Friday, October 30, 2020

The Day After Election Day

 The Day After Election Day

Current and former Trump administration officials are worried about what might happen on Nov. 3d 

By Ron Suskind NY Times

Mr. Suskind is an investigative journalist who has written about the presidency and national affairs for more than three decades. 

There will of course be an Election Day — and it could be one of tumult, banners colliding, incidents at the polls and attempted hacks galore. More likely than not, it will end without a winner named or at least generally accepted.

America will probably awaken on Nov. 4 into uncertainty. Whatever else happens, there is no doubt that President Trump is ready for it.

I’ve spent the last month interviewing some two dozen officials and aides, several of whom are still serving in the Trump administration. The central sources in this story are or were senior officials, mainly in jobs that require Senate confirmation. They have had regular access to the president and to briefings at the highest level. As a rule, they asked for anonymity because they were taking a significant professional and, in some cases, personal risk in speaking out in a way that Mr. Trump will see as disloyal, an offense for which he has promised to make offenders pay. 

Several of them are in current posts in intelligence, law enforcement or national security and are focused on the concurrent activities of violent, far-right and white supremacy groups that have been encouraged by the president’s words and actions. They are worried that the president could use the power of the government — the one they all serve or served within — to keep himself in office or to create favorable terms for negotiating his exit from the White House. Like many other experts inside and outside the government, they are also concerned about foreign adversaries using the internet to sow chaos, exacerbate divisions and undermine our democratic process. 

One senior government official, who spent years working in proximity to Mr. Trump, said: “He has done nothing else that’s a constant, except for acting in his own interest. ”Credit...Erin Schaff/The New York Times

Many of those adversaries, they report, are already finding success in simply amplifying and directing the president’s words and tweets. And they’re thoroughly delighted, a former top intelligence official told me, “at how profoundly divided we’ve become. Donald Trump capitalized on that — he didn’t invent it — but someday soon we’re going to have figure out how to bring our country together, because right now we’re on a dangerous path, so very dangerous, and so vulnerable to bad actors.”

None of these officials know what will happen in the future any better than the rest of us do. It is their job to fret over worst-case scenarios, and they’re damn good at it. I can’t know all their motives for wanting to speak to me, but one thing many of them share is a desire to make clear that the alarm bells heard across the country are ringing loudly inside the administration too, where there are public servants looking to avert conflict, at all costs.

It is possible, of course, that this will be an Election Day much like all other Election Days. Even if it takes weeks or months before the result is known and fully certified, it could be a peaceful process, where all votes are reasonably counted, allowing those precious electors to be distributed based on a fair fight. The anxiety we’re feeling now could turn out to be a lot of fretting followed by nothing much, a political version of Y2K. Or not. 

Many of the officials I spoke to came back to one idea: You don’t know Donald Trump like we do. Even though they can’t predict exactly what will happen, their concerns range from the president welcoming, then leveraging, foreign interference in the election, to encouraging havoc that grows into conflagrations that would merit his calling upon U.S. forces. Because he is now surrounded by loyalists, they say, there is no one to try to tell an impulsive man what he should or shouldn’t do.

“That guy you saw in the debate,” a second former senior intelligence official told me, after the first debate, when the president offered one of the most astonishing performances of any leader in modern American history — bullying, ridiculing, manic, boasting, fabricating, relentlessly interrupting and talking over his opponent. “That’s really him. Not the myth that’s been created. That’s Trump.”

Still another senior government official, who spent years working in proximity to Mr. Trump, put it like this: “He has done nothing else that’s a constant, except for acting in his own interest.” And that’s how “he’s going to be thinking, every step of the way, come Nov. 

One of the first things senior staff members learned about Mr. Trump was that he was all but un-briefable. He couldn’t seem to take in complex information about policy choices and consequences in the ways presidents usually do in Oval Office meetings.

What they saw instead was the guy from the first debate. He’d switch subjects, go on crazy tangents, abuse and humiliate people, cut them off midsentence. Officials I interviewed described this scenario again and again.

In the middle of a briefing, Mr. Trump would turn away and grab the phone. Sometimes the call would go to Fox television hosts like Sean Hannity or Lou Dobbs; sometimes the officials wouldn’t even know who was on the other end. But whoever it was would instantly become the key voice in the debate. 

In one meeting about the border wall, Mr. Trump called a person “who built a flagpole at one of his golf courses,” said an official in attendance that day. Mr. Trump explained that because this person “got in a big fight about the size of the flagpole” and because it was “really big,” “the president thought, of course, they would understand how to build a wall.”

“Obviously,” this official said, “it is not the same.”

“We used to joke that is was like a phone-a-friend thing, a lifeline thing” from “Who Wants to Be a Millionaire,” this person said. Soon, senior officials — frustrated that they couldn’t seem to get a word in during briefings — adopted their own version of this technique. They’d ask an array of people — some Trump friends, some members of Congress, assorted notables — to call Mr. Trump and talk to him about key issues. The callers just couldn’t let on that a senior official had put them up to it. Two of these senior officials compared the technique to the manipulations of “The Truman Show,” in which the main character, played by Jim Carrey, does not know that his entire life is being orchestrated by a TV producer.

In March 2018, Mr. Trump took a trip on Air Force One to Charlotte, N.C., for the funeral of the Rev. Billy Graham. 

History may note that the most important thing that happened that day had little to do with the religious leader and his large life, save a single thread of his legacy. That would be his grandson, Edward Graham, an Army Ranger “right out of central casting,” as Mr. Trump liked to say, who’d served eight tours in Afghanistan and Iraq over 16 years. In full uniform he met Mr. Trump to escort him, and the two talked about the country’s grueling conflicts overseas. 

For Mr. Trump, the meeting was a face-to-face lifeline call. When he returned to Washington, he couldn’t stop talking about troop withdrawals, starting with Afghanistan. During his campaign, he had frequently mentioned his desire to bring home troops from these “endless wars.” As president, his generals — led by the polished, scholarly, even-keeled Defense Secretary Jim Mattis — explained the importance of U.S. troops in stabilizing whole regions of the world, and the value of that stability. Suddenly, after talking to Edward Graham, Mr. Trump didn’t want to hear it.

“In a normal, sane environment,” said a senior Pentagon official, “were it Obama or Bush, or whatever, they’d meet Billy Graham’s grandson and they’d be like ‘Oh that’s interesting,’ and take it to heart, but then they’d go and they’d at least try to validate it with the policymakers, or their military experts. But no, with him, it’s like improv. So, he gets this stray electron and he goes, ‘OK, this is the ground truth.’ ” 

Mr. Graham, now working in his family’s ministry, said, “Any conversations that I have had with the president are private.” And, “additionally, when I had those conversations with the president, I was in the Army and I was speaking with our commander in chief.”

Several weeks later, at a speech in Ohio, Mr. Trump said, “we’re knocking the hell out of ISIS” in Syria and the U.S. troops there would be coming home “very soon.” 

Once they heard this, shock started to run through Mr. Mattis and his old friend, John Kelly, who’d commanded Marine forces but was then the chief of staff to the president. Both men understood that the 2,000 U.S. troops in Syria were, soldier for soldier, probably the most valuable fighting force on the planet. They not only fought alongside the Kurds in routing ISIS, which was battered yet still a threat. These few troops helped hold the region intact, supporting the Syrian Democratic Forces, also filled with Kurds, which in turn checked the expansion of Syria’s murderous leader, Bashar al-Assad, and also kept Russia, Mr. Assad’s patron, in check. The Kurds had suffered tremendously in these conflicts, much more than the Americans had. 

Word spread, and soon much of Congress, the Pentagon, the State Department and Mr. Kelly were doing various versions of “The Truman Show,” trying to get people on the phone that Mr. Trump trusted. 

This went on for much of the year — as various voices, both inside and outside of government, worked to try to excise this idea of pulling troops out of Syria from the man.

On Dec. 19, 2018, top brass at the Pentagon received notification via Mr. Trump’s Twitter feed, along with more than 80 million of his followers: The United States would be pulling troops out of Syria. It wasn’t clear what, precisely, Mr. Trump was thinking, beyond the tweet: “We have defeated ISIS in Syria, my only reason for being there during the Trump presidency.” 

ISIS was shrunken, but not yet fully defeated. And the move meant a radical reduction in American influence in Syria, an increase in the power of Russia and Iran to determine events there and quite possibly a land grab by the Turkish government, sworn enemy of the Kurds. Senior leadership of the U.S. government went into a panic. Capitol Hill, too. John Bolton, who was still the national security adviser then, and Virginia Boney, then the legislative affairs director of the National Security Council, hit the phones, calling more than a dozen senators from both parties. Mr. Bolton started each call, saying, in an apologetic tone, “This is the mind of the president, he wants to bring home our troops,” and then switched to frank talk about what might be done. Senator Lindsey Graham of South Carolina was beside himself. Senator Joni Ernst of Iowa, who served during the Iraq War, was dumbstruck. So was Senator Dan Sullivan of Alaska, a colonel in the Marine Corps Reserves who had served in Iraq and Afghanistan. “Is there any way we can reverse this?” he pleaded. “What can we do?” 

That’s what Mr. Mattis wondered. He’d worked nearly two years developing techniques to try to manage Mr. Trump, from colorful PowerPoint slides to several kinds of flattery. This was his moment. The next day, he suited up, put on his cherished, navy blue NATO tie, with the four-pointed symbol of the alliance from which Mr. Trump had threatened to withdraw, and entered the Oval Office. He tried every technique — his entire arsenal, every tack, every argument. The president was unmoved. Mr. Mattis paused, and then pulled from his breast pocket an envelope with his resignation letter. 

Down the hall, the very next day, Mr. Kelly was almost done cleaning out his office. He, too, had had enough. He and Mr. Trump had been at each other every day for months. Later, he told The Washington Examiner, “I said, whatever you do — and we were still in the process of trying to find someone to take my place — I said whatever you do, don’t hire a ‘yes man,’ someone who won’t tell you the truth — don’t do that.” But, in fact, that’s exactly what Mr. Trump wanted. Seventeen months as chief of staff, stopping Mr. Trump from umpteen crazy moves, from calling in the Marines to shoot migrants crossing the Rio Grande — “It’s illegal, sir, and the kids, they’re good kids, they just won’t do it” — to invading Venezuela. The list was long. Were they just trial balloons? Sure, some were. And, if someone wasn’t there to challenge Mr. Trump, might they have risen to action? Surely. 

“I think the biggest shock he had — ’cause his assumption was the generals, ‘my generals,’ as he used to say and it used to make us cringe — was this issue of, I think, he just assumed that generals would be completely loyal to the kaiser,” a former senior official told me. “And when we weren’t, that was a huge shock to him, because he thought if anyone was going to be loyal, it would be the generals. And the first people he realized were not loyal to him were the generals.”

This shock, and his first two-plus years of struggle with seasoned, expert advisers, led to an insight for Mr. Trump. It all came back to loyalty. He needed to get rid of any advisers or senior officials who vowed loyalty to the Constitution over personal loyalty to him. Which is pretty much what he proceeded to do. 

In February 2019, William Barr arrived as attorney general, having auditioned for the job with a 19-page memo arguing in various and creative ways that the president’s powers should be exercised nearly without limits and his actions stand virtually beyond review. He stood ready to brilliantly manage the receipt of the Mueller Report in March. Mr. Barr’s moves constituted what amounted to a clean kill, decapitating the sprawling nearly two-year investigation led by his old friend with a single blow.

That summer, two more heavyweight senior officials, Dan Coats, the director of national intelligence, and his deputy, Sue Gordon, a beloved 32-year veteran of the C.I.A., both resigned. To replace Mr. Coats, Trump selected Representative John Ratcliffe of Texas, a small-town mayor-turned-congressman with no meaningful experience in intelligence — who quickly withdrew from consideration after news reports questioned his qualifications; he lacked support among key Republican senators as well. Mr. Trump then picked a communications official in the administration of George W. Bush and ambassador to Germany under Mr. Trump, Richard Grenell. Mr. Grenell’s stint was temporary and in May Mr. Trump brought back his first choice, Mr. Ratcliffe, who is now director of national intelligence for Mr. Trump’s homestretch and postelection period. 

In other words, by the summer of 2020, Mr. Trump was well along in completing the transition to a loyalty-tested senior team. When I asked the White House to respond to this idea, I heard back from Sarah Matthews, a deputy press secretary. 

“President Trump serves the American people by keeping his promises and taking action where the typical politician would provide hollow words,” she said. “The president wants capable public servants in his administration who will enact his America First agenda and are faithful to the Constitution — these principles are not mutually exclusive. President Trump is delivering on his promise to make Washington accountable again to the citizens it’s meant to serve and will always fight for what is best for the American people.” 

The reason having loyalists at both the Department of Justice and D.N.I. is so very important for the president is that it allows him, potentially, to coordinate two key agencies of the government — secret intelligence and prosecution — toward his own political ends. This is exactly what he was criticized for doing in the summer and fall of 2020, with Mr. Barr being accused of announcing politically motivated action and investigations — including to support the fiction of widespread voter fraud — and Mr. Ratcliffe, with collecting and releasing information that is targeted at Mr. Trump’s opponents.

The third leg of what would be an ideal triad for this sort of activity is the F.B.I. director, Christopher Wray, who drew Mr. Trump’s ire in September, when, in congressional hearings, he echoed the consensus of the intelligence community that the Russians intervened in the 2016 election on Mr. Trump’s behalf, that they were doing it again in this election cycle, that “racially motivated violent extremism” — coming mostly from right-wing white supremacists — was a persistent threat, and that widespread voter fraud was a nonissue. 

The F.B.I. has been under siege since this past summer, according to a senior official who spoke on the condition of anonymity. “The White House is using friendly members of Congress to try to get at certain information under the guise of quote-unquote, oversight, but really to get politically helpful information before the election,” the official said. “They want some sort of confirmation that we’ve opened an investigation,” for example, into Hunter Biden, “which, again, the F.B.I. doesn’t confirm or deny whether it’s opened investigations.” 

This official said that Senator Ron Johnson of Wisconsin, chairman of the Senate Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs committee, “sends letters constantly now, berating, asking for the sun, moon, stars, the entire Russia investigation, and then either going on the morning talk shows or calling the attorney general whenever he doesn’t get precisely what he wants.” The urgency, two F.B.I. officials said, ratcheted up after Mr. Trump was told three weeks ago that he wouldn’t get the “deliverables” he wanted before the election of incriminating evidence about those who investigated and prosecuted his former national security adviser, Michael Flynn. 

Ben Voelkel, a spokesman for Senator Johnson, specifically disputed the idea that Mr. Johnson had made requests to receive material quickly for TV appearances.

Furthermore, he said, “Senator Johnson has been frustrated by the failure of the F.B.I. and many other federal agencies to timely produce documents since taking over as chairman of the Senate’s chief oversight body in 2015. In that time, the F.B.I. habitually rebuffed oversight requests, which prompted Senator Johnson to issue F.B.I. a subpoena in August 2020. Senator Johnson has been putting pressure on the F.B.I. — and other federal agencies — because that’s the only way to get the records the committee is entitled to receive.” 

Rumors swirled a week before the election that Mr. Trump was preparing to fire Mr. Wray, as well as, perhaps, the director of the C.I.A., Gina Haspel — who had also drawn Mr. Trump’s ire, according to both former and current senior intelligence officials. The speculation is that they could both be fired immediately after the election, when Mr. Trump will want to show the cost paid for insufficient loyalty and to demonstrate that he remains in charge. 

The senior official at the F.B.I., however, said that “firing the director won’t accomplish the goal.” There are “37,000 other people he would have to fire. It won’t work.” 

That doesn’t mean that the president won’t try. Nov. 4 will be a day, said one of the former senior intelligence officials, “when he’ll want to match word with deed.” Key officials in several parts of the government told me how they thought the progression from the 3rd to the 4th might go down.

They are loath to give up too many precise details, but it’s not hard to speculate from what we already know. Disruption would most likely begin on Election Day morning somewhere on the East Coast, where polls open first. Miami and Philadelphia (already convulsed this week after another police shooting), in big swing states, would be likely locations. It could be anything, maybe violent, maybe not, started by anyone, or something planned and executed by any number of organizations, almost all of them on the right fringe, many adoring of Mr. Trump. The options are vast and test the imagination. Activists could stage protests at a few of the more crowded polling places and draw those in long lines into conflict. 

A group could just directly attack a polling place, injuring poll workers of both parties, and creating a powerful visual — an American polling place in flames, like the ballot box in Massachusetts that was burned earlier this week — that would immediately circle the globe. Some enthusiasts may simply enter the area around a polling location to root out voter fraud — as the president has directed his supporters to do — taking advantage of a 2018 court ruling that allows the Republican National Committee to pursue “ballot security” operations without court approval. 

Would that mean that Mr. Trump caused any such planned activities or improvisations? No, not directly. He’s in an ongoing conversation — one to many, in a twisted e pluribus unum — with a vast population, which is in turn in conversations — many to many — among themselves. People are receiving messages, interpreting them and deciding to act, or not. If, say, the Proud Boys attack a polling location, is it because they were spurred on by Mr. Trump’s “stand back and stand by” instructions? Is Mr. Trump telling his most fervent supporters specifically what to do? No. But security officials are terrified by the dynamics of this volatile conversation. It can move in so many directions and very quickly become dangerous, as we have already seen several times this year.

The local police are already on-guard in those cities and others around the country for all sorts of possible incidents at polling places, including the possibility of gunfire. If something goes wrong, the media will pick this up in early morning reports and it will spread quickly, increasing tension at polling places across the country, where the setup is ripe for conflict. 

Conservative media could then say the election was being stolen, summoning others to activate, maybe violently. This is the place where cybersecurity experts are on the lookout for foreign actors to amplify polling location incidents many times over, with bots and algorithms and stories written overseas that slip into the U.S. digital diet. News of even a few incidents could summon a violent segment of Mr. Trump’s supporters into action, giving foreign actors even more to amplify and distribute, spreading what is, after all, news of mayhem to the wider concentric circles of Mr. Trump’s loyalists. Groups from the left may engage as well, most likely as a counterpoint to those on the right. Those groups are less structured, more like an “ideology or movement,” as Mr. Wray described them in his September testimony. But, as a senior official told me, the numbers on the left are vast. 

Violence and conflict throughout that day at the polls would surely affect turnout, allowing Mr. Trump to claim that the in-person vote had been corrupted, if that suits his purposes. There’s no do-over for Election Day. 

Under the 12th Amendment, which Mr. Trump has alluded to on several occasions, the inability to determine a clear winner in the presidential election brings the final decision to the House of Representatives. The current composition of the House, in which Republicans control more state delegations even though Democrats are in the majority, favors Trump. But the state count could flip to the Democrats with this election. 

There are many scenarios that might unfold from here, nearly all of them entailing weeks or even months of conflict, and giving an advantage to the person who already runs the U.S. government. 

There will likely be some reckoning of the in-person vote drawn from vote tallies and exit polls. If Joe Biden is way ahead in these projections, and they are accepted as sound, Mr. Trump may find himself having to claim fraud or suppression that amounts to too large a share of votes to seem reasonable. Inside the Biden campaign they are calling this “too big to rig.”

Races tend to tighten at the end, but the question is not so much the difference between the candidates’ vote totals, or projections of them, as it is what Mr. Trump can get his supporters to believe. Mr. Trump might fairly state, at this point, that he can get a significant slice of his base to believe anything. 

But he could use all the help that he can summon to invalidate the in-person vote.

Senior intelligence officials are worried that a foreign power could finally manage a breach of the American voting architecture — or leave enough of a digital trail to be perceived to have breached it. There were enormous efforts to do so, largely but not exclusively by the Russians, in 2016, when election systems in every state were targeted. There is also concern that malware attacks could cripple state governments and their electronic voter registration data, something that could make swaths of voters unable to vote. A senior official told me that provisional ballots can then be passed out and “we keep all the receipts,” meaning that these votes would have a paper ballot trail that can be laboriously counted and rechecked. But a breach or an appearance of a breach, in any state’s machinery, would, in a chaotic flow of events, be a well-timed gift to Mr. Trump.

The lie easily outruns truth — and the best “disinformation,” goes a longtime C.I.A. rule, “is actually truthful.” It all blends together. “Then the president then substantiates it, gives it credence, gives it authority from the highest office,” says the senior government official. “Then his acolytes mass-blast it out. Then it becomes the narrative, and fact, and no rational, reasonable explanation to the contrary will move” his supporters “an inch.” 

No matter how the votes split, there’s an expectation among officials that Mr. Trump will claim some kind of victory on Nov. 4, even if it’s a victory he claims was hijacked by fraud — just as he falsely claimed that Hillary Clinton’s three million-vote lead in the popular vote was the result of millions of votes from unauthorized immigrants. This could come in conjunction with statements, supported by carefully chosen “facts,” that the election was indeed “rigged,” as he’s long been warning. 

If the streets then fill with outraged people, he can easily summon, or prompt, or encourage troublemakers among his loyalists to turn a peaceful crowd into a sea of mayhem. They might improvise on their own in sparking violence, presuming it pleases their leader.

If the crowds are sufficiently large and volatile, he can claim to be justified in responding with federal powers to bring order. Secretary of Defense Mark Esper, and the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Mark Milley, have both said they are opposed to deploying armed forces on American soil. 

A senior Pentagon official, though, laid out a back-door plan that he was worried about. It won’t start, he thinks, with a sweeping move to federalize the National Guard, which is within the President’s Article 2 powers; it’d be more of a state by state process. The head of the National Guard of some state “starts feeling uncomfortable with something and then calls up the Pentagon.”

The F.B.I., meanwhile, is bracing for huge challenges. “We are all-hands-on-deck for the foreseeable future,” the F.B.I. official I mentioned earlier told me. “We’ve been talking to our state and local counterparts and gearing up for the expectation that it’s going to be a significant law-enforcement challenge for probably weeks or months,” this official said. “It feels pretty terrifying.”

In the final few weeks of the campaign, and during Mr. Trump’s illness, he’s done two things that seem contradictory: seeking votes from anyone who might still be swayed and consolidating and activating his army of most ardent followers. They are loyal to him as a person, several officials pointed out, not as president. That army Trump can direct in the difficult days ahead and take with him, wherever he goes. He may activate it. He may bargain with it, depending on how the electoral chips fall. It’s his insurance policy. 

The senior government official who discussed Mr. Trump’s amplifying of messages spoke with great clarity about these codes of loyalty. The official was raised in, and regularly visits, what is now a Trump stronghold. 

“They’re the reason he took off the damned mask when he got to the White House” from Walter Reed, the official said. “Those people eat that up, where any reasonable, rational person would be horrified. You are still actively shedding a deadly virus. You are lucky enough to have the best and brightest doctors, trial drugs, whatever. You get flown back to the White House, and you do a photo-op with a military salute to no one. You ask it to be refilmed, and you take off your mask, which, in my mind, has become a signal to his core base of supporters that are willing to put themselves at risk and danger to show loyalty to him.”

But across the government, another official — a senior intelligence official in a different department — argues that citizens may yet manage to rise to the challenge of this difficult election, in a time of division. 

“The last line of defense in elections is the American voter,” he told me. “This is the most vulnerable phase,” now and the days immediately after Election Day, “where we’re so eager to have an outcome, that actors both foreign and domestic are going to exploit that interest, that thirst, that need for resolution to the drama.”

I asked him what he would say to American voters. “Look,” he said, softly, “just understand that you’re being manipulated. That’s politics, that’s foreign influence, they’re trying to manipulate you and drive you to a certain outcome.”

“Americans are, I think, hopefully, made of sterner stuff.”

Friday, October 23, 2020

Trump issues sweeping order for tens of thousands of career federal employees.

 Trump issues sweeping order for tens of thousands of career federal employees to lose civil service protections

By Lisa Rein and Eric Yoder Washington Post

President Trump this week fired his biggest broadside yet against the federal bureaucracy by issuing an executive order that would remove job security from an estimated tens of thousands of civil servants and dramatically remake the government.

The directive, issued late Wednesday, strips long-held civil service protections from employees whose work involves policymaking, allowing them to be dismissed with little cause or recourse, much like the political appointees who come and go with each administration.

Federal scientists, attorneys, regulators, public health experts and many others in senior roles would lose rights to due process and in some cases, union representation, at agencies across the government. The White House declined to say how many jobs would be swept into a class of employees with fewer civil service rights, but civil service experts and union leaders estimated anywhere from tens of thousands to hundreds of thousands in a workforce of 2.1 million.

It would be a profound reimagining of the career workforce, but one that may end up as a statement of purpose rather than anything else. The order fast-tracks a process that gives agencies until Jan. 19 to review potentially affected jobs. That’s a day before the next presidential inauguration. An administration under Democratic nominee Joe Biden would be unlikely to allow the changes to proceed.

Still, the order, coming less than two weeks before the election, represents a stunning effort to reshape large parts of the nonpartisan government, which is supposed to serve as a cadre of subject-matter experts for every administration.

“President Trump is delivering on his promise to make Washington accountable again to the citizens it’s meant to serve,” Russell Vought, director of the Office of Management and Budget, said in a statement. “This much-needed reform will increase accountability in essential policymaking positions within the government.”

Critics said the latest effort, while not affecting a majority of the government, would upend the foundation of the career workforce by imposing political loyalty tests.

“I am calling this a declaration of war on the civil service,” said Richard Loeb, senior policy counsel for the American Federation of Government Employees, the largest union representing federal workers.

Political appointees ultimately call the shots on policy direction, but career employees advise them on how to follow the law and implement their priorities.

Tensions are common. But in the Trump era, they have reached a fever pitch in many offices, as career employees chafe at an agenda that has upended Washington. Political appointees have come to view many civil servants with suspicion. The new directive tries to even the score, returning the upper hand to the administration, two senior administration officials said. They spoke on the condition of anonymity because they were not authorized to speak publicly.

And over almost four years, the Trump administration has moved to weaken employee unions and hold them accountable for misconduct and weak performance.

The administration has been open with its frustration at the obstacles to firing poor performers. “Agencies need the flexibility to expeditiously remove poorly performing employees from these positions without facing extensive delays or litigation,” the order says.

The White House’s earlier efforts to limit the power of federal employee unions and impose faster discipline survived multiple court challenges as it created a climate of anxiety across much of the government.

Agencies have reined in some job protections for all employees, imposing shorter timetables for correcting poor performance and appeals. They’ve dispensed with established union practices such as allowing labor officials to use agency computers for work on employees’ behalf, for example. And a long-held practice called official time, in which unions work on behalf of employees facing discipline or other action, has been all but killed.

Even if Trump loses the election, Loeb said the administration could move in fewer than 90 days to impose the order, which he worries might be designed to let Trump political appointees stay on into a Biden administration.

“This could be used to put a whole bunch of Trump loyalists in place,” Loeb said, making it messy for a Biden team to fire them.

Loeb estimated that the change could strip due process rights and protections from more than 100,000 employees.

Rep. Don Beyer (D), whose Northern Virginia district includes about 85,000 federal workers, said the order, if enacted, would usher in loyalty tests and further politicize agencies that have become deeply partisan workplaces under Trump.

“It’s an attempt to redefine the civil service as a political arm of the presidency rather than public servants who work for the American people,” Beyer said, calling the result “open cronyism that does not benefit the country, but the president.”

The order would shift the affected employees from what is known as the “competitive service” — which covers the bulk of the executive branch — into the “excepted service,” which in general applies to political appointees below the level requiring Senate confirmation.

The group would no longer be hired under competitive procedures and would lose its right to be represented by a union.

While unions said they heard rumblings of the order, neither they nor government personnel experts say they were consulted on the details.

“The order is highly troubling,” said Max Stier, president and chief executive of the nonprofit, nonpartisan Partnership for Public Service. “It appears to be an effort to remove the career merit protections around a core part of the civil service.”

Stier said that while the change would not turn the employees into political appointees, “the effect and the apparent intent is that they are moving them into that box. The discretion for both hiring and firing is so great that the merit principles are undermined, and they resemble a political appointee much more than a career civil servant.”

“This is a bad idea, and it was done in a bad way,” he said. “What happens next is something that the election will be relevant for.”

While it does not define which occupations will be swept into the new job classification, the order gives broad roles, including those that develop or advocate policy, negotiate with employee unions, write regulations, and do legal work. The work would include “substantial discretion to determine the manner in which the agency exercises functions committed to the agency by law.”

“Career employees in confidential, policy-determining, policymaking, and policy-advocating positions wield significant influence over Government operations and effectiveness,” Trump wrote.

Among career employees, the “excepted service” mainly applies to positions in which it is not practical to use competitive processes in hiring, such as attorneys. Employees of some entire agencies, such as in the intelligence community, also are in the excepted service.

Hiring managers are not required to post these kinds of vacancies on the government’s central job board, USAJobs.gov. The jobs do not require the complex rating systems of applicants that are mandated for most federal roles. And there is no formal preference for veterans.

Unless they are veterans, employees in this group do not have rights to appeal disciplinary actions by a supervisor for two years, rather than the standard one year.

The order would not affect the roughly 6,000 senior executives in the government. But experts on the civil service said the most likely targets would be employees at the highest level of the General Schedule below that, GS-13, -14 and -15.

The new set of employees would lose the rights to due process and appeals of personnel actions against them they now enjoy — with one exception. Whistleblowers and those claiming discrimination or harassment would have more rights, according to John Berry, an attorney who represents federal workers.

The Trump administration has moved aggressively on other issues involving federal workers. It has recommended in its annual budget proposals numerous cuts to federal retirement benefits while advocating that employees pay more toward those benefits. While Congress has not accepted those proposals, the administration moved on its own authority in several controversial ways.

Trump’s new order closely follows issuance of rules telling agencies to provide only the minimal accommodations required by law to assist underperforming employees before disciplining them and to make the maximum use of their discretion in choosing discipline either for poor performance or misconduct.

 

Saturday, October 03, 2020

Totalitarian Friendship: Carl Schmitt in Contemporary China

 



Totalitarian Friendship: Carl Schmitt in Contemporary China 


By Jackson T. Reinhardt  INQUIRIES


The Political Thought of Carl Schmitt 

Three Chinese Interpretations 

Schmitt and the Chinese Communist Party 

References 

Endnotes 

KEYWORDS 

China Carl Schmitt Legal Theory Political Theory Totalitarianism Liberalism Chinese Politics 

For the past several years, the study of German jurist Carl Schmitt has exploded in China. Floria Sapio remarks that Schmitt has enjoyed “enormous currency among mainland Chinese scholars since the 2000s.”1 Even though Schmitt has received a recent revitalization of interest of his thought among Western scholars,2 he is still known primarily for his aphoristic (and largely untranslated) texts on political theory and his infamous association with the Nazi Party. Yet, the reason that this esoteric and controversial thinker has garnered any consideration within Chinese academia is no mystery: Carl Schmitt was a political philosopher of illiberalism. He believed that liberalism had “a tendency to undermine a community's political existence” because a state founded on such an ideology “will lack the power to protect [citizens] from external enemies.”3 

What is needed, Schmidt argued, is “a strong state… with the capacity to defend… ‘the unity of the state.’”4 While his argument in totum is more elaborate, it is Schmitt’s hostility to liberalism as embodied in Western political culture, governance, and ideology that has spurred interest in his work in China, for “[the Chinese] now feel… [that] liberal thought… doesn’t help them understand the dynamics of Chinese life today or offer a model for the future.”5 In Mark Lillia’s conversations with Chinese scholars and students, there is a pervasive desire “across the political spectrum… that China needs a stronger state, not a weaker one.”6 Liberalism has not provided an answer. 

Schmitt’s analysis on the crisis of liberalism is thus an ideological tool that helps not only legitimate current CCP one-party rule, but also an attempt to “ground new forms of Chinese political agency on an anti-Western value discourse…”7 Currently, Xi Jinping is trying to “revive communist ideology as a vibrant bulwark of China’s exceptionalism, to inculcate its citizens against Western democratic ideas.”8 While non-socialistic in orientation, Schmitt’s thought is quite similar to the Xi’s overall ideological aims. Thus, the reason that Schmitt’s political theories can help legitimise one-party rule “have ensured that China’s ‘Schmittian’ discourse has... [become] fashionable and profitable.”9 Schmitt’s relevance in China is not purely scholarly, but also socio- and geopolitical. 

The purpose of this paper is to examine how contemporary Chinese scholars have received and utilized Schmitt’s thought for legitimating CCP rule and for constructing an illiberal, anti-Western ideology. First, I will briefly describe Schmitt’s political thought and critique of liberalism. Second, I will review recent interpretations of his thought from Chinese scholars. Lastly, I will see a means in which Schmitt’s theories can be used in legitimizing CCP rule. 

The Political Thought of Carl Schmitt 

The three most relevant and influential aspects of Schmitt’s thought are his definition of the political (also known as the “friend/enemy distinction”), the state of exception, and the concept of homogeneity. 

Schmitt’s conception of politics is based in conflict. Schmitt saw all legitimate political and legal theories as ones that characterized “human beings as evil, their nature prone to conflict.”10 The conflict that initiates politics (or rather the political) is “the utmost degree of intensity of a union or seperation, of an association or dissociation.”11 In other words, it is in the distinguishment of the friend and enemy towards the state in its most pivotal moments, such as after the creation of the constitutional order or during a state of emergency that can plunge the state into chaos. The so-called “friend/enemy distinction” can be used against any individual member “within the state when antagonism reaches its highest intensity.”12 A friend is one who shares and partakes in the social and political way of life with the state, while an enemy, “post a threat to [the state’s] concrete physical existence.”13 Liberalism all but destroys the possibility of the friend enemy distinction, of politics at its most essential. Instead, it installs within the body politic a “neutrality [that] negates the existential intensity of the political.”14 Liberal ideology “substitutes a politically united nation with a ‘culturally interested public.’”15 To Schmitt, the alternative to the political, “depoliticized liberalism,”16 only infests the body politic with a pathology of singularity and individualism. In order for the protection of the constitutional order and political legitimacy of the state, Schmitt declares that the state must “require an individual to sacrifice his life to fight an enemy of the state… [and] cannot refuse to engage in battle.”17 The belief that individuals or groups can resist or be neutral in responding to state commands, leads to “the dreadful fate of the state in liberalism” whereby its internal plurality destroys its territorial and sovereign unity.18 

The state of exception is one of Schmitt’s most lasting and controversial political concepts. Similar to the idea of “prerogative” in both Thomas Hobbes and John Locke,19 Schmitt sees that law is unable to adequately and fully defend the legal and political order from an extraordinary circumstance or crisis. In essence, law runs out. A sovereign is tasked to decide when law has run out and what means can be used to quell the crisis situation. Hence Schmitt’s famous dictum that “the sovereign is he who decides on the state of exception.”20 While in Schmitt’s text Political Theology, “the sovereign can be [any] person or institution, in a given polity, capable of bringing about a total suspension of the law and then to use extra-legal force to normalize the situation,”21 it is reasonable to conclude that Schmitt was truly thinking about the position of a dictator. Schupmann is clear that Schmitt “conceived of dictatorship as an institution bound to realize and defend the underlying political status of the political order” in moments of crisis.22 Thus, the sovereign dictator decides when a crisis arises and what measures must be done to eliminate the cause of that crisis and/or the crisis itself. Prioritizing law, the individual, or ethical and moral concepts in a political system (all inherent to a liberal polity, Schmitt decries) during a time of crisis will be the demise of the state. Schmitt states clearly that “the rule proves nothing; exception proves everything.”23 Therefore, the sovereign dictator is bound by no rules or beliefs that would limit his prime imperative of resolving an emergency. 

Building off the political and the state of exception, Schmitt see the homogeneity as an essential feature for the lasting order of the state. The jurist argues that there must be “a certain uniformity- a homogeneity… for a people to achieve its political existence in a state.”24 By “friends” of the political order, during moments of exception defined by the dictatorial sovereign, are “ready to defend the political project with their lives… this creates a total unity.”25 A state without homogeneity is a state made up of friends, enemies, and indifferent persons with “radically conflicting values… [all competing] for political power via the means of formal legality.”26 Thus, homogeneity is the status by which all citizens are friends to the state. When crisis arises again, the state is fully unified to utilize all productive and physical energies from the people for the purpose of defense of the nation and destruction of the enemy. 

Three Chinese Interpretations 

While Liu Xiaofeng was Schmitt’s primary translator into Mandarin, three of the German philosopher’s most influential contemporary interpreters are literary theorist Zhang Xudong, and legal scholars Gao Quanxi and Qi Zheng. All three utilize Schmitt's political thought for differing political projects to help establish China and/or the CCP’s legitimacy, in and out of the Mainland. Zhang uses Schmitt for the construction of a new Chinese cultural policies, Gao for the maturation of political liberalism within China, and Qi for a theoretical basis for the transition to democracy. 

Zhang’s interpretation of Schmitt allows for China to be fully uncoupled from the colonial and inappropriate paradigm of Western universalistic liberalism. The theorist believes that it is impossible for China to construct an organic and particular cultural politics for China in “a [political] space delimited by Western universal values such as science, democracy, and liberty,”27 because Chinese cultural identity “often appears as an inferior mode [in Western discourse].”28 Zhang’s Chinese cultural politics is the reaffirmation of “Chinese subjectivity” which is “self-sufficient and not delimited by Western modernity.”29 The main content of this cultural politic is Schmittian homogeneity. To Zhang, Western values of market and political liberalism make “the genuine ideal of social equality in China… [impossible to] be realized.”30 This social equality occurs by aligning establishing and aligning a homogeneous character of the citizens in relation towards the state. Zhang concludes that only with the governing leadership of the Chinese Communist Party is China able to foster this egalitarian vision. First, because the political and ideological framework of the CCP is not affected by liberal thought. Second because Zhang, by mixing both the thought of Schmitt and Georg Lukacs, sees the CCP as “[representing] the interests of the whole proletariat… on the basis of its knowledge of society in its totality.”31 The CCP’s knowledge of society and vast state apparatus powers gives it the ability to, not only perform politics in the friend/enemy distinction, but more importantly “to forge the political will of the nation and… establish the state form of contemporary China.”32 Thus for Zhang, the counter-universalism based in the cultural subjectivity of China’s contextual existence must grounded in the authority and representation of the CCP. Without the party’s representation of the Chinese citizenry, either the scourge of liberalism or hierarchical authoritarianism would infect China’s unique and powerful political culture. 

With a similar goal of decoupling from the West, Gao Quanxi uses Schmittian concepts in order to foster a political maturation and reformation Chinese liberalism. It is strange that Gao uses Schmitt considering he is liberal who “envasages China’s future… based on liberal virtues.”33 One Schmittian scholar in fact sees Gao more as a critic to Schmitt’s overall political paradigm than an advocate.34 While it is true that Gao does have legitimate criticism with Schmitt, especially the latter’s relationship with fascism in his work and life, this has not stopped his engagement and utilization of Schmitt’s theories because a well-rounded political liberalism “should be able to reconcile seemingly contradictory elements of political thought.”35 Gao sees that contemporary China and Chinese liberalism in that the country is “being pressured to establish a liberal democratic constitutional state at a time when the ideal nation-state is increasingly being questioned.”36 

China, to Gao, is thus in a transitional phase. It is not yet in liberalism and not completely out of authoritarianism, but the germination and ideological conceptions of liberalism are within public and political discourse. But this transition also puts China in a situation where it “simultaneously faces the demands of both exceptional and normal politics.”37 Gao identifies a critical weakness with liberalism in “its inability to handle exceptional [and transitional] politics.”38 To Gao, Modern Chinese liberalism as incredibly naive in that lacks an adequate understanding of this transition phase and China’s unique contextual political predicament. Chinese liberals and legal scholars thus must stop reading “well-worm (Anglo American) liberal theory that… is clearly inappropriate for China”39 and read Schmitt instead. Gao’s hope is that a reformed liberalism will be an “exceptional liberal politics”40 one that can deal with the transitional state and effectively articulate an appropriate understanding of nationalism, political agency, and constitutionalism within contemporary China. One cannot establish liberal system “without realizing that this first requires facing the realities of... [transitional] politics.41 To Gao, Schmitt provides the theoretical basis for contemporary political existence in China and a means to best conceptualize a road from the current transitional state towards liberal constitutionalism. Schmitt’s theories are thus the primary way by which China can actually achieve liberalism, even if that liberalism is “clearly at odds with the liberalism represented in the Chinese discourse of the late 1990s.”42 

While Gao wants to mature liberalism so that it can grasp China’s contemporary political dynamics, Qi Zheng sees Schmitt’s theories as providing a basis for the transition towards a democratic state in China. Synthesizing Schmitt’s theories of the political, state of exception, and homogeneity, Qi theorizes that Schmitt’s political thought can be boiled down to “the political of transition, which refers to political activities related to a fundamental political rupture within the state.”43 This rupture contains two moments, “the founding and protecting moment.”44 The founding moment is when “a new political form is established” and the protecting moment being “when the new political order is under threat by an enemy.”45 To Qi, Schmitt views the founding moment being the creation of a state/constitution by a “political collectively that has a common political conscious of its political existence.”46 The protecting moment to Qi is an extreme variation state of emergency in Schmitt’s theory, a “radicalization of political tension and… the immediate possibility of disorder and political violence.”47 Whether a civil war or invasion by foreign forces hoping to reap the booty of a recently organized state, the protecting moment demands the fullest expression of power by the sovereign and friendship by the people. Based on this Schmittian framework, a transition to democracy for China is possible, but only in the form of “revolution by the people within the state.” 

Qi sees popular revolution as the most probable means for a transition to democracy, as it provides immediate popular legitimacy because of its bottom-up approach, as well as higher probability for occurance for it does not rely precondition of institutional collapse. The revolution is led by the political collectivity with a common conscious and through revolutionary violence and upheaval “form the political commitment and make the most fundamental political decision in the founding moment.”48 Peaceful or consensual means towards democracy do not establish the political friendship required for founding a new polity. Only through the process of determining the friend and enemy in the revolutionary stage, however brutal, is the founding moment successful. 

After the transition and founding moment is what Qi calls “ordinary democratic politics.” Qi makes certain throughout her text that Schmitt’s qualms with liberalism do not completely extend to democracy. She argues that democracy “is always based on the principle of making [friend/enemy] distinctions and forming homogeneity.”49 Schmittian Democracy is therefore a legitimating force for install homogeneity in that it provides a means for the “elimination or eradication of politically threatening heterogeneity” without consistently entering into the state of exception.50 Thus, democracy provides a political mechanism as a protecting moment. But, Qi makes clear that there will always be a time after the revolution that a protecting moment to keep the democratic order alive is necessary (ala the State of Exception). Thus a democratic China will not be liberal democratic China. It will be a strong state democracy that will not respect the rights of those who are indifferent or hostile to the state and require “individuals… to make the interest of the state a priority.”51 Qi’s Schmittian Democracy is thus weaponized democracy that utilizes all political and social instruments towards the unifying of the state. Whether it be a new revolutionary movement by the CCP or not, Schmittian democracy is a political force that Qi believes effectively legitimates whatever rule exists in China. 

Whether it be neocolonialism, liberalism, or democracy, the plurality of governing systems and structures that Schmitt’s ideas can justify is a testament to the active engagement with his thought in China. All of these particular utilizations demonstrate that Schmitt’s ideas are essential for many intellectuals in order to initiate a fundamental political reform or ideological reformulation in China. In one sense, this might point to a general dissatisfaction with the current CCP means of promoting their legitimacy. With Schmitt’s widespread intellectual capital in China, these unique interpretations of Schmitt can be catalysts for new widespread expressions of legitimacy and sovereignty adopted by the CCP or other Chinese political movements. 

Schmitt and the Chinese Communist Party 

China currently has a nationalistic youth and growing social discontent among the populace. For the past several years, the CCP regime has been fostering a nationalistic Confucian ideology, with elements of Marxism, based around the personality cult of Xi Jinping.52 But, in the face of declining economic growth, one wonders if this ideological hodgepodge will be enough if the current performance legitimacy of the regime is lost. Currently, Chinese youth see “the pursuit of national interest as the ultimate goal of international relations” which is a marked difference from “the uncritical internationalism of the late 1980’s [youth].”53 While the CCP has put forward a number of “state initiatives” such as continual curriculum reform or creating “hip” online websites that glorify the Chinese president, these seem misguided attempts that do not fully address the problems of youth frustration and future regime legitimacy. Compounded with social unrest over youth unemployment, violent protests (or rather violent responses to protects), nihilistic materialism, and crime, the CCP needs a ideology that can foster legitimacy with or without a performative-economic aspect. As Carl Minzner argues, Beijing’s weak “efforts to respond to outbursts of popular anger are steadily undermining China’s institutions and norms.”54 

Schmitt's political theory can be tools that the CCP can utilize to redirect youth nationalistic aggression and social frustration to the will of the party. The CCP would merely make the friend/enemy distinction on dissidents, ethnic minorities, or those indifferent to CCP rule. By entering the state of exception, as arbitrarily decided by Xi and/or the CCP, China can rally nationalistic youths on the promise of national glorification with the elimination of enemies and the initiation of homogeneity. Once the enemy is eliminated, or silenced into fearful submission, homogeneity of political will around the CCP is complete. In no way could the CCP lose legitimacy but at any opportunity of dissent or indifference, the sovereign can declare exception and the threat of heterogeneity is eliminated. The differentiation can also provide Chinese youth a firm belief, not in materialism or vague Post-Maoist socialism, but in the continual unity of the state around the totalizing representative will of the CCP. As Schmitt makes clear, “The value of life stems not from reasoning; it emerges in a state of [emergency] where men inspired by myths to do battle.”55 The consistent conflict and full utilization of all peoples towards the elimination of the enemy provides the CCP a means for lasting legitimacy. 

While it may be argued that the current CCP desires peace rather than consistent conflict, there are two ways to have a peaceful Schmittian legitimacy. First, the state of exception need not be a holistic moment, but individualized events whereby the enemy is precisely located and eliminated. With the vast technological apparatus that the CCP possesses, the state of exception can be pinpointed to a single online post. Not one hour may pass without the elimination of the enemy with the Sovereign using whatever extra-legal means it thinks is necessary. Second, there is already a great amount of anger, hostility, and conflict happening in Chinese society everyday, whether it be protests that end in police brutality or delusional men trying to massacre schoolchildren with a knives. The political gives citizens an opportunity to unleash aggression, not at the state or schoolchildren, but against those who wish to destroy their political (and possibly sociocultural) way of life. There is thus peace for the friends of the CCP, those who matter. Unlike the Cultural Revolution, which promoted bottom-up aggression as a means toward dismantling the capitalist road bureaucracy that had betrayed the Maoist vision, the Schmittian approach is a top-down revolution of everyday life aimed at the complete harmonization of the state towards the will of the party. 

The Schmittian solution(s) to the Chinese problem of legitimacy, be it from Chinese scholars themselves or the above hypothetical, are quite distasteful to western, liberal democratic ears. Schmitt’s theories, in many context, can sound like the worst justifications for fascism, postcolonial nationalism, and arbitrary dictatorial violence. But to millions of Chinese, Schmitt’s ideas are highly persuasive to more people in China everyday. Schmitt is “at the center of intellectual debate… being read by everyone, whatever their partisan leanings.”56 Without understanding the means by which Schmitt is used and can be used by Chinese citizens, lawyers, and intellectuals, scholars of China are not able to possess a full picture of the contemporary ideological landscape. As liberal democracy slowly loses its hegemonic grip on political expression in the developed world, Schmitt’s ideas and reception, in and out of China, become more relevant than ever before. 

Friday, October 02, 2020

Reality Ends The Reality Show

 

 

Reality Ends The Reality Show

Is this a chance to start over? 

Andrew Sullivan

In the reality show that has been the Trump presidency, we probably should have expected something like this. As a plot twist, the show-runners would have kept this moment for the very end of the penultimate episode, just before the season finale. Anything could still happen, of course. Trump could be dead by election day. Or he could somehow stage a swift recovery in a mild case, and run a back-from-the-near-dead campaign that surges improbably to victory on a wave of sympathy. Between those two scenarios, your guess is as good as mine.  

It’s a terrible thing for an elderly person to get this disease, and Trump’s obesity puts him in an even more vulnerable category. No one deserves this, even those, like Trump, who openly defied prudent measures to reduce risk, and thereby helped infect and kill countless others. The president, like any human being, deserves sympathy and support.

But there is something salutary in the Trump era about reality reasserting itself in this last twist of the viral knife. The man has spent years at war with reality: living in delusions, perpetuating fantasies, imagining hoaxes, constructing conspiracies, accruing debt, rewriting history constantly as self-serving myth. At some point, reality was going to get personal in return. 

And it has. Like all tyrants, Trump lives in an alternate universe where his will, tempered only by his whim, determines everything. And like all tyrants, Trump will eventually be defeated by the distance between his universe and the real one. The question has always been how long that would take, and how much damage would be done in the process. But the toll has been piling up of late. 205,000 dead, a stalled economy, a broken constitution, a bankrupt treasury, a ravaged environment, and the most toxic political culture in memory have not, exactly, made America great “again”. And, with his tax returns now public, the reality that Trump is a failed businessman and tax dodger is as inescapable as the truth that he is a serial sexual abuser.

Just as inescapable is the reality of the epidemic. The winter looms, as cases surge in Europe once again. The pandemic economy has been absolutely brutal for the working poor, compared with the middle and upper classes, intensifying dangerous, destabilizing levels of inequality. It has torn the social fabric apart, sequestering the elderly in heartbreaking solitude, compounding the opioid crisis, deepening depression and anxiety, increasing suicides among soldiers, keeping loved ones away even from a deathbed. It cannot be willed away. 

Neither can the fast-deteriorating environment, which will condemn this country and the world to unknowable ordeals from wind and rain and fire and ice in the coming years and decades. Neither can the intensifying polarization and tribalism of our culture of online algorithms — a world of techno-politics we are only beginning to understand how to control. Trump denied these realities, obscuring them with salesmanship and shock, or exploiting them for his own purposes. He preferred a reality show — which he has been a genius at concocting at the expense of everything else — and so, unforgivably, did many of us. 

The one simple thing I learned from being diagnosed as positive with a lethal virus decades ago is that I am not in control, and that maturity subsists in acceptance of this. A life well lived is not in denial of reality, but in difficult, unsatisfying, daily, hourly engagement with it, alongside a spiritual attempt at occasional transcendence. Similarly, it seems to me, politics is best conducted as a tackling of the world as it is, free from delusion and ideology, wary of our own bias and wants, humble in our goals, prudent in our methods. It is not a show, let alone a psychotic melodrama about a deranged narcissist. 

This latest news, hard to absorb, is therefore nonetheless a tonic. It points in a simple direction: toward a man whose encounters with reality have been many and brutal, and who has endured them with grace and grit and realism. Joe Biden — blindsided by the untimely, soul-testing deaths of his nearest and dearest through the decades - knows how unsparing the world as-it-is can be. He has taken this epidemic seriously from the start, taken the proper precautions, and urged a serious, sustained response. He is not in denial of the fragility of life, because he has been taught the hard way how not to be.

At some point, the reality show must end; and our engagement with reality needs to begin again. We can start November 3. 

Quote For The Week

“Who gives a fuck about Christmas stuff and decoration?” - First Lady Melania Trump. Indeed.

 

Trump Lost. But Did Biden Win?

The debate last Tuesday now seems like ancient history — another story of Trump’s deranged narcissism wrecking yet another liberal democratic institution, the presidential debate.

But obscured by that truth was the fact of Joe Biden’s less-than-reassuring performance. Since few have pointed this out, allow me.

The age issue — however unfair — remains. Biden looked older than I’ve ever seen him, and with less of a grizzled-elder-vibe than a nursing-home-visit one. In the primary debates, he managed at times to look vigorous, even sharp, to the relief of many of us. Last Tuesday, he looked … well, the word that comes to mind is simply frail. His voice was relatively quiet, higher-pitched than usual and often hushed, his whispery white hair and pale color accentuating the sense of a beloved great-uncle who gets confused at times, but whose heart is nonetheless in the right place. When Biden looked directly at Trump, and we saw his profile, he looked even frailer: less like an authoritative statesman ready to take back the helm with vigor than a reluctant draftee, called out of retirement, like Bob Mueller, doing his duty, barely able to comprehend, let alone counter, the walking, talking shit-show to his right. 

The hackneyed phrase for a key sign of a presidential winner — “fire in his belly” — did not and does not seem to apply to Biden. It’s more like a flickering blue pilot light you’re worried may go out at some point. “I was praying that Biden was going to come in and slam dunk, and I was really disappointed,” said one female 2016 Trump voter, in a focus group organized by Sarah Longwell. “I agree that we weren’t able to get a full idea of Biden. I was hoping I was going to come away with more,” said another. “I understand why you’d tell someone to ‘shut up’ but I wish he could’ve been a contrast to Trump a little more,” another complained. “I felt like Biden stuck to talking points. I was disappointed all around,” whined another. Some of this is unfair — try debating Trump — but some of it is also on point. Trump so dominated the time and format that Biden had no chance to connect and seal the deal with voters. That matters.

The best line of the night — “Will you just shut up, man?” — was wonderful in the moment, but also showed just how reactive Biden was throughout. He never seized the initiative, and was constantly on the back foot. He never demonstrated the kind of authority you want to see and feel in a president. Days after Trump had been humiliated by tax returns that showed he was both a massive business failure and a stupendous tax dodger, the issue came and went with Biden barely making a dent. Even on Covid19, as Michael Tomasky noted, Biden failed to lay out clearly the chronology of Trump’s lies and incompetence. He even flubbed what was an obviously rehearsed (and good) line: “He said he didn’t tell us or give people a warning of it because he didn’t want to panic the American people. You don’t panic. He panicked.” He garbled the last two sentences. 

On the crucial issue of healthcare, Biden also misfired. He backs and helped pass the largely popular Obamacare, and now offers a public option within it for anyone who wants in. Trump, on the other hand, wants to kill Obamacare, has wounded it, threatens to finish it off in the Supreme Court, and has no plans to replace it. We’re in a pandemic. More people are uninsured than four years ago. Anxiety is sky-high, alongside unemployment. This was the core issue that won the 2018 mid-terms for the Democrats. Easy, right? 

And, yes, at the start of the evening, Biden made a decent start: “The president … wants to get rid of the Affordable Care Act. He’s been running on that, he ran on that and he’s been governing on that. He’s in the Supreme Court right now trying to get rid of the Affordable Care Act, which will strip 20 million people from having health insurance now.” But when challenged on the new policy he’s proposing, a public option in Obamacare, this is how Biden described it: “It’s only for those people who are so poor they qualify for Medicaid they can get that free in most States, except Governors who want to deny people who are poor Medicaid. Anyone who qualifies for Medicare, excuse me, Medicaid would automatically be enrolled in the public option. The vast majority of the American people would still not be in that option.” Say what? 

Stan Greenberg saw Trump actually gain with white working class women in his debate focus group — from 44 percent to 53 percent support — largely because of this issue: “they headed into the debate favoring Biden on the issue by an 11-point margin and came out supporting Trump by 6 points.” Losing white working class women on healthcare access is not good for a Democratic candidate. While nothing else hurt him as badly, Biden also added some clunkers. On core Constitutional and procedural questions — like adding members to the Court or ending the filibuster — Biden simply refused to say what he supports, saying “Whatever position I take on that, that’ll become the issue.” Well, yeah, it will. But that’s also how we decide elections. If you can’t tell us where you stand, how are we to make a decision? 

He portrayed critical race theory as a completely harmless attempt not “to hurt other people’s feelings,” which is the kind of view you’d expect from someone who has no idea what is actually happening, and someone who, as president, will do nothing to stop it. He had no solid response to the obvious fact of his son Hunter’s sleaze at all, except to say it’s all been “discredited,” when a lot of it hasn’t been. He said that he was opposed to AOC’s “Green New Deal” and then said that “the ‘Green New Deal’ will pay for itself as we move forward.”

He said he supports both “equity” and “equality”, two directly contradictory goals, one supporting equality of outcome, the other equality of opportunity. He doubted the existence of antifa, suggesting he really has drink the left kool-aid. On police and criminal justice reform, he repeated that he was against any defunding of the police, and then we got this big bucket of blah: “I’m going to call together an entire group of people at the White House, everything from the civil rights groups, to the police officers, to the police chiefs, and we’re going to work this out.” Weak. 

If Trump had let Biden speak more, Biden’s inadequacies might have been more visible. And if Trump hadn’t engaged in a menacing, fascistic hissy-fit, Biden’s failure to score many points might have become a much bigger story — which is, perhaps, a coda to this entire campaign. With any luck, Trump’s infection will preclude any more debates, keeping the race roughly where it is. But we should be wary, I think, of assuming that Biden won this debate. If he did, it was by default. 

Dissents Of The Week

A lot of readers pushed back on me calling Trump a tyrant. Many took issue with my characterization of his “greatest policy failures: the appalling loss of life in the Covid epidemic and the collapse of law and order in the cities.” One reader:

Laying the blame for the civil unrest this summer on Trump is not credible. The police in Minneapolis and other cities are under Democratic rule. The mostly false narratives about police violence have come from the left side of the political spectrum. Widespread arson and violence was perpetrated by actors aligned with the left.

Kevin Williamson ran with that theme this week, calling the Democrats “the arson party.” And I don’t dispute that the core responsibility for law and order belongs to mayors of cities. But Trump is nonetheless president, the man tasked with keeping the country stable and peaceful. Instead, he stoked the instability, and intensified it with provocation. As to the 205,000 Covid deaths on Trump’s watch, a reader notes:

On a per million population basis, many countries, including Belgium, Spain, and Brazil, have higher COVID-19 fatality rates, and the rate in the UK is comparable. Not to mention the US fatality rate would be substantially lower if Governor Cuomo’s New York were excluded from the statistics, because he forced nursing homes to take infected people. See Table 2 on this CDC page, noting the “Percent of expected deaths” for New York State and NYC — far higher than any other place in the country.

I agree it’s becoming harder and harder to make simple judgments about which country did best on Covid19 and why. I suspect we’ll only really figure this out in retrospect, if then. But by Trump’s own predictions, he has failed massively; by any reasonable standard, the US has signally failed to get the virus under control, and Trump’s constant undermining of consistent public health messaging is a lesson in how not to govern. Another dissent:

You state that Trump “installed a crony at the Department of Justice to pursue his political enemies and shield him from the law.” How was Bill Barr a crony, i.e. a long-time associate given a position even though unqualified? Barr had no prior association with Trump and was one of the most qualified nominees in our nation’s history. Trump was extremely lucky that Barr happened to have long-held views of official corruption (bad, even when committed by the Left) and executive authority (broad) that served Trump’s interests. That did not make Barr a crony.   

Also, your opinion of the Mueller investigation seems deliberately untainted by any of the revelations made since it ended, and by the fact that much of this information would have been known by Barr when the report was released.

Another reader looks beyond Trump’s repellent rhetoric:

While I agree with you that he is a despicable human being, I think you have failed to give him his due for some policy successes:

Economy: Deregulation has benefited the economy greatly and tax cuts were a help. The greatest beneficiaries of the robust economy have been the minorities and the young. I know, I know, the rich got richer, but who has the life transforming experience: the guy who goes from a net worth of $100M to $200M or the guy who goes from jobless to employed?

Supreme Court: The only way to play a game is with hard-and-fast rules, and the only people who believe in firm rules are the Originalists/Textualists. The Constitution is a living and breathing document, but it changes by amendment, not by whim. Gorsuch and Kavanaugh will do their best to honor the Constitution, so that counts as a home run to me. For those who believe in individual liberty, the past session was very successful: upheld both gays rights and religious liberty. These guys are loyal to the Constitution, not to Trump.

One more reader is surprised:

How did you not take the Sully bait last week? Trump issued an executive order trying to ban diversity/equity/anti-racism trainings. And his call for “patriotic education,” too, echoes some of the things you’ve said. What sense do you make of this intersection of two of your hobby horses? 

I don’t like politicians interfering in educational curricula, to police speech, any more than I like academic fanatics corralling students into half-baked ideologies. In so far as Trump stopped this pernicious doctrine from being taught in the federal government, that’s well within his bailiwick and of course I agree with him. But in general, beyond the federal government, I want Trump as far away from this topic as possible. He taints everything. He has done more to empower this racist poison than anyone on the left. Getting rid of him is, to my mind, essential to getting rid of it.

From The Annals Of Dishness

A reader writes:

Your reference to the pseudonymous Scott Alexander and his admission of error reminds me of the single greatest reason why the only blog I ever read with any regularity was The Daily Dish. I didn’t read to be led around by the nose, nor because I thought you were right on the first try on anything — especially the invasion of Iraq — but because it turned out that admitting error and then exploring the why of the intellectual error, the explication, is what made you trustworthy.

One of the best conversations about this quality of the blogosphere — the grace of being wrong — came from Ta-Nehisi Coates and Ezra Klein on the latter’s podcast in late 2016. Money quote from Ezra:

It’s harder and harder to learn; harder and harder to be wrong. And I worry that the end result of that is getting really bad at the job. … I miss the idea in blogging that you could be wrong, that you could be uncertain.

Here’s how Coates put it after the stratospheric success of Between the World and Me:

Blogging, as a form, is open to this real-time, ongoing learning process. That went away. But in addition to that, as your profile rises, people say you must have this high profile because you know, because you’re an authority.

I didn’t write too much during this election cycle. One of the reasons I didn’t is because I didn’t want to play this oracular role. There was no space to figure it out, to think about it, or go through the arguments if you’re writing … There’s no room to tease out, say, in my case specifically, what it means that the representative of the left tradition in the Democratic Party rejects reparations. No room to tease out what that means. But then what am I doing? I’m just making pronouncements. I’ve become, in the most vulgar sense, a pundit. I’m not open to having my mind changed, I’m not trying to figure it out; I’m not out here curious and exploring. I am standing on a rock, sitting on a throne, making pronouncements about what the world is. And that is so boring. It bores me to tears.

Here’s the whole episode. Podcasting, to a large extent, has filled the void of the blogosphere — a place where you could think out loud and try to figure shit out (and apologize when you’re wrong, as Rogan recently did). The Dish podcast is launching soon.

 

Mental Health Break

Fade into the watercolors:

 

In The ‘Stacks

Our latest recommendations from other substackers:

Jesse Singal updates us on the utterly shameless effort by the Florida GOP to keep former felons from voting.

Antonio Garcia-Martinez dissents from me on The Social Dilemma: “What few serious reflections on tech contained in the film—Jonathan Haidt makes a brief cameo and presents some interesting data on teen mental health and smartphone use—are overshadowed by all the docu-drama gimcrackery and Tristan Harris worship.” More on Haidt’s warnings here. (My take on the docu-drama is here.)

Tomiwa Owolade, a British black man, wishes his fellow citizens would stop looking at race through an American lens, because it “cloaks the reality of black British lives behind an abstraction that flattens our humanity.”

The Narratives Project by Shaun Cammack maps the diverging stories told by partisans and tribalists when a news event surfaces. He recently covered the death of Jake Gardner, an early victim of this summer’s unrest you might have missed.

If you’re looking for a good summary of the day’s news, check out Prof. Heather Cox Richardson’s mega-popular Letters from an American, replete with history, or the more wide-ranging News Items, by my old friend and Dishhead, John Ellis.

 

The View From Your Window Contest

So, where do you think it’s located? Email your entry to contest@andrewsullivan.com. Please put the location — city and/or state first, then country — in the subject heading, along with any details about the location within the body of the email. The winner gets the choice of a VFYW book or two TWD subscriptions. Happy sleuthing! (The results for last week’s contest are coming in an email to subscribers shortly, and you can find previous results here.)

See you next Friday.

(Photo of Trump by Jim Watson/AFP via Getty Images. Photo of Biden by Win McNamee/Getty Images)

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Rosewood