the old regime were in Western banks, and have already been frozen, leaving the Taliban with access to a miniscule amount of money. Some resources could probably be rustled up from the land and some found in the next poppy crop, but not the kind of money that can run a state and pay salaries. Iraq has already demonstrated what happens to governments that cannot pay their soldiers and bureaucrats. Unless they can submit to a sponsor like China, Russia, India, or Pakistan, the Taliban may find themselves in the same crunch, and lash out as they are wont to do.

Implications for the United States

For the US as a global power, this defeat in Afghanistan means that its rivals and opponents will take it even less seriously than they have after the debacles in Iraq and Syria, and the presidency of Donald Trump. It was assumed that the former Chair of the US Senate Foreign Relations Committee and former Vice-President would turn out to be a formidable player on the world chessboard. Justifiably or not, that fiction is gone. America today may be more rational and normal than that of Donald Trump, but does not seem any smarter. Brash incompetence appears to have been replaced by fecklessness. Strongmen from Beijing to Brasilia have surely taken note. So too militant groups all over the world. The Soviet Union actually disintegrated after its defeat in Afghanistan. The United States is infinitely stronger and more stable, but its enemies will doubtless be emboldened and its partisans deflated. Analyses will be written comparing the US to Rome in decline – a power on its last legs. Pro-American world leaders – a jittery group in the best of times – will become even less confident in its leadership, perhaps even tempting Boris Johnson to attempt a tinpot coup for world leadership. But America will recover in time – if necessary, by firing off a couple of hundred cruise missiles at some shacks in a desert somewhere. It remains the indispensable power against an ascendant China, and everyone knows it. But this American defeat is a big strategic win for Beijing, and everyone knows that too.

Or almost everyone. There is, curiously, an alternative idea afoot in regions closer to Afghanistan – that the US departure is some sort of brilliant strategy to plant a ticking time-bomb for regional powers and retire to safety behind two oceans. A recent cartoon in a Middle Eastern newspaper captures the idea perfectly: It shows a huge grenade on the ground and the American eagle, Uncle Sam’s hat on its head, flying away with the grenade’s pulled pin. While this prediction may turn out to be correct, ascribing it to the Machiavellian strategic genius of the Americans is far-fetched. This is the country that elected Donald Trump, and almost re-elected him.

Implications for Biden

For Joe Biden, the withdrawal is not a failure of analysis – where he was correct – but a failure of leadership and, more importantly, a failure of temperament. His rigidity and overconfidence in making the decision as well as his initial dismissive defensiveness in justifying it afterwards are alarming. He was elected on competence and empathy, but both seem to be lacking in this instance. This may be unfair (it is), he may have had no better choices (he didn’t), but words, images and the style matter in leadership, and on that he has failed.

However, things may be quite different with respect to Biden’s political fortunes. Right now, he is under withering assault in the press, but, as Trump’s presidency showed, that can be an asset as much as a liability. For better or worse, the vast majority of American voters do not care about Afghans or Afghanistan, and just want the war to be over. Joe Biden has given them just what they wanted. If a few thousand Afghans out there die at the hands of the Taliban, why then, as Joe Biden himself said once to Richard Holbrooke, “Fuck that, we don’t have to worry about that. We did it in Vietnam, Nixon and Kissinger got away with it.” Of course, “we” also did it in Iraq and Syria and Yemen and Libya and in various other countries that no patriotic American should be able to find on a map. This simplistic view of the world is especially prevalent in some demographics such as the Obama-Trump voters who populate critical swing states and are so attractive for NPR reporters haunting diners in “the Heartland” to solve the mystery of Trumpism. Trump was their man, but in many ways, so is Joe Biden. Some of them even abandoned Trump to vote for “Joey from Scranton” in 2020. Not for them – and not for Joe Biden – the snooty cosmopolitan internationalism of the Harvard-Princeton-Georgetown crowd, of which Richard Holbrooke was a quintessential example. These people work hard, love their families, go to church and ballgames, and don’t think much about distant regions of the world. People “over there”, they believe, should take care of their own shit. Biden’s decision to withdraw from Afghanistan was perfectly rational, but the way it was made came from within this mindset – what Yascha Mounk has perceptively called “foreign policy for the middle class”. And if all Americans can be extracted safely from Afghanistan – a big if – Biden may actually gain more political support among these voters than he loses among those in thrall to Wolf Blitzer and Tom Friedman. But if things go badly – for example, if there is an attack on American soldiers at the airport – that will be the end of Biden’s political career. Republicans are already beginning to talk about impeachment if they win the House next year. But Joe Biden is confident that, in the end, his decision will be vindicated. The next few weeks will show whether he is a savvy politician or whistling past the graveyard – speaking of which…..

The Graveyard of Empires – Not!

Now a pet peeve. Throughout the war in Afghanistan, we have heard incessantly that the country is a rude land populated by brutal tribes who have turned it into “the graveyard of empires” and never allowed outside powers to conquer it. Nothing could be further from the Truth. For one, the country called “Afghanistan” is a recent thing – going back to the unification of the area by Ahmad Shah Durrani (nee Abdali) in the mid-eighteenth century. Before that, most of Afghanistan was part of Khorasan – without doubt one of the most historically important regions in the world. Far from being a barbaric backwater, this was a jewel of human civilization for fifteen centuries. Two of its cities – Balkh and Merv – have been called mother cities of civilization. Zoroaster lived and died in Khorasan, as did Omar Khayyam and Ferdowsi. Rumi was actually born within the boundaries of modern Afghanistan. A great Buddhist civilization flourished here for centuries. And far from being the graveyard of empires, it is more like their emporium, having been ruled – wholly or partially – through most of history by outsiders: the Achaemenids, the Greeks, the Mauryans, the Parthians, the Hephthalites (White Huns), the Kushans, the Sassanians, the Umayyads, the Abbasids, the Tahirids (who were Iranians), the Saffarids (who were also Iranians), the Samanids (also Iranian), the Ghaznavids (who were Turks), the Seljuqs (who were Turks as well), the Mongols, Timur (also a Turk), the Mughals (who were Turco-Mongols), the Safavids (Turco-Persian), and the Afshars (Turks). It was conquered by Cyrus and Alexander. Darius, Asoka, Akbar, and Nader Shah ruled here. Babur is buried here. Indeed, few significant regions of the world have been ruled more consistently by outsiders than today’s Afghanistan. Before the Durranis, arguably the only indigenous dynasty to emerge from Afghanistan were the Ghurids, though modern scholarship suggests that even they were of Iranian origin and, of course, the empire they established – the Sultanate of Delhi – was ruled mostly by Turks. In addition to the Sultanate, this region also exported at least three other great empires – the Abbasids (whose revolution was based in Khorasan), the Ghaznavids, and the Mughals – though none was led by what we today would call an Afghan.

The only invading powers that have failed in Afghanistan are three Western ones: The British; the Russians; and the Americans. Indeed, even the British did not really fail. After the Second Anglo-Afghan War, they successfully installed a friendly ruler of their choice (Amir Abdur Rahman Khan) and controlled the state with minimal effort for decades.

Final Thoughts

This article has focused mainly on description and analysis, but I will conclude with a few personal thoughts on the whole episode.

First, it seems unlikely to me that the hope of a stable, relatively competent, Taliban-led government in Afghanistan will be realized. There are several reasons for it, foremost among them the nature of the Taliban as an organization. They are fundamentally an insurgent guerilla force, not an organization capable of governing a country with vast problems and limited resources. While they had an adversary to fight, they remained relatively cohesive, and their decision-making processes were sufficient for the goal of creating mayhem for the occupiers. True, they are a savvier group than in 1996, but governance requires skills that they are unlikely to possess. To this inherent limitation, one can add the possibility of internal armed opposition and the certainty of international pressure. And both of these are likely to build as the Taliban infuse more of their extremist ideology into their governance.

There are other geopolitical factors that may also come into play. What sort of relationship – if any – develops between the new Afghan government and China remains to be seen. Can the Taliban have the self-discipline needed to maintain such a relationship? Another interesting question is the role that Pakistan and India might play in Afghanistan. In the worst-case, it could turn into the locus of a proxy cold war between the two rivals, though this is unlikely. Pakistan will certainly try to exert strong influence, and this may well elicit pushback not only in Afghanistan but also from the Taliban offshoots in Pakistan who are already making threatening noises. The US too will put pressure on Pakistan if the Taliban become a problem, and some of this will be deflected onto the Taliban regime. Back in the 19th century, Afghanistan was at the center of the so-called geopolitical Great Game between Britain and Russia. A new, more complex Great Game has been underway in Afghanistan for fifty years now, and it is likely to heat up again now that the field is clear of American presence.

Much will likely be written on why the US failed in Afghanistan. Some excellent analysis is already underway. But few will ask whether there is some fundamental reason why the United States has failed so often in its neo-colonial enterprises. That is an analysis beyond the scope of this piece and beyond the ability of this author, but it might be instructive to look at history to understand the problem. Empire-building and maintenance is a very onerous and expensive exercise, requiring a great deal of human suffering on all sides. The suffering of the oppressed is obvious, but the oppressor also bears great financial, human, and psychological costs. Every empire in history has dehumanized those it occupies but all too often has also turned its own functionaries – soldiers and administrators – into monsters. Even more, all previous empires have been willing to push immense numbers of its own rank-and-file soldiers into the maw of death to maintain power. It’s worth noting that none of the significant empires in history was a democracy where the rulers needed public consent for their policies. Britain and France might seem to be exceptions, but both were practically oligarchies rather than liberal democracies until very late in their imperial periods, and both lost their empires rapidly as they became more democratic. The US is the first imperial great power in history that: a) Seeks to dominate the world; b) Wants to be loved for it; and c) Is run by leaders on 2, 4 and 6-year election cycles. Perhaps a power that has this configuration just cannot muster the support for the challenging task of controlling dangerous regions of the world for long periods. Yes, it can oppress others, but it cannot long tolerate the costs this imposes on itself. Vietnam established that, and the risk-averse way the US has fought its recent wars is a direct result of that. Tens of thousands of American deaths year after year are no longer acceptable to the public, and that should be seen as a good thing on balance. The democratically-induced friction that prevents a country from making these “hard” choices is exactly what also precludes catastrophically bad choices that have sunk autocratic empires in the past. Of course, one never knows when the American experiment with democracy might be subverted by authoritarian forces, as they have been trying to do of late.

No one can predict what the long-term effects of America’s longest war will be – though that won’t stop anyone from trying. But one can look at where things stood on the eve of the war and compare them with today. Afghanistan in 2001 was a vast ruin smoldering from two decades of civil war and governed by the worst possible group of ruffians. Today the country is back in the hands of the same group, but at least some of the country and society have been rebuilt. More women have had an education. More people have tasted a degree of freedom in their personal lives. The arts have made a comeback of sorts. Considerable infrastructure has been built. Some room for modernity has been reclaimed, though still not even to the degree that Afghanistan enjoyed back in the 1960s and 70s. And, one hopes, the Taliban are a bit less extreme. So, without justifying the toll exacted by the terrible war, one can say that things are not back where they started in 2001. At the cost of tens of thousands of lives and trillions of dollars, they are slightly better – for now.

 

Wednesday, August 18, 2021

The Man Behind the Myth: Should We Question the Hero’s Journey?

 

The Man Behind the Myth: Should We Question the Hero’s Journey?

  By Sarah E. Bond, Joel Christensen 

In an interview with The New Yorker in 1965, Stanley Kubrick and Arthur C. Clarke discussed a working title for a screenplay that would eventually become 2001: A Space Odyssey. Called “Journey Beyond the Stars,” this screenplay about the future had deep roots in mythologies of the past. Kubrick had given Clarke a copy of Joseph Campbell’s 1949 analysis of mythology, The Hero with a Thousand Faces. The “journey” in their working title was a reference to Campbell’s book, one which proposed the existence of a singular “hero’s journey” (also known as the Monomyth), as experienced by ancient heroes such as Odysseus in Homer’s Odyssey. 

Campbell’s synthetic, undeniably alluring model presented a hero who reluctantly accepts the call to adventure, using the tribulations of his odyssey to reshape himself into the savior humanity needs before returning home. Campbell claimed his theory, which has gone on to influence everything from Star Wars to Disney’s Aladdin, arose from a universal structure inherent in the global myths of antiquity. The problem is, that’s a lie. Campbell’s theory is as mythological as the stories from which it borrows. 

Let’s go back to 1949 to trace Campbell’s own origin story. 

In the wake of World War II, Campbell’s Monomyth, a theory about myth and folktales, presented an attractive, simplified narrative pattern as a prescriptive tool to the public — with a global spin born in part from Campbell’s early interest in Native American mythology. Unlike many of his predecessors, he engaged with numerous non-Western sources, shifting some focus from Greece and Rome. Patrice Rankine, a Classicist at the University of Chicago, tells us that Campbell’s book emerged “in the context of the American and British Great Books movement. So, it’s right in the sweet spot of a ‘Western canon.’ In this context I actually like Campbell because he elevated non-Western myth. Ralph Ellison, Toni Morrison, and others gained an entry point or foothold through such flattening.” 

Rankine recognizes that the Monomyth created a more inclusive model, but one which came at the cost of complexity. Most myths with monomythic patterns can be analyzed in different ways for many different functions. To create his hero, Campbell had to depend upon the fallacy of incomplete evidence — otherwise known as cherry-picking. 

These sins of contextual omission allowed Campbell to weave an attractive narrative that found particular favor with his white midcentury audience. Echoing the “ethical egoism” of Ayn Rand’s The Fountainhead, published only a few years earlier, Campbell sold the public on a vision of the individual hero, unfettered from community or history. He gave a postwar readership a seemingly timeless archetype for America’s unique brand of “rugged individualism.” He also helped to create a niche for the intersection of pop culture and pop psychology, paving the way for less savory exploitations of narrative by people like Jordan Peterson. Peterson has latched onto Campbell’s use of archetypes and gender roles and interprets them as the means for saving humanity from political polarization. 

To demonstrate the ubiquity of the hero’s journey, Campbell plucked what was useful — be it from the myths of the East African Chagga or the tales of the ancient Near East — then fit the elements into a prefabricated frame, often, as Kent Huffman notes, without giving the elements proper consideration: 

Campbell passingly cites the stories of Buddhism, Aztec myth, and Ovid's Metamorphoses as examples of virgin birth, then goes on to recount in detail a Tongan folk tale he calls “queer” about a mother giving birth to a clam, which in tum becomes pregnant from eating a coconut husk and gives birth to a human boy. Campbell never specifically explains exactly how the image of virgin birth fits into the heroic cycle as he sets it up. 

East Asian, South Asian, African, and Native American myths were often reduced to archetypes or misunderstood in service of Campbell’s thesis. Even his embrace of the Sanskrit word ?nanda as an inspiration for his famed “follow your bliss” message was based on a fundamental misunderstanding of its meaning in Hindu philosophy. 

The Hero with a Thousand Faces was light on bibliography. But Campbell wasn’t actually telling a new story. Less than a century before his book, writers and scholars like Lord Raglan and Otto Rank published observations on the core details common to heroic myths. Indeed, the beginning of the 20th century was a time for typologies of storytelling: Vladimir Propp followed the work of Raglan and Rank with his morphologies of the folktale, ranging wider and farther than his predecessors. Campbell also integrated Sigmund Freud’s “family drama” and Carl Jung’s “archetypes” to wed folktales with psychology. Like a midcentury Malcolm Gladwell, Campbell aggregated these theories and presented a compelling story to new audiences. 

Monomythic elements do appear ancient and widespread. We find them in several overlapping cultural narratives, from Gilgamesh in ancient Babylon through Moses, Jesus, and the Homeric Achilles. The fatal flaw in Campbell’s blueprint is his failure to recognize that the hero’s journey does not exist in a vacuum. Campbell took little interest in theory or context and was particularly averse to growing fields like sociology or anthropology, and certainly to doing fieldwork. The Hero with a Thousand Faces may have not been wholly Eurocentric, but it plucked at will from global traditions and was definitely crafted for Western consumption. 

Campbell’s theory made the leap from influential thought to universally accepted fact in part thanks to the wild success of George Lucas’s Star Wars franchise and, later, the PBS series The Power of Myth (1988), filmed in part at Lucas’s Skywalker Ranch. As Classicist Brett M. Rogers has observed, such cultural validation has inclined storytellers and audiences alike to see this pattern everywhere. 

Like many tales of compulsion, Campbell’s Hero brings dangers to those who put their faith in it. The first is a serious misunderstanding of how myth works. Myths and traditional stories function in specific environments for reasons bounded by time and place. Common traits are interesting, but the differences — what we might call variations or multiforms — cannot be ignored. 

The second is the existence of an ideal form in myth. How we talk about and choose to accept differences is important. Calling one version of a story a “variant” implies, wrongly, that there is an authoritative and original form. This is a top-down version of storytelling that often misses the significance of the differences themselves. Famous things we think we know about ancient myths are mere possibilities contingent on their time and place. In many stories, Medea did not kill her children. In a majority of tales, Oedipus had children with someone other than his mother. 

The Monomyth is the ultimate example of this simplifying of narrative patterns. It reminds us in a way of the Greek myth of Procrustes, the criminal hotelier who cut guests up or stretched them out to fit the bed of his choosing. Campbell started with a thesis and a fictive metric and then cut global myths to fit his Odyssean bed. 

Another challenge comes from what audiences know and expect. As defenders of Campbell will argue, much of what he suggests is meant to be allegorical. The hero’s journey is not supposed to be a simple narrative pattern; it is instead a psychological, even mystical, exploration of the self. But his language, which is derived from myth, is slippery — and due to its outsize influence it affects how people understand ancient traditions. Modern notions of the word “hero,” for example, assume essential goodness or imply selfless deeds on behalf of others. Ancient heroes and figures from myth are anything but essentially good. Within ancient myths, heroes are young people in their full strength; they are part of a generation before the “iron” age of modern humans, marking the transition from a time when gods and people shared the earth. They can also be exceptional figures who follow a pattern of withdrawal and return to their communities, suffering pain and inflicting suffering in turn. 

One of the most troubling things about Campbell’s Monomyth is its omission of the truth of Greek heroic myth: heroes hurt people. They threaten families and cities. Herakles goes mad and kills his wife and children (even if Disney’s version of Hercules lived happily ever after with Megara), triggering his famous labors as punishment. Achilles prays for his own people to die to pay for a slight to his honor, and his beloved Patroclus gets caught up in this. Odysseus returns home after losing his entire army only to kill 108 of his people and hang the enslaved women of his household. 

The Monomyth encourages audiences to see themselves as protagonists in a great struggle and all others as either helping or hindering their journey. The use of the Monomyth is in a way nearly perfectly narcissistic. It invites audiences to focus on just one character, to see the world as serving the interests of one singular point of view. In the stories themselves, all other characters are helpers, objects, or obstacles in a hero’s tale. 

The hero with a thousand faces turns out to have a depressingly constant appearance. He projects a toxically masculine, heteronormative point of view that often marginalizes other voices and bodies. Despite some heroes of color in recent years, Campbell’s narrative offspring have generally been white and male. When we make heroes of women, we often sidestep or mute their sexuality and capacity to give birth (as in the case of Buffy the Vampire Slayer) and render them essentially masculine. When we cast Black stars as classic or new heroes, audience rage and rejection show that racism is a feature and not a bug of the heroic game. 

It is not enough to put the heroic narrative through a diversity, equity, and inclusion workshop. Its structure itself assumes a particular worldview as dominant and casts socially derived personalities as “natural.” Campbell’s hero is ruggedly individual; it uses weaker people as instruments; and it has no room for collective action, for families, or for bodies that fail to conform: the aged, the disabled, the sick. 

This is not to say there haven’t been challenges to Campbell’s universalism. There are plenty of examples of heroic narratives that run counter to the Monomyth: Frank Herbert’s Dune, for example, presents Paul Atreides struggling against the force of fate and propaganda; Robert Jordan’s Rand al’Thor spends 14 books exploring the madness of being a hero; Philip Pullman’s Lyra in His Dark Materials tries to undermine gender roles and the marginalization of sexuality. 

In recent years, entries in the Marvel Cinematic Universe (MCU) have also looked hard at heroic personalities, just as the danger of heroes has been explored on shows like The Umbrella Academy, Amazon’s The Boys, and Netflix’s recent Jupiter’s Legacy, which dramatizes the psychological and parental trauma of being the child of a superhero. But we are only at the beginning of the reflective turn. The Randian and Campbellian model still holds sway, both in art and in life. Perhaps the most disturbing recent example of the latter is the way critics went after gymnast Simone Biles for thinking about her health rather than following the dangerous template of the hero they wanted her to be. 

Myth does indeed provide a framework for thinking about life, for engaging with it and learning how to live. Heroic myth actually functions to highlight the dangers of violence and war; to outline the importance of families and cities; and to help us think about that most ineffable of mysteries, death. The Monomyth leaves little room for growing old, for having families, for learning to live once the fight is over. 

We won’t side with Plato and ban stories we think are dangerous to the republic, but we need to acknowledge that stories can do damage. The Monomyth sets up unrealistic expectations. It harms people who don’t see themselves represented and it traps people in roles based on the bodies they inhabit, on skin color, race, sex, gender, and ability. 

The virus central to the Monomyth is who and what it centers. It is predicated on a view of life that validates using and profiting from other people. Campbellian simplification is a natural complement to American capitalism and the pursuit of individual bliss: it emphasizes the individual and personal over community. The Monomyth is about privileging one kind of story and profiting from it. 

In the newly unveiled MCU offshoot Loki, the plot centers on an institution called the Time Variance Authority (TVA). The TVA is tasked with protecting peace within the multiverse by hunting down renegade time variants that may cause chaos and disrupt the Sacred Timeline — the primary timeline of the past, present, and future dictated by the mysterious triumvirate known as the Time Keepers. TVA agents think they are helping humanity by preserving, pruning, and policing the singular Sacred Timeline, but the peace offered by maintaining it comes at the cost of the true unifying feature of humanity: the freedom of choice. 

Moving out of the MCU and back into reality, there are gains to be made from deconstructing the Monomyth. The idea of an individual but universal path that can lead to redemption, unity, and heroization is undeniably magnetic, but even in Campbell’s cosmos, it is not available to all. Critiques of the hero’s journey can show us how to embrace the messiness of myth and accept the inevitable variances in our personal and collective journeys. 

 

Saturday, August 14, 2021

The Thing About Homophobia

 The Thing About Homophobia

We’re baffled by the ghoulishness of it, and by its startling predictability. We also have to live with its consequences.

By Bryan Washington The New Yorker

Representation is essential, but it alone is not transformative, because it doesn’t amount to protective legislation, equitable compensation, or access to medical care.

When I was younger, the homophobia I experienced was indistinguishable from daily life—but in Texas, in the nineties, that was hardly a notable thing. One time in fifth grade, standing before a crowd of smiling parents, a sports coach calmly informed us that we’d played our opening football match like a bunch of faggots. Another time, in junior high, I was sitting in the cafeteria eating lunch with another kid deemed sufficiently faggy when our meal was interrupted by an open water bottle of piss that someone had lobbed at our table. In high school, by which time the subject of my queerness was somewhat common gossip, I received a week of e-mails a little too well written for a kid regarding my inevitable descent to Hell. Most days, the stigma surrounding being queer felt nothing short of claustrophobic. Until I reached university—where I finally found community—the anxiety underlying my queerness, in virtually every conceivable situation, was unsettling and annoying. But, as with any other grievance that overstays its welcome, life went on around it. I still had crushes. I still, luckily, had friends. I had a job, stressed over grades, and rode my bike to the store to buy cat food.

Whenever I’m cornered into telling straight friends these stories, they respond with a look of shock, coupled with an apology or a window of silence lasting however long they deem appropriate. When the subject comes up among queer white friends, they offer a nod of acknowledgment, and recognition, before we move on. But when I tell queer friends of color, and Black queer friends specifically, they just snort lightly, or shrug, or give a flick of the wrist, before recounting a similar experience that they themselves endured. Then, always, we’ll laugh at the ghoulishness of it, and also at its startling predictability. Because few things are more boring than homophobia. In its destructiveness, its fearful maliciousness, its nascent violence, it mirrors other stigmas in its profound lack of imagination.

Acouple of weeks back, the rapper Jonathan Kirk, a.k.a. DaBaby, spoke onstage to a crowd at Miami’s Rolling Loud festival. Between statements full of misogyny and misogynoir, he beckoned his fans to raise their lighters if they “didn’t show up today with H.I.V., aids, any of them deadly sexually transmitted diseases that’ll make you die in two, three weeks,” and for “not sucking dick in the parking lot.” A comrade onstage backed him up with the observation that a lot of audience members were “suspect as a motherfucker.” The rapper T.I. later defended the rhetoric by saying, bafflingly, that if the queer rapper Lil Nas X “can kick his shit in peace . . . so should DaBaby.” The following week, the actor Matt Damon applauded himself, after half a century of life on earth, for removing “faggot” from his lexicon on the advice of his daughter. When these comments were called out for their ignorance and irresponsibility, the speakers either doubled down, immediately recanted, or, in DaBaby’s case, asked for education in lieu of “harassment” and then recanted his recanting.

None of it felt particularly surprising. The words were gross. Dumb. Dangerous. They were also boring and predictable.

Today, there are more than 1.2 million people living with H.I.V. in the United States. In 2018, M.S.M. (men who have sex with men) made up sixty-nine per cent of the 37,968 recorded cases of H.I.V. diagnoses in the United States. Half of the nation’s recorded H.I.V. diagnoses were from Southern states, which had more infections than any other region. White M.S.M. accounted for twenty-three per cent of these diagnoses, Latinx M.S.M. accounted for twenty-six per cent, and Black M.S.M. accounted for a staggering forty-eight per cent. Black folks in the U.S. have been disproportionately affected by H.I.V./aids since the epidemic’s Stateside outset, but, in the South, Black M.S.M. are still very much in the midst of an epidemic. If the current rates persist, then half of all Black M.S.M. in the U.S. will be diagnosed with H.I.V. in their lifetime.

Last month, the federal government mandated that PrEP (pre-exposure prophylaxis), a drug for H.I.V. prevention approved by the FDA in 2012, be made available for free under most insurance plans in the U.S. Prior to this legislation—and without support from programs like the Patience Advocacy Foundation or Gilead Co-pay—the cost of PreP could run as high as twelve hundred dollars a month. For H.I.V.-positive folks, antiretroviral medication can reduce a user’s viral load (the amount of H.I.V. virus in their blood) until it’s undetectable, making their viral load untransmittable (U=U). Whether you’re H.I.V.-negative or poz, the presence of such a medication is life-changing, and the benefits of access to it are frankly incalculable.

It’s worth noting that the statistics above only account for the diagnoses recorded: many M.S.M. are entirely unaware of their H.I.V. status. This could be due to the lack of testing or resource centers in many communities. It could be due to a deep underestimation of what, exactly, the risks of the disease are. It could be due to recent infection, the costliness of taking time off from work to get tested, the cost of medication for those who are not currently insured, or any number of difficulties that the marginalized face in a country whose medical system actively and systematically hangs them out to dry. But in a country where, in 2020, at least forty-four trans or gender-nonconforming people were violently killed, and where legislation across the nation continually shuts down abortion clinics performing preventative care and S.T.I./S.T.D. outreach—and where, in 2021 alone, thirty-three states have introduced upward of a hundred bills to curb the rights of trans people, including children—the blinding, boring, deadly stigma surrounding queer folks has a role to play, too.

Around the time I turned twenty, a friend asked me if I’d ever taken the time to get tested for H.I.V. I hadn’t. It simply hadn’t occurred to me that this was something I should do. Around the same time, I’d made myself a regular on Houston’s queer circuit, and my friend told me that this was fine, but that without regular testing I’d be putting myself in danger. This friend told me, gently, that they’d even take me to a testing site, which I politely declined. Other friends continued to ask me, gently, whether I’d been tested yet, until about a month later, after further risks and recklessness, and yet another slipup, when I took them up on their offer. We went to a testing site the very next day.

 

That afternoon, at Houston’s Legacy Community Health clinic in Montrose, I sat down with a Black H.I.V. coördinator who couldn’t have been much older than me. He was patient with my excuses. I got my first rapid test, which was negative. He told me that I had to take care of myself. He was one person who would be checking on me, he said, and I had to do it for the both of us. He gave me a prescription for Truvada. He asked if I’d be picking the meds up at the building’s pharmacy, and I asked him to send it to my local one instead—the clinic was situated outside of my daily revolutions, and I was terrified that I would simply put off going there.

This turned out to be a mistake. At my local drug store, a pharmacist told me—incorrectly—that I didn’t need the medication if I wasn’t H.I.V.-positive. At another pharmacy, I was told that the prescription was likely given to me by “mistake.” Eventually, I returned to Legacy, where a woman promptly filled my prescription. When I told her what had happened, she shook her head. She told me to just keep coming back here, and there wouldn’t be any more issues. And then she smiled.

Lately, a good chunk of my time is centered on telling queer love stories. It’s a pretty cush privilege, and one that’s only possible because of those who wrote their own stories before me. Narratives of queerness, in which queerness is treated with care and attention and mundanity, without needing to be a mountain of struggle or something to be overcome or a pool of trauma to be waded in ad infinitum, are the exact sort of thing that I had very little of growing up. The stories I write aren’t ones in which the randomness of violence or misinformation or stigma don’t exist, because that couldn’t be further from the truth. They just aren’t the primary focus.

Representation is certainly one way of combatting stigma—an essential one, even—but it alone is not transformative, because it doesn’t amount to protective legislation or equitable compensation or access to medical care. It does not amount to the rule of law unfucking itself to provide access to life-saving services for marginalized populations. And it does not amount to undoing the sort of blatant homophobia that DaBaby and Damon recently put on display. But it’s possible to fight for all of these things at once, because it has to be.

A story is one thing, and life as it’s lived can be another. It’s rare that more than a few days go by without a friend of mine being accosted or called a slur. One week, several buddies on Instagram, in different parts of the globe, posted about being harassed on the street on the same day. Another week, when my boyfriend and I were picking up barbecue outside of Houston, a man saw the two of us and our running shorts and he spit. Another week, a Lyft driver, apropos of nothing, said wasn’t it a shame that so many “fag flags” were popping up around the neighborhood. I told him that I was responsible for at least one of those flags (after checking to make sure that the route we were taking matched where I’d intended to go), and he fell silent, until we arrived at my destination, when he told me to take care and not catch aids.

The other weekend, some queer friends and I caught a drink at a bar. We’d all been vaccinated for months, and, although the risk of the Delta variant loomed large, we figured we’d try and make the most of an outdoor beer while we could. The patio was crowded, but parties kept to themselves, and while the body language of queer spaces—hands on shoulders, fingers on waists, lips on ears—was largely absent, the laughter wasn’t, and each table existed in its own little universe, connected to the larger orbit. Chatter bounced from table to table, because how could it not in a country that actively tries to kill its most marginalized, and comes just too close every time. That was enough to catch a buzz for. So we cheered, and we laughed, because those things feel, at any given point in time, like they couldn’t be further from predictable.

 

 

Wednesday, August 11, 2021

Selection Week

 Selection Week

A Short Story

By hurmat kazmi The New Yorker

In the beginning, it was him and the gecko.

I was probably the only one in the room who saw it, my eyes secretly, partially, open. The fourteen other boys in the room stood obediently, bent over—their underpants at their ankles, bottoms hoisted in the air, like mine. Eyes shut. That was the only difference between me and them. Them and me.

The gecko was directly above him, dull and textured like a pebble. It hung upside down in the crack between the two walls, and I thought it might fall, at any moment, into the crack of his raised ass. Out of one crack, into another. I continued to stare at his body despite the looming reptilian danger, but I was scared that if I stared too long my dick might become hard, so I closed my eyes.

The silence in the room was interrupted by the drone of the doctor’s voice: “All right now, eyes firmly shut, no looking here and there. I want you all to grab your buttocks with your hands and stretch them as far apart as possible, and when I tap your shoulders one by one I want you to cough three times, loudly. Understood?” Silence. Which meant, yes, we understood.

The doctor was tall and sturdy, all muscles and rounded shoulders. His uniform starched and crisp, three golden stars glistening on the shoulder flaps. With a flashlight in one hand and a latex glove on the other, he began his survey, tapping shoulders, observing our assholes, those beautiful flowers that were now in full bloom.

After the medical screening, we waited in a large sitting area. Meanwhile, the next group of fifteen boys was sent into the doctor’s room. We were going to get our forms back shortly with either fit or tuf (Temporarily Unfit) stamped on them. The unfit would be let go.

In the sitting area, speculations were rife:

“Dude, what the fuck was that? Why do they check our assholes?”

“They think we’re hiding national-security secrets there.”

“No, yaar! They just want to make sure no one ever went to town on our bottoms. No place in the Pakistan Air Force for gandoos.”

An hour later, the medical assistant appeared. At that moment I really wished that someone had dipped his dick in my ass so I would be rejected then and there, but, despite the varicose veins in my scrotum, which the doctor had fondled with stiff formality and suspicion, I was declared fit. The three boys with tuf stamped on their forms were asked to leave. The fit boys hugged and congratulated one another for having made it through the first round. A wave of excitement swept the room, saved as everyone was from the embarrassment of being sent back home on the first day. He was in a corner, hugging two boys at the same time, a tangle of limbs.

A group of boys came out of the doctor’s room, another went in, and many more were waiting their turn. I wasn’t surprised at the number of people who were applying to the Air Force. Growing up, I’d always known someone who was trying to join the armed forces: the tailor’s son, the laundryman’s nephew, a classmate’s neighbor. Once, on the way back from school, I chatted with a rickshaw wallah and learned that before channeling his energies into his three-wheeled vehicle he had applied to the military and been rejected. That’s the way it was, it seemed. Before people did anything with their life, they applied to the armed forces—and only after they had been rejected three consecutive times, and hence rendered ineligible forever, did they think of doing something else.

I applied, too. Not because I wanted to but because my father had when he was my age, and he hadn’t made it. Didn’t matter that I didn’t want to. I was already on a gap year after high school, having been rejected from every single medical school that I’d tried for: Dow, Agha Khan, Ziauddin, even Baqai. It was my year of shame and humiliation. I applied because I preferred to spend a week away from home, away from my mother’s taunts and insults, her constant comparisons with this or that friend of mine who had got into a med school or an engineering program, was well on his way to starting life. I applied to the Air Force to fulfill my middle-class parents’ middle-class dreams—dreams that my upper-class high-school friends would respond to with arrogant smiles and eye rolls. I didn’t tell anyone I was applying.

In the evening all of us—the sixty boys who had survived the first day and been declared fit—were asked to gather in the academic block. That was when I saw him again. Sitting on a chair two rows away from mine, he looked in my direction and held my gaze for a little longer than was necessary. His eyes were like the sun setting—you could really look into them without feeling the sharp hurt of staring at something forbidden. He waved his stack of light-pink papers in my direction and smiled as if he had just won an award. For a while I indulged his gaze simply because he was attractive, like so many of the boys in my school whom I would stare at from a distance and never approach, boys whose pictures I would talk to on my phone at night or fantasize about before sleeping. Then, realizing that someone somewhere in the room must be looking at us looking at each other, I rolled my eyes from him to the window. Outside, the trees stood still.

The heat of the bodies in the room was stifling. As I waited for the registration process to begin, I rehearsed monologues that, on my return home, I would deliver with great enthusiasm and mock disappointment about the unpunctuality of the I.S.S.B. staff—monologues that would ultimately exasperate my father, whose singsong praises of the Army’s and the Air Force’s infatuation with time management was all I had heard in the days preceding my arrival here. I would also complain about the sticky dust, the broken chairs, the defunct fans, the geckos on the walls, the clusters of mosquitoes, the ripe, festering smell of sweat, the lack of boys from Karachi, the abundance of boys from Rawalpindi, Gujranwala, Mianwali, Tando Adam, Mirpur Khas, Multan, Dera Ghazi Khan, Sukkur, Larkana, Mithi—boys with whom I had nothing in common except sex and age.

When the I.S.S.B. staff arrived, our baggage was searched, our documents were verified, and our phones were confiscated. Later in the evening we were served tea and then a dinner of aloo gosht and roti. At eight sharp we were asked to return to our rooms, which would then be locked from the outside.

The rooms looked more like hospital wards, oblong, white paint peeling off in large flakes. There were twelve beds, six on each side, rusty wrought-iron affairs. I could not sleep. The wind in the trees outside was more pronounced now, the song it sang. A subdued, powdery gray cut through the darkness of the room.

It was the twentieth of Muharram, the day of the annual ladies’ majlis at our house. It was the first time in my life that I had missed it. What was I doing in this strange, threatening place? Threatening like a bed of nails, a land full of mines. All day the masculinity of the boys around me had made me aware of my own femininity. At school I had found solace in female friendship, at home in the company of my sisters. How had I got so far in the process? Could I make it to the end? Be rewarded with a uniform, blue like a rare bird? No, it did not matter, I told myself. In four days, at most, I would be out of this place, would never see any of these boys again in my life. I could fake it for this short while.

In the morning, he asked me if I recognized him. This was a little after four o’clock, after a fervent banging on our doors had jolted us from sleep, after we had rushed to the bathrooms—towels, toothbrushes, toothpastes, trimmers in hand—after, turn by turn, each of us relieved ourselves in stalls where the smell of shit was so strong that we had to cover our noses with our shirts, after we had washed up, shaved, combed, dressed, become ready for the day, tip-top, fauji style.

He approached me as I stood outside the dining hall. I was staring absent-mindedly at the itinerary on the notice board, squinting, feigning interest.

“Hey, remember me?” he said, tapping my shoulder. 

“Hey, I am sorry. I don’t.”

“We were together during the initial medical test, and I think I also saw you in the registration room yesterday.”

“Did you? I don’t think I saw you.”

“Oh.” He shoved his hands into the pockets of his jeans.

And then, “What city are you from?”

“Karachi,” I said.

“From around here only—nice, yaar. I am from Lahore.”

“Cool.”

He volunteered his name and presented his hand and I offered mine—his grip firm, providing both a mild pain and a warm comfort.

The knob jangled and the door to the dining hall yawned open. We walked in together and, despite the commotion of famished boys that almost separated us, we ended up sitting next to each other. This made me utterly self-conscious. I was suddenly all too aware of the hairiness of my arms, of my elbows a shade darker and drier than the rest of my skin, of the way my tight shirt accentuated the lack of muscles on my body. We ate in silence, or at least I avoided speaking for fear of exposing a smear of food accidentally left on my teeth. Somewhere across the room a boy clinked his fork and clattered his plate a bit too loudly. Two superintendents stood like palace guards, observing us, scrutinizing every movement.

After breakfast we were asked to gather in the foyer. The group testing officers were about to arrive. Together with the psychologist and the president of the I.S.S.B., the G.T.O.s had a say in who got selected and who didn’t. The superintendents, reading our names from a list, divided us into six groups of ten. When the G.T.O.s arrived—each of them a variation of the other: butts bobbing in their fitted blue pants, hair trimmed to expose the sheen of their scalps, half a dozen medals pinned to their chests—they took charge of the six wings.

He and I were in different wings. Throughout the morning we sat for tests with our own group. At lunch, we were at different tables.

After lunch we had the rest of the day to ourselves. Most of the boys changed into more casual clothes. Everyone gathered in the anteroom, which, with its offerings of snooker, chess, table tennis, snakes and ladders, carom board, and a large TV, was the most appealing place in I.S.S.B. The anteroom contained so many photographs that I could not tell what color the walls were. Army generals, naval chiefs, air marshals, martyrs of the 1965 war, the Quaid himself—all huddled against one another, rubbing shoulders.

The TV had only twelve channels—all of which played either patriotic anthems or documentaries about the armed forces—and I was nervous about inserting myself into the groups of boys hunched over this board game or that, so I sat alone, observing everyone. Many of these boys must have failed med-school entrance exams, like me. Many of them would settle for modest jobs in pharmacy or tech. But here they were, smelling of old sweat, with their bedraggled clothes and scraggly mustaches, fully convinced that they had a fair and equal chance of making it into one of the most full-of-itself professions in the country. In the best-case scenario, only one of them would get selected. Then, there was another, much smaller group of boys—even from a distance you could tell them apart. These were the sons of serving armed officers, and, with their hair tamed by pomade and styled into shimmering puffs, clothes tailored specifically for the selection week, shoes polished to reflect their faces, they could blind you with their shine—a shine that was inherited, yes, but burnished further by months of training at Army bases, favors of their colonel and brigadier uncles. One of those uncles, or perhaps even their own fathers, must have been a former president of the I.S.S.B. For them, appearing before the selection committee was just a formality.

I was too good for one group and not good enough for the other, so I settled for him. At least he was beautiful; his rosy thin lips and eyes like hungry fishes in a bowl. He was idling on the sofa, talking to another boy. I went up to him and asked if he wanted to take a walk outside, maybe go to the tuckshop.

Small purple-black fruits had fallen on the rocky, bituminous pavement, their insides splattered, seeping into the cracks. Along the broad pathway leading to the tuckshop, under a Gulmohar tree, a sign wished us “Good Luck.” The old and crinkly man at the shop was unboxing some snacks, dabbing at sweat on his forehead and eyelids with a handkerchief he kept draped over his shoulder. I bought only a bottle of Pepsi, he got a few things—Chili Mili, Cocomo, Kurkure, Pakola. Then we walked back.

The outer wall of the compound, which faced the main road, was half red brick and half filigreed black grille. Cars sped by, giving evidence of life outside. From the spot where we now sat on the large lawn, between the main building and the entrance, one could see the façade where an inscription read:

inter services selection board

“We Recruit the Defenders of Pakistan”

On the lawn were grimy white benches with bird droppings all over. The sun was beginning to set, the sky deepening into crimson and cobalt. Clusters of rickety insects clung to lampposts that were just coming to life, the mild light illuminating their emerald-and-burgundy bodies, their fluttering, opaque wings. There was an obsolete F-86 displayed in a corner of the compound, a replica of the one used by M. M. Alam in the Indo-Pak war of 1965. I did not know this but read it on a placard as we sat under the jet’s silvery, rusted wings.

For a while we talked about mundane things. I liked reading, he was into cricket and football; I had recently completed my A levels with mediocre grades, he his Intermediate with a passing percentage. He kept asking questions to propel the conversation. Where did I live? How had my tests gone that morning—math, physics, I.Q., general knowledge, psychological analysis, the Officer-Like Qualities test? Was the answer to the so-and-so MCQ on the so-and-so test A or B? We had different answers; we both were probably wrong.

The lagging music of his Punjabi accent clung to his Urdu like ants to a sticky, hard candy, but he talked with an ease and comfort, volunteering information that, if I were him, I wouldn’t tell someone I had met just a day ago. His father lived illegally in Dubai and worked in construction, sending scant cash whenever he could. He hadn’t seen him in ten years. His mother, now ailing, had retired from her job as a nurse in a government hospital in Raiwind. A younger sister was still in school. He wanted to join the Air Force to offer his family a better life.

“Are you serious about the Air Force?” he asked, the veins in his neck blue, bulging.

“Yes,” I said, reflexively. “It’s my passion.”

As we spoke, our bodies touched occasionally. At every touch—casual and inert though it was—I glanced at the point of contact, but he made nothing of it, his eyes roving around the compound.

He peeled open a half roll of Zeera biscuits and offered them to me. I took one. He kept dropping tiny crumbs on his lap which resembled the scintillas of dandruff on his shoulders. He slurped his Pakola in large gulps, chewed with his mouth open. He was wearing the same ill-fitting clothes that he had worn yesterday: faded bluejeans, wrinkled white in places, and a black T-shirt with “i lost my number can i have yours” printed on it in a big yellow cursive font. I watched him eat and drink and talk, and my understanding of how different he was from me deepened. How humble and innocent. How rich in his poverty. I realized I would be embarrassed if my friends saw me with him. I felt a mixture of lust and revulsion. Mostly, I felt a little sad. In him I had placed the hopes of a friendship, perhaps something even more than a friendship, that would continue outside this place. But the impossibility of such a situation, an impossibility that was both practical and personal, was beginning to be revealed to me.

“We are going to get fucked tomorrow,” he said then, and that seemed to stir something inside me, a desire, an exhilaration—the plain, blatant charge of the word he had used.

Emboldened, as if what he had said were a cue, I raised my hand and dusted the crumbs from his shirt. He looked at me, surprised, but did not recoil. Just smiled. Then he looked at his crotch, where more crumbs had gathered.

“Should I?” I asked. The loudspeakers on the minaret of the small white-marbled mosque in the corner of the compound came to life, ejecting sharp, static noises. The Maghrib azan was about to begin.

“Oh, no, it’s fine,” he said, getting up and patting his thighs, the crumbs falling like debris. “We should go to the mosque and pray with the other boys.”

I shrugged. “You can go. I don’t pray.”

“You can pretend to.” He looked thoughtful. “My chaachoo is a Subedar in the Army. He said they are always watching us, these I.S.S.B. people. In the dining hall, in the anteroom. Everywhere. They don’t just look at your tests and interviews and how well you perform the physical tasks.” 

“So, you’re saying that man over there could possibly be a lieutenant colonel, dressed as a gardener?” I asked, looking toward the other side of the lawn where a maali was watering the rows of bougainvillea and amaltas trees.

He laughed. “Maybe. In that case, let’s go.”

In the mosque, I stood at a distance for a while, casting my eyes around to see if there was any other Shia guy, praying separately from the rest, hands resting at his sides. But there was no one else. And, because I did not want to set myself apart, I prayed with everyone else, my hands folded in front of me, something I had never done in my whole life, not even at the funeral of my grandfather, who was half Sunni and had had two different funeral prayers for that reason.

After the prayer, we all gathered outside the dining room because it was time for the day’s results to be posted on the notice board. I did not want to be rejected just yet. I wanted to be able to spend more time with him. When the superintendent arrived with a sheet of paper, the boys started pushing and shoving one another, desperate to see their names. I stood in a corner, patiently. Since the I.S.S.B. gods were watching all the time, I wanted to show them that I had Officer-Like Qualities.

Twenty-three boys had failed the tests. They had to be let go before dinner was served. If there was any justice in these things, my name should not have been on the list. I had played a game of eeny, meeny, miny, moe in marking my answers on all the tests, and I was sure I would be sent home today—but my name was there. So was his. I whispered it to myself, and it sounded like chimes on a windy day.

At night, once more, I could not sleep. There was an incessant hiss of crickets, and somewhere in the compound dogs barked curiously. I wished he were in my room, in the bed next to mine. I tried to imagine what he looked like while sleeping, whether he slept with his mouth open or closed, whether he snored, whether he slept with his shirt on or off, whether he slept with his arms folded behind his head, exposing sleek fluffs of hair in his armpits. Whether he liked me.

From tomorrow, I promised myself, I would try my best. I did not know what to do with my life; I wasn’t good at anything. Maybe this was the way out, away from the vitriolic insults of my family, away from the incessant pressures of entrance exams. Suddenly, I felt free. I imagined a future in which he and I were both selected. We would spend two years training together at the Risalpur Academy. We would both graduate as flying officers, deeply and madly in love with each other. It was wishful thinking, I knew, but the fantasy settled like a warm blanket over me and put me to sleep.

In the morning my head was throbbing. My stubble was slick with strands of saliva. I woke up with the desire to work harder intact, but I was nervous about a whole day of physical tasks and interviews. During breakfast, I felt dizzy with headache, the racking pain seeping out of my head and splitting the air. He walked in late for breakfast, found a place to sit quite far from me. Our eyes did not meet. After breakfast we were asked to wear our very tight white shirts and very short white shorts and gather outside. That was the dress code for the Physical Tasks.

The shadows of the trees on the ground rippled and swelled. I went and stood with a group of boys, of the Army-kids variety. Soon a few perfunctory questions were exchanged; I felt a sense of validation, acceptance. I kept my hands as still as I could, my spine stiffened. From time to time, I glanced at him, standing with a group of boys who radiated a fanatic, rampant Lahori energy. He was talking, high-fiving, laughter in the air, a laughter that hinted at the jubilance boys slip into when they talk about girls. He looked like an athlete in his white shirt and white shorts, dull against his lambent, wet-sand-colored skin. Something rose in me then, a feeling too familiar—a lust too strong to be merely physical, a desire too weak to be devotion. It was a feeling I had stifled before, a feeling I knew how to fold and tuck into a corner of my heart.

I had never been any good at sports; the P.T. teacher at my school used to call me a sissy. A group testing officer walked us to a far-off field, beyond the back wall of the I.S.S.B. compound. A small rusted black gate opened into a whole other world, an expanse of hay-brown grass, muddy and spackled in places with wild shrubbery. There was an assortment of hurdles that we had to run over, ditches of various sizes that we had to jump, rope ladders that we had to climb, monkey bridges that we had to cross, puddles of thick mud under barbed wire that we had to crawl through. There were fourteen obstacles in total, and each of us had ten minutes to do them. I managed to do six. The cutoff was five.

In the afternoon, when we met again, he gave me a lazy, boyish hug.

“Lag gaye, yaar,” he said.

“I know. My whole body hurts, too.” 

Both of us were tired and sunburned—dishevelled, but not completely broken by the Physical Tasks. We showed each other the minor injuries we had collected. One of the boys had broken two of his fingers, and another had dislocated his ankle. These boys were sent to the medical unit, after which they would be let go. He had got through twelve obstacles, which by any standard was extraordinary; later, impressed, the other boys would rave about it, most of them having themselves tackled only nine or ten obstacles at best. Embarrassed, I lied and said that I had completed eight.

Lunch was about to be served, so we hung around in the corridor. Apricot-yellow sunlight filtered through the patterns on the wall of the hallway and fell on his face in an odd geometry, slicing through his chocolaty eyes. Under the sun his skin was the color of rusty iron. Sweat dripped down his sideburns. On his shirt, there were damp half-moons near his armpits.

After lunch, everyone raced to the bathrooms. The interviews were in the evening, and everybody wanted to shower and shave. The smell of cheap perfumes was pervasive—Drakkar, Rumba, Maxi, Prophecy, Brut. In front of the mirror, a boy was flossing his teeth with a thread pulled from the sleeve of his T-shirt; another rubbed his teeth with powdered charcoal. Inside the door of a stall, someone had drawn a penis and a circle. There was a phone number scribbled under the drawing, and next to it a few faded words: “Suck Pervez Musharraf’s cock.”

Ihad heard all kinds of things about I.S.S.B. interviews. One of my cousins had told me that during his interview the president had switched off the light in his office for a few seconds and then asked my cousin what had changed. My cousin made up some theory about the laws of thermodynamics and light intensity, but the president replied, “Time, only time changed.” The first thing I noticed when I entered this president’s office was his paunch, neatly tucked beneath the desk. He had no neck. Assalamoaleikum, Waalaikumassalam. When I sat down, his head obstructed my view of the slogan printed on the wall behind him: “excellence is not a skill, it’s an attitude.” He asked me to tell him about myself and why I wanted to join the Air Force, and while I did so he made circular motions in his ear with his finger. It came out with a smattering of pale-yellow earwax. The rest of the interview was a litany of questions: Who is the defense minister of Pakistan? Does the Pakistan Navy have helicopters? Which ones? How much is xyz kilometres in square feet? What’s the capital of Sudan? Do you have any family members in the armed forces? What’s your household income? So, you are Shia? Name the Twelve Imams. Recite Naad e Ali. When the interview was over, I thanked him for his time. As I was getting up to leave, he dropped his pen on the floor. Uncertain about what to do, I bent down and reached for it.

“Don’t!” he yelled at me, and pressed a buzzer on his desk. The door opened, a superintendent entered and, without being told what was needed, picked up the pen, placed it on the president’s desk, and took his leave. A rehearsed trick, I realized; to pick up a fallen object from the floor was beneath the dignity of an armed officer. I had failed.

The interview with the psychologist was shorter, more personal, and devoid of any preposterous theatrics: You are the only son of your parents; how will they feel if you die fighting for Pakistan? Do you have a girlfriend? No? A boyfriend, then? It’s so common these days, you know. When was the last time you had sex? Have you ever had anal sex? Do you watch porn? Do you masturbate? I said I did not remember the last time I had done so. She was clever, the psychologist, a small black mole above her lips, like the infamous Indian TV-soap lady villain Komolika. Her eyes were like a needle to the skin, possessing a sharpness that did not merely see but saw through.

Come evening, everyone was relieved, ecstatic even. It was over, and on top of that no one was being sent home tonight. The results were to be posted the next morning. There was excitement among the boys because at 8 p.m. one of the TV channels would air a Pakistani movie. It was a low-budget Lollywood ripoff of a Bollywood film, which itself was a copy of a Tollywood film. I had no interest in the movie, so I decided to return to my room and read. I was a few pages into my book when he came into the room looking for me.

“Oye, kya hua? Not watching the movie?”

“Hey, I am not feeling well, and I have seen the movie before,” I said, lying.

He stood near my bed and touched my forehead with the back of his hand. “Fever?”

“I don’t know, just not feeling great.”

He sat down next to me on the bed. “How was your interview?” he asked.

“It was O.K. The president was a prick”—instinctively, I felt the need to remedy the lie I had told him the day before, and after a pause I said, “You know, I lied earlier. I did not want to get selected initially, but now I think I do. Like, I wouldn’t mind it.”

“I knew you did,” he said, a smile cutting into his cheeks.

“I know you knew.” I smiled back.

“And you’re not tall enough for the Air Force anyway,” he said teasingly.

“Shut up! I am taller than you.”

“No, you’re not!”

“O.K., let’s see,” I said, getting up from the bed. I took his hand and made him stand, too, his touch softly textured like gauzy fabric. We stood face to face, our chests touching.

“Look, I am taller,” he said, joking.

He wasn’t taller than me. My nose was level with the top of his head. I could smell the metallic fragrance that rose from his hair.

“Let’s lie down and check,” I said. “It’s more accurate that way.”

“You’re crazy!” he said, laughing.

“C’mon!” I tugged at his hand, getting into bed and pulling him to it.

He laughed again; he acquiesced. He lay down on the bed, both hands resting on his chest, as if in prayer. “Now what?” he said to the ceiling.

I was next to him, propped up on an elbow, staring at his face. Silent.

“Happy?” he asked, placing his palms on the bed, lifting his back.

I was happy; I grabbed his arm and held him down. A tint of white from the tube light overhead hovered on his hair, shattered in his eyes. Bursts of laughter and clapping came from the anteroom across the hallway. I continued to stare at him. I imagined what lay beneath the layers of his clothing: a constellation of hard pink pimples on his chest, and a few tiny white pus-filled ones, too, barely camouflaged by a thin film of hair; unhard dick, flimsy and shrivelled—like a dead sea horse washed up on the shore—resting above his coarsely shaved pubic hair.

“Let me get up now,” he said, trying to free himself from my grip.

Keeping him pinned under me, I placed my head on his chest, heard two distinct beats of his heart, thrumming like frogs in a pond; small, silvery coins of pure joy jangled in the pockets of my own heart.

Then he pushed me. “What the hell are you doing?”

As soon as he sat up and ran his hand through his hair, the door to the room slammed shut; we heard the sound of a bolt being fastened on the outside. A rope tightened around my neck. We ran to the door and shoved it. We banged on the door, screaming into it: open it, who is it, please unlock the door. Half an hour later, when the door opened, the resident officer was behind it.

In the president’s office, a naked bulb hung from a wire above the desk, illuminating stacks of papers and khaki envelopes. The resident officer was in a corner, leaning against the wall, alternating between staring out of the dark window and typing furiously into his small Nokia, ignoring our joint pleas and apologies.

Two headlights came into view in the window as a car serpentined toward the office building.

The president entered and switched on the main lights; blinding brightness exploded in the room. He was wearing a shalwar kameez, not his uniform. He told the resident officer to have someone send tea for madam and juices for the children; his wife and kids were waiting for him outside, in the car. It was Friday night. I imagined a little skirmish must have taken place at the president’s house when the call came. The kids must have cried out in protest as their plan to go to KFC or McDonald’s or some play area was stalled by this call from one of their baba’s friends. But, Baba, you promised! We were supposed to take the kids out tonight, the wife must have joined in. I am sorry, jaan, but something urgent has come up. Why don’t you guys come along, and we can eat at the officers’ mess tonight? It was eerie to think that the president had a life outside the I.S.S.B. That he, like the rest of us, was answerable to a family.

“Hello, Mister. I am talking to you. Are you deaf?” The president snapped his fingers, waving the R.O.’s phone in my face.

On its screen, a blurred and bleary photo, awash in sepia colors, and in it the bodies of two boys joined in a way they should not be—the faces, indiscernible, our own.

Hot tears began accumulating in my eyes, flowing down my face of their own volition. A tremor caught in my throat. “Sir, I was just—”

“Sir, we did absolutely nothing wrong,” he interrupted, speaking with conviction and drawing the president’s attention away from me. “We should not be detained like this. We were just resting together.”

“Shut up! Speak when you are spoken to,” the president snapped at him, and then, turning back to me, he said, “You are the Shia boy, aren’t you? What was your name?”

He smiled and nodded as I offered it to him.

“Getting up to all kinds of dirty things during Muharram, huh? Shameful,” he spat. Then, after a sigh, he said, “You should be glad I am a Syed, too. Don’t want to make a Yazeed out of myself by punishing another Syed, especially during these holy days.”

I stared at him—vibrating with fear, the tears stinging my eyes—but somehow filled with optimism.

The president was staring at the wall clock behind me. “You can go back to your room,” he said.

“Thank you, sir. Thank you so much!” I replied. 

Both of us looked at each other, stunned and shining with relief, and made to leave the office.

“Hey, not you. Where do you think you’re going?” the president said to him.

His smile turned to ice and melted under the heat of the president’s glare.

“Talking back to me and thinking you’re some kind of a hot shot? That, too, after talking this boy into all the filthy things you’re into,” the president said. He asked him his name. When he told him, the president and the R.O. exchanged a look. The president nodded toward the R.O., more to give permission than to affirm. The R.O. fumbled with a few pages on the president’s desk and then produced a thin khaki envelope. “Final List [Confidential].”

The president tore the envelope open with his thick, tapered fingers. He held the paper up toward the R.O., the light from behind his head illuminating its thin, membrane-like surface. Five names were printed in bold in the center.

“You mess around, you mess up,” the president said, and laughed.

“Sir, please, please let us both go. We are extremely sorry, sir. We will never do anything like that ever again,” I pleaded, shivering, my hand already on the door handle.

“Listen up, boy. I want you to shut up and fuck off from here,” the president said. “You won’t get another chance. Don’t make me change my mind.”

I glanced at his boyish face, now grave and scared. His unyielding will had dissipated; eyes like teacups filled to the brim, lips like dead birds. He kept swallowing hard, as if there were a ball of hair suspended in his throat. My focus blurred, or I made it blur, looking not at him but past him—past the crumpled expression of fear on his face, past the sharp hurt of someone who has been betrayed—settling on his hazy outlines. I thought of my parents, who were already going to be so furious that I hadn’t made it. I thought of the time they had brought the flyswatter down on the palms of my hands for wrapping my sister’s dupatta around my body. I imagined them finding out what I had done in this place. I looked away, opened the door, and quietly fucked off from the president’s office.

The sky was dark, empty of birds. At the main building, boys were exiting the anteroom and being ushered toward the dining hall by the superintendents. Surely the superintendents must know what had happened, must have sent the pictures of us to the R.O. I thought it would be best to tell them that the president had exonerated me before they tried to create a scene. My right leg had fallen asleep; hot needles prickled the bottom of my foot. The smell of my sweat reached me, olid and milkier than it had been all day. As I approached one of the superintendents, hands shaking, he looked at me as if he were seeing me for the first time in his life. Smiling.

“Come on, beta. Hurry up! It’s dinnertime. Don’t keep the food waiting. It’s bad luck,” he said.

Inside, I spotted a boy I had spoken to earlier. His table was half empty. I quickly sat next to him. With the fingers of one hand, I peeled the dead skin under the fingernails of the other.

“What happened to you? Seen a ghost?” he asked.

“How was the movie?” I pulled my face together, countered his question.

“Yaar, bhenchod! The movie was fucking amazing. But right before the ending they shut it down. The superintendent says some shit has gone down. Do you know what happened?”

“No. I was taking a nap in the room,” I said. “I am not well.”

I felt nauseated, could not eat, but I did not dare abandon my food for fear of being reprimanded. I shoved large bites into my mouth. As soon as I was finished, I rushed to the bathroom and threw up in the basin. Chunks of chicken tikka and paratha clogged the sink. I looked away and swirled my finger in the beige-colored smudge to unclog the drain. I rinsed my mouth and washed my hands.

Ilay awake for a long time, watching the still and billowing shadows converge on the walls. A chill settled in me, or perhaps it was guilt, fluttering its wings in my chest. It was foolish, reckless, what we had done. I had done. I said his name out loud to myself: Babar, Babar, Babar. The words felt like broken teeth in my mouth. We would never have talked had he not accosted me. I would have spent my days here in seclusion; I had learned to make myself invisible around other boys. What had he seen in me on the first day, when he sat several rows away and smiled at me and waved in my direction? Had he seen himself reflected in my eyes? Did this reflection kindle in him a platonic want—the desire to know and be known? And at what cost had this reflection come? Behind the veneer of my sleek clothes and a plagiarized sophistication, did he see the potential for cruelty? And behind the borrowed sense of haughtiness and an accent that was sharpened to impress and charm, did he see my willingness to be selfish? The cost of reaching out, of seeking, for him, was this betrayal.

I saw something in him, too, and paid a price: he was just an escape, from this place, from my family—the plan of a future that was not possible, the map of a place that did not exist—and in chasing the promise of these things, even transgressing in the process of possessing them, I realized how cruel and heartless I could be, how childish in my selfishness. I felt scalded by shame.

In Quetta, Shias were being slaughtered in the streets. Their families had to protest with the corpses of their loved ones laid out on beds of ice on the highway, before a federal minister or a governor responded to their pleas. Elsewhere, too, Shia bodies were being torn apart by explosives. My own family and I had escaped a bomb blast a couple of years ago during the tenth of Muharram procession in Karachi. And here I was, acquitted, free, simply because the president was Shia, too.

Just as I was thinking this, I heard the sound of a car engine revving up outside, coming alive, like a feral animal roused from sleep. Panic rose in me. I have to do something, anything, I thought. I had to get him out, I had to stop the president, whose car was stuttering along the tarmac path outside. I got up from my bed and ran to the door, knocked. I knocked for a while, audible yet soft thumps, so as to not wake any of the boys, many of whom were already snoring. Then I banged. Loud and wild and desperate. The drumming sound drowned the initial waves of protests from the boys who had started to stir in their beds. What are you doing? Have you gone mad? Missing your mumma?

The first one arrived with a muted ferocity, hit the back of my head, and fell to the floor with a thud. A low cackle emerged from a corner of the room. Then another shoe, poorly aimed, hit the door. I continued to pound. My indifference to the boys’ subtle, small acts of violence seemed to have emboldened them, swirled something inside them, an excitement, a last-night spirit of adventure. A half-filled bottle of water hit the center of my spine; a dull ache slowly spread. I turned around. A wet towel hurled in my direction made it as far as the middle of the room. Guffaws of laughter. A rain of ordinary objects began to pour from all directions. I sat down on the floor, folded my arms around my knees, sank my head in the hollow space between them. Tears began to flow down my face and into my lap. Yes, I thought, this is what I deserve.

I sat there for a long time. Eventually, the boys got bored and went back to sleep. Unbidden, I thought of his smile on the first day—bright and capricious—and the strange storm on his face when I left him in the president’s office. What would the president do to him? Beat him up? Rape him? Hand him to intelligence? I imagined him sitting in a chair in the center of the office, the president hurling insults at him. No place in the Air Force for gandoos! The psychologist would be there, too, standing in a corner, arms akimbo, laughing a high-pitched laugh and saying, I knew you were a freak. Through the first few minutes, he would stay calm, expressionless. Midway, he would squeeze his eyes and clench his teeth to hold the tears back, and not until he had butchered his tongue—blood trickling down the side of his lips and soaking his stubble—would the president stop yelling at him.

All these thoughts were unbearable; I couldn’t go on. In the morning I will find him, I imagined instead. I will bring the insides of his smooth wrists to my split cheeks. I will show him the tattered map of bruises on my body, and he will show me his. Each of us will say to the other, Look what they did to me.

Near dawn it had rained. A mild, short-lived, brokenhearted rain. Clouds the color of dirty socks hung low in the sky. Tea-colored puddles had formed in the foliage. I couldn’t find him. He wasn’t in his room and was absent for breakfast. He wasn’t there when the final result was posted. He wasn’t there to find out that only five boys had been selected, that one of the boys was me. He wasn’t there when everyone else was asked to pack up and leave. He wasn’t there for any of this. He had disappeared. Anything could have happened to him. Though I told myself—as I would continue to tell myself for years afterward—that in the end, during the night, he had simply been let go. ?

 

Rosewood