Friday, August 21, 2020

What Happens if Donald Trump Fights the Election Results?

 

What Happens if Donald Trump Fights the Election Results?

Stealing a Presidential election in America is difficult, but it has been done before.

 

By Eric Lach The New Yorker

On the night of November 7, 1876, as the results of the Presidential election between Samuel Tilden, the Democratic governor of New York, and Rutherford B. Hayes, the Republican governor of Ohio, began to come in, America, in its centennial year, was barely holding together. Reconstruction was faltering. The economic collapse that followed the Panic of 1873 had left millions out of work, and provoked strikes and labor unrest across the nation. The outgoing Republican Administration of Ulysses S. Grant had been embroiled in a series of corruption scandals. A few months earlier, Sioux warriors had defeated General George Custer and his troops at Little Bighorn. Hayes, whom Henry Adams described as a “third-rate nonentity,” had earned the Republican nomination, in large part, by being the one candidate all factions of the Party could agree on. Tilden and the Democrats seemed poised for an easy victory. As the historian Eric Foner writes in “Reconstruction,” his history of the period, “political corruption and the depression became Tilden’s watchwords; issues many Republicans feared would suffice to carry the election.”

Before Election Day was over, it was clear that Tilden, who, in his previous career as a Gilded Age corporate lawyer and reorganizer of bankrupt railroad lines, had earned the nickname the Great Forecloser, would comfortably win the popular vote. He needed only a single vote in the Electoral College to put him over the top, and results were outstanding in Florida, South Carolina, and Louisiana, where white citizens routinely used violence, intimidation, and fraud to keep their Black neighbors, most of whom were loyal to the Republican Party of Abraham Lincoln, from voting. With the prospect of Democrats taking the White House through disenfranchisement at hand, Republicans moved to steal the election outright. “With your state sure for Hayes, he is elected,” Party leaders said in an Election Night telegram to their cronies in the three Southern states. “Hold your state.”

In Florida, the two Republicans on the three-person election board—Samuel McLin, the Florida secretary of state, and Clayton Cowgill, the state comptroller—systematically approved and rejected results, district by district, to swing the election in their party’s favor. “If the canvassing board had simply accepted all the local returns, Tilden would have prevailed by 94 votes,” Edward Foley, an election-law professor at Ohio State University, writes in “Ballot Battles,” a survey of disputed American elections. “In its decisive 2–1 rulings, however, the board selectively invalidated Tilden-favoring returns because of technicalities, while refusing to invalidate Hayes-favoring returns despite clear evidence of actual fraud.” In this way, a narrow Tilden lead was transformed into a narrow Hayes lead. Similar events unfolded in South Carolina and Louisiana. “The result was manufactured by a deliberate manipulation of the count,” Foley writes.

Democrats were outraged. What ensued is a mostly forgotten episode of American misgovernment that has lately been haunting Foley and other academics, as well as a loose network of bipartisan ex-officials, activists, and think-tank types, who are now contemplating the potential for a disputed election in the present day, at our own fraught political moment. The three Southern states in 1876 each sent Congress two pieces of paper, one from Republican electors certifying that Hayes had won the election, the other from Democratic electors certifying that Tilden had. The crisis these pieces of paper provoked, as Congress tried to reconcile their competing claims, pushed America’s constitutional order to its breaking point—or perhaps, looked at from another angle, it was a reflection of an order that had already broken down.

The Twelfth Amendment, which lays out the procedure for electing the President and Vice-President, says nothing about what Congress should do in the event that states send competing election certificates. Republicans controlled the Senate, and Democrats controlled the House. The two chambers established a commission to try to break the impasse. The dispute went on for months. (Back then, Administrations were inaugurated in March.) With Inauguration just days away and the prospect looming of a country with two people claiming the Presidency and no actual President, House Speaker Samuel Randall presided over a debate described decades later in a history of the crisis as “probably the stormiest ever witnessed in any House of Representatives.” Congressmen reached for their revolvers, and women in the gallery, “fearing a free fight,” ducked out of the chamber.

The tension broke only after William Levy, a Democratic representative from Louisiana who had been in on negotiations between the Southern states and Hayes’s camp, finally signalled that a deal had been struck. Tilden and the Democrats would concede the White House to Republicans, allowing Hayes to effectively steal back the election. Rising to speak in the House chamber, Levy called upon his fellow-Democrats “to join me in the course which I feel called upon and justified in pursuing.” The price that Democrats exacted from Republicans, though, was incalculably high: the drawdown of federal troops in the Southern states, the end of Reconstruction, and the consignment of Black citizens to a century of violent repression. “The negro will disappear from the field of national politics,” The Nation wrote at the time. “Henceforth, the nation, as a nation, will have nothing more to do with him.”

The Hayes-Tilden crisis was resolved, Foley told me recently, “at the expense of America’s commitment to its own citizens.” Unlike the 2000 election, between George Bush and Al Gore, where the dispute was contained in the courts, the 1876 dispute spilled out into the broader political system, and its outcome was openly determined by a naked struggle for power between the two ruling parties. “Because many of us have a living memory of 2000, we think that any election dispute is going to look like 2000,” he said. “Where, in fact, I think that kind of gives us a false sense of what might happen. I think there are now conditions in place that may cause this year’s election to be more like 1876.”

It has been difficult, throughout Donald Trump’s Presidency, to immediately know which of his declarations represent constitutional danger and which are merely attention-seeking bluster. “I think mail-in voting is going to rig the election,” Trump told Fox News’s Chris Wallace during a recent White House interview. When Wallace asked if the President was suggesting that he might not accept the results, Trump, with hands raised, replied, “I have to see. I’m not going to just say yes.” The President’s intermittent musings about postponing the November election have so reliably set off rounds of breathless news coverage that Marc Elias, one of the Democratic Party’s go-to election lawyers, was compelled to write a blog post in March titled “No, Trump Cannot Move the General Election.” Similarly, in response to the persistent speculation that an electorally defeated Trump would spend Joe Biden’s Inauguration Day holed up in the Lincoln Bedroom like Tony Montana at the end of “Scarface,” the Biden campaign in July issued a pithy statement saying, “the United States government is perfectly capable of escorting trespassers out of the White House.”

But Trump’s threats about rejecting the results come November are not idle. In 2016, Trump disputed the results of an election he won, ludicrously claiming that his popular-vote shortfall was the result of illegitimate ballots cast by millions of undocumented immigrants. Four years later, the President is at the head of a concerted effort to undermine public confidence in the upcoming election. Trump has denounced efforts to expand the mail-voting systems that will allow millions of people to cast their ballots safely in this pandemic year. He has ignored calls to provide election administrators with much-needed additional funding to safeguard voters, staff, volunteers, and the vote-counting process. And he has overseen the crippling of the U.S. Postal Service at a time when its work will be critical to the success of the election. “It’s just a question of overload,” Richard L. Hasen, a law professor at the University of California, Irvine, and the author of “Election Meltdown: Dirty Tricks, Distrust, and the Threat to American Democracy,” said. “We have problems with voting machines; we have problems with incompetent election officials. There is foreign interference. Layer on top of that the covid-19 crisis. Layer on top of that a President who is a norm breaker.”

In June, the Transition Integrity Project, a newly formed group devoted to evaluating how a disputed election might unfold, hosted a series of “war games” to play out various scenarios for what might happen on and after November 3rd. Zoe Hudson, a former Open Society Foundation analyst who serves as the director of the project, told me that the idea was to “socialize” potential risks. “Surprise doesn’t work for us,” she said. “We really need people to understand that this will be an unusual election year.”

More than a hundred people participated, most of them prominent names in academia, politics, and the media—Foley was there, as were the former Hillary Clinton campaign chairman John Podesta, former Michigan governor Jennifer Granholm, and former Republican National Committee Chairman Michael Steele. Participants assumed roles as members of the Trump or Biden campaigns, state officials, and the media. The games, which were played under the Chatham House rule—participants are allowed to discuss what happened as long as they don’t reveal who in the room said or did what—proceeded by turns, with certain developments determined by dice rolls. “One of the big takeaways on all sides is that what you have here potentially is a situation where neither side accepts a loss,” Adam Jentleson, a former aide to Senate Majority Leader Harry Reid who participated in the war games, told me. “And that’s a very difficult circle to square.”

While Americans have grown accustomed to Election Nights that unfold like Super Bowls—tune in at 5 p.m. for the pregame and turn off the set at midnight after one side or the other hoists the trophy—the surge in absentee voting brought on by the coronavirus pandemic will likely frustrate that expectation this year. Counting absentee ballots is a slow, laborious process, and, in a number of states, the counting cannot begin until the election is over. In primary elections this spring and summer, states without past experience counting large numbers of absentee ballots have struggled to process them. In New York, the state Board of Elections took six weeks to declare Representative Carolyn Maloney the winner of the congressional Democratic primary in the state’s Twelfth District. Her challenger in the race, Suraj Patel, filed a lawsuit, citing a number of issues with the count, including thousands of mail-in ballots being disqualified and tens of thousands being sent out too late for voters to realistically return on time. Maloney suggested that Patel was playing into Trump’s hands by questioning the legitimacy of an election. Patel and his campaign understandably bristled at the charge. Count every vote, they have insisted. Address the problems now so that they don’t plague us in November.

It’s one thing for an election dispute to play out in a little-noticed congressional primary. When similar disputes broke out in the Transition Integrity Project’s games, with the future of the entire country on the line, the effect was pure mayhem. In the first scenario, the results from three states—North Carolina, Michigan, and Florida—remained too close to call for more than a week. On Election Night, Trump’s campaign called on Biden to concede, citing in-person-voting returns, which looked good for the President. But as the absentee ballots in these states were counted, the numbers swung toward Biden. This was “blue shift,” a phenomenon observed by Foley and other academics in recent elections, wherein in-person-vote totals have tended to skew Republican, while absentee voting has skewed Democratic. Blue shift is what kept the Democratic House wave in 2018 from being immediately apparent on Election Night—the mail votes cast in California that fall took weeks to count, an outcome that former House Speaker Paul Ryan, a Republican, described at the time as “bizarre.” This year, with Trump explicitly making mail voting a partisan issue, the blue shift is likely to be especially pronounced. And Trump is, in turn, expected to denounce this easily explainable phenomenon as nefarious.

As the votes were being tallied in the game, Trump pounced. The team playing as his campaign called on the Justice Department to use federal agents to “secure” voting sites and tried to enlist state Republican officials to stop the further counting of absentee ballots. The Biden team, in response, called for every vote to be counted and urged its supporters to attend rallies calling for the same. During subsequent turns, Trump tried to federalize the National Guard, and both parties sought to block or overturn results in key states. Eventually, North Carolina was declared for Biden and Florida was declared for Trump, leaving Michigan as the deciding state—there, a “rogue individual” destroyed ballots believed to be favorable to Biden, leaving Trump with a narrow lead. Michigan’s Republican-led legislature certified Trump’s victory, but the state’s Democratic governor, Gretchen Whitmer, refused to accept the result, citing the sabotage, and sent a separate certification to Congress.

It was 1876 all over again. Both campaigns called for their supporters to take to the streets. Trump invoked the Insurrection Act. Republicans in Congress declared that Vice-President Mike Pence, as president of the Senate, was entitled to choose which certification from Michigan to accept as legitimate. Democrats, of course, rejected that argument. “There was no clear resolution of the conflict in the January 6 joint session of Congress,” the game summary reads. “The partisans on both sides were still claiming victory, leading to the problem of two claims to Commander-in-Chief power (including access to the nuclear codes) at noon on January 20.” The game ended there.

Another scenario, in which Trump won a clear victory in the Electoral College but lost the national popular vote by an even wider margin than in 2016, also ended in chaos. Biden withdrew his Election Night concession and asked the Democratic governors in Wisconsin, Michigan, and North Carolina for recounts. The governors in Wisconsin and Michigan took the 1876 course again, sending a slate of electors to Congress that conflicted with those sent by their states’ Republican-controlled legislatures. Republicans, unsuccessfully, tried to cajole moderate Democrats to break from their party and back Trump’s victory. “At the end of the first turn,” the summary reads, “the country was in the midst of a full-blown constitutional crisis.” Congress, once again, failed to resolve the standoff before Inauguration Day. “It was unclear what the military would do in this situation,” the transcript says. According to the Times, near the end of this scenario, Podesta, the former Clinton campaign chairman, called on California, Oregon, and Washington to secede from the Union.

Even a scenario that led to a peaceful transfer of power was, at certain moments, politically perilous. In one game, Biden won the election by a narrow but clear margin. Trump’s campaign persuaded the Republican-controlled legislatures in Michigan and Pennsylvania to send Congress conflicting election certifications. Attorney General William Barr announced that the Justice Department would begin investigating “voter fraud” and took steps to stop ballot counting. But, as the game went on, Senator Mitt Romney convinced three of his fellow Republican senators to break ranks and support Biden. A dice roll determined that four million people would participate in pro-Biden street demonstrations. The Joint Chiefs of Staff discussed resigning in protest at Trump’s increasingly desperate behavior, and those discussions were leaked to the press. As power began to slip away from the President, right-wing media turned increasingly toxic, and his Administration devolved into a frenzy of document destruction and corrupt pardonings. Biden called on the House and Senate Intelligence Committees to investigate foreign interference in the election and announced that moderate Republicans, including the governor of Massachusetts, Charlie Baker, would serve in his Cabinet. The game ended with the Democratic Party beginning to investigate Trump and his family.

These war games were hypothetical imaginings of extraordinary circumstances. But an election in a pandemic year with a President declaring in advance that the vote will be rigged are extraordinary circumstances. “One big takeaway is that leaders really need to know what exactly their powers are, and what the powers of others are, and think through some of these options in advance,” Rosa Brooks, a law professor at Georgetown University who helped convene the Transition Integrity Project, told me recently. “Because if things go bad, they’ll go bad very quickly, and people will have to make decisions in an hour, not in a week.”

The contours of the upcoming election are already being fought over in the courts. Since the 2000 election, with its hanging chads and butterfly ballots, America has seen an explosion of election-related litigation, from an average of ninety-four lawsuits a year to an average of two hundred and seventy a year, according to an analysis by Hasen, the author of “Election Meltdown.” This year, there have already been some two hundred election lawsuits filed over covid-19-related issues alone. In May, the Trump campaign and the Republican National Committee doubled their legal budget, to twenty million dollars. “Bush v. Gore exposed shortcomings in our system in a very visible way,” Rebecca Green, an election-law professor at William & Mary Law School, said. “And so people started pushing back and testing it.” This isn’t necessarily a bad thing, Green said. “We do disputed elections in this country. We have processes in place. We have law. It’s not the Wild West where we’re left without direction on how this should unfold.” She added, “I really worry about public confidence being undermined by this constant drumbeat of meltdown.”

The biggest cases so far have centered on mail voting. At the state level, efforts to address this year’s unprecedented voting challenges have largely been bipartisan efforts—as many as forty-five states will allow voters to mail in their ballots for the November election. But in the courts, the two parties’ overarching national positions come down to this: Democrats are trying to make voting by mail as easy as possible, and Republicans are fighting to prevent that. Caught in the middle are election administrators, the local officials tasked with organizing and processing our voting systems. The Brennan Center for Justice at N.Y.U. has estimated that administrators would need an additional four billion dollars in funding to safeguard the vote during the pandemic. In the Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security Act, Congress allocated four hundred million dollars for election preparations. The shortfall will likely mean, in many cases, fewer polling places, longer lines, and slower processing of absentee ballots. Administrators have also reported trouble recruiting volunteers—the battalion of retirees that normally mind our polls and count our ballots—because many of them are wary of exposure to the virus. In normal years, election administrators and the volunteers they rely on are prone to mistakes. This year, all these issues make slow counts and frustrated voters even more likely—and create the conditions for one side or the other to dispute the outcome.

Of course, Trump has increased the chances for such a dispute by undermining public trust in the system itself. Nowhere has this dynamic been more insidious than with the Postal Service. Conservatives have been targeting the agency for cuts for years, and recent Trump Administration decisions—spearheaded by the new Postmaster General, Louis DeJoy, who is a major Trump donor—have caused a mail slowdown around the country. Those efforts have collided with an election that will rely on the Postal Service more than any in American history. Trump has made the connection explicit. “They want three and a half billion dollars for something that’ll turn out to be fraudulent,” he said earlier this month, about the Democrats’ position in the latest round of negotiations over pandemic relief. “They need that money in order to make the Post Office work so it can take all of these millions and millions of ballots.” The fear and distrust that Trump has sown has meant that, when the Postal Service recently sent a letter to states warning that some of their absentee-ballot application and filing deadlines were “incongruous with the Postal Service’s delivery standards” and too close to Election Day to guarantee timely delivery—a concern that independent election experts have raised for years—state officials grew worried that the federal government was preĆ«mptively preparing to blame them for problems in November. “I think that many people were surprised by the tone of the letter,” Tammy Patrick, an adviser at the Democracy Fund who previously served as an election administrator in Maricopa County, Arizona, said. “I have never seen the Postal Service throw a customer under the bus before—and certainly not when the votes of American citizens are on the line.” (On Friday, DeJoy is scheduled to appear at hearings before congressional Democrats.)

After Election Day, the lawsuits are expected to shift to questions about ballot counting. Absentee ballots present bureaucratic problems in ways that in-person voting doesn’t. Even in normal election years, a large number of absentee ballots are disqualified. The reasons range from signature matching, a notoriously unreliable process, to disputes over “voter intent,” where individual ballots are evaluated for stray markings, and ballots that arrive after the deadline. “In a lot of cases, the law does give judges leeway,” Green said. “And the unenviable place where they end up is, do I stretch the law to enfranchise as many people as I can, or do I read the law strictly and end up disenfranchising people?” Already this year, the disqualification rate seen in some states during the primaries has been alarming. “The biggest potential disaster is that one candidate wins because so many votes are thrown out,” Hasen told me. “More votes are lost to incompetence than anything else.”

Rachana Desai Martin, who is leading the Biden campaign’s voter-protection efforts, told me that the campaign’s energy was currently focussed on voter education. “We want to make sure that we’re doing everything we can to put out correct information about how to vote, and that means both by mail and also in person, early and on Election Day,” Martin said. (Hasen, for his part, recently made a recommendation on Twitter. “FLATTEN THE ABSENTEE BALLOT CURVE,” he wrote. “If voting by mail request your ballot as soon as you are able and return it as soon as you can.”) Outside progressive groups, though, are preparing for all contingencies. Indivisible, the Trump resistance group founded in the wake of the 2016 election, recently paired up with Stand Up America and other progressive organizations to form Protect the Results, which will strive to get millions of people into the streets in the case of a disputed outcome. “We have to prepare for mobilization immediately,” Ezra Levin, Indivisible’s co-founder, said in a recent interview.

American elections are always messy. The Constitution does not guarantee candidates or voters the right to perfect electoral outcomes. But even a President cannot overturn an election on his own. An 1876-like scenario relies on lawmakers at the state level being willing to potentially buck the will of the voters. In this way, the days after November 3rd may offer an early clue about whether Trumpism will endure in the Republican Party. How far will state lawmakers be willing to go to keep him in office, or to back him up if he declares victory based on the vote totals before the absentees are counted, or disputes the total counts after they are? And if partisans at the state level kick the dispute up to Congress, as happened in 1876, would congressional Republicans, led by Mitch McConnell, follow their lead? “That’s the key question,” William Kristol, the former editor of The Weekly Standard and a prominent Never Trump Republican, said. (Kristol played Trump in two of the Transition Integrity Project’s games.) Even if Trump can’t successfully fight an election outcome, Kristol said, if the Republican Party goes along with his protests, they’d potentially be associating themselves with “a false and dangerous stabbed-in-the-back narrative” that could define the Party for years to come.

There are other nightmare scenarios. Foley, in particular, fears that counting delays will lead to states missing the December deadlines by which elections need to be certified to Congress. There are those who fear that Trump will exploit covid-19 to mandate emergency stay-at-home orders in Democratic-leaning cities in the final days or weeks of the campaign. There are others who point to a recently lapsed judicial-consent decree that, for decades, prevented the Republican Party from sending “poll watchers” out to intimidate voters in nonwhite neighborhoods. (“There is this real concern that officials who have been engaged in voter suppression as an electoral tactic can now weaponize covid to push that further,” Vanita Gupta, the former head of the Justice Department’s Civil Rights Division, who participated in the Transition Integrity Project, said. “Frankly, it’s all of a piece.”) And there are fears about the Portland or Lafayette Square-style deployment of federal agents across the country. Lawrence Wilkerson, a retired Army colonel and former chief of staff to Secretary of State Colin Powell, who sat in on two of the Transition Integrity Project’s games, told me that he couldn’t rule out Trump trying to drag the military into a postelection dispute. “That’s what worries me about this,” he said, “that anybody who told Trump that some action they were going to take was conducive to his retention of office would be told immediately, ‘Go do it.’ ”

As he has in other areas of American self-government, Trump has revealed how much of our democracy rests on norms rather than enforceable laws. Ultimately, the one norm that has been crucial to the resolution of past disputes is the one that Trump is perhaps least likely to observe: conceding defeat. In 1876, Tilden, from the start of the crisis, was privately prepared to concede and ultimately did so. And while the Supreme Court is popularly remembered as the decisive actor that handed the 2000 election to George W. Bush, it was Al Gore’s decision to concede, and to not pursue additional legal options, that really ended matters. In November, if Trump loses and refuses to concede, he may live up to one of his favorite boasts. No one will have ever seen anything like it. When I asked the Trump campaign what preparations it was making for the possibility of counts coming in slowly, or being too close to call, on and after Election Day, Tim Murtaugh, Trump’s campaign communications director, told me in an e-mailed statement, “We don’t know what kind of shenanigans Democrats will try leading up to November. If someone had asked George W. Bush and Al Gore this same question in 2000, would they have been able to foresee the drawn out fight over Florida? The central point remains clear: in a free and fair election, President Trump will win.”

 

 

 
The Stunning Predictability of Steve Bannon’s “We Build the Wall” Scam

 

By Eric Lach


On Sunday, after Steve Bannon appeared on Fox News, an image of his visage during the interview made the rounds on social media. While we in the audience were living through the multifaceted collapse of society, Bannon faced the camera with a mane of gray hair swept back, his face looking like a sunburned hunk of bologna, and a lighthouse rising behind him on some unidentified coast. “He looks INCREDIBLE,” my colleague Naomi Fry commented. Nearly four years have passed since Bannon, the former capo of Breitbart News and the intellectual godfather of contemporary American political extremism, helped bring an egomaniacal bigot to the White House. And now there he was on the screen, his multiple shirt collars unbuttoned and his eyes as unreadable as ever. If the look he was going for was “James Bond villain in retirement,” he was pulling it off.

It has been asked, repeatedly, whether the grifts of Donald Trump and the people around him would ever catch up with them. On Thursday, they caught up to Bannon. Federal prosecutors in New York announced that Bannon and three other men were being indicted for alleged fraud and money laundering for their role in a scheme that, even in a Bond film, might feel too on the nose. For the past two years, Bannon and his accomplices ran an online fund-raising campaign called We Build the Wall, whose nominal purpose was to raise the money for the monument to nativism that Trump had promised to build on the southern border. Trump had also promised that Mexico would pay for the wall. But, when those funds proved unforthcoming, and his various attempts to strong-arm Congress into giving him the money mostly failed, too, Bannon and his gang stepped forward to ask the very people who’d been thrilled by the notion of a “big, beautiful wall” to shell out. According to the government, the group raised more than twenty-five million dollars, and promised “not to take a penny in salary or compensation.” Then they pocketed a bunch of the money. Bannon allegedly routed more than a million dollars through a nonprofit he controls. One of his co-defendants, Brian Kolfage, allegedly used his share of the money to buy, among other things, a boat called Warfighter. According to the Times’ Evan Hill, Kolfage sailed Warfighter in a pro-Trump boat parade held in Destin, Florida, on July 4th. Happy birthday, America. Is there a word in German for something that is at once extraordinary and shocking and yet at the same time totally predictable and stupid?

The indictment raises questions about other Trump allies as well. We Build the Wall’s board members included Kris Kobach, the former Kansas secretary of state; Erik Prince, the Blackwater founder and a brother of Education Secretary Betsy DeVos; David A. Clarke, Jr., the former sheriff of Milwaukee County, Wisconsin; and Curt Schilling, the former major-league-baseball pitcher. The indictment came out of the office of the U.S. Attorney for the Southern District of New York. In June, Trump and his Attorney General, Bill Barrforced Geoffrey Berman out of his job as the U.S. Attorney in that office, for reasons that remain unclear, and despite Berman’s protests. It now needs to be asked whether this case against a close Trump associate played a role in Berman’s ouster.

The notion that political and legal gravity does not apply to Trump has become a key aspect of the Trump mystique, something that even his opponents begrudgingly believe. “Well, I’d like to see ol Donny Trump wriggle his way out of THIS jam!” goes the classic Twitter joke. “*Trump wriggles his way out of the jam easily* Ah! Well. Nevertheless.” And maybe Trump will, in the end, avoid serious consequences, despite the instances of likely obstruction of justice found by the special counsel Robert Mueller, despite the various investigations into the Trump Organization swirling in New York State, and despite his long history of engaging in business and personal activities that raise all kinds of legal questions. Associates of his have been indicted before, from Michael Flynn to Michael Cohen to Rick Gates, without the damage touching Trump. Being President is great insulation.

But there has been recent evidence that not every jam can be wriggled out of, even by Ol’ Donny. Trump has not been able to browbeat and demagogue the coronavirus. The bottom has fallen out of the American economy, a hundred and seventy thousand Americans are dead, and the polls show that those still alive are souring on the President and his party. This week, even before the Bannon news, the Senate Intelligence Committee released a report that detailed the relationship between another former Trump campaign official, Paul Manafort, and Russian intelligence during the 2016 campaign. The report called Manafort—who, in recent years, has faced a list of charges for his actions before, during, and after the campaign that is too long to recite here—a “grave counterintelligence threat.” And, according to news reports, the leaders of the same Senate committee last year alerted federal prosecutors that Bannon and Prince, as well as Donald Trump, Jr., Jared Kushner, and the former Trump campaign official Sam Clovis, may have misled them during testimony—a potential federal crime. (Each has previously denied misleading investigators.) On Thursday, as if to pile on the news, a federal judge once again rejected Trump’s attempts to keep prosecutors in Manhattan from obtaining his tax returns.

Four years ago, the Democratic National Convention took place against the backdrop of an orchestrated political attack: that week, the hacked e-mails of various Democratic Party figures were leaked out to the world. This week, the Democratic Party is again hosting its Convention. The background news this time is a drip, drip of Trumpworld corruption. Trump has spent his recent evenings staying up late to watch his opponents, and to rage-tweet about them. Next week it will be his turn on the live-streamed stage, at the Republican National Convention. Steve Bannon probably won’t be watching from the seashore.

 

Eric Lach is a staff writer at The New Yorker.

 

Wednesday, August 19, 2020

2020 is the struggle between racial liberalism and racial conservatism.



Trump vs. Biden Is an American History Rerun

2020 is the struggle between racial liberalism and racial conservatism.

By Thomas B. Edsall NEW YORK TIMES


Mr. Edsall contributes a weekly column from Washington, D.C. on politics, demographics and inequality.



Not long ago, the struggle between racial liberalism and racial conservatism was a battle fought inside the Democratic and Republican parties. Now it’s a battle fought between the parties.

Even with Joe Biden and Kamala Harris at the top of the Democratic ticket, the importance of ethnicity and race in American politics is growing, not diminishing.

As African-Americans and other racial minorities increasingly occupy positions of influence and authority in American society, they also face backlash from those on the right whose opposition to ceding power is fierce, whether their opposition is veiled or out in the open. This opposition is now lodged solidly in the contemporary Republican Party, and the two parties regularly confront each other with rising intensity over the issue.

The many sources of frustration for Black Americans are evident in “The Economic State of Black America in 2020,” a report released on Feb. 14 by Representative Don Beyer, Democrat of Virginia and vice chair of the Joint Economic Committee.


Black household income grew from 1980 to 2018 by over $11,000 annually in inflation adjusted dollars, but whites did even better. In 2018, “for every dollar earned by the typical white household, the typical Black household earned only 59 cents. This is significantly worse than in 2000, when the typical Black household earned about 65 cents for every dollar earned by a White household.”


Racial disparities are largest for the most successful: both the racial pay-gap and the racial wealth gap are “largest for college graduates.” Whites with degrees made $60,000 in 2018 compared with $49,000 for African-Americans.


Less than “half of Black families own their homes (42 percent), compared with nearly three-quarters of white families (73 percent). This is a significant decline from the peak Black homeownership rate of 49 percent in 2004.”

With virtually all opinion polls suggesting that the Biden-Harris team is at present positioned to win — 7.6 points ahead at RealClearPolitics, with FiveThirtyEight putting the odds of a Biden victory at 73 to 27 — Trump and the Republican Party are pulling out the heavy artillery.

The tactics they are using — targeted at voters of color and their supporters — include poll watchers to challenge ballots cast by minority voters, voter ID requirements, a tooth-and-nail fight against voting by mail, a war against the Postal Service and claims of voter fraud to lay the groundwork for discrediting, or refusing to acknowledge, the outcome of the election. Ron Brownstein summarized this strategy perfectly in The Atlantic as the “weaponization of the federal government.”

Fanning the flames of racial animosity lies at the core of Trump’s election strategy, as it did in 2016.

In their 2019 paper, “The Increasing Racialization of American Electoral Politics, 1988-2016,” Adam M. Enders and Jamil S. Scott, political scientists at the University of Louisville and Georgetown, found that

The relationships between racial resentment and partisan and ideological self-identifications, evaluations of the major party presidential candidates, and attitudes about health insurance and governmental services have strengthened each subsequent year beginning in 1988 through 2016.

Enders and Scott look first at statistics:


The marginal effect of racial resentment on partisan self-identifications increased from 0.01 in 1988 to 0.14 in 2016, and the same effect on ideological self-identifications increased from 0.05 to 0.12 over the same time period.

Enders expanded on the numbers in an email:


The strength of the relationship between racial resentment and partisanship increased by more than 600 percent from 1988-2016, while the relationship between racial resentment and ideological self-identifications more than doubled, increasing 177 percent. Moreover, the strength of the relationship between racial resentment and partisanship actually eclipsed that between racial resentment and ideology, the former starting weaker and ending stronger than the latter.

“Race relations and racism have emerged as a focus of American politics in the last twenty years unlike at any time since the Civil Rights movement,” Herbert Kitschelt, a political scientist at Duke, wrote in an email.

He went on:


The lack of progress in the incorporation and equalization of African Americans is the broad background condition, put into ever starker relief in the aftermath of the Great Recession. The rise of white Evangelicals on the Republican side — with white Christian churches being one of the most racially segregated sectors of voluntary associations — has profoundly deepened the racial divide.

As the share of whites in the population steadily declines, the demographic impact is significant.

In August 2014, Education Week reported that


This fall, for the first time, the overall number of Latino, African-American, and Asian students in public K-12 classrooms is expected to surpass the number of non-Hispanic whites. The new collective majority of minority schoolchildren — projected to be 50.3 percent by the National Center for Education Statistics — is driven largely by dramatic growth in the Latino population and a decline in the white population, and, to a lesser degree, by a steady rise in the number of Asian-Americans. African-American growth has been mostly flat.

In a June 2019 report, Pew found that the “U.S. foreign-born population reached a record 44.4 million in 2017.” From 1970 to 2017, the immigrant share of the population grew from 4.7 to 13.6 percent.

The intensity of the conflict between the two parties over demographic change has been a driving force shaping politics, often in ways that on the surface seem peripheral to race.

Asked to describe how the politics of today compare to the politics of 1988, when Biden first ran for president, Sean Westwood, a political scientist at Dartmouth, replied that what stands out to him


is how animosity is driving the current versions of both parties. The electorate in 1988 was far more likely to view the other side with respect. Voters believed that both candidates sought to better the American way of life. Contrast this with today’s candidates who are both focused on corralling anger to their advantage, with Biden searching for those angry with Trump and Trump searching for angry middle-class whites.

Over the past three-plus decades, the Democratic Party has been on the leading edge of change, one step or more ahead of the nation as a whole.

Democrats have become decisively more liberal, especially on cultural issues; more dependent on states on the East and West Coasts; more diverse; more ideologically orthodox, less religious, less white; and in many cases more highly educated.

“The race and religion gap jumps out to me, specifically white Christians vs. everyone else,” Ryan Burge, a political scientist at Eastern Illinois University, wrote in an email describing how the parties have changed in recent decades.

While “the Republican Party doesn’t look terribly different than it did in the 1980s: about 88 percent were white Christians in 1984; in 2018, it’s still 75 percent.”

In contrast, the Democrats have changed radically, Burge continued: “About 68 percent of Democrats were white Christians in 1984, today it’s 38 percent.”

From 1991 to 2018, the share of Democrats who describe themselves as religiously unaffiliated has grown from 10 percent to 38 percent. While a majority of Democrats say they believe in God, the party has become the home on nonbelievers.

In an interview with The Times, Robert P. Jones, founder and C.E.O. of the Public Religion Research Institute, described in blunt terms the underlying rationale for the alliance between the Republican Party and white evangelicals: “The new culture war is not abortion or same-sex marriage, the new culture war is about preserving a white, Christian America,” Jones said, adding


That’s what Trump’s really leading with. The "Make America Great Again” thing — the way that was heard by most white evangelical Protestants, white working-class folks, was saying: “I’m going to preserve the composition of the country.”

In an email, Jones wrote


As the Republican Party has continued to remain fairly homogeneous and has organized itself, fueled by decades of deploying the so-called Southern Strategy, around a politics of white racial grievances, the Democratic Party has become the default party for those who do not share those grievances and has come to more closely reflect the changing demographics of the country. As a result, the Democratic coalition, in terms of race and religion, is notably more diverse today than it was when Biden first ran for president in 1988. And issues of religious and racial identity are more salient today in defining the partisan divides.

As the share of white Christians has eroded within the Democratic Party, the share of Democrats describing themselves as liberal has more than doubled. In 1994, only a quarter of Democrats described themselves as liberal. An equal share called themselves conservatives, and 48 percent said they were moderates according to Gallup.

Today, the party has moved decisively leftward in terms of ideological self-identification. By the start of 2020, Gallup found that 53 percent of Democrats called themselves liberal, while self-identified Democratic conservatives had shrunk to 11 percent and moderates fell to 35 percent.

White Democrats are driving an increase in liberal self-identification: over the past 20 years, Gallup found that the percentage of white Democrats who said they were liberal grew by 20 points, from 34 to 54 percent. For Black Democrats, the increase was 9 points, from 29 to 38 percent, and for Hispanic Democrats, the increase was 8 points, from 25 to 33 percent.

In 1992, six out of ten Democrats had only a high school degrees or less, while 17 percent had taken some college courses and 24 percent had college degrees. 26 percent of Republican voters had degrees

Since then, the Democrats have eclipsed Republicans as the party of the college-educated. The percentage of Democrats with college degrees grew from 22 to 37 percent, from 1999 to 2019, according to Pew. Over the same period, the percentage of Republicans with college degrees barely changed, growing by one point to 27 percent.

Crucial to the changing ideology and demographics of the Democratic electorate is the geographic shift in the base of the Party.

Compared with the Democratic Party of today, the Democratic Party of 30 years ago was geographically dispersed, and not concentrated on the two coasts. Look at the map of the 1992 election, with a sea of blue states in the Midwest and four that had been part of the confederacy.

In the presidential election of 2016, all of the Midwest except for Minnesota and Illinois turned red, along with 10 of the 11 Confederate states.

Southern and midwestern states that voted for Clinton in 1992 went to Trump in 2016
States are sized by their number of electoral votes.

The New York Times·Note: Maine and Nebraska split their electoral votes. Each of the states’ voting units is represented individually. Source: 270toWin


The same regional shift has taken place in the House of Representatives, as can be seen in this comparison of the partisan distribution of seats in 2008 and 2018, posted at the website of the Brookings Institution, a center-left think tank:

These shifts have resulted in a growing economic divergence between the regions where Democrats dominate and where Republicans rule the roost.

Democrats have lost ground in non-urban, inland congressional districts



111th Congress

Elected in 2008


116th Congress

Elected in 2018
The New York Times·Source: Brookings Institution


“Basically the two parties have in just 10 years gone from near-parity on prosperity and income measures to stark, fast-moving divergence,” Mark Muro, a senior fellow at Brookings, wrote by email:


With their output surging as a result of the big-city tilt of the decade’s ‘winner-take-most’ economy, Democratic districts have seen their medium household income soar in a decade — from $54,000 in 2008 to $61,000 in 2018. By contrast, the income level in Republican districts began slightly higher in 2008, but then declined from $55,000 to $53,000.

Take productivity, a key economic measure. “Overall, ‘blue’ territories have seen their productivity climb from $118,000 per worker in 2008 to $139,000 in 2018,” Muro wrote. “Republican-district productivity, by contrast, remains stuck at about $110,000.”

In just a decade, Democratic-voting districts, according to Muro’s analysis, “have seen their share of adults with at least a bachelor’s degree rise from 28.4 percent 2008 to 35.5 percent” while voters in Republican districts “have barely increased their bachelor’s degree attainment beyond 26.6 percent and have meanwhile become notably whiter and older.”

While more complex analytically, one of the most significant developments in recent years is the decline of what political professionals call “cross-pressured voters." Christopher Warshaw, a political scientist at George Washington University, described this phenomenon in an email:

At the mass level, people in the two parties have become much more sorted ideologically during this time period. For instance, in the 1980s, there were many pro-life Democrats and pro-choice Republicans, whereas today the vast majority of pro-choice people are Democrats and pro-life people are Republicans.

Along similar lines, Warshaw wrote,


People are much more ‘one-dimensional’ in their preferences today. That is, there used to be many people that were liberals on economic issues and conservatives on cultural issues such as abortion or race (or vice versa). But today most people have views that largely fall upon a single ideological/partisan continuum. So if you’re liberal on cultural/social issues you’re probably also liberal on most economic issues.

Warshaw, writing with Devin Caughey and James Dunham, political scientists at M.I.T., describe what they call “the ideological nationalization” of politics. They found that in the 1950s, the economic conservatism of voters and elected officials was “unrelated to their racial and social conservatism.”

Among Senators, these “three domains had become roughly equally correlated by 1970” and, moving more slowly, “by the 2000s, mass conservatism was just as highly correlated.”

In other words, conservatism and liberalism both became one dimensional — consistent across economics, race and sociocultural issues:


By century’s end, conservatism at both levels had become highly correlated across domains. The primary difference between elite and mass trends is that ideological conflict collapsed to one dimension earlier in the Senate than in the public.

Kitschelt, whom I cited above, described this trend in different terms:


Political scientists like to compare the effect of “mutually reinforcing” and “crosscutting” divides in a polity, with the typical hypothesis being that crosscutting divides contain and dampen societal conflict, while mutually reinforcing divides deepen it.

In recent years, Kitschelt continued,


political divisions in the United States became progressively less crosscutting than reinforcing and have now configured the country into two warlike camps, with deep mutual hatred and anger, more so than at any time since the Civil War.

In one camp, he wrote are the


highly educated; postindustrial economic sectors; nonreligious/atheist or non-Christian religion; almost all ethnic minorities; sympathy with non-heterosexual orientations; the more urban than rural; the distinctively younger; and the slightly more female, particularly if single.

In the opposing camp are the


less educated; industrial and agro-/extractive industries economic sectors; evangelical Christians; European stock whites; heterosexuals; the more rural than urban; the distinctively older; the slightly more male, particularly if married.

While left and right have multiple concerns, among the most prominent of these is race and its first cousin immigration, and both of these concerns have become more and more central to partisan politics.

Democrats twice nominated and the nation elected Barack Obama as its first Black president. On Wednesday night, the party will nominate Kamala Harris for vice president, the first woman of color — Indian-American and African-American — on a national party ticket. As never before, Democratic racial liberalism is challenging Republican racial conservatism. The election will not bring this conflict to an end, but the outcome will determine whether the nation moves forward or backward in the struggle to realize the promise of full equality that has been central to the country since its founding.

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Saturday, August 08, 2020

Why That Falwell Jr. Yacht Photo Was the Final Straw

 


FAITH-BASED

Why That Falwell Jr. Yacht Photo Was the Final Straw

By RUTH GRAHAM SLATE


Jerry Falwell Jr. is taking a leave of absence from Liberty University, the school announced on Friday evening. The executive committee of the evangelical university’s board of trustees met on Friday and requested that Falwell Jr. temporarily step down from his roles as president and chancellor, according to a brief statement issued by the school. Falwell Jr. agreed, effective immediately.

The college’s statement did not mention a reason for the board’s request. But the announcement comes at the end of a week in which Falwell has faced unprecedented public pressure to resign from prominent associates of the college. Last weekend, Falwell Jr. posted a photograph to his Instagram account in which he posed with his arm around a pregnant woman with a bare midriff at a private party on a yacht. The college president’s shirt is pulled up and his pants are unbuttoned, revealing a triangle of underwear. He’s holding a glass of what appears to be an alcoholic beverage, though he referred to it in the caption as “black water.”

Falwell Jr. quickly deleted the photo from his account, but screenshots spread quickly. In a bizarre, brief interview with a Virginia radio station on Wednesday, he said he had “apologized to everybody” and that he had promised his children, “I’m gonna try to be a good boy from here on out.” Falwell identified the woman as his wife’s assistant, and other photos from the weekend show his wife and several of his children and their spouses on the excursion. (Other family photographs from the weekend show the engagement of Falwell Jr.’s daughter Caroline, a Liberty student.)

Students on Liberty’s campus are forbidden from drinking alcohol, and are instructed to dress modestly. A poster on Reddit compiled Falwell Jr.’s potential violations in the yacht photograph and an accompanying video, and calculated that a student captured in the same scene could have accrued more than $9,000 in school fines and 900 hours of required service, and possible expulsion. 

Faculty and alumni who have been critical of the school’s direction under Falwell Jr. were both shocked and gratified by the news of his leave of absence. “For at least a decade, Liberty’s faculty have labored under Falwell’s increasingly autocratic leadership and been shamed by his public behavior besides,” said Marybeth Davis Baggett, who taught English at Liberty for 17 years and resigned this spring after publishing an op-ed calling for Falwell Jr.’s removal based on his handling of the coronavirus crisis. “One man cannot act this way without many enablers, and any meaningful reform of the school will require a thorough and brutally honest inquiry into the LU culture.”

“One man cannot act this way without many enablers."— Marybeth Davis Baggett, who taught English at Liberty for 17 years

Falwell Jr. is the oldest son of the school’s gleefully pugnacious founder, a fundamentalist pastor and conservative activist. Falwell Jr., a businessman with a law degree and no pastoral experience, took over the college when his father died in 2007. He has built the school into a sports powerhouse with a campus filled with luxury amenities, and conservative activists and politicians regularly speak there. The school now boasts more than 15,000 residential students, and more than 100,000 students online.

But Liberty has also been under almost constant national scrutiny since Falwell Jr. endorsed Donald Trump in early 2016, months earlier than other white evangelical leaders embraced the crude casino magnate’s candidacy. Falwell Jr. began 2020 by calling for parts of Virginia to secede from the state and join West Virginia. As the coronavirus crisis encroached, Falwell Jr. initially dismissed it as “hype,” and called a Liberty parent who questioned him on Twitter a “dummy.” He was then criticized for welcoming back any students who wanted to return to campus after spring break. (Fewer than 2,000 of 15,000 residential students ultimately returned, and Liberty has avoided any outbreaks.) In May, Falwell Jr. tweeted a racist image in an attempt to needle Virginia governor Ralph Northam. He eventually deleted the tweet and apologized, but multiple Black employees publicly quit their jobs soon afterward; several high-profile Black athletes also departed. None of these media dust-ups seemed to dent Falwell Jr.’s favorability in the eyes of his hand-picked board of trustees.

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The yacht photo was different. It was the first time a significant number of prominent white conservative evangelicals have publicly criticized Falwell Jr. Mark Walker, a former Southern Baptist pastor and Republican congressman from North Carolina, tweeted that Falwell Jr.’s “ongoing behavior is appalling” and called for him to step down. (Walker is the vice chairman of the House Republican Caucus.) Dean Inserra, a prominent Florida pastor and Liberty graduate, tweeted that “the leadership at the top is tragic” and urged the board to “show some courage.” Colby Garman, a Southern Baptist pastor and executive committee member of the denomination in Virginia, also called on Falwell Jr. to resign.

“This upset a lot of Southern Baptist pastors,” said D.J. Jordan, a Liberty graduate with strong ties to the alumni community. “The visual is so stunning. And even more so to these conservative retired pastors and business leaders” who make up a significant portion of the board.

“Liberty’s board has shown us that their only public convictions relate to alcohol and sex.”— 2018 Liberty graduate Dustin Wahl

“It’s a very encouraging moment for the Liberty community,” said Dustin Wahl, a 2018 Liberty graduate who recently helped assembled a 501(c)(4) advocacy group to pressure the board to remove Falwell Jr. But he questioned why a racy photo was deemed more damaging than any previous controversies. “Why did the board decide this was the last straw? Because of a photo that made them uncomfortable, and the following public humiliation. They allowed everything up until that point. Liberty’s board has shown us that their only public convictions relate to alcohol and sex.” Calum Best, who graduated this spring and collaborated with Wahl on the new advocacy group, said that while Falwell Jr.’s leave “certainly feels like a victory,” he was troubled that the board didn’t respond to a recent alumni-led petition with almost 40,000 signatures, but rather to Republican congressmen and pastors behind the scenes.

Still, the board’s resistance to countless previous calls for Falwell Jr.’s departure is exactly what makes Friday’s announcement so significant. “This is an incredible shock,” Jordan said. “Many of us who have been close to Liberty for years never thought this board of trustees would take this action, or any type of discipline, against Mr. Falwell.”

It’s not clear how long Falwell’s leave will last, or whether he will return to the school at all. For now, however, the school is without a Falwell at its head for the first time since its founding in 1971. “This is the right call for @LibertyU students & family,” Rep. Walker tweeted on Friday night. “I pray for Jerry Jr. and the Falwells, and I take solace in the Christian principle that forgiveness and redemption is available to all.”

 

Wednesday, August 05, 2020

How the Dutch invented our world

How the Dutch invented our world

Liberal democracy and capitalism would have been impossible without the Dutch Republic 

BY RALPH LEONARD Unherd

 

Ralph Leonard is a British-Nigerian writer on international politics, religion, culture and humanism. 

“Forward! Brave people! The goddess of liberty leads you on!” So declares Count Egmont, the protagonist in Goethe’s exquisite 1788 play, Egmont, a tragedy based on the Dutch revolt of the late 16th century. “And as the sea breaks through and destroys the barriers that would oppose its fury, so do ye overwhelm the bulwark of tyranny, and with your impetuous flood sweep it away from the land which it usurps.”

Egmont would become a martyr representing the aspirations of the Dutch people, persecuted and oppressed for their Protestantism by the corrupt and tyrannical Duke of Alba, an agent of Phillip II and his Catholic Spanish empire. This was the first great “bourgeois revolution”, a concept that will be familiar to those acquainted with the Marxist and socialist lexicon, denoting the events and processes that facilitated the development of modern bourgeois society on the basis of the capitalist mode of production. The classic example was the French Revolution of 1789, when monarchy and seigneurialism were overthrown, and the basis of the modern liberal-democratic capitalist nation established.

In recent years, however, bourgeois revolution has gone out of fashion and subjected to revisionist critique wishing to consign it to the dustbin of history. Part of what underlines this dismissiveness is a rather childish unwillingness to credit capitalism, and by extension, the bourgeoisie and liberalism, with any positive contribution to human development. The assumption is that because the bourgeoisie has been reactionary for so long, therefore it has never played a historically revolutionary role; because capitalism is now senile and decadent therefore it has never been historically progressive; because liberalism is now servile therefore it has never been emancipatory. None of which is true.

The Dutch Revolt that began in the late 16th century was the first such bourgeois revolution, but because it was the first, it is arguably the most ignored. Today its distance in time makes it seem remote, and it doesn’t bare a shadow over our current epoch in much the same way as the American and French revolutions do.

But for the figures of the Enlightenment and Romantic period the Dutch Revolt and its effects held huge resonance. Adam Smith saw the Dutch Republic as the prime exemplar of a commercial society, and in the Wealth of Nations, Smith lauded the commercial cosmopolitanism of the republic, and its emphasise on free trade as the basis of its immense wealth.

For the likes of Goethe it was the struggle for liberty that made the Dutch revolt a subject of fascination, and his play in turn inspired Beethoven to compose EgmontFriedrich Schiller, in his history of the Dutch revolt, extolled the “spirit of independence” of the Dutch people in their liberation struggle against the Habsburg Empire.

Although he only referred to it briefly in scattered sentences across his works, Karl Marx also understood the significance of the Dutch revolt and the Dutch Republic as a key moment in the historic ascendancy of the bourgeoisie and the transition from feudalism to capitalism. He called it the “victory of the sixteenth century over the fifteenth century”. This was also recognised by other Marxists, among them Antonio Gramsci, who pointed out that “in the Netherlands and only in the Netherlands was there an organic passage from the commune or city-state to a regime that was no longer feudal”.

But the dominant view among socialist and Marxist historians since the mid-20th century, particularly promulgated by Eric Hobsbawm et al, has been to portray the English upheavels of the Stuart era as the first bourgeois revolution, of which the Dutch revolt was at best an appetiser.

Europe in the 16th century was a continent of strife and turbulence, a civilisation in the zygotic stages of a great transformation. The Renaissance had reacquainted European culture with the patrimony of classical Greece and Rome that helped spur great advances in art, astronomy, mathematics and philosophy, while science and technology had recently made great leaps,  most notably with the printing press. The Reformation had transformed how many European Christians related to God, while the violent and remorseless but nonetheless historic “discovery” and opening up of the Americas established new trading links, new forms of commerce and the rudimentary beginnings of the global market.

The Low Countries — the modern-day Netherlands and Belgium — were rather unique in this continent. Here the economy was diversified, highly commericialised and urbanised, and cities like Amsterdam, Antwerp and Rotterdam already hubs of commercial activity. But it also was under the control of Habsburg Spain, a feudal empire which heavily taxed the population, in particular urban merchant elites, to pay for the mercenary armies hired to fight their wars. Heavy taxation became a key burden retarding the development of further commercial expansion.

Moreover, the domination of the Catholic Church had become oppressive to the northern provinces, where Protestantism had become dominant. The spread of Calvinism among the merchant class was particularly significant, with its emphasis on self-government, self-reliance, thrift, discipline and work as noble in and of itself. While the Catholic Church forbid anyone to rebel against their ruler, Calvinist doctrine, at least in theory, supported the right to resistance, which would serve as an ideological justification for the Dutch revolt.

The revolt was about religion but it was also about money, and the right of the bourgeois to make it. As Pepijn Brandon has argued, the revolt unconsciously, yet effectively, facilitated capitalist development, with Church lands confiscated and turned into large-scale commercial exploitation, and the political influence of the nobility and Catholic clergyman diminished. On top of this, the merchant class had way more control over state power where commercial interests usurped dynastic warfare.

Ultimately, the Dutch revolt emancipated one of Europe’s most rapidly developing regions from an empire that fettered trade and industry according to the interests of the Spanish crown, the aristocracy and the Catholic Church, allowing it to become the first in which pre-industrial commercial capitalism developed on a vast, country-wide scale and a highly urbanised commercial power in its own right. 

The birth of the Dutch Republic, emancipated from the Habsburg yoke, would lead to the “Dutch Golden Age” of the 17th century when Holland, an increasingly wealthy and relatively open and tolerant society with an increasingly educated and literate population, produced great flourishings in art, science, banking, optics, engineering, philosophy and culture.

It was unquestionably the most advanced society in Europe, economically and politically making it “the envy of some, the fear of others, and the wonder of all their neighbours” as, the English ambassador to the Dutch Republic, William Temple, once put it.

This economic growth, trade and innovation helped foster one of the greatest eras in the history of art, the age of Rembrandt, Vermeer and De Hooch. Art was mass produced with portraits, landscapes and still-lifes sold on the market to as mass audiences. The nouveau riche merchant class (with their increasingly large homes with many walls that needed decorating), shopkeepers, even the odd peasant were avid consumers of this art. In 2004’s Enchanting the Eye: Dutch Paintings of the Golden Age, Christopher Lloyd estimates that between 1580 and 1800, approximately 5,000 Dutch artists produced between nine and ten million paintings, of which less than 1% have survived.

Some of the art very much reflected the experiences and aspirations of middle-class urban elites and the new cornucopia of wealth and luxury that had become available. Once prohibitively-expensive goods from all over the world poured into Dutch ports: fruits from across the Mediterranean; tobacco from the New World; spices and precious gems from India; and silk and porcelain from China. Pieter Claesz and Willem Claesz Heda, both Haarlem-based painters, introduced banquet pieces into their still life inventory portraying lavish arrangements of food and drink.

Abraham van Beyeren in the 1650s produced a still-life showing a sumptuous table full of lobsters and bowls of exotic fruits, again a glimpse of the potential plenitude and gastronomic pleasure produced by the commercial society; this ironically contrasted with the dominant Calvinism and as it was feared that the Dutch people would be corrupted by their “embarrassment of riches”, so the art often came with proverbs warning against the dangers of excess.

Arguably, the greatest product of the Dutch Golden Age was Baruch Spinoza, the philosopher whose ideas were key to the development of liberalism. The son of Jewish merchants expelled from Portugal because of the Inquisition, he found refuge in the relatively tolerant and free Netherlands, a land where ideas could be debated and exchanged more freely than anywhere else.

Because of this he was a firm defender of confessional toleration, the idea that state had no business concerning itself with the private beliefs of citizens no matter how heretical, unorthodox, crazy or immoral they seemed. Unlike his English contemporary John Locke (they were born just three months apart), Spinoza made no “special exceptions” for who did not deserve tolerance: Catholics, Protestants, Jews and atheists were all to be tolerated alike.

Spinoza’s stance on freedom of religion was intimately linked with his broader views on freedom of thought and speech. In 1670 he wrote that “in a free state every man may think what he likes, and say what he thinks”. Even now, this is a remarkably radical statement, but in his own time it was positively dangerous, of the kind that would make Jewish community leaders excommunicate him for “heresy”. Spinoza’s philosophy was that of the free individual who is “guided by reason” as opposed to the “slave” who is “guided by emotion and belief”.

Spinoza wasn’t an atheist but a pantheist, holding that the divinity was “the sum of the natural and physical laws of the universe and certainly not an individual entity or creator”. But as Jonathan Israel has shown in his voluminous yet magisterial tour de force on the Enlightenment, Spinoza’s rationalist materialism was a key intellectual influence on the radical Enlightenment that unemphatically emphasised religious scepticism, individual freedom, anti-authoritarianism and republicanism against the moderate Enlightenment that took a more conciliatory attitude towards authority and the old institutions.

Because of the innovations in shipbuilding and navigation, the Dutch Republic was also able to develop into a formidable maritime empire, expanding into the West and East Indies (modern-day Indonesia), first via eponymous companies like the Dutch West India Company then later on directly by the Dutch state itself.

Moreover, as Pepijn Brandon has recently argued, 17th century Holland was a key player in the Atlantic slave trade that was vital to the breakthrough of European capitalism in the 18th century. Suriname, for instance, was founded in 1667 as a plantation colony dependent on African slaves for the purpose of producing sugar and other “exotic” goods that would be sold on the global market and exported back to Europe. Slavery and colonial plunder wasn’t the sole means of amassing wealth by the Dutch republic, but it was certainly a contributing factor that shouldn’t be omitted.

All of these trends made Holland the wealthiest and freest country in Europe at the time, a haven for political refugees like Spinoza and Locke, at the cutting edge of the latest developments in art, science and philosophy, the first consumer society gobbling up luxury goods from around the world. Bourgeois society found its first unencumbered infant expression in 17th century Holland.

Although it would eventually be supplanted by other European powers, mainly Britain, the Dutch Republic that emerged out of the revolt against the Habsburg Empire was nonetheless a key constitutive moment of our modern world. It was an exemplar in a popular revolt for liberty against a tyrannical empire; it progressed the development of liberalism and the idea of a society based on toleration and free and open intellectual exchange.

Furthermore, a new dynamic social form, what we now call capitalism, was consummated in the small country by the North Sea, breaking out of the fetters of feudalism. This system,  for all its well known iniquities and pathologies, would contain within it the basis for a global civilisation based on freedom and the rights of the individual, and producing material abundance that the Europeans of the Reformation era could only dream of.

 


Rosewood