Tuesday, August 02, 2016


No bottom: Trump, allies declare Khizr Khan a Muslim radical, smear dead son as 'double agent'


By Hunter   Daily Koss

No, Mr. Trump. He's just a better American than you.


It took only a few days. And it is indicative of the sort of support Trump has garnered: Racists, conspiracy theorists, white supremacists, and the rest of the far-right fringe were quick to declare Democratic convention speaker Khizr Khan and his wife are not truly patriotic Muslims—and much, much worse.

Roger Stone, a longtime Trump ally and adviser, is promoting smears against fallen U.S. Army Captain Humayun Khan and his family. Stone is claiming that Khizr Khan, Capt. Kahn’s father, is a “Muslim Brotherhood agent” and is promoting an article suggesting Humayun Khan was a double agent working for Al-Qaeda. [...]
He tweeted on July 31 that Khan is “more than an aggrieved father of a Muslim son- he's Muslim Brotherhood agent helping Hillary” and Khizr Khan is "traced to the same radical Muslim group as @HumaAbedin.”
Republican operative Roger Stone can best be described as the illegitimate love child of Karl Rove and a dirty bin of used heroin needles, so it's not surprising that he personally was quick to promote the notion that the patriotic Muslim American family seen onstage were probably terrorist agents liked to Muslim Brotherhood and whose dead U.S. Army son was, according to the truly rancid conspiracy-riddled article he linked to, probably a double agent "working for the US and Al-Qaeda" who was "killed before his Islamist mission was accomplished."

Stone is an avid and prolific liar—who just happens to have been a "friend" of Donald Trump for, according to him, decades. The post he is referring to is by the venomous conspiracy theorist Walid Shoebat, and is par for the far-right course. (Indeed, the anti-Muslim far right has long supposed that a host of prominent Muslims or Muslim-linked Americans are "agents" of the terrorists, from Hillary Clinton's aide Huma Abedin to conservative anti-tax kingpin Grover Norquist. The claims are always vitriolic, and the proof is always ephemeral or simply fabricated.)

It is not possible, according to this theory, that there is such a thing as a patriotic Muslim American. They are all up to something; they are all working towards Sharia or are secretly in league with terrorists, and their dead Army sons were probably terrorists after all—even while they were serving their country, and dying for it. The similarity to pre-war Nazi rhetoric is too obvious to ignore. Under this theory, it is impossible for the ethnic other to love their nation. They are all colluding behind the scenes. They are seeking to destabilize us, they have secret connections to each other that they will use to bring us down, their mere presence is dangerous to us, and if we do not act to bar or banish them, they will destroy us.

But it wasn't just human urinal cake Roger Stone. The new claim spread like wildfire, both from advocates inside and outside Trump's campaign.

Fox Business News host Lou Dobbs responded eagerly with his own retweet of the their-Muslim-son-was-a-secret-terrorist claims: "Need to Check This Out; @realDonaldTrump #TrumpPence16 #MakeAmericaGreatAgain". (Yes, he really wrote that.) Writers at the Trump-fellating Breitbart were quick to promote the theory themselves, throwing in everything from email scandals to the Clinton Foundation to the suspicious squirrel outside the office windows.

The claim soon made it inside the Trump campaign itself, with Trump veterans' affairs adviser Al Baldasaro promoting the claims. "Read the truth about your hero, Mr Khan who used his son as Political Pawn", he tweeted.

This is where the Republican Party is at. This is the movement that Trump brought to the primary fore, and which the rest of the candidates dared not criticize or condemn lest they attract far-conservative ire. It is easier for Trump allies to believe that a U.S. Army captain who died in service to his country was a secret "double agent" than to believe he was a patriotic Muslim. When faced with the proud parents of a Muslim American soldier condemning Trump's bigotries they can only presume that the parents are themselves malevolent. It is the essence of what Trump has unleashed. It is not just the things he says and his willingness to traffic in vile white supremacist conspiracy theories from "birtherism" to Mexican "rapists" to Muslims as a malevolent force: He has acted as megaphone for those conspiracies, and has given mainstream urgency to voices previously relegated to the movement's worst fever swamps.

This is his movement. He built it, he crafted it, he retweeted it, and he dared the party to go against it. And even now, the party sits at the sidelines while agents and advisers of his campaign suggest the dead veteran whose parents spoke up against bigotry was probably himself a terrorist, with terrorist parents.

This is a dead political party. Whatever ideology it once had has been swept aside on Trump's behalf, and the new ideology is whatever Trump blurts out. If he's against trade deals now, so are they. If he doesn't like Mexican immigrants, then neither do they. If he believes all the military needs is a willingness to torture and a Great Leader like Donald Trump, so do they. There's no ideological force binding the party together other than what Trump himself provides: A racist base worked into conspiratorial froth. He didn't do that. It was broken when he got there, hobbled with everything from Steve King's anti-Latino vitriol to Tom Cotton's ISIS theories to Jade Freaking Helm. Trump just collected the pieces.

Will any one of them come out against what the Trump campaign has become? Will any one of them speak with appropriate fury over the notion that the Muslim American family is probably terrorist-linked after all, and their dead son a terrorist as well?

Not likely. Now Trump's campaign is seeking out support for his attacks on the Khan family on Capitol Hill. He doesn't want the story to go away—he's demanding the rest of the party support him in his attacks.

Meanwhile, an "open letter" to the Khan family from a conservative pundit at FoxNews.com chastises: "your religion of peace, Islam, is anything but" and "we don't plan on letting our country be devoured by Muslim maniacs."

A Washington Times columnist took to The Hill to praise their son while dismissing the human agency of what the father had to say. Khan's words against Trump's bigotries were part of a "political tradition of lying and distorting" and Khan was merely a tool, who "allowed himself to be tricked into it."

By the evening, Donald Trump was giving voice to the smears himself. “[Y]ou have radical Islamic terrorists probably all over the place, we’re allowing them to come in by the thousands and thousands. And I think that’s what bothered Mr. Khan more than anything else.”

As we keep saying, Donald Trump is the party now. There is no other.

Friday, July 22, 2016

Sunday, July 17, 2016

ISIS: The Durability of Chaos

Scott Atran NY Review of Books

Empty beach chairs on the Promenade des Anglais, a day after the Bastille Day attack, Nice, France, July 15
David Ramos/Getty Images
Empty beach chairs on the Promenade des Anglais, a day after the Bastille Day attack, Nice, France, July 15
Mass murder has again been visited upon France and shaken the world. Again ISIS has claimed credit, though this time the link to the group seems confusingly ambiguous, feeding new fears in the West about random violence by alienated or radicalized Muslims anywhere. It raises the urgent questions: What does the attack tell us about the changing face of jihadist violence today? And how might our own response, in turn, be contributing to it?

The local driver of the truck that mowed down at least eighty-four people, including ten children, and wounded more than two hundred, on the Nice waterfront Thursday was a Tunisian citizen residing in France. He had a police record for road rage and wife beating, but was not on a terrorism watch list and had no known jihadi affiliations. Yet supporters of the Islamic State immediately celebrated his actions on social media, and French President François Hollande directly linked the attack to France’s war against ISIS in Syria and Iraq.

And on Saturday, the ISIS media outlet Amaq formally claimed the Nice truck driver as “one of its soldiers” who answered the call to kill anyone from a country in the coalition against it. Such formal claims have, until now, never been merely opportunistic but refer to those who have either sworn allegiance to ISIS (like the Orlando shooter) or have actually been involved in an ISIS plot (like the Paris and Brussels attackers).

All of this suggests that trying to pin down a direct ISIS connection—while ramping up operations against ISIS in Syria and Iraq—may be missing the point. In Western political circles as with the Islamic State, and in the minds of their publics, the connection already is real, whatever actual facts may emerge. As a result, suspicion that any disgruntled Muslim is a possible terrorist-in-the-making will continue to make headway among non-Muslims while further disgruntling Muslims, just as ISIS wants. As my and my colleagues’ field research in Europe has shown, the growing stigmatization of European Muslims, who are in fact overwhelmingly peaceful, has effects of its own; even as Western leaders talk of unity and resolve in the face of such an attack, they risk undermining the authority and legitimacy of their own governments in the eyes of those who are most vulnerable to radicalization.

Others, noting that the recent attacks in France and around the world have coincided with large territorial losses for ISIS in Iraq and Syria, suggest that, as Secretary of State John Kerry put it at the end of June, the group is “desperate” because “they know they are losing.” Indeed, in the last eighteen months ISIS has lost more than one-fourth of the territory it seized, while the Pentagon estimates that the group’s foreign forces have decreased by about one-third, to 20,000 fighters, since coalition bombing began in August 2014. But this too misses some larger truths about ISIS and its long-term ability to inspire followers in Europe and the West.

Another frequently heard view is that such attacks are nihilist actions by detached individuals who simply want to wreck society because they feel society has wrecked their own lives. This assumption ignores growing evidence that attacks like what occurred in Nice are almost always perceived by those who carry them out and who admire them as acts of personal redemption and collective salvation in the service of a world revolution. Again and again, we heard, among those who have been susceptible to ISIS’s message, that realizing something close to true justice on Earth, and a right to enter Paradise in the effort to achieve that, can only come “by the sword” and “under the sword.”

To begin with, that such a horrific, large-scale mass killing was carried out by one person, with little apparent direct support—unlike the previous Paris attacks—may not be as anomalous as it appears. Nor is it necessarily of recent derivation. As long ago as September 2014, at a time when ISIS was still gaining territory, ISIS spokesman Abu Mohammed al-Adnani urged supporters around the world to “kill in any manner,” including “running him over with your vehicle,” any “disbelieving American or European—especially the spiteful and filthy French, or… the citizens of the countries that entered into a coalition against the Islamic State.”

Such statements, in turn, reflect ISIS’s longtime aim of creating chaos among the civilian populations of its enemies, as outlined in the 2004 jihadi tract “The Management of Savagery/Chaos,” Idarat at-Tawahoush, a crucial source of ISIS ideology. According to this manual, acts of daring sacrificial violence—whether by individuals or small groups—can be used to undermine faith in the ability of governments in the West and the Middle East to provide security for their peoples, and to polarize Muslim and non-Muslims, or what ISIS regards as true believers and infidels. Amplified through the media, these attacks become an effective way to publicize, and possibly propagate, revolutionary change of the political, social, and moral order.

Rather than reflecting a movement in decline, then, the Nice attack might be better understood as a recalibration of long-endorsed tactics in the service of a constant, overriding strategy of world revolution. Even if ISIS loses all of its territory in Syria and Iraq, the global jihadi archipelago could continue to expand if the social and political conditions that have led to its emergence continue to persist.

Among the social conditions that have contributed to ISIS’s relative strength in France, in particular, has been its ability to connect with young men from lower socio-economic immigrant backgrounds, who have been marginalized in French society (whereas female recruits tend to be even younger but from higher socio-economic strata). France’s large Muslim underclass, from which ISIS has recruited so effectively, has long been overrepresented in French prisons (only 7 to 8 percent of France’s population is Muslim, whereas 60 to 70 percent of France’s prison population is Muslim); while the increasingly aggressive profiling and policing of the Muslim population at large by the French government has enhanced a sense of rejection and exclusion within the Muslim community, where discontent can develop into something more radical, slowly or quickly. With his background in low-level crime, the French-Tunisian attacker in Nice, Mohamed Lahouaiej-Bouhlel, fits the French public perception of an ISIS sympathizer whether or not actually true.

Serious jihadi involvement with petty criminal networks began after the September 11 attacks as an unintended consequence of the ability of the United States and allies to cut off the flow of funding to suspect groups, especially through Islamic charities. So al-Qaeda and others began looking for funding and arms in criminal networks instead. And in these networks there were large numbers of marginalized immigrant youth, especially in France. Many of them really didn’t want to be criminals and then the jihadists came along and said to them: “look what this sick, nihilist society has done to you, but you can turn the tables be following God, redeem yourselves, save others and you can do this best by using the skills and knowledge of the underworld against the society that forced you to suffer there.”  

Meanwhile, as we continue to fight ISIS on the battlefield, we may overlook the extent to which it has been able to attract recruits amid military defeat in the past and already appears to be conditioning its supporters for such an outcome in Iraq and Syria. In May of this year, al-Adnani said in an audio message: “Were we defeated when we lost the cities in Iraq and were in the desert without any city or land [during the US-led Iraqi war surge of 2007–2008]? And would we be defeated if you were to take Mosul, Sirte, or Raqqa [primary ISIS strongholds in Iraq, Libya and Syria]? Certainly not! Defeat is the loss of will and desire to fight.” Adnani went on to call again for acts by lone individuals in Europe and the US: “the smallest action you do in their heartland is better and more enduring for us than what you would if you were with us [in Syria and Iraq]… we wish we were in your place to punish the Crusaders day and night.”

In fact, during the 2007–2008 Iraqi surge, before it became a self-declared Caliphate, ISIS lost nearly all the territory it had held, up to three-fourths of its foot soldiers, and about a dozen “high-value” members of its leadership each month for fifteen consecutive months. Nonetheless, its diffuse religious, political, military, and economic organization (including payoffs to martyrs’ families) continued to function in fairly orderly fashion. Then, at the end of 2011, the US withdrew, leaving the fate of Iraq’s Arab Sunni to a corrupt, rapacious, and oppressive Shia government while doing nothing to stop the Assad’s Shia-allied Alawite regime from massacring Arab Sunni in Syria. Thus, as Syria descended into civil war in 2011–2013, ISIS’s highly adaptable and resilient consortium of local jihadi leaders and ex-Baathist military and intelligence officials (many of whom had formed strong links in US military detention centers in Iraq) was well-prepared to take advantage of the chaos there. When the group stormed back into Iraq, it was initially welcomed by an overwhelming majority of Arab Sunni as “The Revolution” (Al-Thawra).

What seems increasingly clear, both in its earlier rise and in its current response to the coalition offensive, is that ISIS has created a surprisingly durable and seductive ideology. The mainly young people who volunteer to fight for ISIS unto death often express a joy that comes from binding with comrades in a glorious cause—involving great shared risk and shedding of blood, which has always been the strongest glue in war—as well as a joy that comes from the satiation of anger and the gratification of revenge (whose sweetness, says science, can be experienced by brain and body much like other forms of happiness). At least for hardcore ISIS adherents, the more the coalition squeezes the more determined the resistance.

We witnessed this in our recent work on the frontlines in Iraq, where we interviewed combatants near the village of Kudilah, site of the very first battle in the ongoing offensive to ultimately retake Mosul. At Kudilah, some ninety ISIS fighters with no heavy weaponry managed to prevent a sustained advance by more than five hundred coalition forces of Arab Sunni militia, Iraqi army, and Kurdish Peshmerga, aided by US and German advisers and repeated air strikes. This, despite the fact (according to Peshmerga leaders) that more than fifty ISIS fighters were killed in the battle, including a score of inghamasi (“those who dive in deep,” suicide attackers trained for piercing enemy positions and for covering retreat). Many who fought in the battle, including some who had been fighting in various wars since the 1960s, told us this was the fiercest combat of their lives.

According to both the ISIS media outlet Amaq and to leaders of the coalition forces, there has been a notable increase in ISIS suicide attacks in recent battles, the most feared attacks of all, which many in ISIS (especially among the foreign fighters) long to do: not out of desperation but in hope of contributing by their sacrifice to eventual victory. The inghamasi war cry on the battlefield is: “The Islamic State is enduring and expanding!” (Ad-Dawla al-Islamiyah baqiyah wa tatamaddad!). In our experiments, coalition combatants considered ISIS fighters to have decidedly inferior physical means, but vastly superior fighting spirit to that of US, French, Arab Sunni militia, or Iraqi army forces.

In his recent comments, Secretary Kerry was echoing a view by leaders and the press around the world that ISIS has been “running scared.” Such assertions are not new. Ever since 9/11 we have been told that mass attacks on civilians—or “soft targets” as officials like to refer to them, as opposed to “hard” military targets—are sure signs that those behind the attacks are running scared.

Are we again dangerously underestimating ISIS’s will to fight, and its ability to endure and expand? Although military defeat in Iraq, Syria, and Libya could help make it more difficult for the group to recruit, we will not be able to defeat ISIS itself until we find a way to reconnect the neighborhoods, online communities, and other particularly susceptible social and political settings where attacks like what occurred in Nice continue to find inspiration and support.

Wednesday, July 13, 2016


Polling gives a dark forecast for Iranian president Hassan Rouhani


Rouhani is losing ground as his fundamentalists opponents push slogans oddly similar to those of Donald Trump and the Brexiteers 

The latest poll from IranPoll, the Canadian outfit linked to Maryland University, is bad news for president Hassan Rouhani. Just under three quarters – 74% - of Iranians surveyed on 17-27 June say there has been no improvement in the economy as a result of last year’s nuclear agreement with world powers. With a presidential election looming next year, probably in June, Rouhani’s lead over possible challenger Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, the former ‘principle-ist’ (or fundamentalist) president, has narrowed to eight percentage points from 27 points in May 2015.

Economic growth in the Iranian year ending in March was far smaller than expected. A leading Iranian business journalist told me he thought it had been 0.9% at best. The government anticipates 3.9% growth in the current year. This improvement will come from a doubling of oil exports since sanctions eased in February, but it also reflects the government loosening monetary and fiscal discipline, stimulating economic activity at the risk of higher inflation.

But how widely will any benefits of growth be distributed? Back in March the state’s statistical centre reported poverty and inequality had increased in the previous 12 months.

And poorer Iranians are the target group for Rouhani’s principle-ist opponents. The recent ‘pay cheque scandal’ played into their hands to such an extent that many in Tehran believe principle-ists not only publicised the details of lucrative pay and bonuses enjoyed by leading executives but unearthed them in the first place.

The government’s sacking at the end of June of four bosses of state banks was unprecedented. It followed a cabinet meeting where Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, the supreme leader, told ministers that that “astronomical salaries” were “an attack on our values” and demanded the matter be “seriously followed up and the people informed of the results”.

Among those sacked was the head of Refah Bank, whose leaked pay cheque had revealed a monthly income in salary and bonuses of 240 million tomans [$78,000], far above the basic level for workers of 850,000 [$276] per month.

Principle-ists have been showing nostalgia not just for the egalitarianism of the 1979 Revolution and the noble sacrifices of the 1980-88 war with Iraq but for the landslide election victory won by Ahmadinejad in 2005 on the slogan of ‘putting the oil money on the sofreh’ (the dining mat used by poorer Iranians). Hence the value of exposing rewards enjoyed by technocrats often associated in the public mind with Rouhani and his ally, former president Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani.

Memories can be short. “While corruption always existed,” the business journalist told me, “it probably worsened under Ahmadinejad as he made an attempt to centralise power and reduced oversight of the government by the majles [parliament] and other bodies.” Ahmadinejad’s spending policies – including cheap loans – also left the banking sector with a massive burden of non-performing loans.

Khamenei has a sharp memory, however, and would be reluctant to see the return of Ahmadinejad, who in his second term, after 2009, challenged the leader’s authority several times. Ahmadinejad’s deputy, Esfandiar Rahim Mashaei, was barred from the 2013 presidential poll by the watchdog Guardian Council, six of whose 12 members are appointed by Khamenei, and council might well also bar Ahmadinejad next year.

A possible alternative to Ahmadinejad might be Qassem Soleimani, commander of al-Quds brigade, the overseas arm of the Revolutionary Guards (IRGC), who has enjoyed a strong public profile since 2014, especially in organising the military campaign against Daesh, the so-called Islamic State group, in neighbouring Iraq.

But Saeid Golkar, lecturer at Northwestern University in the United States and senior fellow at Chicago Council on Global Affairs, believes the ‘pay cheque scandal’ may have indirectly revealed another potential ‘principle-ist’ contender in Parviz Fattah, head of the Imam Khomeini Relief Committee.

“There are strong [popular] feelings against what is seen as corruption,” Golkar told me. “That’s why Fattah put his pay cheque online, to show he was the people’s man and receiving a monthly net income of 7.34 million tomans [$2380], far less than many senior managers. Like Ahmadinejad, he has a simple life.”

Fattah also enjoys good links to the IRGC as former director of Bonyad Taavon Sepah, the IRGC charitable foundation, and as a former deputy head of Khatam-ol Anbia, the Guards’ construction arm. He has a ready-made constituency among the 5 million families supported by the Imam Khomeini committee.

Golkar points out that principle-ist publications are putting pictures of Fattah alongside those of Ebrahim Raeisi, whom Khamenei appointed in March as chairman of Astan Quds Razavi, the foundation that manages the shrine of Imam Reza in Mashhad.

“Recently, in Mashhad, in the shrine and in the seminary, they are calling Raeisi an ayatollah,” Golkar said. “Ayatollah Khamenei has been reshuffling the guard, also in late June appointing Major-General Mohammad Baghari [an IRGC stalwart] as head of the general military command instead of [Hassan] Firouzabadi. If you put these signs together, Ayatollah Khamenei is thinking seriously about the future.”

Rouhani’s close relationship with Khamenei was crucial to the acceptance of the nuclear agreement in the face of strong criticisms. But the lack of progress in easing sanctions, reinforced by the recent House of Representatives vote for legislation that would block sales by Boeing and Airbus aircraft to Iran, are reinforcing the principle-ists narrative that the US is endemically hostile.

While Khamanei has said Tehran won’t renege as long as Washington doesn’t, both those who accepted the deal as a positive step and those who did so reluctantly as a ‘poisoned chalice’ are losing enthusiasm. The political factions in Iran may be shifting again, making Rouhani vulnerable.

The president moved quickly after Khamenei’s intervention in the pay cheque scandal, but Golkar is not convinced the president understands the size of the challenge he faces: “His focus is on the middle class and big cities. Poorer people, and those in rural areas, are saying, ‘Why should I vote for Rouhani, he’s a technocrat? These people are getting 240 million tomans a month and I’m on just 850,000’.”

The populism of the Iranian principle-ists shows striking similarities with populism elsewhere. It is critical of bankers, often anti-intellectual, and pushes a notion of national control against an international, or even global, elite. Its idea of nation is not just nostalgic but hostile to diversity, and extols the values of supposed ‘simplicity’ against the wicked ways of the big city – praising the morality police acting against ‘bad hijab’ is a topical example.

Such politics is hardly new, nor peculiar to Iran. Philip Mansel, the British historian, has long drawn attention to the fragility of cosmopolitan cities, which he has again illustrated in his compelling recent book on Aleppo, “Syria’s great merchant city”, now largely reduced to rubble after centuries of diversity and success based on trade.

Mansel recently told me that the destruction of Aleppo resulted from “40 years of dictatorship”, international intrigue and “the conflicts devastating the entire Muslim world from Morocco to Malaya”. But he said it also had roots in increasing poverty in the countryside due in part to climate change and desertification.

Mansel argues a hostility to urban sophistication goes back to antiquity. “In the Old Testament, there were denunciations of Babylon,” he told me. “In French history it was the provincials devastating Paris in 1848 or 1871. More generally, poorer people dependent on agriculture have been jealous of the capital city although it had often benefited them. It happened in the Lebanese civil war, people from the mountains from poorer areas thinking they’d been snubbed by Beirut.”

Mansel believes the demise of Smyrna, Alexandria and partly Beirut as multicultural centres – which he charted in his 2010 book, Levant: Splendour and Catastrophe in the Mediterranean – could be repeated elsewhere. “Look what’s happening to London now with Brexit. The great dynamic, energetic, cosmopolitan London of the last few years might change. There are parallels with [Donald] Trump - one’s always been told there are two Americas, the coast and the hinterland.”

The Iranian principle-ists’ use of social media is probably still less important than networks based on work, mosque and the Basij. But they are well aware of the Internet’s potential – IranPoll found 42.8% of Iranians go online at least once a week “to become informed about the news”, up from 33.6% in May 2015 – and their style of operation clear shows parallels with the Brexit campaign. As Dhruva Jaishankar of Brookings India recently wrote, social media “rather than creating connections with people who possess differing views and ideologies, tends to reinforce prejudices … greater information has, rather counterintuitively, contributed to a ‘post-fact’ information environment ... populists are willing to cross the lines that mainstream parties have flirted with, becoming forces that the centre cannot hold.”

Such a perspective subverts common analysis of Iran and its politics.

“Categories of ‘reformist’ and ‘hardliner’ don’t work, this isn’t about democratisation,” says Golkar. “There are those who want to interact in foreign relations – Rouhani has spoken of the nuclear deal as a model for regional problems – and against them are ‘confrontationists’. They have different discourses on both the economy and international relations. The competition for the next presidential election and the next supreme leader will be between ‘interactionists’ and ‘confrontationists’.”

In the 2005 presidential election, Ahmadinejad not only promised to put oil revenue on the sofreh, he scorned the middle classes and intellectuals. After his election, better-off Tehranis made jokes about the president scorning his origins: there were problems with the quality of drinking water because Ahmadinejad had washed his socks in the reservoir.

Whereas his reformist predecessor, Mohammad Khatami, spoke in universities and international bodies of a “dialogue among civilisations”, Ahmadinejad made repeated provincial trips around Iran addressing huge crowds of people who felt neglected by central government. Those feelings of neglect are just as strong today – and president Rouhani has little time to address them.

Philip Mansel, Aleppo: the Rise and Fall of Syria’s Great Merchant City, IB Tauris 2016. The Tehran Bureau is an independent media organisation, hosted by the Guardian. Contact us @tehranbureau

Sunday, July 10, 2016

A FIRE BELL IN THE NIGHT 2016
 
 
When Black men or women are no longer afraid of the white man, the first response of the white man is to immediately kill them as in Louisiana and Minnesota. Fear of a slave revolt is now fear of the black race holding a gun. "Black Lives Matter" is a serious threat to White Supremacy and like it or not the Police are hired guns to control the black race. Either WE ALL take a step back and be reasonable or we will all end up hiding in a cold wet basement starving and waiting to die! Think not? Look at Syria, Iraq, and Sudan.

Monday, July 04, 2016

MOSCOW — Wassyl Slipak, a baritone at the Paris Opera who became a folk hero in his native Ukraine for returning home to fight in his country’s war in the east, was killed by sniper fire on Wednesday near the town of Debaltseve. He was 41.
Mr. Slipak died around 6 a.m. after his position came under a surprise attack, said Artyom Skoropadsky, a spokesman for Right Sector, a nationalist paramilitary organization.
Mr. Slipak was born in the western city of Lviv on Dec. 20, 1974. A musical prodigy as a child, he rose quickly to fame performing in France in the late 1990s. By 2011, he was at the top of his field, winning the prize for best male performer at the Armel Opera Competition and Festival in Szeged, Hungary, for his rendering of the Toreador Song from the opera Carmen.
But after the war with Russian-backed separatists broke out in eastern Ukraine in 2014, he traded the stage for the trenches, carrying a belt-fed machine gun with other right-wing volunteers in Right Sector.
He adopted a traditional Ukrainian hairstyle, similar to a Mohawk, and served at various positions along the front line — a maze of trenches and minefields that surrounds separatist territory.
Mr. Slipak, who had won fame in France for his renditions of the aria of Mephistopheles from the opera “Faust,” adopted the nom de guerre Meph.
In an interview with Hromadske TV, a Ukrainian station, Mr. Slipak had said he was inspired to serve his country by the popular uprising on Maidan Square in Kiev, though he had been living in France since 1996.
“Ukraine can become a successful country and a major player on the political stage if we start heeding the voices of the people,” he said in the interview.
Right Sector, originally an umbrella organization of far-right groups, including some with neo-Nazi leanings, is vilified in Russia as a fascist organization. Right Sector denies it is neo-Nazi.
Euromaidan Press, a Ukrainian news website, quoting a field commander, said Mr. Slipak’s survivors included his parents and an older brother. A city spokesman in Lviv said Mr. Slipak would be buried at the historic Lychakiv Cemetery, which is reserved for notable local figures.
Mr. Skoropadsky said: “Ukraine this year celebrated 25 years of independence, but it was real independence only after the Maidan, when a real state started to form. Here we have an example of a person who left his career to fight. New heroes of the new Ukraine are being born.”
Mr. Slipak would sometimes sing for his fellow soldiers at the front, Mr. Skoropadsky said.
In the public television interview, Mr. Slipak is shown singing the Ukrainian folk song “Moon in the Sky” as he loads his gun, snapping bullets into the magazine in time with the music.

Thursday, June 30, 2016

 

Fate of Democracy

Los Angeles Review of Books
 
ANDREW SULLIVAN’S RECENT New York magazine essay, Democracies End When They Are Too Democratic, rattled many a reader and provoked a heated debate that spilled over to the pages of The New York Times, among other publications (see here). Sullivan’s provocative thesis is that the United States, in this election year of the Trump candidacy, may be perilously close to a collapse into tyranny precisely because it is too democratic — drawing on Plato’s critique of the instability of a "government by the people." To the exact contrary is the view of LARB contributor Roslyn Fuller, whose recent book Beasts and Gods: How Democracy Changed Its Meaning and Lost Its Purpose takes the American system to task for modeling itself on the Roman Republic instead of the Athenian democracy; that is, for not being democratic enough. We invited Roslyn Fuller to offer a riposte to Sullivan’s views, and gave Andrew Sullivan an opportunity to reply — which he embraced. What follows is Fuller’s all-out attack on the notion that we may be suffering from a surfeit of democracy and Sullivan’s reply.
— Don Franzen, Los Angeles Review of Books‘s Law Editor
¤
America Needs More Democracy, Not Less
by Roslyn Fuller
It is said that a little knowledge is a dangerous thing, and nowhere was this more apparent to me than when reading Andrew Sullivan’s recent article in New York magazine. In it, Sullivan uses a smattering of knowledge about ancient Greece to declare that the United States is falling apart because it has too much democracy. In Sullivan’s view, just like the ancient Greeks, we have become a permissive and disorganized society, incapable of passing any judgment on ourselves and decaying from within. The final proof: Donald Trump.
It would be a much more convincing argument if ancient Greek democracy had decayed from within or if it had looked anything like what passes for democracy in the United States of America. But while Sullivan complains about others’ lack of judgment, he falls into the opposite category — judging in ignorance.
So, first, let me explain a bit about the ancient Greek democracy that the United States is allegedly copying. The Greek democracy we know the most about is Athens. In Athens:
generals and treasurers were elected
 
other official positions were chosen by an elaborate lottery process that every adult male citizen was entitled to participate
 
none of these officials had very much power to make any decision
 
decisions and laws were passed in Assembly, which was a gathering of citizens anyone could turn up to anyone could speak to the citizens at Assembly and seek to sway them to their point of view
 
legal matters, including constitutional matters, were decided on by large numbers of lottery-selected citizens
 
elections were regarded as undemocratic and to be avoided wherever possible
 
The Athenians paid people for participating at Assembly and on juries
Now, correct, me if I’m wrong here, but I’m pretty sure that laws in the United States are passed by Congress and the president, and not the American people sitting in Assembly. I’m also fairly certain that the Supreme Court is not staffed by, say, a randomly chosen 10 percent of the American population. And as far as I’m aware Generals McChrystal and Petraeus were not elected by the general public.
In other words, the democracy that Sullivan alleges degenerated so badly in ancient times has never existed in the United States, a country that runs its politics in an entirely different manner.
Sullivan goes on to allege that in their wisdom the Founding Fathers altered "democracy" to prevent the horrors of Athens from repeating themselves, by building "firewalls" to prevent "democratic wildfires" (like Trump) from sweeping the country. The Founding Fathers did indeed not desire majoritarian rule, but they were explicit in the fact that they were not tweaking democracy for the sake of stability, but rather simply not instituting a democracy at all for the sake of protecting their wealth from "wicked" projects like debt cancellation. I’m not an originalist, but when someone says they don’t want democracy and what they create looks nothing like a democracy, you may want to give that some consideration.
Now to get back to Athens itself: it is a cliché among would-be elites to declare that Athenian democracy was an unruly form of government that could not possibly work, and Sullivan serves this one up yet again. But how does he know? Because one man — Plato — said so.
Plato’s main argument — according to Sullivan — is that democracy would degenerate in its later stages to some kind of carefree, nonjudgmental egalitarian society, devoid of the authoritarian elites that Sullivan thinks are so vital to keeping the rest of us from running amok.
However, we don’t have to rely on what Plato speculated would eventually befall Athenian democracy, because we know what did happen in the democracy that really did exist in Plato’s time. Despite penning nearly 8,000 words on the topic, Sullivan preferred to take Plato’s speculation, as he didn’t have time to go into all the "wrinkles and eddies" of Athenian politics, so allow me to fill in the gaps.
Most of our factual information about democracy (as opposed to Plato’s lengthy if erudite rant) comes from Aristotle, who decided to do something useful with his life and write down the details of Athenian state organization; Thucydides, who recorded a large chunk of Athenian history; the comedic plays of Aristophanes; the preserved speeches that Athenians made in the law courts and Assembly; as well as an assortment of pamphlets, memos, and other paraphernalia.
Now let’s examine those sources — and here’s a piece of advice I’ll give you for free: this is often a good idea before you write an article about something.
Some of Plato’s work is presented as a transmission of his mentor Socrates’s teachings, so it can be difficult to really know where one of them ends and the other begins or where each thought originates, but we can say with some certainty that they both loathed democracy. The thing both of them hated most about democracy was that it allowed ordinary people to have a say in politics, as people were directly participating in decisions in the law courts and Assembly. Socrates/Plato complained that the Assembly was chock-a-block with fullers, shoemakers, carpenters, blacksmiths, farmers, merchants, and traders.
Check out my name at the top of this article. That’s right, I’m a Fuller. My ancestors fulled, which I am told is a process for making felt. And due to this wretchedly low birth, even if I were a man, my place in the Socrates/Plato worldview would be to shut up and put up. Forever. And so, likely, would yours. Socrates/Plato also complained that the Athenians were so lenient to their slaves that you could hardly distinguish between slaves and free people in Athens.
So to sum up, in Plato’s mind some of the main problems with Athenian democracy were that people were allowed to participate equally in politics regardless of income class and they were marginally more humane to the helpless than other societies of the time.
Not only is it hard to see what is so objectionable about this, but I haven’t met too many Americans who complain about the overabundance of political equality in their society, nor have I caught myself contemplating such pressing issues in the early hours of a San Francisco morning as commuters step over rows of homeless people sleeping in the subway system while sipping their overpriced Starbucks. My God, if only we could find some way to exclude these people from participating in our society!
Not only are the "problems" that Plato diagnosed with Athens nowhere in evidence in the United States, but they didn’t seem to cause too many issues in Athens, either. Contrary to Sullivan’s assertions, the Athenian democrats were quite good at law enforcement, extremely pernickety about granting citizenship, prone to harshly punish wrongdoing of the high as well as the low, and fastidious in their religious observances. It is telling that while the Athenians had nothing against having a little fun, many of Athens’s most-respected citizens, like Pericles and Phocion, were admired for their conservative and sober lifestyles. The Athenians believed in protecting property, had a developed banking system, and you could take out insurance on your ships’ cargo. In short, despite the fact that Athens was a very participatory society, it was also very organized.
Suppressing this information and simply repeating the unfounded claims of one of democracy’s most determined enemies has been used to cut off meaningful debate on what democracy is and what we are trying to achieve with it for centuries. This oversimplistic view often leads to many seemingly irreconcilable contradictions, such as Sullivan’s concern about an alleged rise of fascism centering around Trump because of too much democracy, and seeking to buttress this argument with reference to Plato/Socrates who were two very committed proto-fascists. Their recipe for an ideal state started with an end to fits of laughter, and went downhill from there. Socrates’s students actually tried to forcibly implement this state at one point, during a brief period known, for very good reason, as the Thirty Tyrants.
One thing is certain: it was impossible for Athenian democracy to "slip" into tyranny, as Sullivan claims, because there were no offices to win and no institutions to take control of. There was no "president" of Athens; there were just a lot of ordinary citizens standing around together making decisions.
So, there are two lessons to take out of this: a) democracy in the United States is nothing like democracy in ancient Greece, and b) democracy in ancient Greece was nothing like what Sullivan claims it was.
The society Sullivan is thinking of, the one that experienced a late-stage decline from within is actually Rome. Now mixing up the late Roman Republic with Athens is like mixing up the 20th-century United States with 17th-century France, but leaving that aside, one very interesting point here is that the Founding Fathers explicitly decided to found a republic as opposed to democracy and deliberately copied the Roman institutions in doing so, including the practice of election to powerful office, the institution of the Senate, and the adoption of the eagle as their symbol. The legal system reflected this with a formal Constitution guaranteeing a limited number of rights vis-à-vis the State. This was much celebrated, just as the Twelve Tables, the Roman equivalent, was celebrated in its time.
The key here for us is really the election bit though.
In Athens, if you wanted to be someone, you had to get down to the Assembly and convince your peers that whatever you had on your mind was a good idea. In Rome, you had to win high office, but after that you could do what you liked. That meant that you had to get your billboards up, you had to hand out favors to your nearest and dearest to make them a little nearer and dearer still, you had to invite the influential down to the theater for a spot of entertainment, and above all, you had to not tick anyone powerful off, as that was a one-way ticket to character assassination, and, in the worst case, real assassination.
I trust this sounds more familiar than the Athenians’ little lottery arrangement.
Unlike the Athenian system where people were paid to participate, the Roman system was really only feasible for the rich who used money to stay in power and used their power to ensure that they kept their money. As a consequence, power and wealth became increasingly centralized commodities. If an opponent was spending one million sesterces on an election, you had to spend two. If they threw a banquet for the entire neighborhood, you had to hold one, too, and make it more exotic than theirs. These were not optional activities, because in an election, the winner takes it all.
At the same time, the Romans did become more permissive about everything else in life, with extravagant parties and luxury goods that would not have been permitted in earlier days becoming the norm among the elite. The Romans conquered more and more territory, acquired more and more slaves, had wilder and wilder parties, and conducted more and more lavish campaigns to win high office, a position from which they could grant themselves and their friends favors. The poor, of course, got poorer, with increasing numbers of the middle-class slipping into poverty, but with a few notable exceptions, the rich couldn’t have cared less.
Then one day a brash individual came along, a man of the elite but with the common touch. That man was Gaius Julius Caesar. Caesar was a fairly flamboyant character. One famous anecdote tells of an incident in which a youthful Caesar was kidnapped by pirates. He convinced the pirates to more than double his ransom, while simultaneously assuring them that he would kill them all as soon as they released him, a promise he kept. His three consecutive wives also didn’t stop him from having a robust extramarital love life. And to cut a long story short, he and his heir Octavian put an end to the Republic.
Caesar may have been a significantly less tawdry and therefore somewhat more palatable version of Trump, but the essence of what they stood for and the context isn’t all that different. They both shook up the elites of their day by appealing directly to the common person in a pact that understood that power for one would entail material improvement for the other. Just to be clear, this pact is no more democracy than holding elections is, because it entails neither political equality nor widespread participation. It is merely a nondemocratic reaction to a preexisting system of non-democracy. But it can deliver power for some. Caesar and Trump’s supporters have reacted to them in much the same way. For most people, Donald Trump can screw as many supermodels as he wants, as long as he gets them a manufacturing job back, just like Julius Caesar could loll around with Cleopatra as long as he kept up the bread and games.
Sullivan sees this bit quite clearly, although he falsely attributes it to too much democracy, before choosing the worst possible way of dealing with it: crush Trump and turn back to our treasured elites, even if that means subjecting him to a double standard that would not be applied to others.
According to Sullivan, "those Republicans desperately trying to use the long-standing rules of their own nominating process to thwart this monster deserve our passionate support, not our disdain."
But thwart Trump on a technicality and it may well be the last thing you do. In fact, this is exactly the tack the Roman elite tried with Caesar and it backfired there.
The constant suppression of societal dissatisfaction, rather than dealing with people’s grievances as they arise is what creates the Trumps among us. Anger and frustration may be ugly things to deal with and they may manifest in forms we don’t approve of, but the willingness and ability to deal with them was what made Athenian democracy strong and resilient. The unwillingness to deal with these grievances, to dismiss them as illegitimate and seek to suppress their expression by marshalling forces to defeat them in election is what made Rome a brittle Republic. It was not too much democracy that made Romans willing to accept an enlightened despot in Caesar, but rather too little.
If the United States were a democracy, it would have no need for Black Lives Matter, because any citizen would be able to report police brutality to the Assembly at any point and have a judgment rendered immediately instead of suffering in silence. If the United States were a democracy, it would not run for-profit prisons, because companies would not be allowed to collude with a special group of lawmakers behind closed doors to get their predrafted laws passed. If the United States were a democracy, there would be no "money in politics" because there would be no one to spend the money on. If the United States were a democracy, it would be devoid of mass media demagoguery, because anyone would be entitled to address the public in a public sphere anytime they wanted. I’ll even give the benefit of the doubt and say that if the United States were a democracy, it may not have perpetrated so many wars on other people.
For some reason, however, Sullivan persists in seeing "we the people" as the problem, claiming "we need them [elites] precisely to protect this precious democracy from its own destabilizing excesses."
Curiously, the vast majority of American people (much like the Romans before them) have participated in exactly zero of what Sullivan terms the country’s "destabilizing excesses." From the Congresspeople who repealed the Glass-Steagall Act, to the Supreme Court justices who ruled on Citizens United, from the bank executives who bundled up subprime mortgages, to the architects of the World Trade Organization, this was elites from top to bottom.
In excusing the "elite" wholesale for these transgressions on the grounds that we need them to save us from Donald Trump, a phenomenon they created, Sullivan engages in exactly the kind of permissive nonjudgment he accuses democracies of. But it is exactly on these public issues that we should feel free to judge. The Athenians got things right: they judged the public decisions that had a bearing on their own lives, and tried to avoid pointless altercations over the private sphere. There was little point to judging your neighbor’s sex life, but quite a lot of point to judging a case of embezzlement.
Republics, like the United States, self-implode because they create a dynamic where money equals power and power equals money. The elite power game is essentially a form of musical chairs, in which everyone scrambles for increasingly centralized power and money, which means less and less left over for everyone else. The system also contains no way to address grievances but in the all-or-nothing power contest that is the election held every few years. Democracy, on the other hand, is durable, because it contains mechanisms that allow grievances to be addressed publicly on an ongoing basis. This creates many small conflicts and few really large ones. Democracy, unlike electoral politics, is not all-or-nothing; it is a form of government that gets buy-in from people by allowing them hands-on participation in meaningful activities instead of relegating them to the role of cheerleader. It forces them to confront each other in a common arena on an ongoing basis and to reassess their previous decisions in the light of results achieved. It’s also a form of government that has never been tried in the United States.
Sullivan’s contribution is but one more libel on what is really the only system that offers any hope for meaningful change in the United States and a path out of poverty for most Americans. It’s an attempt to bury deep the powerful truth about what we can do together, the good news that things really don’t need to be this way.
¤
A Brief Response
by Andrew Sullivan
I am grateful for Roslyn Fuller’s lengthy treatment of some of the themes of my essay, and find her description of Caesar’s Rome an interesting historical allegory for Trump’s United States. But I fear we may be talking at cross purposes. It was never my intent to describe American democracy in 2016 as reflecting the historical events in ancient Athenian democracy. That would be an entirely different essay, demanding an exacting historical analysis of both systems. Fuller’s critique is therefore of an essay I didn’t write.
The piece was, rather, a meditation on Plato’s imaginative and theoretical linking of late-stage democracy to the rise of tyranny; and even then I described Plato’s views not as a history but as a "vision," fueled in part by Plato’s and Socrates’s own experience and bias. My goal was to explore the themes of Plato’s rumination on democracy as a form of government — beyond that of Athens — and see if his startling view that democracy is the only system to generate tyranny had any resonance today. I specifically mentioned the vast differences between Athenian democracy and our own.
Instead, in my own subjective way, I attempted to construct a narrative that showed remarkable echoes of Plato’s theoretical themes in our own predicament, especially his acute understanding of democracy as an interplay of psychology and culture. And the core of my argument for hyper-democracy was the very recent democratization of online media, which creates a uniquely 21st-century intensification of what worried Plato about democracy’s preference for feeling over reason, and for the mass over the individual.
There is, to be sure, an argument to be had about the power of concentrated wealth over our current democracy. I find the argument for money’s overwhelming power in determining policy unconvincing, but didn’t fully attempt to explore what would also have been another essay. I should merely point out that the influence of big money in politics does not seem to have had any effect on this populist presidential season (or the last two presidential elections), nor to have generated any amalgam of law or policy over the last few decades that was directly against the majority will. Yes, big moneyed interests lobby government and distort policy in some areas because of their access. But the impact of the masses is more pronounced. In fact, we have a massive debt built, since the 1980s, on the premise that popular entitlements, popular tax cuts, and initially popular wars can be extended beyond any fiscal reason. To see the trees of corporate influence rather than the forest of democratic demands seems to me to be a diversion from the core problem we currently face.
 
¤

Rosewood