Friday, October 28, 2022
60 years ago today, this man stopped the Cuban missile crisis from going nuclear
Tuesday, October 25, 2022
The Roots of War
The Roots of War
To discern why we fight, we should ask why we do not.
An inmate in a
Colombian penitentiary first told me about the Billiards War. I’ll call him
Carlos. Lean, muscular, in his late twenties, he had run a drug corner for a
Medellín street gang before his arrest.
If we take our
eyes off the roots of war and focus on misleading causes, we are unlikely to
make the choices that will promote peace.
A powerful
criminal group called Pachelly ruled Carlos’s cellblock, selling drugs and
charging inmates for beds and phones. Revenues from these activities made the
prison hallways profitable territory, just like the streets Pachelly controlled
on the outside.
A rival gang, El
Mesa, lived in the same prison block. Their power was growing outside of the
prison’s walls, and they had begun to resent Pachelly’s rule. Tensions between
the two groups came to a head one afternoon as men from both gangs were playing
billiards. Though Carlos cannot recall why they started arguing, he does
remember that the fight got out of hand quickly. Members of El Mesa pulled out
their guns and fired. Miraculously no one was killed, but twenty-three were
injured in the shootout.
Over the next few
days, the prison saw a series of retaliatory attacks. Soon anger and
recrimination spilled outside of the penitentiary. Pachelly and El Mesa
activated their alliances. Hundreds of gangs lined up on either side.
Medellín’s underworld geared for war.
Over the
following weeks, however, the city never spiraled into bloodshed. The Billiards
War never happened. Instead, tense negotiation ensued. Pachelly ceded some
territory—a prison hallway here, a street corner there. None of these
territories were worth a battle.
The reason was
simple: violence seemed too costly. Fighting kills little brothers and friends,
and no one wants to pay protection money or buy drugs in the middle of a
gunfight. Most of all, though, a war between the gangs would have brought
police attention to the crime bosses and risked their arrest. These leaders
could not care less about civilian casualties. Mass violence would have
compromised leaders’ bottom line and their freedom.
So Pachelly and El Mesa compromised, negotiating an agreement to avoid violence: El Pacto del Fusil, or the Pact of the Machine Gun. Some things have not changed, of course. The gangs still despise one another. They maneuver for drug corners and prison hallways. They occasionally have skirmishes (where things can get pretty rough). But they steer clear of war, knowing that it would result in vastly more damage. Today their pact has been held for a decade and Medellín’s homicide rate is nearly half that of U.S. cities such as Chicago.
Medellín’s
hostile peace is not unusual. Indeed, its gangs are an allegory for our wider
world. The globe is a patchwork of rival territories. Controlling them brings
wealth and status. Different groups covet their neighbors’ resources and prey
on the weak, but most do their best not to wage war.
Now, when I say
war, I don’t just mean countries duking it out. I mean any kind of prolonged,
violent struggle between groups. This includes villages, clans, gangs, ethnic
groups, religious sects, political factions, and nations. At every one of these
levels, compromise typically wins for the same reason it does in Medellín: war
is ruinous.
Nothing destroys
progress like conflict. Fighting massacres soldiers, ravages civilians, starves
cities, plunders stores, disrupts trade, demolishes industry, and bankrupts
governments. It undermines economic growth in indirect ways too. Most people
and business won’t do the basic activities that lead to development when they
expect bombings, ethnic cleansing, or arbitrary justice; they won’t specialize
in tasks, trade, invest their wealth, or develop new ideas. These costs of war
incentivize rivals to steer clear from prolonged and intense violence.
Of course, it
seldom feels like peace is our natural state. “The story of the human race is
war,” said Winston Churchill, “except for brief and precarious interludes,
there has never been peace in the world.” Certainly it often seems so, especially
today as a major conflict rages in Ukraine and the number of civil wars in the
world climbs to levels not seen since the 1990s.
But that
sentiment is misleading and comes from ignoring the quieter moments of
compromise. One example of peace came two weeks after Russia’s invasion of
Ukraine, when India accidentally launched a cruise missile at Pakistan.
Pakistan was outraged, but violence did not break out. Calm ensued, as it has
for decades. War would have been so costly that both sides strove to avoid it.
Likewise, for two
decades, President Vladimir Putin tried every means possible to co-opt Ukraine
without invasion: dark money, propaganda, political stooges, assassinations,
and support for separatists. War was his last resort. He succeeded in subjugating
neighbors such as Belarus and Kazakhstan without a major fight, and he hoped to
repeat the trick in Ukraine.
Look around and
tense instances of peace appear everywhere, whether it’s the gloomy impasse
between North and South Korea or the constant deadlock over Taiwan. We see it
at lower levels too. Take ethnic and sectarian groups, who are mostly covered
in the news when they purge or pillage their neighbors. When social scientists
tallied the number of rivalries in the world and counted how many turned
violent, however, they found that fewer than one in a thousand actually fight.
We forget this
because few people write about the conflicts avoided. Instead, our gaze is
often pulled to the horrific, violent struggles that do happen. That’s natural.
We have to pay attention to wars, but we shouldn’t focus solely on the
hostilities that do occur.
Solely examining
the times that peace failed is a kind of selection bias—a slanted accounting of
the evidence that distorts our view of the world. It is a mistake that has two
important consequences. One is that we exaggerate how much we fight. Yes, our
natural condition is conflict and competition, but most of the time this
jostling is not violent. Enemies prefer to loathe in peace.
The second and
greater harm of selection bias is that we mistake the roots of war and follow
fruitless paths to peace. When we trace the steps leading up to a fight, we
find familiar features: ancient hatreds, poverty, historical injustices, and an
abundance of arms. But when we look at the times rivals did not fight, we often
see many of the same preceding conditions. We ought to be skeptical, then, that
these are the causes of the violence. To discern why we fight wars, we should
begin with why we do not.
Most nations, political factions, ethnic groups, and gangs behave strategically. Like players of poker or chess, they try to think ahead, discern their opponents’ strength and plans, and choose their actions based on what they expect them to do. Even when they’re poorly informed, mistaken, biased, or impassioned, they still want to attain the best outcome. Strategic behavior is thus a good starting point for thinking about war.
Solely examining
the times that peace failed is a kind of selection bias—a slanted accounting of
the evidence that distorts our view of the world.
The science of
strategy is game theory, which works out how one side will behave based on what
it believes its opponent will do (knowing that the opponent is thinking in the
same way). Consider the decision facing Pachelly and El Mesa in the aftermath
of the billiards shootout. The foes were evenly matched, and so each gang had a
roughly fifty–fifty chance of winning a winner-takes-all war. The two rivals
also knew that war would have dire consequences, regardless of the winner.
Let’s suppose
that the territory they contested was worth $100, and that both gangs expected
fighting to cost one-fifth of that total, $20. War’s destruction means that
both sides are better off finding a peaceful split than going to war. The $20
is a peace bonus they get to divide. It creates a whole range of territorial
splits both sides prefer to fighting it out. Consider Pachelly. Fighting gives
them even odds for gaining a shrunken $80 prize. That means that any peaceful
split that leaves Pachelly more than 40 percent of the $100 territory is a
better deal. The same is true of El Mesa, and both sides know it. The $20 that
will be saved by not fighting gives the rivals an array of acceptable
compromises—what political scientists and economists call a bargaining range.
This strategic
insight is decades old. The early applications were not to military conflict,
but to commerce. Take negotiations between firms and unions, for instance. Just
replace “war” with “labor strike,” and the result is the same. Both groups want
the best deal for their group—shareholders and management on one side, workers
on the other. Strikes and stoppages are costly to both sides. Thus, most firms
and unions try to avoid them. Or consider court battles. Lawsuits are expensive
and inefficient. It’s better to settle, and most litigants do. Long, messy
court battles happen only when something hijacks the normal incentives for
settlement.
Now we should not
use this game theory blindly. Some employ these models to paint a picture of
humans as unreasonably rational—Homo economicus—but this species still manages
to commit an awful lot of violence. Groups and their leaders are not always
logical or all-seeing, and people rarely hold coherent beliefs that the
body politic faithfully represents. Still, game theory serves as a base frame
of reference—not because people are necessarily peace-loving, but simply
because they are self-interested. The losses from violent conflict usually
outweigh the gains.
The five reasons
for war
This allows a new
perspective on violence. If societies avoid war because it is ruinous, then
every explanation for fighting is the same: a society or its leaders either
ignore the costs of war or choose to pay them. Whether it is Russia’s attack on
Ukraine, the U.S. invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq, or the gang wars that have
(on occasion) turned Medellín into the most dangerous place on the planet,
something overcame the usual strategic incentives for peace, pushing opponents
away from nonviolent politics and toward bloodshed.
There are five
main reasons incentives for peace break down: unchecked interests, intangible
incentives, misperceptions, uncertainty, and commitment problems.
And while there’s
a reason for every war and a war for every reason, there are only so many
logical ways that the incentives for peace can break down. There are five main
reasons it happens: unchecked interests, intangible incentives, misperceptions,
uncertainty, and commitment problems. Each eliminates the incentives for
compromise in a distinct way. To explain them, I’ll step away from the gangs of
Medellín and consider the great conflict of this moment: Russia’s invasion of
Ukraine.
1. Unchecked
interests
Like gang
leaders, autocrats and oligarchs can ignore many of the costs of war because
the soldiers and citizens who pay them cannot hold their leaders to account.
Think of Putin. Dictators like him must only heed the damage and risks to
themselves and their cabal—a fraction of the total costs. They are quick to use
violence because others pay much of the price.
Unchecked leaders
are also free to pursue their private interests, and this can lead them to go
to war against their society’s interests. Again, consider Putin. Ukrainians had
tossed out two Russian-facing leaders in the previous two decades. But while an
increasingly restive and democratic Ukraine was hardly a danger to ordinary
Russians, from Putin’s point of view, Ukrainian democracy was a dangerous
example to dissidents at home, potentially threatening his system of control.
Co-opting the regime and installing a puppet government could eliminate that
threat. War was not in the interest of Russia at large; it was in the interest
of Putin’s narrow regime.
Democratic
societies are vulnerable to unchecked interests as well, such as a president
who hopes to boost popularity ahead of an election, military leaders who see
opportunity in a conflict, or extremist splinter factions who want to spoil the
peace. Each of these examples involves decision-makers who are imperfectly
accountable to the populace. Dictators are the most extreme and dangerous of
the lot, because they are accountable to the fewest people and bear the least
costs.
2. Intangible
incentives
Sometimes
violence can deliver value, such as glory, renown, or justice. Any ideological
rewards might offset the costs of war, spurring sides to fight instead of
bargain.
Consider status.
A desire for glory and dominance has driven kings of the past and tyrants of
the present to warfare. This is probably the most common explanation for
Putin’s invasion: nationalist pride and a desire to see Russia restored to its
imperial glory. If it adds to Putin’s personal renown and place in history, so
much the better.
Our natural
condition is conflict and competition, but most of the time this jostling is
not violent. Enemies prefer to loathe in peace.
This sounds like
a case of unchecked interests, and it may be true that Putin prizes glory most
of all. But he is not alone; at least some Russians support him. Unaccountable
leaders are not the problem if the populace shares nationalistic and
ideological goals. When they do, the leader is faithfully representing the
group’s ideals by going to war. Most commonly, however, rulers and their cabals
seek personal and national glory.
Another example
of intangible incentives is the value societies place on certain pieces of
land. When rival street gangs split territory in the example above, their
interests were mostly mercenary. The neighborhoods had no sacred value. The
soil wasn’t tied to their identity. But there are other times when a territory
is hallowed. In those cases many fight because the idea of compromising over a
sacred space or ethnic homeland is unfathomable.
Similarly,
sometimes fighting is a society’s only path to achieving other righteous ends.
Throughout history colonized and repressed peoples have decided to fight for
their freedom because compromise was abhorrent. One example is the American
Revolution. The colonists rebelled against a tyrannical superpower because they
did not want the semi-sovereignty on offer (even if that is all their military
weakness could reasonably earn them).
This is possibly
the most important and least talked about explanation for the conflict in
Ukraine. Putin demanded Ukraine sacrifice its sovereignty, a price other
neighbors have paid. But like the U.S. revolutionaries over two centuries
before, Ukrainians refused the bargain. In both cases they were willing to bear
some costs of war because compromise on freedom and sovereignty was simply
repugnant.
3. Misperceptions
A third way
rivals get the costs and benefits of war wrong is when they form and hold
mistaken views, even when evidence piles up to the contrary. In this scenario
decision-makers do not stop acting strategically, but rather strategize from a
set of delusional and biased beliefs.
We often
misperceive others. Humans are prone to demonizing their enemies and
attributing to them the worst intentions. We often treat opponents too
harshly—repressing protesters with deadly force, striking insurgent leaders
with imprecise drones—and then wonder why they angrily reject the miserable
deal on offer. People are especially prone to these errors when the conflict
follows ethnic and religious cleavages: the troubles in Northern Ireland, the
civil war in Syria, or the U.S. war on fundamentalist Islamic armed groups.
Other times we
misperceive ourselves, overestimating chances of victory or underestimating the
costs of a fight. Sometimes we owe this overconfidence to psychological biases.
Other times it arises from an institutional problem that insulates
decision-makers from bad news.
When social
scientists tallied the number of rivalries in the world and counted how many
turned violent, they found that fewer than one in a thousand actually fight.
The best evidence
of overconfidence comes not from politics—where the assurance of leaders is
hard to pin down—but rather from business. Whether it is mutual fund managers,
CEOs, or entrepreneurs, economists have shown that many are prone to repeating
the same overconfident mistakes—repeatedly overestimating the success of a
merger or investment strategy.
Political leaders
could overestimate their chances of victory, underestimate the costs, and be
too quick to take their society to war. This is one of the most common charges
laid against the Bush administration’s invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq. It is
also one of the most familiar narratives for Russia’s invasion of Ukraine: an
isolated and insulated ruling cabal overconfidently expected to easily topple
the Zelensky regime, so much so that they were unprepared for the possibility
of failure.
4. Uncertainty
Misperceptions
are important, but generally speaking, people attribute too much influence to
mistakes, and too little to uncertainty. After all, Russian leaders weren’t the
only people surprised by Ukraine’s military resistance. Most leaders simply do
not know the strength or resolve of the other side. The fourth root of war is
this uncertainty.
The first months
of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine showed how hard it is to estimate the
probability of victory or the costs of violent struggle. The competence of
Russia’s forces, resolve of the Ukrainian people, and the west’s sweeping
sanctions were all fundamentally hard to judge in advance. While it was always
possible that Russia would get a bad draw on all three, almost no politician or
military expert predicted it—least of all Putin. The problem was not simply
overconfidence, it was also the tremendous unpredictability of the situation.
Granted, war is
so ruinous that both sides ought to invest enormous time and energy in
discerning their rival’s strength and resolve. And they do—this is the function
of diplomacy and intelligence. Moreover, no nation wants to be mistaken as
weak. To avoid attack, most rivals signal their true strength through military
exercises, missile tests, and (if necessary) skirmishes. In many cases,
however, an opponent’s strength is hard to determine. Arguably neither Ukraine
nor Russia knew their own strength or resolve before testing themselves on the
battlefield. That uncertainty makes war a gamble.
More importantly,
it is hard to trust any signals from a rival. While no nation wants to be
underestimated, everyone would like to be overestimated. If you have played a
game of poker, you grasp the game theory already. You don’t know what cards
your opponent holds, but you do know that the uncertainty gives them an
incentive to bluff. Your best response is not to believe them and fold every
time.
The economic costs
of war incentivize rivals to steer clear from prolonged and intense violence.
Likewise, in war,
enemies do not know the other’s strength or resolve. They may be bluffing. The
optimal approach is to play what is called a mixed strategy: occasionally you
ought to fold; occasionally you ought to call (risking war). Each time is a
gamble. If uncertainty explains why wars break out, it also helps to explain
why the average war is so brief—typically counted in weeks rather than years.
Once the uncertainty dissipates, each side prefers to bargain rather than
fight.
5. Commitment
problems
Commitment
problems comprise the fifth and final strategic dilemma—one that lies behind
many of history’s longest wars. Commitment problems arise whenever one side
believes its opponent has an incentive to renege on a peace deal—to use some
future advantage to attack. Knowing this, a deal unravels before it can even
begin.
A classic example
is the preventative war, where one side expects its adversary to become more
powerful in the future and renegotiate the deal in their favor. One side
capitalizes on its ability to strike while still strong. When neither side can
commit to future peace, a quintessential commitment problem ensues—both sides
would prefer a deal that avoids the ruin of war, but that bargain is not always
credible. Historians and political scientists use this dilemma to explain
conflicts as varied as the Peloponnesian War, World War I, and the U.S.
invasion of Iraq.
Commitment problems also arise when leaders are unable to make credible deals. Both democrats and autocrats face this challenge, though for different reasons. Elected presidents, such as Ukraine’s Zelensky, can agree to peace terms, but a year down the road, should circumstances change, a legislature could refuse to ratify the agreement, or citizens could elect a leader who rejects the previous terms. Again, a deal unravels before it begins. Meanwhile, dictators such as Putin have even greater difficulty making deals because nothing constrains them from changing their mind later. Why should Ukraine agree to peace terms if they worry that Russia might use any pause to regroup and renew its strength, only to attack again? Part of the problem here is an autocrat’s inability to credibly keep their word.
These five roots
of war provide a diagnostic tool to discipline our thinking. Every time a
conflict is explained by reference to a specific factor, we can use this lens:
“How does that factor obscure or override the incentives for peace? How does it
fit into the five?” It may not. There are many misleading ideas about war that
arise from focusing on the failures and attributing the conflict to false
causes.
Take poverty,
which most people associate with a risk of conflict. War is expensive, though,
and poor societies often have even more to lose. This is why sudden financial
crises, price shocks, and droughts seldom lead to war.
Another common
mistake is to blame inept and ideological leaders alone. This is the dominant
account of war after war: World War I, the U.S. invasion of Iraq, or Putin’s
attack on Ukraine. But in all these cases a set of subtler strategic
factors—unchecked political systems, uncertainty, and commitment
problems—narrowed the range of peaceful settlements to a sliver, to the point that
glory-seeking, overconfident leaders and chance events could take their
societies to war. We need both the psychological and strategic explanations if
we are to understand why fighting happens.
For the same
reason, we must resist the allure of chance events. History books on wars are
filled with random human foibles, economic tumult, natural disasters, lucky
coups, new technologies, and assassinations. These play a role, but
perturbations matter for war and peace only when the five fundamentals have left
rivals with little room to maneuver. Peace, in contrast, is what happens when
societies are insulated from the five roots of war and can find ways to compete
without violence.
The paths to
peace
“Peace is not the
absence of conflict,” Ronald Reagan once said, “it is the ability to handle
conflict by peaceful means.” Indeed, successful gangs, ethnic groups, cities,
and states all share the same strategy: they develop institutions and
interventions that pay attention to the fundamentals and seek to minimize all
five kinds of breakdown. They check the power of centralized leaders. They
share information. They make commitments easier to hold. In short, they compel
rivals to consider the costs of war and to make peace strategic.
Consider the
gangs of Medellín. Long before the Billiards War, they built a governing board
called La Oficina—The Office—to manage these kinds of disputes. After the
shootout in Bellavista prison, the kingpins that dominated La
Oficina sat El Mesa and Pachelly down to negotiate, to clear up any
uncertainty and misperceptions. Both sides wanted revenge and spoils,
but La Oficina countered those unchecked interests with powerful
threats, promising to sanction anyone who continued to break the peace. The
kingpins lorded over an unequal and illegitimate system, but to some degree it
has worked. Medellín remains a dangerous place, but its murder rates are far
lower than those of most U.S. cities.
When a society
fails to contain violence, it is usually because it has allowed one or more of
the five logics of war to flourish.
Once again, the
gangs of Medellín are an analogy for our wider world. We too have kingpins and
organizations that steer rivals from violence—the member states of the UN
Security Council or NATO, for instance, and the institutions and tolls they
have established, from peacekeepers to sanctions regimes.
Like La
Oficina, these institutions are imperfect. The promise of sanctions was clearly
not enough to deter Putin from his prize. And, also like La Oficina, our
tools are unequal. International institutions work poorly against great powers,
such as the United States or Russia. (For the same reasons, La
Oficina is powerless to constrain a major kingpin. When one of the great
powers of Medellín decides to fight, the city becomes the most violent place on
the planet.) Still, the evidence suggests our international institutions and
tools work, to a degree. The world is a more peaceful place with a general
assembly, peacekeeping forces, sanctions regimes, and ranks of mediators than
it would be without.
Nations and
cities have been even more successful, as they have built social and legal
institutions that counter the five roots of violence. Their states and social
norms sanction violent offenders. Their political systems check the power of
elites and compel them to consider the interest of wider groups. Their
institutions share information and dispel fake news and other misperceptions.
Everyday work and social life integrate one group with another, giving them
shared interests and additional incentives not to fight. And their ideologies
emphasize shared identity—as citizens, or as people possessing universal human
rights—blurring the factional boundaries that separate competing groups.
Of course, many
people worry about the erosion of these checks in their societies—and they
should. When a society fails to contain violence, it is usually because it has
neglected these fundamentals and allowed one or more of the five logics of war
to flourish. If we take our eyes off the roots of conflict and focus on false
or misleading causes, we are unlikely to make the choices that will promote
peace.
Editors’ Note:
Adapted from Why We Fight: The Roots of War and the Paths to Peace by
Chris Blattman (Viking, 2022).
Thursday, October 20, 2022
How the ‘Black Death’ Left Its Genetic Mark
Saturday, October 15, 2022
The Rent Revolution Is Coming
The Rent Revolution Is Coming
For the 44 million households who rent a home or apartment in the U.S., inflation keeps pushing costs higher and higher. Anger is rising too. It could be a breaking point.
Tiana Caldwell, a co-founder and Board President of KC Tenants, outside the East Patrol Division Station in Kansas City after being arrested during the group's disruption of a city council vote on a new set of housing ordinances. Credit...Barrett Emke for The New York Times.
By Conor
Dougherty
Reporting from
Kansas City, Mo.
Oct. 15, 2022
Here’s a list of
places you might imagine seeing an argument over housing policy. A city council
meeting. A late-night zoning hearing. Maybe a ribbon-cutting to christen a new
affordable housing complex.
Instead, there
was Quinton Lucas, the mayor of Kansas City, Mo., on a stage dressed as the
pope with a half-dozen hecklers in yellow T-shirts berating his new
housing plan from the audience in front of him. Mr. Lucas had arrived at the
outdoor Starlight Theater on a warm August evening for a cameo
appearance in a local production of “Sister Act.” Just before he walked onto
the stage, the demonstrators, who belonged to a group called KC Tenants,
unfurled a banner that read “Mayor Lucas: Developing Displacement.”
A pack of
uniformed security guards promptly smothered the scene. During the slow
procession to the exit gates that followed, members of KC Tenants chanted, “The
rent is too damn high!” while the audience tried to focus on the mayor/pope and
the dancing nuns.
Such is the state
of housing in America, where rising costs are flaring into pockets of
resistance and rage. Take two-plus years of pandemic-fueled eviction
anxiety and spiking home prices, add a growing inflation problem that
is being increasingly driven by rising rents, and throw in a long-run
affordable housing shortage that cities seem powerless to solve. Add
it up and the 44 million U.S. households who rent a home or apartment
have many reasons to be unhappy.
That unhappiness extends across the economic spectrum. At one end are renters who aspire to buy a home but have had their dreams dashed by high home prices and, now, rising mortgage rates. At the other are low-income tenants who make up the bulk of the 11 million households who spend more than half of their income on rent. In between is a hollowed-out middle class that is steadily losing ground, although not enough to qualify for much sympathy or help.
The confluence of
all these forces has fueled a swell of tenants’ rights activism that has
brought organizing muscle and policies like rent control to cities far beyond
the high-cost coasts. Kansas City, Mo., is a leading example. With a population
of 500,000, where the avenues are lined with brick buildings and side streets
have modest homes with raised porches, the city offers little to suggest a
renters’ revolution. Zillow’s home value index puts the typical Kansas City
home at $230,000, or more than $100,000 below the national
level.
But with a
steadily expanding economy driven by the logistics and medical industries,
Kansas City has seen its rents increase 8.5 percent from a year ago, outpacing
the rest of the nation, according to rental search site Apartment List. Over
the past decade, Kansas City, like many places, has added a collection of
high-end towers and apartments even as its stock of low-income housing has
withered. The strain from rising rents, which landlords say they need to cover
their costs, is creeping from people working in low-income service professions
to middle-income teachers and city workers, part of a festering affordable
housing crunch that spreads more widely across the nation each month.
Organizers with KC Tenants protesting a new set of housing ordinances during a council meeting at City Hall.Credit...Barrett Emke for The New York Times
“It’s a
transition in politics for us,” said Mayor Lucas, a Democrat, who says he meets
with the leaders of KC Tenants regularly, despite being a frequent subject of
the group’s protests. “There is a new, almost tougher political edge, in the
sense that there are people who are organizing and intrigued by politics and
are very angry and are not coming out of the same institutions that built a lot
of us.”
America’s housing problem was simmering long before the pandemic, and tenant organizing is a well-established trade. What’s changed is the depth of the housing shortage and the suddenness with which Covid-19 and inflation have tipped smaller cities into an affordability crisis. This has opened the aperture for policies once deemed politically impossible, in a wider range of markets.
Unlike
homeowners, whose budget problems are blunted by a litany of tax breaks and
fixed-rate mortgages, renters are mostly unprotected from rapidly rising
prices. Once cities around the country passed widespread eviction moratoriums
and emergency rent caps that were followed by tens of billions of
dollars in pandemic rental assistance, it was only natural for housing activists
to push for some of those temporary policies to be made permanent.
Politically
speaking, inflation has only helped. Nationally, rents are now 20 percent
higher than they were in early 2020, creating an opportunity for
renter-friendly laws to get baked into long-term policy.
“People take for
granted that rent is always going to go up,” said Tara Raghuveer, a co-founder
of KC Tenants. “There’s so little political imagination about what could be
different, and now I think that’s changing.”
A hyper-focused
worker who blends the rhetoric of a revolutionary with the efficiency of a
chief executive, Ms. Raghuveer also directs the Homes
Guarantee campaign, which works to create tenant unions around the
country. She described KC Tenants as both a local movement and national
experiment through which organizing ideas can be test-driven.
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“I think every
national organizer should be accountable to a local base,” she said.
During a
three-day visit in which I hung around the office and shadowed meetings and
protests, Ms. Raghuveer returned repeatedly to an idea that has become a
refrain among tenant groups: the hope that growing resentment over housing
costs is fostering a broad tenant identity that will inspire a wide range of
renters to organize and vote with a shared interest. In the activist
nomenclature, this is known as “tenants as a class.”
That’s an audacious goal in a country where homeownership is all but defined as success. An irony of the nation’s housing problem is that it’s become so pervasive that it has created as many opportunities for cleavage as it has for coalition. Need has grown faster than resources, making housing policy a prism through which a stealth conflict between the middle class and the truly poor is filtered.
Even so, what’s
clear is that in Kansas City and elsewhere tenants are becoming a real
constituency. That’s not something you could say as recently as a few years
ago. But a few years ago the rent wasn’t quite so high.
Tara Raghuveer, KC Tenants’ founding director, working outside the East Patrol Division Station where the group camped out waiting for Board President Tiana Caldwell to be released on bond.Credit...Barrett Emke for The New York Times
KC Tenants began,
more or less, as homework.
Ms. Raghuveer,
now 30, was in her final year at Harvard when she settled on a topic for her
senior thesis: evictions, inspired by the work of Matthew Desmond, the
Princeton sociologist and author of “Evicted,” the 2016 book that explored the
housing struggles of low-income families in Milwaukee. She’d grown up in
Mission Woods, a suburb on the Kansas side of the Kansas-Missouri border, and
conducted her thesis research in the Kansas City metropolitan area.
After college,
Ms. Raghuveer was invited to talk about her thesis in policy forums, and that’s
how she met the women who would help her start KC Tenants.
One was Tiana
Caldwell, whose husband contacted Ms. Raghuveer as the family bounced between
hotels after being evicted from their apartment amid Ms. Caldwell’s treatment
for ovarian cancer. Another was Diane Charity, a 72-year-old retiree who rents
a two-bedroom townhouse and who met Ms. Raghuveer during a presentation at the
local health department.
“She gave all
these stats and I said, ‘I need to talk to you,’” Ms. Charity said. “We’ve been
telling these stories forever, and no one’s listening. But she had what it took
— I’m sorry to say this, but to talk to white people and people in power, you
got to have data.”
KC Tenants was founded in 2019 by a group that included Ms. Charity and Ms. Caldwell. A local union allowed the group to work out of its offices, and a folding table there formed KC Tenants’ first headquarters. That’s where Ms. Raghuveer was working when the Covid-19 pandemic erupted.
‘Shut it down’
For all the
uncertainty that the pandemic wreaked on markets and the economy, there seemed
to be at least one prediction that housing experts and policymakers agreed on
in its early days: a “tsunami of evictions” was imminent.
Nearly three
years later, that prediction has yet to materialize. The economic recovery from
the immediate shock of Covid was faster than many expected, and in the meantime
trillions of dollars in federal stimulus spending and eviction moratoriums
helped plug the gaps. Still, the attention that Covid brought to housing
insecurity is poised to be a lasting remnant of the pandemic economy, even
after rental assistance wanes and the patchwork of moratoriums expire.
It shows up in
cities like Los Angeles, where the City Council this month voted to
expand tenant protections for renters in the same meeting that it voted to end
its Covid-related eviction moratorium. Last year, voters in St. Paul,
Minn., passed a new rent control ordinance. The uneven rollout of federal
rental aid, in which bureaucratic hurdles frequently prevented cities and
states from getting money to tenants, inspired a number of cities to experiment
with cash assistance programs that are now becoming a permanent feature of the
policy landscape.
For organizers,
the pandemic provided an almost perfect opportunity to build their ranks. Here
was a crisis that affected large swaths of renters pretty much all at once, in
contrast to the normal state of affairs in which tenants who are falling behind
or evicted are dealing with problems that seem unique to their lives and mostly
handled in private.
“Embedded in
tenant organizing are deeper questions about the structure of our political
economy,” said Jamila Michener, a professor of government and public policy at
Cornell who has studied tenant organizations. “It’s getting people to think
about not just how you can leverage power against your landlord or get the city
council to help you, but also questions like: Why does the economy seem to be
rigged against people like you so systematically?”
In 2019, Jenay Manley was making $11.50 an hour at a QuikTrip gas station when a paperwork error cost her a voucher that covered a portion of her rent through the federal Section 8 housing program. To help make up for the loss, she allowed a former boyfriend who she said was abusive to move back in. One night, she texted a friend who had been displaced by a rent hike to ask what she could do. The friend, Maya Neal, suggested that she go to a KC Tenants meeting. There, she heard Ms. Caldwell tell her story of being evicted during cancer treatment.
Maya
NealCredit...Barrett Emke for The New York Times
“It was just this
clarifying moment of, We’re not OK. People are not OK,” she said. “We are
struggling, and no one knows. And the more of us who tell our story, the more
of us realize our story is worth being told.”
A few months
later, after leaving the night shift at QuikTrip, Ms. Manley, along with her
sister and three children, stationed herself along Interstate 70, next to
a minivan with “#CancelRent” scrawled across a window in purple marker. She was
there to protest the burden of Covid on tenants in a socially distant manner.
In July 2020, KC
Tenants protested the end of a local eviction moratorium and tried to halt
eviction proceedings by logging onto virtual court hearings and
continuously reading a script — “Every eviction is an act of violence” — so
that judges and lawyers couldn’t hear one another. By October, the group’s
members were chaining themselves to the courthouse doors.
They also started
targeting lawyers and public officials, including through a rally in the front
yard of Judge J. Dale Youngs, who oversees the circuit court in Jackson
County. Mr. Youngs said in an interview that at one point the group
spray-painted “FU” onto a flagstone path in his yard. He added that he did not
know if “FU” was the completed thought or if the vandal was interrupted before
the message could be finished.
“I’m a pretty big
supporter of the First Amendment, and I’m the first to admit democracy is
messy,” Judge Youngs said. “But when you go protest in front of someone’s
private home, I think the only reason you’re doing that is to let them know
that you know where they live. And there’s something kind of inherently not
cool about that.”
Locals argue over
how effective these protests were, but there’s little doubt that housing
pressures brought on by Covid helped open the door to policies that otherwise
would never have happened. The biggest, by far, is a new right-to-counsel
ordinance in which the city will pay for a lawyer to represent any tenant
facing eviction. The measure was drafted by KC Tenants, according to Andrea
Bough, the City Council member who introduced it.
In an interview in her office, Ms. Bough expressed the same anxiety I had heard all around town, including from the mayor and from low-income tenants: even though Kansas City remains inexpensive compared with larger cities, it is spiraling into the same affordability problems as those places and is no more equipped to solve them.
“We aren’t to the
point of a widespread housing crisis, but if we don’t do something we’re going
to get there,” she said.
The
right-to-counsel law, which went into effect this year, has already
changed the landscape. Julie Anderson, a Kansas City attorney who represents a
number of local landlords, said that the cost of an eviction had risen by a
factor of five and that the process now took from three months to a year, up
from a month or so. Her clients are unhappy, but it’s also been good for
business: Ms. Anderson said she had hired two lawyers and three paralegals to
handle the extra work.
“That part of my
practice was very uneventful,” she said. “Now, post-Covid, almost everything is
contested.”
The Tenant Class
Image
Credit...Barrett
Emke for The New York Times
KC Tenants now
has 4,300 members, seven full-time employees and piles of yellow T-shirts ready
for distribution. The nonprofit organization operates out of a second-floor
office inside a Methodist church, and is funded through a mix of individual
donors and foundations. It has a $450,000 annual budget.
This month,
members launched a separate entity, KC Tenants Power, that is registered as
a 501(c)(4) and has more leeway to engage directly in politics. Like
everyone else these days, Ms. Raghuveer seems to spend most of her time on
video calls, talking in front of a banner that reads, “Eviction Kills.”
Tenant-organizing has been central to any number of social justice and civil rights movements stretching from the turn of the twentieth century, but, in recent decades, it has rarely been successful outside localized pockets. An enduring issue in organizing tenants as a class is that homeownership is still most families’ goal.
Covid has
illustrated this. Once remote workers could live anywhere they wanted, many
renters left big, expensive markets for smaller cities where they could afford
a home.
Ms. Raghuveer
believes in a growing tenant identity, but she has no delusions. She doesn’t
imagine that one day she’ll lead a protest march in which public-housing
tenants lock arms with residents of luxe buildings, where one-bedrooms start at
$3,000 a month and include access to rooftop pools and private dog parks. What
she does believe is that housing instability, however it is experienced, can be
a catalyst for a broader coalition that operates across traditional political
lines.
She pointed to a
recent effort to help a local trailer park where the county was evicting
residents in order to build a jail on the property. This would normally have
been an organizing no-brainer. However, during a meeting, several members of KC
Tenants said they were reluctant to get involved because a number of the cars
and trailers in the park had Trump stickers and flags on them. Other members
responded by recalling that the group’s community agreements, which they read before
every meeting, declare that KC Tenants does not make assumptions
about anyone.
So a group went
to knock on doors.
“This little
skinny gal comes to my door, and I’m like, ‘Who in the hell is this?’” said
Urban Schaefer, a resident of the park who helped organize it after meeting Ms.
Raghuveer. “A lot of people were skeptical about it.”
In the end, about
a dozen members of KC Tenants worked with residents to demand a better deal.
And the county sweetened its offer: six months of free rent and at least $10,000 in
relocation costs.
An organizing
meeting for tenants Gabriel Tower Apartments, in Kansas City.Credit...Barrett
Emke for The New York Times
There weren’t any MAGA hats at the KC Tenants meetings I went to, but it was a generally diverse group with a range of motivations for being there. There were Black women, who are among the people most affected by eviction, both locally and nationally. There were white men, who began whatever they were about to say with acknowledgments of privilege. And there was a child of the housing bust, whose faith in the American dream was shattered when his family was foreclosed on and a chain of moves followed.
During a meeting
of a tenants’ union in the gentrifying Midtown neighborhood, I met an economics
professor who had come because she had wanted to better understand the housing
problem. Later, at meeting in a Section 8 building on the other side of Troost
Avenue — long the city’s dividing line between its Black and white residents —
several attendees sat in wheelchairs, and one said he’d recently slept under a
bridge.
Small frictions
abound. At one recent meeting, a young man talked about the “carceral state,”
only to have Ms. Charity reply: “Are you talking about jail?”
This diversity
is, unintentionally, the policy conundrum that Mayor Lucas and other officials
are grappling with as more people look to the government for help with housing.
Around the
country, developers have spent the past decade building mostly higher-end
units. Eli Ungar, the founder of Mac Properties, which is based in
Englewood, N.J., and owns about 9,000 apartments, including 2,000 in Kansas
City, bluntly laid out the economics. The cost of development is now so high
that the most reliable way to make money is by building apartments for tenants
who regard the cost of rent as “a matter of curiosity.”
This leaves two
groups behind.
“The folks who
think of themselves as middle class and are feeling increased worry and
pressure as rents go up faster than incomes, and the people who are most
vulnerable in our society and desperately need housing that no developer can
provide without a massive subsidy,” Mr. Ungar said. “As a citizen, I would be
entirely comfortable with my taxes being higher to provide well-maintained
housing for those who can’t afford it. The question is how that is achieved,
and market-rate developers are not unilaterally going to say, ‘I will reduce my
income to achieve this goal.’”
Caught in the teeth
of a housing problem that is growing faster than local budgets, public
officials inevitably try to solve both problems at once, pitting the middle
class against families who live on minimum wage or fixed incomes. This was the
crux of the “Sister Act” protest.
Mayor Quinton
Lucas, in Kansas City, last year.Credit...Chase Castor for The New York Times
As part of a new
housing plan, Mayor Lucas had proposed a $50 million bond issue to fund low-income
housing, but at the same time he wanted to loosen the city’s regulations for
apartment projects that receive tax breaks through a program designed to create
affordable housing in market-rate projects. The shift would allow developers to
substitute middle-income units for those reserved for families in the lowest
income brackets.
KC Tenants framed
the change as selling out families closest to the edge. The mayor’s retort was
that the previous iteration of the program had resulted in no new units for anyone,
and his hope was that the revisions would push developers to build
middle-income housing, which the city needs as well.
In the interview,
he cast himself as a leader trying to navigate a difficult problem in world of
limited resources.
“We don’t have a
Scandinavian tax structure,” he said. “Maybe we can get to it, but I don’t know
that it starts in Kansas City.”
Two days after
the “Sister Act” protest, when the City Council held its vote on the plan, the
chambers were packed with yellow T-shirts. After a 9-to-4 vote in
favor of the new policy, Ms. Neal, an early KC Tenants member, yelled, “How
dare you!” Security hauled her out with her arms behind her back in a
scene that members’ cellphones captured from every conceivable angle.
Ms. Neal being
escorted out of the council meeting at City Hall.Credit...Barrett Emke for The
New York Times
When Ms. Neal was gone, Ms. Caldwell, the once-evicted tenant whose cancer is now in remission, continued the chant. “Not another penny for the slumlords!” she shouted. She was removed just as fast, only instead of getting booted to an outdoor bench, like the one where Ms. Neal sat after she’d left the building, Ms. Caldwell was arrested and taken to a local police station.
An hour later,
the lawn outside the station was crowded with yellow shirts. Members of KC
Tenants lay on the grass typing on laptops and eating pizza. A slice was
waiting for Ms. Caldwell when she emerged a short time later to cheers.
“I’m feeling
great,” she said to the crowd, as her 15-year-old son joined her. “I’m doing
this so that my baby will never have to.”
After a chant of
“Tiana, we got your back!” a small group that included Ms. Caldwell and Ms.
Raghuveer went to a wine bar to relax. The bar was closing, but Ms. Raghuveer
said she’d called the owner, who’d promised to keep it open for them. She added
that he was a renter.
Conor Dougherty
is an economics reporter and the author of “Golden Gates: Fighting for Housing
in America.” His work focuses on the West Coast, real estate and wage
stagnation among U.S. workers. @ConorDougherty