Friday, May 31, 2013

SPIEGEL ONLINE

SPIEGEL ONLINE

  

WWII DrugThe German Granddaddy of Crystal Meth

By Fabienne Hurst Der Spiegel
Crystal meth is notorious for being highly addictive and ravaging countless communities. But few know that the drug can be traced back to Nazi Germany, where it first became popular as a way to keep pilots and soldiers alert in battle during World War II.
"Alertness aid" read the packaging, to be taken "to maintain wakefulness." But "only from time to time," it warned, followed by a large exclamation point.
The young soldier, though, needed more of the drug, much more. He was exhausted by the war, becoming "cold and apathetic, completely without interests," as he himself observed. In letters sent home by the army postal service, he asked his family to send more. On May 20, 1940, for example, he wrote: "Perhaps you could obtain some more Pervitin for my supplies?" He found just one pill was as effective for staying alert as liters of strong coffee. And -- even better -- when he took the drug, all his worries seemed to disappear. For a couple of hours, he felt happy.
This 22-year-old, who wrote numerous letters home begging for more Pervitin, was not just any soldier -- he was Heinrich Böll, who would go on to become one of Germany's leading postwar writers and win a Nobel Prize for literature in 1972. And the drug he asked for is now illegal, notoriously so. We now know it as crystal meth.
Many TV fans are familiar with the drug primarily from the hit American series "Breaking Bad," in which a chemistry teacher with financial troubles teams up with a former student to produce meth by the pound, while drug enforcement agents chase drug rings in the oppressive New Mexico heat.
Meth use is also on the rise in real-life Germany. According to the latest official reports, the country saw more first-time users over the last year than ever before. In fact, the number of known cases skyrocketed from 1,693 to 2,556 within a single year. Use of the addictive drug has been increasing in Germany since the mid-1990s, with most of it coming into the country from the neighboring Czech Republic.
German Miracle Pill
It was in Germany, though, that the drug first became popular. When the then-Berlin-based drug maker Temmler Werke launched its methamphetamine compound onto the market in 1938, high-ranking army physiologist Otto Ranke saw in it a true miracle drug that could keep tired pilots alert and an entire army euphoric. It was the ideal war drug. In September 1939, Ranke tested the drug on university students, who were suddenly capable of impressive productivity despite being short on sleep.
From that point on, the Wehrmacht, Germany's World War II army, distributed millions of the tablets to soldiers on the front, who soon dubbed the stimulant "Panzerschokolade" ("tank chocolate"). British newspapers reported that German soldiers were using a "miracle pill." But for many soldiers, the miracle became a nightmare.
As enticing as the drug was, its long-term effects on the human body were just as devastating. Short rest periods weren't enough to make up for long stretches of wakefulness, and the soldiers quickly became addicted to the stimulant. And with addiction came sweating, dizziness, depression and hallucinations. There were soldiers who died of heart failure and others who shot themselves during psychotic phases. Some doctors took a skeptical view of the drug in light of these side effects. Even Leonardo Conti, the Third Reich's top health official, wanted to limit use of the drug, but was ultimately unsuccessful.
Students, Athletes and Medics
Pervitin remained easy to obtain even after the war, on the black market or as a prescription drug from pharmacies. Doctors didn't hesitate to prescribe it to patients as an appetite suppressant or to improve the mood of those struggling with depression. Students, especially medical students, turned to the stimulant to help them cram through the night and finish their studies faster.
Numerous athletes found Pervitin decreased their sensitivity to pain, while simultaneously increasing performance and endurance. In 1968, boxer Joseph "Jupp" Elze, 28, failed to wake again after a knockout in the ring following some 150 blows to the head. Without methamphetamine, he would have collapsed much sooner and might not have died. Elze became Germany's first known victim of doping. Yet the drug remained on the market.
In the 1960s, the Temmler Werke supplied the armies of both East and West Germany with the stimulant pills. Not until the 1970s did West Germany's postwar army, the Bundeswehr, remove the drug from its medical supplies, with East Germany's National People's Army following in 1988. Pervitin was ultimately banned in all of Germany, but its meteoric rise as an illegally produced drug had only just begun.
Dangerous Crystals
The drug's new career came thanks to an American cookbook. In the United States, where meth use is widespread today, illegal methamphetamine was initially more an exception than the rule. Then, starting in the late 1970s, motorcycle gangs such as the Hells Angels discovered crystal meth as a source of income and began setting up large-scale drug labs. But since they targeted mainly the California cities of San Francisco and San Diego as their market for the drug, the problem remained limited mainly to the West Coast.
Methamphetamine was no longer a powder compressed into tablets, but instead sold in crystal form, and few people knew how to produce these crystals. That changed when a mad-scientist type named Steve Preisler, alias "Uncle Fester," a chemist in Wisconsin in the mid-1980s, published a drug "cookbook" entitled "Secrets of Methamphetamine Manufacture."
In this controversial book, now in its eighth edition, Preisler presented six different recipes for preparing the drug. All called for only legal ingredients, using a simple chemical reaction to extract the drug's principal component from cough medicine, then combining it with liquids that increased its effectiveness, such as commercially available drain cleaner, battery acid or antifreeze.
More and more illegal meth labs began to spring up, producing the drug in normal apartments, isolated cabins or hotel rooms. Meth production creates highly toxic, explosive substances, and it's not uncommon for improvised drug labs to explode or for drug-addicted mothers to store the drug's dangerous components in the refrigerator next to baby food and end up poisoning their children.
Like Living Corpses
There are a shocking number of these "private laboratories." According to the US Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), around 11,000 meth labs were discovered in the country in 2010, compared to 7,530 in 2009. Of those, 2,000 were in Iowa, an agricultural state known as part of the country's "bread basket."
Meth can be snorted, smoked, swallowed or injected, with addicts often consuming 1,000 times the dose once taken by Wehrmacht soldiers during World War II. The side effects are alarming. Meth weakens the immune system, which leads to eczema, hair loss and so-called "meth mouth," in which the teeth fall out and mucus membranes rot. Meth addicts experience extreme weight loss and develop kidney, stomach and heart problems, which have a nightmarish combined effect: Before and after pictures of meth addicts show that they come to look like living corpses within an extremely short span of time.
Despite these terrible side effects, it seems the drug has lost none of the appeal to which Heinrich Böll succumbed. In 2011, the National Institute on Drug Abuse, based outside Washington, estimated that around 13 million Americans had tried meth at some point. The UN estimates around 24 million users globally.
Translated from the German by Ella Ornstein

Wednesday, May 29, 2013

Anti-West Hard-Liner Gains in Iranian Race



TEHRAN — At his first presidential campaign rally, Saeed Jalili on Friday welcomed the cheers of thousands of young men as he hauled himself onto the stage. His movements were hampered by a prosthetic leg, a badge of honor from his days as a young Revolutionary Guards member in Iran’s great trench war with Iraq.
“Welcome, living martyr, Jalili,” the audience shouted in unison, most of them too young to have witnessed the bloody conflict themselves but deeply immersed in the national veneration of its veterans. Waving flags belonging to “the resistance” — the military cooperation among Iran, Syria, the Lebanese Shiite group Hezbollah and some Palestinian groups — the crowd roared the candidate’s election slogan: “No compromise. No submission. Only Jalili.”
Mr. Jalili, known as Iran’s unyielding nuclear negotiator and a protégé of the supreme leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, is emerging as the presumed front-runner in Iran’s presidential election on June 14, an unsettling prospect for future relations with the West. Mr. Jalili, 47, who many analysts say has long been groomed for a top position in Iran, is by far the most outspoken hard-liner among the eight candidates approved to participate in the election.
Opposing “détente a hundred percent” and promising no compromise “whatsoever” with the West over matters like Iran’s nuclear program and involvement in Syria, Mr. Jalili seems set to further escalate Iran’s standoff with the United States and its allies if elected president.
“He seems to be Ahmadinejad Phase 2,” said Rasool Nafisi, an Iran expert based in Virginia, referring to Iran’s current president, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad. “He would probably not be a partner to negotiate for the nuclear issues, as we have seen before when he was heading the delegations.”
An analyst based in Iran, who asked to remain anonymous for fear of reprisals, said Mr. Jalili was “the perfect follower of Khamenei.”
“If he gets elected I foresee even more isolation and conflict, as he doesn’t care about foreign relations, the economy or anything,” the analyst said.
In recent weeks, Mr. Jalili has garnered the open support of Iran’s governing establishment, a coalition of conservative clerics and Revolutionary Guards commanders known as the traditionalists. High-ranking Shiite Muslim clerics have begun speaking out in his favor, and a nationwide network of paramilitary volunteers, the basij, is now helping to organize his election campaign.
He has been featured in flattering terms in recent weeks in the semiofficial Fars news agency, which is connected to the Revolutionary Guards, as well as in dozens of Web sites and other news outlets. By contrast, the other candidates now sometimes discover their campaign appearances canceled for unclear reasons and often find themselves under sharp attack in interviews on state TV, while Mr. Jalili gets softball questions.
“He’ll easily get 30 percent of the vote,” said Amir Mohebbian, an analyst close to Iran’s leaders, pointing to the well-organized groups supporting Mr. Jalili. “The remainder will be divided between the other candidates.”
That would lead to a runoff election that Mr. Jalili would be heavily favored to win, since under Iranian law the president must receive at least half of the vote.
Iran’s presidential elections, lacking independent opinion polls and subject to manipulation, are notoriously unpredictable. In 2005, Mr. Ahmadinejad came out of nowhere to win. In 2009, millions of people took to the streets to protest what they said was widespread fraud in the voting that returned Mr. Ahmadinejad to office over the more popular opposition candidate, Mir Hussein Moussavi.
But the major threats to Mr. Jalili’s candidacy were apparently eliminated when the representatives of two influential political factions, one led by Mr. Ahmadinejad and the other by a former president, Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, were disqualified from the election by the conservative-dominated Guardian Council. That decision underscored not just the determination of the traditionalists to consolidate power, but their ability to ensure the result.
In a recent opinion article, Mr. Mohebbian said that while Mr. Jalili’s relative inexperience in domestic politics might make him appear as an outsider, the support of Iran’s governing establishment made it likely that “the conditions of the day will create an atmosphere which will put Mr. Jalili in a leadership position.”
While Ayatollah Khamenei is officially neutral, Mr. Jalili’s speeches and viewpoints closely resemble the leader’s worldview of an Iran engaged in a multifaceted battle with the West.
“The best president,” Mr. Khamenei said on Monday, speaking to students at a military academy, “is the one who powerfully resists the enemy and will turn the Islamic republic into an international example for the oppressed people of the world.”
Mr. Jalili, who sports a gray beard and prefers collarless shirts, headed Ayatollah Khamenei’s office for four years, starting in 2001, before emerging in recent years as the chief nuclear negotiator. But little is known about his views on other issues.
“Mr. Jalili is like a watermelon,” said Mohammad Khoshchehreh, an economist and professor at Tehran University. “He looks ripe on the outside, but we don’t know what color he is inside.”
Partly because of Western sanctions, Iran’s economy is reeling from high inflation and a battered currency, but Mr. Jalili has addressed the problems only obliquely. During a televised interview on Sunday he said that Iran should cut its dependency on oil revenues and establish a “resistance economy in order to foil the conspiracies against Iran.”
Such talk has left economists baffled. “His theory of resistance economy doesn’t mean anything,” Mr. Khoshchehreh said. “If it is based on looking at our weak points, that can be good, but we have no idea if he has a deep knowledge. We are worried about him.”
On Friday, during the campaign event in Tehran, Mr. Jalili chose to explain his policies by citing the first imam of the Shiites, the martyr Ali.
“All across the region we can hear our battle cry, ‘Ya Ali,’ ” said Mr. Jalili, who wrote a dissertation on the Prophet Muhammad’s foreign policy. “We heard it in Lebanon with the victory of Hezbollah. We hear it in our resistance against the Zionist regime. Time and time again we have proved our strength through this slogan.”
As songs played memorializing the battles in the border town of Shalamcheh during the Iran-Iraq war, men punched their fists in the air and shouted, “The blood in our veins belongs to our leader.”
The goal of Iran and its allies, Mr. Jalili said, is to “uproot capitalism, Zionism and Communism, and promote the discourse of pure Islam in the world.”
He did not directly mention the Western sanctions that were imposed over the country’s nuclear program — which Iran insists is for peaceful purposes but the West says is a cover for developing nuclear weapons — or the possibility that they will be tightened in response to Tehran’s intransigence. Nor did he speak about the potential for deeper involvement in the Syrian civil war, where Tehran’s proxy, Hezbollah, has recently intervened in support of the Syrian government.
If his supporters harbored worries over what these policies might mean for the Iranian economy, they kept them to themselves. “We are fighting an ideological war — nobody cares about the economy,” said Amir Qoroqchi, 25, a smiling electrical engineering student from the holy city of Qum. “The only thing that matters is resistance.”
For decades, Iran’s presidents have staked out an alternative power center, frequently in conflict with the supreme leader and the more conservative elements in the government. With the rise of Mr. Jalili and the apparent elimination of serious opposition candidates, those on the losing end of Iran’s political spectrum fear a developing imbalance.
The republican and authoritarian religious parts of the government “have been in conflict from Day 1,” Mr. Nafisi, the Iran expert, said.

Al Jazeera America Shifts Focus to U.S. News



While it has a foreign name, the forthcoming Al Jazeera cable channel in the United States wants to be American through and through.
When Al Jazeera’s owners in Qatar acquired Al Gore’s Current TV in January, they said that Current would be replaced by Al Jazeera America, an international news channel with 60 percent new programming from the United States.
The remaining 40 percent, they said, would come from Al Jazeera English, their existing English-language news channel in Doha, Qatar, that is already available in much of the rest of the world.
That plan is no more. Now Al Jazeera America is aiming to have virtually all of its programming originate from the United States, according to staff members and others associated with the channel who were interviewed in recent weeks.
It will look inward, covering domestic affairs more often than foreign affairs. It will, in other words, operate much like CNN (though the employees say they won’t be as sensational) and Fox News (though they say they won’t be opinion-driven).
The programming strategy, more ambitious than previously understood, is partly a bid to gain acceptance and give Americans a reason to tune in. It may help explain why Al Jazeera America’s start date has been delayed once already, to August from July, and why some employees predict it will be delayed again.
Al Jazeera also has yet to hire a president or a slate of vice presidents to run the channel on a day-to-day basis, which has spurred uncomfortable questions about whether earlier controversies involving the pan-Arab news giant are creating difficulties for the new channel.
The Arabic-language Al Jazeera was condemned by the American government a decade ago for broadcasting videotapes from Osama bin Laden and other materials deemed to be terrorist propaganda. Others have criticized the Arabic and English channels for being a mouthpiece for Qatar, though the channel’s representatives insist that is not the case. Other questions about bias persist; as recently as last week, the Al Jazeera Web site was accused of publishing an anti-Semitic article by a guest columnist.
But Al Jazeera America employees profess confidence that they will be able to work free of interference. Some are already rehearsing with mock newscasts. Others are fanning out to report news stories from parts of the country rarely visited by camera crews. Still others are setting up new studios in New York, where the channel will have a home inside the New Yorker Hotel, and in Washington, where it will take over space previously occupied by ABC at the Newseum on Pennsylvania Avenue.
New employees are being added to the rolls every weekday from places like CNN, “Frontline” and Time magazine. “We expect to have approximately 800 employees when we launch,” said Ehab Al Shihabi, the Al Jazeera executive in charge of international operations, including the American channel. He declined to comment on the delays, but said the channel would start “later this summer.”
Since January, he and his colleagues’ overarching message to lawmakers, mayors, cable operators, and potential viewers has been that Al Jazeera is coming to America to supply old-fashioned, boots-on-the-ground news coverage to a country that doesn’t have enough of it.
A series of announcements about new hires like Ed Pound, an experienced investigative reporter, and new bureaus in cities like Detroit have bolstered that message. Public relations and marketing firms retained by Al Jazeera, like Qorvis Communications and Siegel & Gale, have worked to limit opposition to the channel and increase support for its arrival.
Al Jazeera representatives seem aware that they are confronting an enormous marketing challenge. But they benefit from the public perception that they have boundlessly deep pockets, thanks to the oil and gas wealth of Qatar. Al Jazeera America has been portrayed by some as a giant stimulus project for American journalism at a time when other news organizations are suffering cutbacks. “This is the first big journalism hiring binge that anyone’s been on for a long time,” said the business reporter and anchor Ali Velshi when he left CNN in April for a prime time spot on Al Jazeera America.
Al Jazeera tried and failed for years to get cable operators to carry Al Jazeera English — a button-down challenger to BBC and CNN International — in the United States. Acquiring Current TV gave it a new way into the country and many expected Al Jazeera America to be a glorified simulcast of its existing English-language channel, one that would give Americans more access to a world news perspective.
But cable operators objected to that idea, saying in essence that they had repeatedly chosen not to carry the existing channel, so Al Jazeera couldn’t sneak it onto their cable lineups through Current, according to several Al Jazeera America employees, who spoke on the condition of anonymity in an effort to speak freely about internal matters. (They call the channel “Ajam” — pronounced like A-Rod — for the way it’s abbreviated.)
Another calculation was purely competitive: to compel people to change the channel from CNN or MSNBC, “you can’t just plug in someone else’s international news,” one staff member said. “The filter has to be international news that has an impact on American lives,” said another.
This realization drove Al Jazeera to rethink the programming mix for the new channel. They set out to hire more Americans than originally planned.
Mr. Al Shihabi declined to describe the specific reasons for the changes, but he said Al Jazeera America “will be an American news channel that broadcasts news of interest and importance to its American audience.”
“The precise split will vary from day to day depending only on what is newsworthy and important,” he said. “We expect most days will primarily be domestic news. But Al Jazeera’s 70 bureaus around the world will mean that we will have an unparalleled ability to report on important global stories that Americans are not seeing elsewhere. We will do that when it is warranted.”
The American channel’s daily schedule will consist mainly of live newscasts, with some talk shows and taped documentaries as well, according to an internal presentation reviewed by The New York Times. Three Al Jazeera English programs that are based in Washington, “The Stream,” “Inside Story Americas” and “Fault Lines,” are on the tentative schedule.
Its flagship nighttime show was to be titled “Main Street Journal,” according to the presentation, but is now “America Tonight.” The title is still subject to change.
Mr. Al Shihabi said it would be a “five-night-a-week prime-time newsmagazine that will present the day’s news in Al Jazeera’s typical unbiased, objective, long-form style,” including “stories that are not covered elsewhere.”
The channel has hired Kim Bondy, a former executive producer for CNN, to run the new show, but it has yet to hire an anchor for it. In fact, the only anchor identified by Al Jazeera so far is Mr. Velshi.
The news organization has multiple recruiting firms lining up anchors, correspondents and executives, though, and Mr. Al Shihabi said “discussions are well under way for all senior positions.” For the president position, Al Jazeera wants a journalist who is also a “statesman,” several employees said, owing to the political realities of the job.

Tuesday, May 28, 2013

Interview with Farzin Vahdat
Iranian sociologist Farzin Vahdat discusses the chief players in Iranian politics and provides a general outlook on how the current political streams could flow in the upcoming presidential election of June 14.
• What are the fundamental issues at stake in the upcoming election?
Farzin Vahdat: The economic problems associated with inflation with no increase in income levels, the international embargo on Iran and its consequences such as the drastic decline in the value of the national currency, unemployment, the nuclear issue and the possibility of foreign military action are looming very large at this very sensitive juncture in Iranian history. Iranians are also preoccupied by a “moral crisis” that has created a deep sense of malaise among different strata. As Asghar Farhadi’s Oscar-winning film “A Separation” accurately depicts, there is very little social trust in Iran these days: individuals are after personal gain at any cost. Other problems, such as the environmental crisis and the state’s fastidious restrictions on the private sphere, are also suffocating many, both literally and figuratively.
Another thing at stake is the possible directions the Iranian political system could take, either toward more openness or else a more totalitarian and authoritarian framework. Post-revolutionary Iran has seen the emergence of relatively large segments of the populace that are educated, professional, cosmopolitan and relatively well-off. These strata, which often are called the “middle class” (which I believe is a misnomer), have developed a rather strong sense of human and civil rights, particularly the youth and women. The Green Movement of recent years bears clear witness to the potentialities of these segments of Iranian society. The very existence of such strata in Iran could possibly affect change in the sociopolitical system and, in fact, eventually lead to democratization. Yet those in power are quite nervous about such a possibility and see it as a direct threat to their political power and economic interests.
• Can you identify the chief groups at power play in Iran's politcal system?
FV: The Revolution of 1979 was the result of diverse groups, Islamists and leftists, coalescing to overthrow the old regime. After the Revolution, the Islamist elements in the coalition eliminated other groups to consolidate their own power.  However, from the beginning there were different factions and tendencies among the Islamist forces. This is partly because of the heterogeneous nature of the clerical establishment in Shi’ism, as well as politics in general. During the first decade after the Revolution, the main rivalry within the system was between the Islamic “leftists” (among them then-Prime Minister Mir-Hossein Mousavi) and the right-wing Islamists who pushed for a market economy, while advocating hardline social and cultural control. After the death of Ayatollah Khomeini in 1989, a new tendency became associated with Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani’s ascendance to power, which can be described as “pragmatism”. Rafsanjani’s two terms as the President of the Republic (1989-1997) were marked by the political marginalization of the Islamic “leftists” and a coalition between the right-wing conservatives and the middle-of-the road pragmatism of Rafsanjani. The majority of leftists gradually developed a reformist outlook that was to become active in the election of Mohammad Khatami and the attempts at reform during his presidency.
Currently, there seems to be three major factions within the Islamic Republic.  Primarily there is the conservative meta-faction supported by Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, who is designated as the Supreme Leader of the Republic. This faction is sometimes referred to as the “Principle-ists” of which a powerful branch is called the “Resistance Front”, headed by a staunch hardline cleric, Ayatollah Mohammad-Taghi Mesbah Yazdi. Then there is the “Populist” faction, headed by Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, who is trying to get his close friend and top aide, Esfandyar Rahim-Masha’i, elected as the next president of the Islamic state. This faction was supported by Ayatollah Khamenei and the Conservatives in the controversial election of 2009, but they soon disowned that faction and dubbed it the “Deviant Current.” The Populists have tried to appeal to the “downtrodden” through economic handouts, and tried to co-opt a segment of the “middle class” by evoking Iranian nationalist sentiments. The third faction consists of Reformists of the Khatami-type and Rafsanjani Pragmatists, who are trying to get the “middle class” to vote for them. The most prominent candidate of this group is Hashemi Rafsanjani, who came under severe attack by both the Conservatives and the Populists and was disqualified from running in the election by the Guardian Council.
The Conservatives control the very powerful militia, Iran’s Revolutionary Guards Corp (Sepah-e Pasdaran) and the para-military Basij. The Judiciary and the Legislative branches are also largely controlled by the Conservative faction. The Populists around Ahmadinejad and Masha’i are already a spent force. The mismanagement of the economy and the effects of western sanctions are hurting the livelihoods of the lower classes, who were supposed to be the beneficiaries of Ahmadinejad’s government. The “middle class” seems to be bewildered and demoralized by the suppression of the Green Movement. This group might have voted for a candidate such as Hashemi Rafsanjani for lack of an alternative, had he not been disqualified.
• To what extent is there bipolarity between the Conservatives and the Reformists?
FV: The social background of the majority of Conservatives, Populists, Pragmatists and Reformist can be traced to the traditional and religious classes that became politically active before and after the Revolution of 1979.
Yet the differences between the factions are real and serious. We should not forget that the Iranian Revolution of 1979 was primarily a cultural and ideological upheaval. The Iranian revolutionaries were very much under the spell of different ideological trends that have continued to this day. For example, many of the current Reformists began their revolutionary careers under the influence of Ali Shari’ati, who was a leftist-progressive Islamic thinker/ideologue. As these ex-radicals evolved, gaining experience in the hard years of the post-revolutionary period and war with Iraq, they gradually morphed into what we call the Reformist camp. The Conservatives on the other hand, have upheld most of their militant tenets, while some of them have morphed into the Populists. 
• What is the determining factor in the next phase of the political process in Iran: conflict inside the regime or the conflict between the Iranian people and the system?
FV: In my view, the Leader and the Conservatives are adamant to hold on to power and oppose opening the political arena. However, a large segment of Iranian society now wants to participate in the social and political processes of the country. This “middle class” possesses a relatively high degree of political maturity, as was manifested in the last presidential election in 2009 and the consequent events. The participants in the Green Movement, who largely belong to this class, very seriously asserted their right to fair and transparent elections and protested when the regime denied them that right, but for the most part they refrained from acts of violence. It is not clear, however, how long this segment of Iranian society would tolerate the frustration of its democratic aspirations. It is equally unclear what recourse this class has in the face of the continued suppression of its demands. 
• Are Iran’s current  problems mainly economic or political?
FV: These categories are inseparable. The Conservatives in Iran seek monopolies, both in the economy and politics. Their vision for these spheres is a state-directed form of monopoly capitalism, notwithstanding its contradictions, and a polity that is tightly controlled from above. Given that a capitalist system thrives on the initiative of entrepreneurship, the restrictions that the regime imposes on economic activity only lead to stagnation, even regression, of the economy. The poor results in the economic sphere lead to more social discontent, which in turn necessitates more political repression; and more political control and repression entails further negative consequences for the economic sphere. Thus a vicious circle of poor economic performance and increasing political repression is created.  
• Do you think that the governing system has yet the capacity for solving or reducing Iranian society’s main problems?
FV: The primary concern of the Islamic regime is system maintenance. The Conservatives wish to preserve their political and economic power at any cost. Their strategy for system maintenance is monopolization of the economic system and a totalitarian approach in the political system.  The regime attempts to “solve” the problems of Iranian society by repression, monopolization, and economic handouts to the poor. Given the existence of a resilient “middle class” and the shrinking of oil revenues due to the sanctions, it has to resort to more repression to maintain itself but at the same time undermines itself even more. 
• How strong is the power of the Regime’s propaganda apparatus today?
FV: The regime has invested heavily in the propaganda apparatus from the very beginning of its existence. We should not forget that the clergy’s most effective social and political tool is “persuasion.” The Conservatives and the Populists have had a monopoly over radio and television. Even during Khatami’s Reformist presidency, the media mostly reflected the views of the Conservative establishment. During Ahmadinejad’s presidency, many publications have been permanently shut down. Currently there are only a few newspapers and magazines that are reform-oriented and they are quite cautious about what they publish as they grapple with self-censorship.
Meanwhile, the Establishment media have lost their credibility. The infighting between different factions, the blatant lies, and the inability to deliver on promises evoked by the propaganda have made the media lose all public trust. The media have also failed in fulfilling their entertainment function given the “spirit of seriousness” that generally has characterized the regime’s cultural policies.
Nevertheless, it would be wrong to assume that the propaganda machinery in Iran is totally ineffective. Especially for those who do not have access to the Internet and foreign-based media, the Establishment provides the only channels of information.
• What kind of President is Iran’s Supreme Leader looking for?
FV: The Supreme Leader’s recent statements clearly indicate Ayatollah Khamenei’s desire is to have the second political position in Iran become a mere “executive” who would implement the leader’s plans and vision. 
• Will a new version of the turbulence of 2009 be possible in the upcoming election?
FV: This is exactly what the regime is trying to avoid at any cost, even at the price of further erosion of its legitimacy. The disqualification of Hashemi Rafsanjani is probably very much related to this issue. The regime has no appetite to see any more reforms so it would not tolerate the presidency of Rafsanjani. I think the primary reason that the Establishment in Iran did not allow Rafsanjani to campaign was precisely to prevent a repeat of the upheavals of 2009.
• Is such a repeat of the upheavals likely?
FV: The Green Movement did not simply melt into the air after its suppression. Rather it went into dormancy, like fire under ashes. If there is any opening, it might erupt again. On the other hand, given Iran’s extremely precarious position internally and externally, and given the political and intellectual maturity of this “middle class,” it is quite possible that this social body would act cautiously, and for good reasons.  
• Which one of the candidates do you believe will have a greater chance to win the election?
FV: Among the approved candidates, Mr. Saeed Jalili, the current chief nuclear negotiator, seems to be favored by the establishment. He is inexperienced and young and, as such, most likely to toe the line set by Ayatollah Khamenei.  Furthermore, he does not seem to have a power base, which would make him less likely to fancy himself independent of the Leader’s orders, as Ahmadinejad did. 
• What impact will that have on Iran's international relations?
FV: The further closing of the polity and economy in Iran toward a more totalitarian system does not bode very well for the international arena. If this trend continues, probably the nuclear impasse would become even more complicated and entrenched, something that Israel and its western allies are not willing to accept. 

Farzin Vahdat is a sociologist interested in notions and conditions of modernity and their applications to Iran, Islam andthe Middle East. He is the author of God and Juggernaut: Iran's Intellectual Encounter with Modernity (Syracuse University Press, 2002). He is also the author of the forthcoming book Islamic Ethos and the Specter of Modernity and of numerous articles in English and Persian, a number of which have been translated into various languages, including Swedish, Italian, and Spanish. He has taught at Tufts, Harvard and Yale Universities and Vassar College and is currently conducting research at Vassar.  

Thursday, May 23, 2013

Text of President Obama’s May 23 speech on national security (full transcript)

By Washington Post Staff, Thursday, May 23, 11:01 AM

President Obama delivered remarks on national security on May 23, 2013, at National Defense University in Washington, D.C. Here is the full text of his speech:


PRESIDENT OBAMA: Good afternoon, everybody. Please be seated.
It is a great honor to return to the National Defense University. Here at Fort McNair, Americans have served in uniform since 1791, standing guard in the earliest days of the republic and contemplating the future of warfare here in the 21st century.
For over two centuries, the United States has been bound together by founding documents that defined who we are as Americans and served as our compass through every type of change.
Matters of war and peace are no different. Americans are deeply ambivalent about war, but having fought for our independence, we know a price must be paid for freedom. From the Civil War to our struggle against fascism, on through the long twilight struggle of the Cold War, battlefields have changed, and technology has evolved, but our commitment to constitutional principles has weathered every war, and every war has come to an end.
And with the collapse of the Berlin Wall, a new dawn of democracy took hold abroad and a decade of peace and prosperity arrived here at home.
And for a moment it seemed the 21st century would be a tranquil time. And then on September 11th, 2001, we were shaken out of complacency. Thousands were taken from us as clouds of fire and metal and ash descended upon a sun-filled morning.
This was a different kind of war. No armies came to our shores, and our military was not the principal target. Instead, a group of terrorists came to kill as many civilians as they could.
And so our nation went to war. We have now been at war for well over a decade. I won’t review the full history. What is clear is that we quickly drove al-Qaida out of Afghanistan, but then shifted our focus and began a new war in Iraq. And this carried significant consequences for our fight against al-Qaida, our standing in the world and, to this day, our interests in a vital region.
Meanwhile, we strengthened our defenses, hardening targets, tightening transportation security, giving law enforcement new tools to prevent terror. Most of these changes were sound. Some caused inconvenience. But some, like expanded surveillance, raised difficult questions about the balance that we strike between our interests in security and our values of privacy. And in some cases, I believe we compromised our basic values -- by using torture to interrogate our enemies, and detaining individuals in a way that ran counter to the rule of law.
So after I took office, we stepped up the war against al-Qaida, but we also sought to change its course.
We relentlessly targeted al-Qaida’s leadership. We ended the war in Iraq and brought nearly 150,000 troops home. We pursued a new strategy in Afghanistan and increased our training of Afghan forces. We unequivocally banned torture, affirmed our commitment to civilian courts, worked to align our policies with the rule of law and expanded our consultations with Congress.
Today Osama bin Laden is dead, and so are most of his top lieutenants. There have been no large-scale attacks on the United States, and our homeland is more secure. Fewer of our troops are in harm’s way, and over the next 19 months they will continue to come home. Our alliances are strong, and so is our standing in the world. In sum, we are safer because of our efforts.
Now make no mistake: Our nation is still threatened by terrorists. From Benghazi to Boston, we have been tragically reminded of that truth. But we recognize that the threat has shifted and evolved from the one that came to our shores on 9/11. With a decade of experience to draw from, this is the moment to ask ourselves hard questions about the nature of today’s threats and how we should confront them.
And these questions matter to every American. For over the last decade, our nation has spent well over a trillion dollars on war, helping to explode our deficits and constraining our ability to nation-build here at home. Our service members and their families have sacrificed far more on our behalf.
Nearly 7,000 Americans have made the ultimate sacrifice. Many more have left a part of themselves on the battlefield or brought the shadows of battle back home. From our use of drones to the detention of terrorist suspects, the decisions we are making will define the type of nation and world that we leave to our children.
So America is at a crossroads. We must define the nature and scope of this struggle, or else it will define us. We have to be mindful of James Madison’s warning that no nation could preserve its freedom in the midst of continual warfare. Neither I nor any president can promise the total defeat of terror. We will never erase the evil that lies in the hearts of some human beings nor stamp out every danger to our open society. But what we can do, what we must do, is dismantle networks that pose a direct danger to us and make it less likely for new groups to gain a foothold, all the while maintaining the freedoms and ideals that we defend. And to define that strategy, we must make decisions based not on fear but on hard- earned wisdom. And that begins with understanding the current threat that we face.
Today the core of al Qaida in Afghanistan and Pakistan is on the path to defeat. Their remaining operatives spend more time thinking about their own safety than plotting against us.
They did not direct the attacks in Benghazi or Boston. They’ve not carried out a successful attack on our homeland since 9/11.
Instead what we’ve seen is the emergence of various al-Qaida affiliates. From Yemen to Iraq, from Somalia to North Africa, the threat today is more diffuse, with al-Qaida’s affiliates in the Arabian Peninsula, AQAP, the most active in plotting against our homeland. And while none of AQAP’s efforts approach the scale of 9/11, they have continued to plot acts of terror, like the attempt to blow up an airplane on Christmas Day in 2009.
Unrest in the Arab world has also allowed extremists to gain a foothold in countries like Libya and Syria. But here too there are differences from 9/11. In some cases, we continue to confront state- sponsored networks like Hezbollah that engage in acts of terror to achieve political goals. Other of these groups are simply collections of local militias or extremists interested in seizing territory. And while we are vigilant for signs that these groups may pose a transnational threat, most are focused on operating in the countries and regions where they are based. And that means we’ll face more localized threats like what we saw in Benghazi, or the BP oil facility in Algeria, in which local operatives -- perhaps in loose affiliation with regional networks -- launch periodic attacks against Western diplomats, companies and other soft targets, or resort to kidnapping and other criminal enterprises to fund their operations.
And finally, we face a real threat from radicalized individuals here in the United States.
Whether it’s a shooter at a Sikh temple in Wisconsin, a plane flying into a building in Texas, or the extremists who killed 168 people at the Federal Building in Oklahoma City, America’s confronted many forms of violent extremism in our history. Deranged or alienated individuals, often U.S. citizens or legal residents, can do enormous damage, particularly when inspired by larger notions of violent jihad. And that pull towards extremism appears to have led to the shooting at Fort Hood and the bombing of the Boston Marathon.
So that’s the current threat. Lethal, yet less capable, al-Qaida affiliates, threats to diplomatic facilities and businesses abroad, homegrown extremists. This is the future of terrorism. We have to take these threats seriously and do all that we can to confront them. But as we shape our response, we have to recognize that the scale of this threat closely resembles the types of attacks we faced before 9/11.
In the 1980s, we lost Americans to terrorism at our embassy in Beirut, at our Marine barracks in Lebanon, on a cruise ship at sea, at a disco in Berlin, and on a Pan Am flight, Flight 103, over Lockerbie. In the 1990s, we lost Americans to terrorism at the World Trade Center, at our military facilities in Saudi Arabia, and at our embassy in Kenya.
These attacks were all brutal. They were all deadly. And we learned that, left unchecked, these threats can grow. But if dealt with smartly and proportionally, these threats need not rise to the level that we saw on the eve of 9/11.
Moreover, we have to recognize that these threats don’t arise in a vacuum. Most, though not all, of the terrorism we face is fueled by a common ideology, a belief by some extremists that Islam is in conflict with the United States and the West and that violence against Western targets, including civilians, is justified in pursuit of a larger cause. Of course, this ideology is based on a lie, for the United States is not at war with Islam. And this ideology is rejected by the vast majority of Muslims -- who are the most frequent victims of terrorist attacks. Nevertheless, this ideology persists.
And in an age when ideas and images can travel the globe in an instant, our response to terrorism can’t depend on military or law enforcement alone. We need all elements of national power to win a battle of wills, a battle of ideas.
So what I want to discuss here today is the components of such a comprehensive counterterrorism strategy. First, we must finish the work of defeating al-Qaida and its associated forces. In Afghanistan, we will complete our transition to Afghan responsibility for that country’s security. Our troops will come home. Our combat mission will come to an end. And we will work with the Afghan government to train security forces, and sustain a counterterrorism force which ensures that al-Qaida can never again establish a safe haven to launch attacks against us or our allies.
Beyond Afghanistan, we must define our effort not as a boundless global war on terror but rather as a series of persistent, targeted efforts to dismantle specific networks of violent extremists that threaten America. In many cases, this will involve partnerships with other countries. Already thousands of Pakistani soldiers have lost their lives fighting extremists. In Yemen, we are supporting security forces that have reclaimed territory from AQAP. In Somalia, we helped a coalition of African nations push al-Shabab out of its strongholds. In Mali, we’re providing military aid to French-led intervention to push back al-Qaida in the Maghreb and help the people of Mali reclaim their future.
Much of our best counterterrorism cooperation results in the gathering and sharing of intelligence, the arrest and prosecution of terrorists. That’s how a Somali terrorist apprehended off the coast of Yemen is now in prison in New York. That;s how we worked with European allies to disrupt plots from Denmark to Germany to the United Kingdom. That’s how intelligence collected with Saudi Arabia helped us stop a cargo plane from being blown up over the Atlantic. These partnerships work.
But despite our strong preference for the detention and prosecution of terrorists, sometimes this approach is foreclosed. Al- Qaida and its affiliates try to gain a foothold in some of the most distant and unforgiving places on Earth.
They take refuge in remote tribal regions. They hide in caves and walled compounds. They train in empty deserts and rugged mountains.
In some of these places, such as parts of Somalia and Yemen, the state has only the most tenuous reach into the territory. In other cases, the state lacks the capacity or will to take action.
And it’s also not possible for America to simply deploy a team of special forces to capture every terrorist. Even when such an approach may be possible, there are places where it would pose profound risks to our troops and local civilians, where a terrorist compound cannot be breached without triggering a firefight -- with surrounding tribal communities, for example, that pose no threat to us -- times when putting U.S. boots on the ground may trigger a major international crisis.
To put it another way, our operation in Pakistan against Osama bin Laden cannot be the norm. The risks in that case were immense. The likelihood of capture, although that was our preference, was remote, given the certainty that our folks would confront resistance. The fact that we did not find ourselves confronted with civilian casualties or embroiled in a extended firefight was a testament to the meticulous planning and professionalism of our special forces, but it also depended on some luck. And it was supported by massive infrastructure in Afghanistan.
And even then, the cost to our relationship with Pakistan and the backlash among the Pakistani public over encroachment on their territory was so severe that we are just now beginning to rebuild this important partnership.
So it is in this context that the United States has taken lethal, targeted action against al-Qaida and its associated forces, including with remotely piloted aircraft commonly referred to as drones. As was true in previous armed conflicts, this new technology raises profound questions about who is targeted and why, about civilian casualties and the risk of creating new enemies, about the legality of such strikes under U.S. and international law, about accountability and morality.
So let me address these questions. To begin with, our actions are effective. Don’t take my word for it. In the intelligence gathered at bin Laden’s compound, we found that he wrote, we could lose the reserves to enemies’ airstrikes; we cannot fight airstrikes with explosives. Other communications from al-Qaida operatives confirm this as well. Dozens of highly skilled al-Qaida commanders, trainers, bomb makers and operatives have been taken off the battlefield. Plots have been disrupted that would have targeted international aviation, U.S. transit systems, European cities and our troops in Afghanistan. Simply put, these strikes have saved lives.
Moreover, America’s actions are legal. We were attacked on 9/11. Within a week, Congress overwhelmingly authorized the use of force. Under domestic law and international law, the United States is at war with al-Qaida, the Taliban, and their associated forces. We are at war with an organization that right now would kill as many Americans as they could if we did not stop them first. So this is a just war, a war waged proportionally, in last resort and in self-defense.
And yet as our fight enters a new phase, America’s legitimate claim of self-defense cannot be the end of the discussion. To say a military tactic is legal, or even effective, is not to say it is wise or moral in every instance, for the same progress that gives us the technology to strike half a world away also demands the discipline to constrain that power, or risk abusing it.
And that’s why, over the last four years, my administration has worked vigorously to establish a framework that governs our use of force against terrorists -- insisting upon clear guidelines, oversight and accountability that is now codified in presidential policy guidance that I signed yesterday.
In the Afghan war theater we must, and will continue to, support our troops until the transition is complete at the end of 2014. And that means we will continue to take strikes against high-value al- Qaida targets, but also against forces that are massing to support attacks on coalition forces.
But by the end of 2014 we will no longer have the same need for force protection, and the progress we have made against core al-Qaida will reduce the need for unmanned strikes.
Beyond the Afghan theater, we only target al-Qaida and its associated forces, and even then the use of drones is heavily constrained. America does not take strikes when we have the ability to capture individual terrorists. Our preference is always to detain, interrogate and prosecute them. America cannot take strikes wherever we choose. Our actions are bound by consultations with partners and respect for state sovereignty. America does not take strikes to punish individuals. We act against terrorists who pose a continuing and imminent threat to the American people and when there are no other governments capable of effectively addressing the threat. And before any strike is taken, there must be near certainty that no civilians will be killed or injured, the highest standard we can set.
Now, this last point is critical because much of the criticism about drone strikes, both here at home and abroad, understandably centers on reports of civilian casualties. There’s a wide gap between U.S. assessments of such casualties and nongovernmental reports. Nevertheless, it is a hard fact that U.S. strikes have resulted in civilian casualties, a risk that exists in every war.
And for the families of those civilians, no words or legal construct can justify their loss. For me and those in my chain of command, those deaths will haunt us as long as we live, just as we are haunted by the civilian casualties that have occurred throughout conventional fighting in Afghanistan and Iraq.
But as commander in chief, I must weigh these heartbreaking tragedies against the alternatives. To do nothing in the face of terrorist networks would invite far more civilian casualties, not just in our cities at home and our facilities abroad, but also in the very places, like Sanaa and Kabul and Mogadishu, where terrorists seek a foothold.
Remember that the terrorists we are after target civilians, and the death toll from their acts of terrorism against Muslims dwarfs any estimate of civilian casualties from drone strikes.
So doing nothing’s not an option.
Where foreign governments cannot or will not effectively stop terrorism in their territory, the primary alternative to targeted lethal action would be the use of conventional military options. As I’ve already said, even small special operations carry enormous risks. Conventional airpower or missiles are far less precise than drones and are likely to cause more civilian casualties and more local outrage. And invasions of these territories lead us to be viewed as occupying armies, unleash a torrent of unintended consequences, are difficult to contain, result in large numbers of civilian casualties and ultimately empower those who thrive on violent conflict.
So it is false to assert that putting boots on the ground is less likely to result in civilian deaths, or less likely to create enemies in the Muslim world. The results would be more U.S. deaths, more Blackhawks down, more confrontations with local populations, and an inevitable mission creep in support of such raids that could easily escalate into new wars.
Yes, the conflict with al-Qaida, like all armed conflict, invites tragedy. But by narrowly targeting our action against those who want to kill us, and not the people they hide among, we are choosing the course of action least likely to result in the loss of innocent life.
Our efforts must also be measured against the history of putting American troops in distant lands among hostile populations. In Vietnam, hundreds of thousands of civilians died in a war where the boundaries of battle were blurred. In Iraq and Afghanistan, despite the extraordinary courage and discipline of our troops, thousands of civilians have been killed. So neither conventional military action, nor waiting for attacks to occur, offers moral safe harbor, and neither does a sole reliance on law enforcement in territories that have no functioning police or security services and, indeed, have no functioning law.
Now, this is not to say that the risks are not real. Any U.S. military action in foreign lands risks creating more enemies and impacts public opinion overseas. Moreover, our laws constrain the power of the president, even during wartime, and I’ve taken an oath to defend the Constitution of the United States. The very precision of drones strikes and the necessary secrecy often involved in such actions can end up shielding our government from the public scrutiny that a troop deployment invites. It can also lead a president and his team to view drone strikes as a cure-all for terrorism.
And for this reason, I’ve insisted on strong oversight of all lethal action. After I took office, my administration began briefing all strikes outside of Iraq and Afghanistan to the appropriate committees of Congress. Let me repeat that: Not only did Congress authorize the use of force, it is briefed on every strike that America takes, every strike. That includes the one instance when we targeted an American citizen: Anwar Awlaki, the chief of external operations for AQAP.
Now, this week I authorized the declassification of this action and the deaths of three other Americans in drone strikes to facilitate transparency and debate on this issue and to dismiss some of the more outlandish claims that have been made.
For the record, I do not believe it would be constitutional for the government to target and kill any U.S. citizen -- with a drone or with a shotgun -- without due process. Nor should any president deploy armed drones over U.S. soil.
But when a U.S. citizen goes abroad to wage war against America and is actively plotting to kill U.S. citizens, and when neither the United States nor our partners are in a position to capture him before he carries out a plot, his citizenship should no more serve as a shield than a sniper shooting down on an innocent crowd should be protected from a swat team.
That’s who Anwar Awlaki was. He was continuously trying to kill people. He helped oversee the 2010 plot to detonate explosive devices on two U.S.-bound cargo planes. He was involved in planning to blow up an airliner in 2009. When Farouk Abdulmutallab, the Christmas Day bomber, went to Yemen in 2009, Awlaki hosted him, approved his suicide operation, helped him tape a martyrdom video to be shown after the attack, and his last instructions were to blow up the airplane when it was over American soil.
I would have detained and prosecuted Awlaki if we captured him before he carried out a plot. But we couldn’t. And as president, I would have been derelict in my duty had I not authorized the strike that took him out.
Of course, the targeting of any American raises constitutional issues that are not present in other strikes, which is why my administration submitted information about Awlaki to the Department of Justice months before Awlaki was killed and briefed the Congress before this strike as well.
But the high threshold that we’ve set for taking lethal action applies to all potential terrorist targets, regardless of whether or not they are American citizens. This threshold respects the inherent dignity of every human life.
Alongside the decision to put our men and women in uniform in harm’s way, the decision to use force against individuals or groups, even against a sworn enemy of the United States, is the hardest thing I do as president. But these decisions must be made, given my responsibility to protect the American people.
Now, going forward, I’ve asked my administration to review proposals to extend oversight of lethal actions outside of war zones that go beyond our reporting to Congress.
Each option has virtues in theory but poses difficulties in practice. For example, the establishment of a special court to evaluate and authorize lethal action has the benefit of bringing a third branch of government into the process but raises serious constitutional issues about presidential and judicial authority.
Another idea that’s been suggested, the establishment of an independent oversight board in the executive branch, avoids those problems but may introduce a layer of bureaucracy into national security decision-making without inspiring additional public confidence in the process.
But despite these challenges, I look forward to actively engaging Congress to explore these and other options for increased oversight.
I believe, however, that the use of force must be seen as part of a larger discussion we need to have about a comprehensive counterterrorism strategy, because for all the focus on the use of force, force alone cannot make us safe. We cannot use force everywhere that a radical ideology takes root. And in the absence of a strategy that reduces the wellspring of extremism, a perpetual war through drones or special forces or troop deployments will prove self- defeating and alter our country in troubling ways.
So the next element of our strategy involves addressing the underlying grievances and conflicts that feed extremism, from North Africa to South Asia. As we’ve learned this past decade, this is a vast and complex undertaking. We must be humble in our expectation that we can quickly resolve deep-rooted problems like poverty and sectarian hatred. And moreover, no two countries are alike, and some will undergo chaotic change before things get better. But our security and our values demand that we make the effort.
This means patiently supporting transitions to democracy in places like Egypt and Tunisia and Libya, because the peaceful realization of individual aspirations will serve as a rebuke to violent extremism. We must strengthen the opposition in Syria, while isolating extremist elements, because the end of a tyrant must not give way to the tyranny of terrorism.
We are actively working to promote peace between Israelis and Palestinians because it is right and because such a peace could help reshape attitudes in the region. And we must help countries modernize economies, upgrade education and encourage entrepreneurship because American leadership has always been elevated by our ability to connect with peoples’ hopes and not simply their fears.
Success on all these fronts requires sustained engagement, but it will also require resources. I know that foreign aid is one of the least popular expenditures that there is -- that’s true for Democrats and Republicans; I’ve seen the polling -- even though it amounts to less than 1 percent of the federal budget. In fact, a lot of folks think it’s 25 percent if you ask people on the streets. Less than 1 percent; still, wildly unpopular.
But foreign assistance cannot be viewed as charity. It is fundamental to our national security, and it’s fundamental to any sensible long-term strategy to battle extremism. Moreover, foreign assistance is a tiny fraction of what we spend fighting wars that our assistance might ultimately prevent. For what we spent in a month in Iraq at the height of the war, we could be training security forces in Libya, maintaining peace agreements between Israel and its neighbors, feeding the hungry in Yemen, building schools in Pakistan and creating reservoirs of good will that marginalize extremists.
That has to be part of our strategy.
Moreover, America cannot carry out this work if we don’t have diplomats serving in some very dangerous places. Over the past decade, we have strengthened security at our embassies, and I am implementing every recommendation of the Accountability Review Board, which found unacceptable failures in Benghazi. I’ve called on Congress to fully fund these efforts to bolster security and harden facilities, improve intelligence and facilitate a quicker response time from our military if a crisis emerges.
But even after we take these steps, some irreducible risks to our diplomats will remain. This is the price of being the world’s most powerful nation, particularly as a wave of change washes over the Arab world. And in balancing the trade-offs between security and active diplomacy, I firmly believe that any retreat from challenging regions will only increase the dangers we face in the long run. And that’s why we should be grateful to those diplomats who are willing to serve there.
Targeted action against terrorists, effective partnerships, diplomatic engagement and assistance -- through such a comprehensive strategy, we can significantly reduce the chances of large-scale attacks on the homeland and mitigate threats to Americans overseas. But as we guard against dangers from abroad, we cannot neglect the daunting challenge of terrorism from within our borders.
As I said earlier, this threat is not new. But technology and the Internet increase its frequency, and in some cases its lethality.
Today a person can consume hateful propaganda, commit themselves to a violent agenda and learn how to kill without leaving their home. To address this threat, two years ago my administration did a comprehensive review and engaged with law enforcement. And the best way to prevent violent extremism inspired by violent jihadists is to work with the Muslim American community, which has consistently rejected terrorism, to identify signs of radicalization, and partner with law enforcement when an individual is drifting towards violence.
And these partnerships can only work when we recognize that Muslims are a fundamental part of the American family. In fact, the success of American Muslims, and our determination to guard against any encroachments on their civil liberties, is the ultimate rebuke to those who say that we’re at war with Islam.
Now, thwarting homegrown plots presents particular challenges in part because of our proud commitment to civil liberties for all who call America home. That’s why in the years to come, we will have to keep working hard to strike the appropriate balance between our need for security and preserving those freedoms that make us who we are. That means reviewing the authorities of law enforcement so we can intercept new types of communication, but also build in privacy protections to prevent abuse.
That means that even after Boston, we do not deport someone or throw somebody in prison in the absence of evidence. That means putting careful constraints on the tools the government uses to protect sensitive information, such as the state secrets doctrine. And that means finally having a strong privacy and civil liberties board to review those issues where our counterterrorism efforts and our values may come into tension.
You know, the Justice Department’s investigation of national security leaks offers a recent example of the challenges involved in striking the right balance between our security and our open society. As commander in chief, I believe we must keep information secret that protects our operations and our people in the field. To do so, we must enforce consequences for those who break the law and breach their commitment to protect classified information. But a free press is also essential for our democracy. That’s who we are. And I’m troubled by the possibility that leak investigations may chill the investigative journalism that holds government accountable.
Journalists should not be at legal risk for doing their jobs. Our focus must be on those who break the law. That’s why I have called on Congress to pass a media shield law to guard against government overreach. And I’ve raised these issues with the attorney general, who shares my concern. So he’s agreed to review existing Department of Justice guidelines governing investigations that involve reporters, and he’ll convene a group of media organizations to hear their concerns as part of that review. And I’ve directed the attorney general to report back to me by July 12th.
Now, all these issues remind us that the choices we make about war can impact, in sometimes unintended ways, the openness and freedom on which our way of life depends. And that is why I intend to engage Congress about the existing Authorization to Use Military Force, or AUMF, to determine how we can continue to fight terrorism without keeping America on a perpetual wartime footing.
The AUMF is now nearly twelve years old. The Afghan War is coming to an end. Core al-Qaida is a shell of its former self. Groups like AQAP must be dealt with, but in the years to come, not every collection of thugs that labels themselves al-Qaida will pose a credible threat to the United States. Unless we discipline our thinking, our definitions, our actions, we may be drawn into more wars we don’t need to fight or continue to grant presidents unbound powers more suited for traditional armed conflicts between nation states.
So I look forward to engaging Congress and the American people in efforts to refine and ultimately repeal the AUMF’s mandate. And I will not sign laws designed to expand this mandate further. Our systematic effort to dismantle terrorist organizations must continue. But this war, like all wars, must end. That’s what history advises. It’s what our democracy demands.
And that brings me to my final topic: the detention of terrorist suspects.
I’m going to repeat one more time: As a matter of policy, the preference of the United States is to capture terrorist suspects. When we do detain a suspect, we interrogate them. And if the suspect can be prosecuted, we decide whether to try him in a civilian court or a military commission.
During the past decade the vast majority of those detained by our military were captured on the battlefield. In Iraq, we turned over thousands of prisoners as we ended the war. In Afghanistan, we have transitioned detention facilities to the Afghans as part of the process of restoring Afghan sovereignty. So we bring law-of-war detention to an end, and we are committed to prosecuting terrorists whenever we can.
The glaring exception to this time-tested approach is the detention center at Guantanamo Bay. The original premise for opening Gitmo, that detainees would not be able to challenge their detention, was found unconstitutional five years ago. In the meantime, Gitmo has become a symbol around the world for an America that flouts the rule of law. Our allies won’t cooperate with us if they think a terrorist will end up at Gitmo. During a time of budget cuts, we spend $150 million each year to imprison 166 people, almost a million dollars per prisoner. And the Department of Defense estimates that we must spend another 200 million (dollars) to keep Gitmo open at a time when we are cutting investments in education and research here at home and when the Pentagon is struggling is struggling with sequester and budget cuts.
As president, I have tried to close Gitmo. I transferred 67 detainees to other countries before Congress imposed restrictions to effectively prevent us from either transferring detainees to other countries or imprisoning them here in the United States. These restrictions make no sense. After all, under President Bush, some 530 detainees were transferred from Gitmo with Congress’ support. When I ran for president the first time, John McCain supported closing Gitmo. This was a bipartisan issue.
No person has ever escaped one of our super-max or military prisons here in the United States -- ever. Our courts have convicted hundreds of people for terrorism or terrorism-related offenses, including some folks who are more dangerous than most Gitmo detainees there in our prisons. And given my administration’s relentless pursuit of al-Qaida’s leadership, there is no justification beyond politics for Congress to prevent us from closing a facility that it should -- should have never been opened.
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Excuse me, President Obama, you are the commander in chief -- (off mic) -- (applause) --
PRESIDENT OBAMA: Today -- so -- (sustained applause) -- so let me finish, ma’am. So today -- so today, once again, today --
AUDIENCE MEMBER: (Off mic) -- for (102 ?) people -- (off mic) -- people’s rights, these desperate people -- (off mic) --
PRESIDENT OBAMA: I’m about to address, ma’am, but you got -- you got to let me speak. I’m about to address it.
AUDIENCE MEMBER: -- (off mic) -- our commander in chief --
PRESIDENT OBAMA: Let me address it.
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Our commander in chief -- (off mic) -- Guantanamo Bay --
PRESIDENT OBAMA: Why don’t you let me address it, ma’am.
AUDIENCE MEMBER: (Off mic.)
PRESIDENT OBAMA: Why don’t you sit down and I’ll tell you exactly what I’m going to do.
AUDIENCE MEMBER: (Off mic.)
PRESIDENT OBAMA: Thank you, ma’am. Thank you. Thank you. (Applause.) Ma’am -- thank you. You should let me finish my sentence.
Today I once again call on Congress to lift the restrictions on detainee transfers from Gitmo. I have asked -- (applause) -- I have asked the Department of Defense to designate a site in the United States where we can hold military commissions.
I am appointing a new senior envoy at the State Department and Defense Department whose sole responsibility will be to achieve the transfer of detainees to third countries. I am lifting the moratorium on detainee transfers to Yemen so we can review them on a case-by-case basis.
To the greatest extent possible, we will transfer detainees who have been cleared to go to other countries. Where we --
AUDIENCE MEMBER: (Off mic) -- released every day.
PRESIDENT OBAMA: Where appropriate, we will bring terrorists to justice in our courts and our military justice system. And we will insist that judicial review be available for every detainee. Now --
AUDIENCE MEMBER: (Off mic.)
PRESIDENT OBAMA: Ma’am, let me -- let me finish. Let me finish, ma’am.
Now, this is part of free speech, is you being able to speak, but also you listening and me being able to speak. All right? (Applause.) Thank you. (Applause.)
Now, even after we take these steps, one issue will remain, which is how to deal with those Gitmo detainees who we know have participated in dangerous plots or attacks but who cannot be prosecuted, for example, because the evidence against them has been compromise or is inadmissible in a court of law. But once we commit to a process of closing Gitmo, I am confident that this legacy problem can be resolved, consistent with our commitment to the rule of law.
And I know the politics are hard. But history will cast a harsh judgment on this aspect of our fight against terrorism and those of us who fail to end it. Imagine a future 10 years from now or 20 years from now when the United States of America is still holding people who have been charged with no crime on a piece of land that is not a part of our country.
Look at the current situation, where we are force-feeding detainees who are being held on a hunger strike. I’m willing to cut the young lady who interrupted me some slack because it’s worth being passionate about. Is this who we are? Is that something our founders foresaw? Is that the America we want to leave our children?
Our sense of justice is stronger than that. We have prosecuted scores of terrorists in our courts. That includes Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab, who tried to blow up an airplane over Detroit, and Faisal Shahzad, who put a car bomb in Times Square. It’s in a court of law that we will try Dzhokhar Tsarnaev, who is accused of bombing the Boston Marathon.
Richard Reid, the shoe bomber, is as we speak serving a life sentence in a maximum security prison here in the United States. In sentencing Reid, Judge William Young told him, “the way we treat you is the measure of our own liberty.”
When --
AUDIENCE MEMBER: How about Abdulrahman al-Awlaki, 16-year-old -- (inaudible) --
PRESIDENT OBAMA: -- when we --
AUDIENCE MEMBER: -- killed by you?
PRESIDENT OBAMA: -- we went --
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Is that the way we treat a 16-year-old -- (inaudible)?
PRESIDENT OBAMA: He -- he -- he went on to --
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Why was he killed?
PRESIDENT OBAMA: -- we went --
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Can you tell us why Abdulrahman al-Awlaki was killed? Can you tell the Muslim people their lives are as precious as our lives? Can you take the drones out of the hands of the CIA? Can you stop the signature strikes that are killing people on the basis of suspicious activities?
PRESIDENT OBAMA: We’re addressing that, ma’am.
AUDIENCE MEMBER: (Inaudible) -- apologize to the thousands of Muslims that you have killed? Will you compensate the innocent family victims? That will make us safer here at home.
I love my country! I love the rule of law! The drones are making us less safe.
And keeping people in indefinite detention in Guantanamo is making us less safe. Abide by the rule of law -- (inaudible) --
PRESIDENT OBAMA: You know, I think that the -- and I’m going off script, as you might expect, here. (Laughter, applause.) The -- the voice of that woman is worth paying attention to. (Applause.) Obviously -- obviously I do not agree with much of what she said, and obviously she wasn’t listening to me in much of what I said.
But these are tough issues, and the suggestion that we can gloss over them is wrong. You know, when that judge sentenced Mr. Reid, the shoe bomber, he went on to point to the American flag that flew in the courtroom. “That flag,” he said, “will fly there long after this is all forgotten. That flag still stands for freedom.”
So, America, we have faced down dangers far greater than al- Qaida. By staying true to the values of our founding, and by using our constitutional compass, we have overcome slavery and Civil War, and fascism, and communism. In just these last few years as president, I have watched the American people bounce back from painful recession, mass shootings, natural disasters like the recent tornados that devastated Oklahoma. These events were heartbreaking; they shook our communities to the core. But because of the resilience of the American people, these events could not come close to breaking us.
I think of Lauren Manning, the 9/11 survivor who had severe burns over 80 percent of her body, who said, “That’s my reality. I put a Band-Aid on it, literally, and I move on.”
I think of the New Yorkers who filled Times Square the day after an attempted car bomb as if nothing had happened.
I think of the proud Pakistani parents who, after their daughter was invited to the White House, wrote to us, “We have raised an American Muslim daughter to dream big and never give up because it does pay off.”
I think of all the wounded warriors rebuilding their lives and helping other vets to find jobs.
I think of the runner planning to do the 2014 Boston Marathon, who said: “Next year you’re going to have more people than ever. Determination is not something to be messed with.”
That’s who the American people are: determined, and not to be messed with.
And now we need a strategy and a politics that reflects this resilient spirit. Our victory against terrorism won’t be measured in a surrender ceremony at a battleship or a statue being pulled to the ground. Victory will be measured in parents taking their kids to school, immigrants coming to our shores, fans taking in a ballgame, a veteran starting a business, a bustling city street, a citizen shouting her concerns at a president. The quiet determination, that strength of character and bond of fellowship, that refutation of fear -- that is both our sword and our shield.
And long after the current messengers of hate have faded from the world’s memory, alongside the brutal despots and deranged madmen and ruthless demagogues who litter history, the flag of the United States will still wave from small-town cemeteries, to national monuments, to distant outposts abroad. And that flag will still stand for freedom.
Thank you very much, everybody. God bless you. May God bless the United States of America.

Rosewood