Monday, March 27, 2017

POLITICAL SUICIDE; ALEXEY NAVALNY 1976 2017

Russia is a ruthless gangster state, there is no rule of law or any kind of justice. The system is rigged and controlled by Vladimir Putin. Mr. Navalny is a deluded fabulist and a suicide. He will be murdered by the Interior Ministry police and some moron will be arrested and framed with the murder. Putin has ordered the murder of at least 30 people, why would it be different this time?

From Wikipedia
Alexei Anatolievich Navalny (RussianАлексе́й Анато́льевич Нава́льныйRussian pronunciation: [ɐlʲɪkˈsʲej ɐnɐˈtolʲɪvʲɪtɕ nɐˈvalʲnɨj]; born June 4, 1976) is a Russian lawyer, political and financial activist,[1] and politician. Since 2009, he has gained prominence in Russia, and in the Russian and international media, as a critic of corruption and of Russian President Vladimir Putin. He has organized large-scale demonstrations promoting democracy and attacking political corruption, Putin, and Putin's political allies; he has run for a political office on the same platform. In 2012, The Wall Street Journal described him as "the man Vladimir Putin fears most".[2]

A self-described nationalist democrat, Navalny is a Russian Opposition Coordination Council member and the leader of the political party Progress Party, formerly People's Alliance.[3][not in citation given] In September 2013, he ran in the Moscow mayoral election, supported by the RPR-PARNAS party. He came in second, with 27% of the vote, losing to incumbent mayor Sergei Sobyanin, a Putin appointee. His vote total was much higher than political analysts had expected, but Navalny and his allies insisted that the actual number was still higher, and that authorities had committed election fraud in order to prevent a runoff election from taking place.[4]
Navalny came to prominence via his blog, hosted on the website LiveJournal, which remains his primary method of communicating with the public. He has used his blog to attack Putin and his allies, to organize political demonstrations, to post documents showing Putin and his allies to be engaged in unsavory behavior and, most recently, to promote his campaigns for office. He has also been active in other media: most notably, in a 2011 radio interview he described Russia's ruling party, United Russia, as a "party of crooks and thieves", which soon became a popular epithet.[5]
Navalny has been arrested numerous times by Russian authorities, most seriously in 2012, when federal authorities accused him of three instances of embezzlement and fraud, all of which he denied.[6] In July 2013, he was convicted of embezzlement and was sentenced to five years in a corrective labor colony.[7][8] The NGO Memorial Human Rights Center recognized Navalny as a political prisoner.[9] Navalny was released from prison a day after sentencing.[10] The prison fine was suspended in October 2013.[11] In February 2014, Navalny and his brother were prosecuted on embezzlement charges, and Navalny was placed under house arrest and restricted from communicating with anyone but his family; he was sentenced in December 2014 with another suspended prison term of 3.5 years, and his brother received an actual 3.5-year prison sentence.[12]

Sunday, March 19, 2017

THE DEVIL PROBLEM

By David Remnick

Elaine Pagels won popular and scholarly acclaim for her revolutionary interpretation of the early Christian Church in “The Gnostic Gospels.” Then unthinkable personal tragedy led her to the subject of a new book: What is Satan?

According to Pagels, the Gospel writers’ creation of Satan gave rise to the moral history of the West. “This material is painful,” she says.

Sixteen years ago, Elaine Pagels, who was then a professor in her mid-thirties at Barnard College, shattered the myth that early Christianity was a unified movement and faith. It is a rarity for a scholar so young to alter even slightly the historical view of something as vast and essential as the Western world’s dominant religion. Ordinarily, only the physicist or the mathematician can hope to enter early middle age having made a scholarly mark; indeed, for such a scientist a glide into the thirties without distinction can be cause for despair—or a job in university administration. The historian, by contrast, cannot rely on intuition or mental speed. History is an art not only of imagination but also of accumulation—of languages, reading, travel, perspective. Pagels, who is now the Harrington Spear Paine Professor of Religion at Princeton, had accumulated thousands of hours in the library, the classroom, and the archives, and a working command of Greek, Latin, German, Hebrew, French, Italian, and Coptic as well—an appropriately full quiver for a specialist in early Christianity. She had also, at this preposterously early point in her career, hit the academic bull’s-eye. In 1979, Pagels published “The Gnostic Gospels,” a brief and elegant analysis of a series of ancient documents known collectively as the Nag Hammadi Library. Just as Edmund Wilson illuminated for a wide audience the importance of the Dead Sea Scrolls, Pagels explained the value and meaning of a trove of manuscripts unearthed in 1945 in the upper-Egyptian desert by a peasant named Muhammad Ali al-Samman. While digging near the village of Nag Hammadi for sabakh, a soft soil used as fertilizer, Muhammad Ali found a red earthenware jar. Thinking there might be gold inside, he smashed the jar with his mattock, and found instead thirteen papyrus books bound in leather. That night, his mother burned much of the find in the oven as kindling. What she did not burn ended up in the hands of black marketeers, antiquities dealers, and, eventually, scholars of first- and second-century Christianity.

Through a careful reading of the fifty-two sacred texts that survived—they are Coptic translations of Greek originals, some as old as the four Gospels—Pagels made it clear that early Christianity was far more complicated than anyone had ever imagined. A wildly diverse compendium of poems, chants, myths, gospels, pagan documents, and spiritual instructions, the texts are distinct evidence of fierce theological debate and of an alternative tradition within early Christianity—a kind of mystical variant, much like the Zen tradition in Buddhism, Kabbalah in Judaism, Sufism in Islam. What was more, Pagels argued, the early Church Fathers, in their attempt to eliminate this more experiential Christianity in favor of building an orthodox institution—a universal, or catholic, church—declared the texts to be heretical. The Gnostics may well have buried the texts to avoid brutal purges being led by the notorious Bishop of Alexandria, Athanasius, in the year 367. Although many of the stories in what became the New Testament—the Virgin Birth, the Resurrection of Christ—are at least as strange as anything in the Gnostic texts, the Church leaders canonized the Gospels attributed to Mark, Matthew, Luke, and John as a reliable basis for a social organization with mass appeal. Gnosticism, with its emphasis on individual divinity and unmediated personal communion, was a threat to the authority of bishops and priests. Its suggestion, for instance, that the Resurrection of Jesus was a mythological vision, rather than, as the Synoptic Gospels assert, a historical event, was intolerable, and so was the Gnostic notion that God was both father and mother of Jesus. Thus, in the second century an orthodoxy began to take shape—and, with it, a temperament. Irenaeus, the orthodox Bishop of Lyons and one of the leading crusaders against the Gnostics, declared that, while certain heretics “boast that they possess more gospels than there really are,” no Church leader may, “however highly gifted he may be in matters of eloquence, teach doctrines different from these.”

“The Gnostic Gospels” won the National Book Award, the National Book Critics Circle Award, and the praise of Pagels’ professional colleagues. Harold Bloom, a literary critic with a minor in Gnosticism, credited Pagels (in the Washington Post) with “devoted and sound scholarship”; reviewers remarked on her skills as an artful, concise explainer. She had, remarkably, delivered a complicated argument to a popular audience without cheating the demands of scholarship.

In the years that followed the success of “The Gnostic Gospels,” Elaine Pagels seemed to lead a life of invariable good fortune. Her professional future was limitless, her personal life a source of pleasure and vitality. Her marriage, to the physicist Heinz Pagels, was a match of intellect and spirit. Heinz Pagels was a research scientist, a writer, the executive director of the New York Academy of Sciences, a human-rights activist, and a famously charming raconteur. “In a way, they were a perfect couple,” Elizabeth Diggs, a playwright and one of Elaine’s closest friends, recalls. “Heinz was tall, blond, fabulously good-looking. He was brilliant, and he was good. He had flaws—he could be a name-dropper—but he was a good, deeply moral man. Heinz had more passion and love of the world than almost anyone else I’ve ever known. He was a perfect foil to Elaine. He adored Elaine and completely supported her. He more than supported her—he championed her.”

In 1980, Elaine gave birth to a son, Mark. When Mark was two, he was diagnosed with a respiratory ailment that would inevitably shorten his life; this knowledge haunted the family, yet they lived a nearly ideal existence. Elaine began work on a study of the Adam-and-Eve story and the way Augustine of Hippo had reinterpreted it in the fourth century as a parable of inherent sinfulness rather than of human freedom. Heinz became increasingly involved in writing popular books about physics and in studying the emerging field of complexity theory. Mark grew up a radiant and preternaturally intelligent little boy, who went everywhere in New York with his parents (often on Heinz’s shoulders): to the Hayden Planetarium and the Museum of Natural History, to the ships docked along the Hudson, to the galleries in the East Village. In 1986, Elaine and Heinz adopted a second child, a girl named Sarah.

On April 10, 1987, Mark Pagels died, at the age of six and a half. As he got older, his lungs had failed to grow properly and had lost their elasticity. By the time Elaine finished the manuscript of “Adam, Eve, and the Serpent” and Heinz finished his study of complexity theory, “The Dreams of Reason,” they found themselves dedicating their books to the memory of their son. Friends remember coming out of the funeral service, at the Church of the Heavenly Rest, on Fifth Avenue, and seeing men and women weeping openly as they went down the steps. “I’ve been to God knows how many funerals and yet this one seemed to break everyone’s heart,” one friend said.

For the next year, Elaine and Heinz plunged into an unthinkable grief, an ache worthy of Job. “Raw absence, sadness, dumb grief,” Elaine called it later. But they refused to succumb to despair. They still had their daughter, Sarah, and after about a year had passed they adopted a son—David. Heinz, especially, provided a spirit and a perspective that helped move the family forward. In “The Cosmic Code,” a study of modern physics, published in 1982, he concluded with a joyful meditation on the pleasure of understanding, even in the face of death, some of the structures and the logic of the universe:

I used to climb mountains in snow and ice, hanging onto the sides of great rocks. I was describing one of my adventures to an older friend once, and when I had finished he asked me, “Why do you want to kill yourself?”

I protested. I told him that the rewards I wanted were of sight, of pleasure, of the thrill of pitting my body and my skills against nature. My friend replied, “When you are as old as I am you will see that you are trying to kill yourself.” I often dream about falling. Such dreams are commonplace to the ambitious or those who climb mountains. Lately I dreamed I was clutching at the face of a rock but it would not hold. Gravel gave way. I grasped for a shrub, but it pulled loose, and in cold terror I fell into the abyss. Suddenly I realized that my fall was relative; there was no bottom and no end. A feeling of pleasure overcame me. I realized that what I embody, the principle of life, cannot be destroyed. It is written into the cosmic code, the order of the universe. As I continued to fall in the dark void, embraced by the vault of the heavens, I sang to the beauty of the stars and made my peace with the darkness.

By the beginning of the summer of 1988, friends began to think that Heinz and Elaine were starting to emerge from the shock of their first child’s death. That June, the family went to Aspen, where Heinz could work at the Center for Physics, Elaine could read, and they and the children could relax together. Seth Lloyd, a young physicist who was working with Heinz on complexity theory, recalled that the summer started out with an aura of promise. “Elaine and Heinz were really looking happy,” he said. “It seemed as if they’d finally made it to the other side.”

In Aspen, Heinz and, sometimes, Elaine took long hikes in the hills and the mountains. On the morning of July 24th, Heinz and Seth went for a long trek up Pyramid Peak, a fourteen-thousand-foot mountain in the Elk Range, outside the town. Elaine stayed behind. Seth was an experienced climber, but he had never been up Pyramid Peak. Heinz had, and he took the lead. “The only reason there is any danger on Pyramid Peak is that there is the danger of crumbling, falling rock,” Lloyd said. “Otherwise, it’s really more of a hike than a climb. It’s only in the last thousand feet that you have to use your hands. At around midday, we made it to the top and hung around there for about an hour It was a nice day, with long, clear views. We ate our lunch. Then we started down.”

As a child, Heinz had suffered from polio. The condition left him with weakened ankles, but outward signs of that weakness were slight. Once in a while, climbing or just walking down the street, he would stumble, but not very often. He wore ordinary hiking boots on the climb up Pyramid Peak. “We’d come down a half mile, maybe four hundred vertical feet from the top, and then we came to a tricky bit on a ledge with a deep drop below,” Lloyd went on. “Heinz was in front. At the end of the ledge there’s a spot where you have to hop onto a saddle, a little ridge. It’s a hop of a couple of feet—nothing that a kid couldn’t do, really—but Heinz had those weak ankles, and as he landed on the ledge his ankle gave out. He slipped and he fell. That’s all it was—a slip. Heinz slid down a kind of rock chute into a narrow ravine and out of sight. He was trying to save himself, but there was nothing for him to grab onto.” Three hours after the fall, a mountain-rescue team found Heinz Pagels’ body two thousand feet below the point of his fall. He was forty-nine years old.

In June, Elaine Pagels will publish a new book, “The Origin of Satan.” (1995) Characteristically brief and lucid, it is an attempt to describe the evolving shape of the Devil in the sacred Judeo-Christian literature and the rise of demonization, a practice that has haunted two thousand years of history. For Pagels, demonization is a crucial and terrifying component of Christianity. What began as a minority sect’s rhetorical strategy, a way of defining and asserting itself, became a majority religion’s moral, and even psychological, justification for persecution: first of Jews, then of Romans and of heretics—of all opponents, real or imagined.

Pagels, like many other scholars, begins with the observation that, although all kinds of angels frequent the Hebrew Bible, demonic beings are nearly absent; there are agents of obstruction in the Book of Job and in Numbers, for example, but they are still members of the heavenly court. This changes with the rise of sectarianism. To two first-century Jewish sects—the Essenes (who died out and became a historical curiosity) and the followers of Jesus (who flourished)—figures called, variously, Satan or Belial or Beelzebub, who would shatter the unity of the heavenly court, appear as the great Other in a cosmic war. Pagels outlines the way the four Gospel writers, who probably wrote between the years 60 and 70, just after the Roman destruction of the Temple of Jerusalem and the dispersion of the Jewish people, shaped their stories and imagery to unify the Jewish followers of Jesus. The typology of God and Satan, Us and Them, appears. Although the Gospels tell a story of the moral genius of Jesus—his lessons of charity, redemption, and love—they also tell a parallel story in which the enemies of Jesus threaten tribal unity on earth and are, moreover, incarnations of Satan. This second story, in which the Gospel writers create a psychology of cosmic war, has influenced the course—the tragic course—of Western history.

Pagels begins with the details of the text to chart the appearance of Satan. The Gospel of Mark, for example, deviates from Jewish tradition and describes (3:23-27) the ministry of Jesus in constant battle with the “kingdom” of Satan. For the Gospel writers, the first enemy was “the intimate enemy”—the majority of their fellow-Jews, who did not follow Christ. The creation of such a powerful Satan in the orthodox Christian cosmology becomes not only a foundation for anti-Semitism but also a pattern of viewing the world. “Such visions have been incorporated into Christian tradition and have served, among other things, to confirm for Christians their own identification with God and to demonize their opponents—first other Jews, then pagans, and later dissident Christians called heretics,” Pagels writes. This apocalyptic vision, in which victory is assured to those who stand on the side of Christ, “has taught even secular-minded people to interpret the history of Western culture as a moral history in which the forces of good contend against the forces of evil in the world.” Demonization is crucial to the language and thinking of fundamentalists, from Pat Robertson to the ayatollahs; during the Gulf War it was present in the rhetoric of both Saddam Hussein and George Bush. Demonization is also present even in secular fundamentalisms: Lenin’s rhetoric, his prediction of a global victory over the capitalist infidels, borrows from the religious tradition he promised to bury.

Curiously, “The Origin of Satan” begins with a nakedly personal moment, a hint of the way Pagels transformed pain into scholarship: “In 1988, when my husband of twenty years died in a hiking accident, I became aware that, like many people who grieve, I was living in the presence of an invisible being—living, that is, with a vivid sense of someone who had died.” It is a tantalizing moment, but, just as quickly as Pagels opens the curtain on her creative process in “The Origin of Satan,” she rings it shut.

When I first met Pagels, she reminded me of a caricature Einstein—the dreamy academic heading down Nassau Street, his keys falling out of one pocket, a pen leaking in the other. Pagels, too, presents a deceptively absent-minded face to the world. Because she is forever rushing from one commitment to another, she is often late, forgetting things, dropping things, a little helpless. Her acquaintance with the world of the ordinary seems, at times, unsure. When we travelled together from Princeton to Harvard, train schedules and airport gates seemed to baffle her. In a retro sort of way, she invites help. You can’t resist carrying her bag, or checking her forehead to see if she has a fever. And yet she is enormously strong. Pagels not only survived two tragedies in the space of fifteen months but since then has written another book, reared her children, taught her many students. She is, by all reports, a good colleague, a devoted friend. Her mind is quick and generous. At fifty-two, she has a mild, earnest appearance (a rounded, friendly face, windblown blond hair), and yet in conversation she is absolutely fierce, focussed, picking apart the careless question, delighted by the unexpected one. When she delivers her lectures for an undergraduate course on the New Testament—Monday and Wednesday mornings at ten—she does not so much pace the room as prowl it. Pagels radiates so much intensity that you somehow imagine a fast-burning cigarette in her hand. There is none. She does not smoke. She smolders.

“At one point in my life, I had to make a decision,” Pagels told me one day as I raced after her, past a “Don’t Walk” sign and into the street. (We narrowly missed being hit by a maroon minivan doing about thirty miles an hour.) “I had to decide whether to have too little or too much in my life,” she went on. “Study, children, friends, travel—all of it. That was an easy one. I chose too much.”

After reading the manuscript of “The Origin of Satan,” I asked her how the death of her husband and her child could possibly have led her to a study of the Devil.

“The tragedy—the tragedies—were absolutely devastating, unimaginable,” she began. Her voice was even, deliberate. “You’re just beginning to think you can get through one tragedy and start again and then this hits—Heinz’s death. David was three months old and Sarah was two and a half when Heinz died. The thought of raising these children without him was inconceivable. But the question was: Can you get through? I found that in times of grief the church has little to say. It’s just too remote. The meditation techniques I’d learned from Trappist monks in Colorado were more useful. But just to imagine doing anything was so hard. I withdrew from teaching and went for a year to the Institute for Advanced Study. Mostly, I spent time with my children and my friends, reading, listening to music.”

After a brief pause, she went on, “When two things like that happen, you wonder, How can I cope? You wonder, What ever happened to a sense of proportion in the universe? But the universe, of course, is not about that. Heinz had a sense of all this. His work was all about chaos—chaos theory. But in me—even in me, who was raised by a nonbeliever—there was a subliminal perception of a morally ordered universe. Look at the story of Sodom and Gomorrah in the Hebrew Bible. It is a story about how a feature of the natural universe, a volcano, destroyed two towns. The writer tries to describe how every one of the men in these towns was evil and therefore they were all destroyed by this volcano. But in fact erupting is simply what volcanoes do. They erupt, regardless of whether anyone in their path is good or evil. So I began to think about these stories and these questions, and move myself out of a position of subliminally accepting a position in which a moral order is so present. I began to see and become aware of the extent to which I perceive things through this idea of a universe of good and evil. It didn’t matter that I was not a believer in the traditional sense. These stories, whether you believe them literally or not, are shadow images, the mental architecture we live in, and they are pervasive.

“The kind of response that most of us would have to such an event would be as though the event itself were part of a morally ordered universe, as if God had planned it to punish someone. This to me seemed impossible and strange. Nevertheless, it is a pattern that works on you psychologically. The impulse is to ask, Why me? It just couldn’t be meaningless, any more than the birth of a wonderful child could be meaningless. I began thinking of how the Greeks and the Romans thought about the forces of nature as powerful forces that were benign or malevolent. They either graced your life or destroyed it, but it was not a matter of intention. Zeus and Apollo and all the rest affected your life, but without thinking about it, without intending to.” After the deaths of Mark and Heinz, Pagels said, she wondered how people dealt with catastrophe, where they focussed their anger. “For people more religious—well, some might get angry at God, but that made no sense to me,” she said. “In the ancient Church, they got mad at Satan. That seemed to make more sense. And so I had to ask, What is Satan? What’s the Devil?”

Elaine Hiesey Pagels grew up in a world in which the idea of such questions—or of studying the history of religion as an academic discipline—was faintly comic. Her father, a professor of biology at Stanford, was Protestant but almost aggressively nonobservant. He considered religion obsolete. In his view, there had been in human history a line of progress from magic to religion and on to science. Partly out of curiosity, partly out of a teen-ager’s search for the precise way to drive her parents crazy, Elaine began going to a local evangelical church when she was thirteen. She succeeded in her rebellion, but stopped going to church a couple of years later, when she decided that the stories and the instructions of the Bible were being understood too literally. Her ambivalence, which persists, is the familiar modern one: a constant wavering between spiritual need or interest and the unwillingness to heed the orthodoxies of any church. Even now, when Pagels is asked whether she is a believer she will answer “Not exactly” or “Not in the sense that believers mean it,” or something of the kind. She is deeply attracted to religious ritual: she has visited a Zen center in San Francisco, watched Hopi snake-dancing rituals in the Southwest. (Nowadays, she even goes regularly to an Episcopal church, “though at first it ran counter to my self-image.”) After long thought, she decided, upon graduating from Stanford, to apply for graduate study in religion at Harvard.

“At that time, in the sixties, religion was not considered a fit subject for study by most of my peers,” Pagels said when we met at her office in Princeton one afternoon. “Even Heinz, when I got to know him, thought it was a little strange. But I was determined. When I applied to Harvard, they said, ‘Wait a year. We’ve had bad luck with women students. They always quit and get married.’ But I wanted to go, so I got my master’s degree in Greek in the meantime and then entered the doctoral program in religion at Harvard in 1965. My parents, needless to say, thought this was all a little strange.”

Pagels is interested in a range of subjects—poetry, music, modern dance—so I asked her if she had decided to study religion as part of a spiritual quest or as an academic pursuit.

“Well, both, really,” she said. “For so many people like me, who are put off by the shape the modern church can take, there is the idea that if you go back to the early Christian Church you’ll find some pure golden age, some clear and much simpler version of what later became more complex and amplified. Christians look around the world today and they see Christian Scientists, Roman Catholics, Greek Orthodox, Southern Baptists, Methodists, right-wing Presbyterians, Pentecostalists—and they say that this is a tremendous cacophony of voices, an impossible situation. When I went to graduate school with that rather naïve idea, one of my teachers—Krister Stendahl, a former Lutheran bishop—asked me, ‘Why have you come?’ I said something about finding the essence of Christianity. And he looked at me in a very penetrating way and said, ‘How do you know it has an essence?’ Then I knew why I had come to graduate school—to be asked that kind of question. But I was looking for some phenomenon that would account for both my fascination with Christianity and my disaffection with its various institutional forms. I thought that it would be way back in the beginning, something pure in its divine revelation. What I found, first of all, is that one cannot get back to that revelation in any form we would agree is pure. In just a generation after Jesus of Nazareth, there are all kinds of refractions, and even more later than that. Not only that but there were refractions and differences in the Gospels themselves. It was a much more complicated picture than I had ever imagined.”

Nothing proved to Pagels the complications of early Christianity more decisively than her first encounters with the Gnostic manuscripts. Gnosticism was not by any means unknown in scholarly circles: early Christian orthodox thinkers wrote extensively about Gnosticism, mostly by way of debunking it; writers as diverse as Gibbon, Blake, Melville, and Jung were aware of Gnosticism and interested in it; between the World Wars, the German-born scholar Hans Jonas (among others) wrote about the sources of Gnosticism. But when the Nag Hammadi manuscripts were discovered, in 1945, the concrete proof of Christianity’s complications, its diverse forms in those first generations after Christ, became inarguable.

As had been the case with the Dead Sea Scrolls, study of the Nag Hammadi Library languished for years because of confusion, bureaucracy, and academic turf battles. For several years after Muhammad Ali found the manuscripts, they were mainly in the hands of antiquities dealers, who tried to make their fortune from them. Some papers slowly became available to scholars, but mostly they remained scattered. In 1952, the Egyptian government declared the manuscripts national property, yet in that same year a dealer managed to sell an important codex to the Jung Institute, in Zurich. Eventually, this and the rest of the Nag Hammadi Library were returned to Cairo and put in the Coptic Museum. Throughout the fifties, some scholars were allowed to examine the papers, but there was still no formal system of access or publication. Finally, in 1961, the director-general of unesco called for the publication of the papers and proposed the establishment of an international scholarly panel to prepare an edition of photographs of them. The first volume of that edition appeared in 1972, and the series was completed in 1977. James Robinson, the director of the Institute for Antiquity and Christianity, who was a member of the unesco committee, played an especially heroic role, circulating copies of all the manuscripts privately, so that many scholars had access to the find well before official publication.

Pagels was one of the scholars who won access to the Gnostic samizdat. She was thrilled to be among the favored few. Twenty years after the find in upper Egypt, the texts were still a loosely held secret. The first she had heard about the Nag Hammadi find was when she began her graduate studies at Harvard. With the encouragement of her mentor at Harvard, Helmut Koester, she learned Coptic in order to study the manuscripts. In 1970, she completed her doctoral dissertation on the struggle between Gnostic and orthodox Christianity, and in 1975 she went to Cairo to study the documents at first hand. Her experience there was amazing. In the Coptic Museum, she worked at a table, hunched over papyri that seemed to her far more beautiful than any of the photographs she had seen circulating among scholars in the United States; children played nearby, and a cleaning woman mopped the floor as Pagels made her way through the Dialogue of the Savior, the interpretation of Knowledge, the Gospel of Mary, and all the other strange texts of the Gnostics—myths, mystical instructions, creation epics, alternative gospels. Pagels joined an international team of a few dozen scholars which, under Robinson’s direction, issued an English edition of the manuscripts—“The Nag Hammadi Library”—in 1977.

“It’s funny,” she said. “I remember reading that novel by Irving Wallace, ‘The Word.’ It’s about someone finding a secret gospel. At the end, it turns out to be something trivial—some sort of Protestant truism, totally boring and disappointing. But when you open the Gospel of Thomas, which was hidden for so many centuries, it’s not trivial at all. You find Jesus speaking cryptically, as in a Zen koan. In the Gospel of Thomas—this is one of my favorite passages—Jesus says, ‘If you bring forth what is within you, what you bring forth will save you. If you do not bring forth what is within you, what you do not bring forth will destroy you.’ ” Many of the Gnostic texts are thought to have been written later than the canonical Gospels. According to Helmut Koester, however, it is quite possible that the Gospel of Thomas, or part of it, may have been written somewhere between the years 50 and 100—that is, as early as, or earlier than, the Gospels of Mark, Matthew, John, and Luke.

To some degree, Pagels’ title, “The Gnostic Gospels,” is too loose. Not all the Nag Hammadi papers are Gnostic in origin, and not all are, strictly speaking, gospels. The variety of the texts makes a synthetic analysis quite difficult. But there are texts, such as the Testimony of Truth, that are clearly rivals to the canonical Biblical literature. In the Testimony of Truth, for example, the Garden of Eden story is told through the eyes of the serpent—a symbol, in Gnostic literature, of divine wisdom. In this version, the Lord threatens Adam and Eve, while the serpent prods them toward eating the fruit of knowledge. Perhaps the most important feature of the text is that it denies the actuality of the Passion of Christ and attacks the canonical enthusiasm for martyrdom. (In fact, several of the Nag Hammadi texts—the Apocalypse of Peter, the Second Treatise of the Great Seth, the Treatise on the Resurrection—tell the Passion story in far different ways, which suggest that Jesus was not an ordinary human being and that his suffering is not a model for emulation.) The Testimony of Truth mocks “empty” martyrs for their delusions of redemption and mocks thinkers such as Ignatius and Tertullian for welcoming martyrs as an offering to God; such a God, the text says, would be a cannibal.

And yet the orthodox vision of martyrdom, and of Christ as human, prevailed. Why? Pagels writes that the orthodox emphasis on martyrdom was essential to the building of the Church institution in the second century. Church leaders like Ignatius wrote letters about martyrdom to various Church groups at a time of terrible persecution of Christians, for distributing accounts of martyrdom was a way of warning others, closing ranks, and lifting spirits. The Gnostic vision of Jesus as a purely spiritual being, in this case, could serve no such purpose. The Church Fathers were rightly convinced that ordinary human suffering is better validated through the orthodox Christian version of the Jesus story: an ordinary man martyred by his enemies.

Another text that fascinated Pagels was “Thunder: Perfect Mind,” a mystical poem spoken in the voice of a female divine:

For I am the first and the last.

I am the honored one and the scorned one.

I am the whore and the holy one.

I am the wife and the virgin. . . .

I am the barren one, and many are her sons. . . .

I am the silence that is incomprehensible. . . .

I am the utterance of my name.

Pagels suggests that this passage represents a tendency in the Gnostic literature to provide for a female aspect in the representations of God. In the Gospel of Philip, the birth of Jesus derives from the unity of the Father of All, a masculine divinity, and the Holy Spirit, a distinctly feminine presence. The text mocks the orthodox notion of Mary’s conception of Jesus independent of Joseph: “They do not know what they are saying.”

The early-Christian movement showed great openness toward women—Jesus himself flouted Jewish tradition by talking freely with women; women sometimes acted as prophets, apostles, and teachers—and the Gnostics generally affirm that tradition in their texts. But orthodox Christians struck back—and decisively. Once more, Pagels says that the reason for the orthodox victory was as much political as theological. The Church leaders simply would not tolerate what they saw as a feminine interest in Gnostic literature or a position in the Church hierarchy. Tertullian, a great enemy of Gnostics, was outraged at the idea of women flocking to heretical sects. “These heretical women—how audacious they are!” he wrote. “They have no modesty; they are bold enough to teach, to engage in argument, to enact exorcisms, to undertake cures, and, it may be, even to baptize!” By the year 200, Christian feminism was clearly brought to an end by the text known in the New Testament as Paul’s First Epistle to Timothy: “Let a woman learn in silence with all submissiveness. I permit no woman to teach or to have authority over men; she is to keep silent.” This consensus of masculine hegemony “has continued to dominate the majority of Christian churches,” Pagels wrote. “Nearly 2,000 years later, in 1977, Pope Paul VI, Bishop of Rome, declared that a woman cannot be a priest ‘because our Lord was a man’! The Nag Hammadi sources, discovered at a time of contemporary social crises concerning sexual roles, challenge us to reinterpret history—and to re-evaluate the present situation.”

Pagels determined as she read the Gnostic texts that the Church Fathers feared their strangeness and variety—especially the way they gave individual knowledge and transcendence priority over obedience to a patriarchal orthodoxy. Some of her critics, however, including Raymond E. Brown, a Catholic theologian, believe that Pagels went overboard in her claims for the importance of the Gnostic texts. In a mostly negative assessment in the Times Book Review, Brown said that in “The Gnostic Gospels” Pagels gives more than “about nine-tenths” of her discussion to the Gnostics, “which will leave the reader cheering for them and wishing that the narrow-minded orthodox had not won.” But in fact, Brown argued, the Gnostics were élitist, and thought of other Christians as ignorant. “Read the texts themselves,” Brown wrote, “and you may emerge ‘conservative-chic,’ concluding that crusty old Irenaeus”—the orthodox Bishop of Lyons—“was right, after all, to regard the gnostics as the crazies of the second century.”

For the most part, though, the critical reception was positive, and most accepted Pagels’ assurance in the book that she did not intend to proselytize for or celebrate the Gnostics but, rather, to underline the complexity of early Christianity and explain some of the social and political reasons for the rise of an orthodoxy.

“One of the real reasons Elaine’s book was a blockbuster was that it shattered the entire premise of the ecumenical movement,” Malcolm Diamond, a professor emeritus in the Princeton Religion Department, has said. “There was this idea that you could get back to the presumed unity of the early Church, get away from the fragmentation in Christendom. What Elaine showed was that there was more fragmentation in the early Church than there is today. That was startling—and it was just one point of many. She wanted to show, through the Gnostic manuscripts, the active role of women in early Christianity and how they were forced out of the governance of the Church. She gave such perspective on the established Gospels and the diverse traditions they competed with. It was her point to go back to that time when you have it all up for grabs and take the competitors seriously and are not just dismissive of it. Her achievement wasn’t a matter of discovery so much as it was a novel attitude to non-canonical material.”

Not only did “The Gnostic Gospels” gain wide academic and popular audiences but Pagels herself became, through no choice or desire of her own, a kind of spiritual sage for some of her readers. She still gets letters from religious seekers describing their encounters with the Gnostic Gospels; some of the letter writers approach Pagels not as a scholar of ancient texts but as the texts’ evangelist or author. “Once in a while, it all gets a little weird,” she said, laughing. When Vogue asked the actor Harvey Keitel for an interview before the release of “The Piano,” Keitel asked that the interviewer be Elaine Pagels. “The Gnostic Gospels,” he said, had changed his life. (Pagels, for her part, refused the assignment—“I don’t know how to write that way,” she says—but she did sit in on the interview, at Keitel’s request.) Not long ago, Pagels met a woman who was the head of a Gnostic church in Palo Alto. “I was quite enchanted by her and delighted by her,” Pagels told me. “She said she met some people at Orly Airport who told her about an ancient order—the Order of Mary Magdalene.”

“But this is serious stuff,” Pagels said. “It’s fermenting. People are beginning to think about incorporating into the canon elements of Christianity that were lost. There are many people, of course, who have abandoned Christianity altogether and have gone out in search of more experiential modes of access to the divine, like chanting, channelling spirits—you name it. Gnosticism isn’t a matter of belief. It’s not about that. That’s why I think the analogy is with Zen Buddhism, or Buddhism in general. It has to do with dimensions of experience and meditation. It’s about practice, spiritual discipline, and the religious imagination. If you look at one of the Gnostic texts, the Discourse on the Eighth and the Ninth, it’s a dialogue between a teacher and a student. The student has read all the books, and the teacher says, ‘Now you have to go beyond what you’ve read in the books.’ And he tries to take him to a higher level of contemplation, to an ecstatic state through mantras, chanting, and so forth. It’s about leaving belief behind; gnosis means knowledge, or understanding. I’m not a missionary for Gnosticism, but what interests me about it is that it opens up dimensions other than the ones usually available in churches or on the basis of a statement of faith, which is often a series of propositions that many people do not believe.”

“Adam, Eve, and the Serpent,” which was published in 1988, grew out of “The Gnostic Gospels” and elaborated on the idea of an early pluralistic Christianity. According to Pagels, the Creation story and Adam’s defiant decision to eat of the Tree of Knowledge, as it appears in the second and third chapters of Genesis, was widely understood by early Christian thinkers as a parable of human freedom. Such an understanding had a profound influence on behavior: sexuality was without stigma, marriage was considered no less holy than celibacy, divorce was considered a regrettable but tolerable event. In Christianity’s early manifestation, as a dissident Jewish sect, Pagels writes, its adherents championed the notion of free will. “So long as Christianity remained a persecuted movement,” she wrote, “the majority of Christian preachers proclaimed the plain and powerful message of freedom that appealed to so many people within the Roman world—perhaps especially to those who had never experienced freedom in their everyday lives.”

With the conversion of the Roman emperor Constantine in the year 313, and the rise of Christianity as a majority religion, the interpretation of the Creation story—the self-image of Western Christianity itself—changed radically. When the monk Jovinian argued that celibacy was no holier than marriage, he was denounced by the fourth-century theologians Jerome, Ambrose, and Augustine, and was excommunicated. Augustine, whose pagan father had encouraged his youthful sexual adventures, gave up a Christian marriage that would have guaranteed him wealth and social status, and adopted a life of asceticism. He wrote about sex in the language of the addict, and, like some recovering addicts, he took an absolutist position: there is no middle ground on the question of lust; self-mastery is impossible; all men and women are fallen. In his interpretation of the second and third chapters of Genesis as the fall of all humankind, Augustine rejected the idea of free will and recoiled from human sexuality as innately sinful. It was Augustine’s interpretation, Pagels writes, that became the orthodoxy of the Western church, displacing theologians as prominent as Justin Martyr, Clement of Alexandria, and John Chrysostom. Augustine’s interpretation was linked not only to personal experience and thought but to the politics of his day: it proved useful to the emperor. Where once the revolutionary church had preached a message of human freedom in the face of the Roman oppressor, now, as Rome’s official religion, it described human nature as inherently sinful, fallen, infirm, and in need of the absolute authority of the state’s moral institution, the church.

One afternoon in Princeton, I asked Pagels why either Augustine’s reading of Genesis or the New Testament versions of Satan still matter.

“It’s true that many Christians today would say, ‘Oh, the Devil, who believes that?’—as if it were a throwaway part of Christianity,” Pagels said. “Liberal Christians would say the Devil is irrelevant. But that’s not so. The dramatic tension of the whole Jesus story would not work without this figure, because, after all, the story is about the defeat of the Lord. Why did Jesus fail if his failure wasn’t due to an enormously strong and evil force? The shape of these stories matters so much to the way we think. The details are essential. Just imagine, it was only about twenty years ago that people began to think that the use of ‘he’ as a general pronoun might be exclusive of women. At a certain point, one realizes that it does make a difference. It might be a trivial example of the way a culture is formed, even without malice, but it points to the shape of the social order. In the case of ‘he,’ it points to the efficiency of patriarchy. In my own work, I’ve never been concerned with changing the language but, rather, with identifying the language—in this case, the language about the Devil—and seeing its effects on the social order. When I was thinking about ‘Adam, Eve, and the Serpent,’ I took notice that there had been all these recent changes in attitudes toward divorce and homosexuality, and yet for a very long time these sexual attitudes of Western culture were just built into the universe. Why? Where does all this come from? Much of what seems to be written into nature itself is a matter of cultural patterning. You don’t have to believe in these religions for them to have an effect. The work is exciting because you begin to uncover what Jungians would call the cultural unconscious.

“What I’m interested in is how these images and stories relate to the way we live. How do we interpret our own lives and understand ourselves through them? How does that imaginative process affect our dreams, how does it appear in our metaphors? How does our imagination of the invisible relate to the way we act and feel and think? With Adam and Eve, it is clear that the social attitudes we have as children are shaped by the story. Satan is a way of perceiving opponents. You may not believe the mythology of such a universe, but it’s in you, a background perception.”

Pagels lectures at universities all the time, but few appearances have meant more to her than her recent talk on the Satan book at the Harvard Divinity School. Parts of the book have appeared in academic journals, and she has shown the manuscript to some colleagues, but here was a chance to rehearse her arguments in front of a room filled with graduate students and, most important, her former mentors—Helmut Koester, Krister Stendahl, and several other scholars of the New Testament and of early-Christian history. That day, Pagels was getting over a cold passed along to her by her children, and by the time our cab reached Newark Airport she was thinking about turning around and going home. But a few hours later, at the Divinity School lectern, she seemed miraculously transformed: healthy and ready for cosmic battle.

Pagels gave her reading of the development of the New Testament Satan and its role in the development of Christian anti-Semitism. The New Testament Gospels, she said, identify Satan not with the Romans (despite the dominant Roman role in the trial and execution of Christ) but, rather, with their Jewish contemporaries—“the intimate enemy.” In the Gospel of Matthew (23:13-15), for example, Jesus accuses the Pharisees, the Jewish majority, of being demon-possessed and sons “of hell”; similarly, in the narrative of the Passion, Mark (14:53-64) makes it plain that “the chief priests and elders and the scribes” assembled and “condemned him as deserving death.” Mark concludes that the Jewish court, the Sanhedrin, as well as “the crowd”—the Jewish majority—were responsible for the death of Jesus.

The figure of Pontius Pilate, the Roman governor, grows increasingly benign with each successive Gospel; the Jewish enemy is framed in ever more hostile rhetoric. While historical testimonies of the time, from Philo and Josephus, describe Pilate’s cruelty in detail, recounting that he would routinely round up Jews suspected of anti-Roman activity, he becomes in the Gospels a nearly sympathetic character, the better to depict the Jews as the satanic agents of Jesus’ execution. The social result of this interpretation in the Gospels is that, as the Christian movement became more Gentile, its followers could find canonical justification for the hatred of Jews. At one point, Pagels looked up at the packed auditorium and said, simply, “This material is painful.”

By the end of “The Origin of Satan,” it becomes clear that, while Pagels does not consider herself an evangelist for Gnostic wisdom, she does in some cases show a clear preference for a Gnostic interpretation over a canonical orthodox one. After expressing her profound regret about how the figure of Satan has distorted human perspective and heightened aggression among peoples, she turns to the Gnostic Gospel of Philip, which, she says, offers a more subtle and promising discussion of good and evil. In the Gospel of Philip, Satan never appears. The message taught is not that there exists an eternal clash between good and evil but, rather, that each individual needs to know his potential for doing evil. “Instead of envisioning the power of evil as an alien force that threatens and invades human beings from outside, the author of Philip urges each person to recognize the evil within, and consciously eradicate it,” she writes.

At the conclusion of the lecture, someone made the point that, while Satan is a critical figure in the four Gospels, he is almost absent from the other great New Testament literature, the Epistles of Paul, for example. Pagels had no argument with that, but she said to me later on that the Gospels, as literature, have an extraordinary narrative power that the Epistles, for all their theological importance, cannot match. “The Origin of Satan” is, in fact, a one-sided book. Pagels admits as much. Balance is not really her intention; in all her books, she is best at shaking up and rearranging set ways of thinking. She leaves the intellectual tidying up for others.

Once the graduate students and the guests had left the hall, Pagels went off to dinner at the faculty club with her mentors and colleagues. She heard a fair amount of criticism. Koester told me later that he saw “loose ends” in the book; Pagels, he said, finds evidence of Satan in texts “where it really isn’t there.” Stendahl wished that Pagels had covered Paul’s Epistles, but he was more enthusiastic. “When the book comes out, there will, of course, be a certain amount of defensiveness,” he told me. “People will say she is overdoing it. But I don’t think so. Demonization is one of the plagues of religious tradition because you are dealing with an intense rhetoric intensified to the voltage of the divine. My only comments would be that she has not taken account of the countervailing rhetoric and traditions in Christianity: love your enemies, and so on.” In fact, at the end of her book, Pagels does mention a tradition of generosity of heart in Christianity that runs from St. Francis of Assisi to the Reverend Martin Luther King, Jr.

After dinner, Pagels felt like talking some more. It was late, and I figured that, what with her cold, the trip, and the long day, she would be exhausted. On the contrary, she said that she felt cured, even charged up, by the lecture and the arguments over dinner.

“After my son died,” she said, “I went to the Church of the Heavenly Rest, up on Fifth Avenue, just to see if I could stand to walk in there for the funeral service that would be held a couple of days later. I was with an Israeli friend. It was the Easter season, and I stood there listening to the Good Friday liturgy, all about the death of Jesus, and, probably because my friend is Jewish, I became intensely aware of what was being said. I was taken aback, really distressed, because within that story are these terrible accusations against the Jews about the execution of Jesus. It struck me so deeply, this demonic language. Animosity between groups is a human universal, but what’s different here is the moral and religious dimension of the animosity. The Greeks had certain jealousies of the Jews, the Romans had their resentments, but Christianity added this moral and religious dimension.”

Back in Princeton a few days later, I asked her if she thought that by publishing “The Origin of Satan” she would have an effect beyond the academy—whether the laying bare of the demonic language in the Gospels would make any change at all in demonization in the modern world.

“When I was talking at Harvard about trying to dislodge the inherited assumption of a structure of right and wrong in the universe, that was something I needed to do because of events in my life,” Pagels said. “That doesn’t mean I’m relativistic about good and evil. The book is a meditation on the issue of how we perceive good and evil. For me, the book moves from a consideration of the social patterning about good and evil to an awareness of the individual’s capacity for evil.

“When I read the Gospels now and I come across the figure of Satan, instead of gliding over it as part of the story, I see it as raising a sort of warning flag, and I think, Ah, what is this writer doing now? What is the clue? What group of people are we speaking about and who is saying this? I became really interested in the structure of who is being demonized and who is doing the demonizing. It’s a question of awareness instead of just reading the story by rote. When that happens, it changes the way we read our own history. There was a time, for instance, when very few people who didn’t suffer from it were aware of racism as an idea. Now this question is a part of our culture. It’s not undone, but most people find it impossible to be unaware of racism. The same is true of sexism or homophobia. So that, too, is what the work on Satan and demonization is about. It’s about being aware.”

Now that Pagels has finished going over the proofs for “The Origin of Satan,” she is starting to consider her next project. This time, she is thinking about the problem of religious participation—the contrast between how people can participate in religious traditions and rituals quite apart from accepting basic propositions of the Church. “What happens with Christians—people brought up nominally as Christians, as I was—they ask themselves, Well, do I really believe that?” Pagels said. “Do I believe that Jesus was the son of God, or whatever. And if they answer the question in the negative, they tend to abandon the tradition. That’s quite different from Judaism. You can go to a seder and it doesn’t matter if the person next to you is observant or is just home for the holidays. Everybody can participate in the seder, or go to a service. What you think about it or believe about it is not necessarily important. Rather, it’s a kind of connection with a community. In a Christian community, that doesn’t exist as much. Many people, if they don’t believe, leave the religious traditions behind.”

Sometimes, in our conversations, I got the feeling that the invisible world is still very much a presence for Pagels. She talks about Heinz often. He is there in her talk and, it seems, in her being. The loss must still be unbearable. At the same time, she told me that for the past few years she had been seeing “a wonderful man,” a prominent law professor at Columbia named Kent Greenawalt. Like Pagels, Greenawalt was widowed six years ago; he has three sons ranging in age from twenty-four to seventeen.

“When you’re seeing Elaine now, you’re seeing someone who has gone through horrible stuff,” her friend Elizabeth Diggs said. “If something terrible happens to you, you can either become heroic in the face of the awfulness of it and end up a better and stronger person or become diminished by it, become a victim and give in to self-pity and rage. After a time, Elaine came out on the other side. She’s come out larger and more generous, kinder and more mature.”

At the end of my last meeting with Pagels in Princeton, I mentioned what Elizabeth Diggs had said—that she had changed in the years since the deaths of Mark and Heinz. Pagels smiled. “At first, what I really felt had changed was that I unwillingly had to take on many of the tasks that Heinz had taken on in our life together—as a parent, as a provider, as a taxpayer, as an organizer, as the person who takes care of the car,” she said. “There are certain ecological structures in any marriage—some with a traditional gender bias and some not. Simply, people take on certain roles. In a way, I had to do everything. But, most of all, I also wanted to take on the challenge of not giving up, of not despairing. Because Heinz was on the side of life. He loved life. He was full of explorative excitement, interest, passion. I realized that it would be no honor to him to say, ‘I can’t take this, I can’t go on, it’s too hard.’ Somehow, I wanted to take on something of what I’d learned from him, the way he embraced life, with all its dangers and difficulties. I was challenged to do that. I can’t say I’ve done it, but that’s what I wanted to do.”

“The Origin of Satan” will be published in June (1995). It is dedicated to the living: “To Sarah and David with love.” That same month, Pagels will marry Kent Greenawalt in an Episcopal church in Princeton. “It’s like the beginning of a different life,” she said. ♦

Wednesday, March 15, 2017

Drugs are Cheap: Why Do We Let Governments Make Them Expensive?


Written by Dean Baker


Remarks by Dean Baker, Co-Director, Center for Economic and Policy Research (CEPR)

The Svedberg Seminar, Uppsala University

Introduction

I often begin talks by telling my audience that “drugs are cheap.” This typically leads people to believe they are listening to a crazy person. At least in the United States, everyone knows that drugs are not cheap. It is common for prescriptions of brand drugs to cost several hundred dollars. More expensive drugs can easily cost tens of thousands of dollars a year. And, the new generation of cancer drugs carry list prices that run into the hundreds of thousands of dollars a year.

If people are lucky enough to have good insurance, most of the cost will be picked up by the insuance company, but insurers are not happy paying tens of thousands of dollars a year for a patient’s drugs either. To save money and discourage usage insurers are increasingly requiring substantial co-payments. These copayments can be a huge blow to patients who may already not be able to hold down a full-time job because of their health. Paying 25 percent of the bill for a drug selling for $40,000 a year, still comes to $10,000 a year. That’s close to 20 percent of the median family income in the United States.

This is a background that is familiar to people in the United States who have someone with a serious health condition among their family or friends. They know drugs are extremely expensive for them. But, I am not crazy for saying that drugs are cheap. They are in fact in almost all cases cheap to manufacture.

To take one example that has frequently been in the news in the United States, the Hepatitis C drug Sovaldi has a list price of $84,000 for a three-month course of treatment. By all accounts, the drug is genuine breakthrough in the treatment of the Hepatitis C, in most cases curing a debilitating and sometimes fatal disease. There has been an extensive public debate as to whether insurers or government health care programs should be forced to pay for this expensive drug. The issue is complicated further by the fact that many people suffering from Hepatitis C might have contracted it through intravenous drug use.

The United States is estimated to have 3 million people suffering from Hepatitis C. This implies a bill of well over one hundred billion dollar if everyone were to be treated, even if its manufacturer, Gilead Sciences, provided substantial discounts. 

But it doesn’t cost $84,000 or anything close to that figure to manufacture Sovaldi. In fact, in India a high quality generic version of the drug is available for $200 for a three month course of treatment, less than 0.3 percent of the list price in the United States.1 We wouldn’t need a major debate to decide whether we would spend $200 for a drug that would hugely improve a patient’s health and would possibly save their life. The reason we have this debate is that the drug has a list price that is more than 400 times higher. 

Patent Monopolies: The Villain Behind High Prices

Of course people have realized at this point that the reason Sovaldi has a high price in the United States is that Gilead Sciences has a patent monopoly on the drug. This monopoly gives it the exclusive right to sell the drug in the United States. The U.S. government will arrest anyone who tries to sell Sovaldi in competition with Gilead Sciences.2 The United States is unique in that we both grant pharmaceutical companies a patent monopoly on their drugs, and then let them sell the drugs for whatever price they want. Other wealthy countries also grant patent monopolies, which are required by a number of international agreements, but they have some form of price control which limits what companies can charge. For this reason, drug prices in other wealthy countries are typically around half of the price in the United States. 

My comments will refer largely to the United States. This is first and foremost because it is the market with which I am most familiar. However the same problems appear in other countries, even if they may not be as extreme as in the United States. Furthermore, it is the explicit goal of the United States government to use trade agreements like the Trans-Atlantic Trade and Investment Pact to raise the price of drugs in other countries to U.S. levels. So the United States may well represent the future for the prescription drug market in Sweden and the rest of Europe. 

Patent Monopolies as Incentive for Innovation

The rationale for patent monopolies is to provide an incentive for drug companies to innovate. It is expensive to develop new drugs. Even if the industry has a tendency to exaggerate the cost, and downplay the extent to which they benefit from publicly financed research, they do encounter substantial expenses that they would not be able to recover if new drugs were sold in a free market.3 The question for critics of this system is whether there are feasible alternatives to patent monopolies that would be as effective in producing new drugs and would be less wasteful than the patent system. While we will not know the answer to this question until we actually have an alternative in place to provide a basis for comparison, there are strong reasons for believing that an alternative system would be vastly more efficient. In addition, a system in which drugs were sold at their free market price would forever end the situation where people are unable to afford drugs that are essential for their life or health.4

Problems of Patent Monopolies

There are two distinct types of problems associated with patent monopolies. The first stems simply from the fact that the patent protected price makes drugs much more expensive for patients than the free market price. As a result, fewer patients have access to drugs they need and/or they have to go through more obstacles to gain access. The other set of problems stem from the behavior of drug companies to maximize their profits. This is often referred to as “rent-seeking” behavior. It amounts to actions by drug companies which serve no productive use from an economic standpoint. Rent-seeking behavior is exclusively redistributive. It allows drug companies to increase their profits at the expense of patients, insurers and governments.

It is worth noting that these points are completely standard in economic analyses of trade. If someone were to propose a 20 percent tariff on imported steel, any serious economist could quickly point out the loss to consumers as a result of this arbitrary increase in the price of steel. They would also point to rent-seeking activities by the steel companies, for example lobbying politicians to extend and increase the tariff, as a further source of waste. The same logic would apply to patent protection for prescription drugs, except the price increases are equivalent to tariffs of 1000 percent or even 10,000 percent of the free market price.5 Unfortunately economists spend far more time worrying about the costs associated with 20 percent tariffs on things like steel than they do on patent monopolies for prescription drugs.

The first type of loss, from people having to pay high prices, takes several different forms. The most obvious is the case where people simply can’t buy the drug because patent monopolies raise the price by several thousand percent above the free market price. The result is that people get worse health care and quite possibly die. But even those who might be able to afford the drug often suffer because of the high price. In the United States it is common for many lower income people to cut pills in half or to take them every other day in order to make a prescription go further. In many cases this can seriously undermine the effectiveness of the drug.

Even when people have reasonably good insurance they often have to battle their insurer to pay the cost of an expensive drug. This may mean that they have to go to a second physician to verify that an expensive drug is in fact necessary. In some cases an insurer has a policy where they will pay for a drug for a particular use, but not for the use prescribed by the doctor. This can lead doctors to put down a false diagnosis so that their patient is able to have their drug covered by the insurance company. Needless to say, this can create a problem for a patient in future treatment since it means they will have an inaccurate medical record.

There is also a massive gaming process whereby the drug companies try to get around insurers’ efforts to discourage the use of an expensive drug. Sometimes the pharmaceutical company will provide coupons to cover patients’ copayment, making them more likely to opt for an expensive drug and leave the insurers with the bill. When its patent on the allergy drug Claritin expired, Schering-Plough pushed to make it an over-the-counter drug not requiring a prescription. Since insurance generally doesn’t cover the cost of over-the-counter drugs, this action meant that the generic versions of Claritin would likely cost patients more money than their co-pay on Schering-Plough’s new patented product, Clarinex. 

In addition to this gaming, the high price of patent protected drugs has created a whole industry of “pharmacy benefit managers” who act as intermediaries between insurers or hospitals and drug companies. They negotiate prices that typically are substantial discounts from the list prices, leaving the uninsured as the only ones who might actually pay the full list price. In any case, there would be no reason for the industry of pharmacy benefit managers to exist if prescription drugs were sold in a free market.

Costs on the Research Side Due to Rent-Seeking

Science advances most quickly when the research is fully open. In this situation, the community of researchers can assess research and look for flaws and also quickly build upon interesting findings. Openness has no place in research supported by patent monopolies. It is in the interest of the pharmaceutical company to make available only the information needed to receive a patent. The test results it submits to the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) are kept secret from the public, with firms only disclosing the findings they choose to share. Needless to say, these results are likely to be ones that reflect well on their drugs, with the companies less likely to highlight results that question a drug’s effectiveness or suggest it could be harmful.

This was the allegation in the case of the arthritis drug Vioxx, where the manufacturer allegedly concealed evidence the drug increased the risk of heart attack and stroke among patients with heart conditions. The result was a number of strokes and heart attacks that might have been prevented if doctors and patients knew of the risks associated with Vioxx. Drug companies also have an incentive to promote the use of their drug in situations where it may not be appropriate. Efforts to promote drugs for “off-label” use are a regular source of scandal in the business press. 

A recent analysis that looked at five prominent instances in which it was alleged that either drug companies concealed information about their drugs or marketed them for inappropriate uses, found that the cost born by patients was in the range of $27 billion annually over the years 1994–2008.6 While this estimate is far from precise, it suggests that the cost associated with improper drug use due to deliberate misrepresentations and mis-marketing is substantial, quite likely in the range of the amount spent by the industry on drug research. Also, it is worth repeating that these costs, in terms of bad health outcomes, are the result of deliberate actions stemming from the perverse incentives created by patent monopolies, not costs from the sort of mistakes that are an inevitable part of the research process.

Patent monopolies also distort the research process itself. Most obviously they encourage drug companies to pursue patent rents rather than finding drugs that meet the most urgent health needs. This means that if a pharmaceutical company produces a drug for a particular condition that earns large amounts of revenue, its competitors have a strong incentive to try to produce similar drugs for the same condition to capture a share of the rents.

For example, in the case of Sovaldi, Merck and AbbVie, along with several smaller drug manufacturers, are rushing to market alternatives to Sovaldi as treatments for Hepatitis C..7 In a context where Gilead Sciences, the maker of Sovaldi, has a monopoly on effective treatments for Hepatitis C, this sort of competition is highly desirable because it will lead to lower prices. However, if Sovaldi was being sold in a free market at $200 to $300 for a course of treatment, there would be little reason to waste the time of highly skilled scientists finding additional treatments for a condition where an effective drug already exists. If drugs were sold without patent protection, research dollars would usually be better devoted to developing a drug for a condition where no effective treatment exists than developing duplicative drugs for a condition that can be well-treated by an existing drug. 

Patent protection also is likely to slow and/or distort the research process by encouraging secrecy. Research advances most quickly when it is open. However, companies seeking profits through patent monopolies have incentive to disclose as little information as possible in order to avoid helping competitors. This forces researchers to work around rather than build upon research findings. Williams (2010) found that the patenting of DNA sequences in the human genome project slowed future innovation and product development by between 20 to 30 percent.7

Finally, relying on patent incentives to support medical research encourages drug companies to direct research toward finding a patentable product. This means that if evidence suggests that a condition can be most effectively treated through diet, exercise, environmental factors, or even old off-patent drugs, a pharmaceutical manufacturer would have no incentive to pursue this research.8 Ideally, the manufacturer would make this evidence publicly available so that researchers supported by the government, universities, or other non-profit organizations could pursue it, but there is little incentive for them to go this route. In fact, if they are concerned that such research could lead to an alternative to a patentable product that they might develop or be in the process of developing, their incentive is to conceal the research.

Lawyering and Lobbying: Other Forms of Patent-Induced Waste

When the government is the payer, which is to some extent the case in the U.S., the willingness to pay for a particular drug can often be the outcome of a political battle, with the drug’s producer working with patients to pressure the government to pay for drugs of questionable value.10 While the government in the U.S. plays a smaller role in providing health care than in most other wealthy countries, it nonetheless plays a huge role in shaping the market. It directly pays for drugs through Medicare, Medicaid, and other government health care programs, and can set standards that effectively require private insurers to pay for drugs. This gives the pharmaceutical industry a substantial incentive to be involved in the political process. According to Center for Responsive Politics, the pharmaceutical industry ranked 5th in campaign contributions to members of Congress in 2016.11 The broader category of health related industries ranked second, behind only finance, insurance, and real estate in total contributions to politicians.12

Because this involves decisions on public health, the victory of drug companies is not just a question of getting more money at the expense of competitors or the general public. They may lobby for policies that are detrimental to public health in order to boost their profits. For example, pharmaceutical companies that produce pain relief medication have been leading the fight against medical marijuana. It turns out that marijuana is an effective substitute in many cases for prescription pain medications. In order to protect its market share, the industry is trying to keep a major potential competitor off the market.13 There can be major consequences for public health as patients take stronger and more addictive medications when marijuana may be an effective treatment. Similarly, the industry uses its ties to disease groups to try to keep generic competitors from being covered by the government or insurers.14 This is precisely the sort of corruption that would be expected in a situation where there is such a huge gap between the monopoly price and the cost of production.

The fact that there is so much money as stake with patent protection in pharmaceuticals means that the sector is also a primary target for litigation. Pharmaceutical companies routinely bring suits to harass competitors, discourage generic competition, or to gain a slice of the patent rents associated with a highly profitable drug. The pharmaceutical and medical equipment industries together accounted for almost a quarter of the patent-related lawsuits over the years 1995–2014. The suits in the pharmaceutical sector also had the highest median damage settlement, with medical equipment coming in a close third just behind the telecommunication industry.15

In any legal battle, there is a fundamental asymmetry between the situation of brand drug manufacturers, which have the right to sell a drug at monopoly prices for the duration of its patent protection, and potential generic entrants, who are looking to have the right to sell a drug in a competitive market. This means that the brand manufacturer stands much more to lose than the generic producer stands to gain. As a result, the brand producer has an incentive to spend much more on legal expenses than a potential generic competitor if doing so can block, or at least delay, generic competition. The brand producer also may attempt side payments as a way to discourage the entry by a generic competitor. While this collusion is illegal, it can be hard to detect, especially if the payment takes the form of a contract (e.g. the generic producer is paid to manufacture one of the brand manufacturer’s drugs) which could have been reached without any collusion. 

For all of the reasons discussed above, patent-supported research is particularly ill-suited for the pharmaceutical sector. The question is whether it is possible to design an alternative mechanism that can be equally effective in developing new drugs.14

Publicly Financed Pharmaceutical Research

The basic logic of a system of publicly financed medical research would be that the government expand its current funding for biomedical research, which now goes primarily through NIH, by an amount that is roughly equal to the patent supported research currently being conducted by the pharmaceutical industry. Pharma, the industry trade group, puts this funding level at roughly $50 billion or 0.3 percent of GDP, a figure that is also consistent with data from the National Science Foundation. That would be a reasonable target, with the idea that the public funding would eventually replace the patent-supported funding.17 Adding in research on medical equipment and tests would increase this figure by $12–15 billion.17

In order to minimize the risk of political interference and also the risk that excessive bureaucracy could impede innovation, it would be desirable that the bulk of this funding would be committed to private firms under long-term contracts (e.g. 10–15 years).19 This would allow for the imposition of clear rules that apply to all research directly or indirectly funded by the public sector, without a need for micro-management. The contracts would be subject to regular oversight for their duration, but the contractors would be free to set priorities for which lines of research to support. The contractors could also freely subcontract, just as the major pharmaceutical companies do now. They could also use their funds to buy research produced by other companies, just as the pharmaceutical industry does at present. As the period for a contract approached its end, the contractor could attempt to gain a new long-term contract. It would argue its case based on its track record with the prior contract. 

The basic rules governing these contracts would be that all the results stemming from publicly financed research would be placed in the public domain, subject to copyleft-type restrictions.20 This means that any patents for drugs, research tools, or other intermediate steps developed by contractors or subcontractors, would be freely available for anyone to use, subject to the condition that they also would place any subsequent patents in the public domain. Similarly, test results used to get approval for a drug from Food and Drug Administration would be available for any generic producer to use to gain acceptance for their own product. 

In addition to requiring that patents be placed in the public domain, there would also be a requirement that all research findings be made available to the public as quickly as practical. This means, for example, that results from pre-clinical testing be made available as soon as they are known, so that other researchers could benefit from the findings. This should prevent unnecessary duplication and allow for more rapid progress in research. These restrictions would apply to both direct contractors and any sub-contractors that were hired.21

This disclosure requirement would not be a negative for participants in the context of this sort of open-source contract system. Because the goal is to generate useful innovations rather than procure a patent, a contractor would be able to make an effective case for the usefulness of their work even if competitors were the ones that ultimately used it to develop a useful drug or medical device. The incentive in this system is to disseminate any interesting findings as widely as possible in the hope that other researchers will be able to build upon them.

The contracting system in the Defense Department can be seen as a loose model for contracting in pharmaceutical research. When the Defense Department is planning a major project, such as a new fighter plane or submarine, it will typically sign a contract with a major corporation like General Electric or Lockheed. The contractor will generally subcontract much of the project, because it is not prepared to do all the work in-house. The same would be the case with a contractor doing research developing pharmaceuticals or medical equipment, although the expected results will be somewhat less clearly specified. While that is a disadvantage of contracting with medical research, because the outcomes will be less well-defined, a major advantage is that there would be no excuse for secrecy in the medical research process. There is a clear justification for secrecy in military research, because it wouldn’t make sense to allow potential enemies to have access to the latest military technology. By contrast, biomedical research will be advanced more quickly by allowing the greatest possible access.

Secrecy has often been an important factor allowing military contractors to conceal waste or fraud, because only a very select group of people have access to the specific terms of a contract and the nature of the work a company is doing. In the case of bio-medical research, there is no reason that the terms of the contract would not be fully public. And, all research findings would have to be posted in a timely manner. With such rules, it should be possible to quickly identify any contractor whose output clearly did not correspond to the money they were receiving from the government. For all the instances of waste and fraud in military contracting, it nonetheless has been effective in giving the U.S. the most technologically advanced military in the world.

Because the system of patent protection and rules on data exclusivity is now enshrined in a large number of international agreements that would be difficult to circumvent, it is important that an alternative system work around this structure. As proposed here, patent protection under current rules would still be available to drug companies conducting research with their own funds. However, they would run the risk that at the point where they have an FDA-approved drug, there is a new drug available at generic prices that is comparably effective. This sort of competition would likely force the company to sell its drug at a price comparable to the generic, leaving it little margin for recouping its research costs. 

Simply the risk of this sort of generic competition should make the current system of patent-financed drug development unprofitable, especially if the industry’s claims about its research costs are anywhere close to being accurate. In this way, the existing rules on patents can be left in place, even as a new system of publicly financed research comes to dominate the process of drug development.

The Cost-Benefit Arithmetic of an Alternative System

The simple arithmetic summing the extra costs, deadweight losses, and wasteful rent-seeking behavior associated with patents, and comparing it to the amount of actual research that is funded, suggests the opportunity for large gains through an alternative system. The first and most obvious advantage is that all the drugs and medical equipment developed through this process would be immediately available at free market prices. Instead of costing hundreds of thousands of dollar a year, breakthrough cancer drugs might cost $1,000 a year, or even less. The cost would be the price of safely manufacturing these drugs and with very few exceptions, that cost would be quite low. With drugs selling at prices that even middle-income families could readily afford, the whole industry of middle-men that has grown up around mediating between the drug companies and insurers, hospitals, and patients would disappear. There would be no need for it.

This would also end the horror stories that many patients must now endure as they struggle to find ways to pay for expensive drugs even as they suffer from debilitating or potentially fatal diseases. Doctors also would not be forced to compromise in prescribing a drug they consider inferior because it will be covered by a patient’s insurance when the preferred drug is not. Also, doctors would likely make better informed prescribing decisions because no one would stand to profit by having them prescribe a drug that may not provide the best treatment for their patient. 

A similar story would apply to the use of medical equipment. In almost all cases, the cost of manufacturing the most modern medical equipment is relatively cheap. The cost of usage is even less. For example, the most modern screening equipment only involves a small amount of electricity a limited amount of a skilled technician’s time, and the time of a doctor to review the scan. Instead of a scan costing thousands of dollars, the cost would likely be no more than $200–$300. Here also, the price would then be a minor factor in deciding how best to treat a patient. A doctor would naturally recommend the device that best meets the patient’s needs. And in a context where no one has an incentive to mislead about the quality of the equipment, the doctor is likely to make better choices. The same would be the case with various lab tests, all of which would be available at their free market price. With few exceptions, this would be a trivial expense compared to the current system. 

Table 1 below shows the potential gains from replacing patent supported research with direct public funding under three alternative sets of assumptions.

Table 1: Gains from ending patent protection for pharmaceuticals (billions of dollars)

The most optimistic scenario, shown in column 1, assumes that 75 cents of public spending on research is roughly equivalent to one dollar of spending financed by patent monopolies. The greater efficiency would be based on the idea that increased openness and the elimination of unnecessary duplication led to more effective research. It also assumes that prescription drugs would sell for 10 percent of their current price without any patent or related protections..22 In this case, the implied annual savings in the United States would be $349.5 billion. Adding in the reduction in deadweight loss from a prior set of calculations brings the total benefits to more than $800 billion a year. 23

Column 2 shows an intermediate scenario in which $1.00 of public money for research is needed to replace $1.00 of patent supported research. This case assumes that prescription drugs would cost 15 percent as much to produce as they do today if all patent and related protections were eliminated. In this case the savings would be $315.5 billion. Adding in the reduction in deadweight loss brings the total net benefit to more than $450 billion a year.

Column 3 shows a scenario in which it takes $1.50 of public money to replace $1.00 of patent supported research. This implies that because money is going through the government, the research process becomes hugely less efficient than is currently the case. This is in spite of the fact that the research is now fully open, so that all researchers can benefit quickly from new findings, and a main motivation for unnecessary duplicative research has been eliminated. This scenario assumes that it would cost 20 percent as much to manufacture drugs in a world without patent and related protections as is the case at present. In this scenario, the savings would still be $269 billion annually or 1.5 percent of GDP. Adding in the reduction in deadweight loss in the most inelastic scenario would put the total net benefit at $329 billion annually. 

The next set of rows shows the additional benefits from publicly funded research for medical equipment. The assumption in all three cases is that the cost of buying and using this equipment would fall by 70 percent if it was sold in a free market. The 2016 spending level is a projection from the Center for Medicare and Medicaid Services. The estimate for current research spending is taken from data for 2012 from the National Science Foundation and increased by 20 percent to account growth between 2012 and 2016. The optimistic scenario assumes that 75 cents in publicly funded research is equivalent to a dollar of patent-supported research. The middle scenario assumes that they are equally effective, and pessimistic scenario assumes that $1.50 in publicly funded research is needed to replace $1.00 in patent supported research. In these cases, the net annual savings in optimistic, middle, and pessimistic scenarios would be $24.1 billion, $20.4 billion, and $12.9 billion, respectively.24


While publicly financed research would require the government directly commits funding for research, it should not be necessary to secure additional tax revenue. The government already directly or indirectly pays for a large portion of prescription drug expenditures through Medicare, Medicaid and various other health care programs. In addition, it effectively subsidizes private spending on drugs as a result of the tax-deductible status of employer provided health insurance and various other tax deductions. Table 2 shows the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) projections for 2016 spending on prescription drugs and medical equipment by source.25 It also shows the assumed savings in each case.

Table 2: Savings to the government from publicly supported research for pharmaceuticals (billions of dollars)

For Medicaid and other government programs, the assumed savings are 50 percent on both drugs and medical equipment, based on the fact that these programs typically pay substantially lower prices for drugs than private insurers. In the case of Medicare, the assumed savings are 70 percent on drugs and 50 percent on medical equipment, under the assumption that insurers within the program pay somewhat lower prices drugs than insurers not connected with Medicare. In the case of private insurers and the out-of-pocket payments, it is assumed that the savings to the government will be equal to 16 percent of current payments for drugs 14 percent for medical equipment. This uses the assumption that drug prices will fall 80 percent if not subject to patent protection and the price of medical equipment will fall by 70 percent. The calculation further assumes that 20 percent of this saving accrues to the government in the form of higher tax revenue, because less money will be deducted for health care expenditures. 

Even with these relatively conservative assumptions the savings to the government based on the 2016 projections would still be over $139 billion.26 This substantially exceeds the amount of public funding that would be needed to replace patent supported research in even the most pessimistic scenario described above. This means that the savings to the government from having drugs sold in a free market without patent or related protections should be more than enough to support a system of publicly funded drug development. There would be no need for additional tax revenue even in a relatively pessimistic scenario. 

It is possible that there could be some short-term need for additional funding due to the lag between research spending and the development of new drugs. At least initially, there would be no savings from publicly funded research because all the drugs being sold would still be subject to the same protections as they are today. The savings would only accrue over time as new drugs were produced through the public system and being sold at free market prices. For this reason, a switch to direct public funding of research may at least initially increase budget deficits, even if it led to substantial savings over a longer time frame.

Publicly Funded Clinical Trials

Switching all at once to a system of fully funded research would likely be a difficult step both politically and practically. This would involve a radical transformation of a massive industry of a sort that is rarely seen in the U.S. or anywhere else. Fortunately, there is an intermediate step that can be used to advance toward a system of fully funded research which would offer enormous benefits in its own right.

There is a simple and basic divide in the research process between the pre-clinical phase of drug development and the clinical phase. The pre-clinical phase involves the development of new drugs or new uses of existing drugs and preliminary tests on lab animals. The clinical phase involves testing on humans and eventually proceeding to the FDA approval process if the earlier phases of testing are successful. The clinical testing phase accounts for more than 60 percent of spending on research, although this number is reduced if a return is imputed on the pre-clinical testing phase, because there is a considerably longer lag between pre-clinical expenditures and an approved drug than with clinical tests.

The clinical testing process involves a standard set of procedures, and is therefore far more routinized than the pre-clinical portion of drug development. For this reason, the clinical testing portion of the drug development process could be more easily adapted to a program of direct public funding. The model could be the same as discussed earlier, with the government contracting on a long-term basis with existing or new drug companies. However, the contracts would specify the testing of drugs in particular areas. As was the case described earlier, all results would be fully public, and all patent and related rights associated with the testing process would be put in the public domain subject to copyleft-type rules. This would likely mean that in many cases the contracting companies would have to buy up rights to a compound(s) before they initiated testing, because another company held a patent on it.

There are many advantages to separating out the clinical testing portion of drug development rather than attempting to fully replace patent supported research all at once. First, it would be much easier to slice off particular areas to experiment with public funding. For example, it should be possible to set aside a certain amount of funding for clinical trials for new cancer or heart drugs without worrying about fully replacing private support for research in these areas. Also, it should be possible to obtain dividends much more quickly in the form of new drugs being available at generic prices. The time lag between the beginning of preclinical research and an approved drug can be as long as 20 years. The clinical testing process typically takes less than eight years and can be considerably shorter if a drug’s benefits become quickly evident in trials.

Another important early dividend from the public funding of clinical trials is that the results of these trials would be posted as soon as they are available. This means that researchers and doctors would not only have access to the summary statistics showing the success rates in the treatment group relative to the control group, but they would also have access to the data on specific individuals in the trial.27 This would allow them to independently analyze the data to determine if there were differences in outcomes based on age, gender, or other factors. It would also allow for researchers to determine the extent to which interactions with other drugs affected the effectiveness of a new drug.

In addition, the public disclosure of test results may put pressure on the pharmaceutical industry to change its practices. The problem of misreporting or concealing results in order to promote a drug is one that arises in the process of clinical testing. While misrepresented results can be a problem at any stage in the drug development process, misrepresentations at the pre-clinical phase are unlikely to have health consequences because they will be uncovered in clinical testing. The problem of patients being prescribed drugs that are less effective than claimed or possible harmful to certain patients due to misrepresentations is entirely an issue with clinical testing. If experiments with a limited number of publicly funded clinical trials can change the norms on disclosure of test results, they will have made an enormous contribution to public health.

Conclusion

The system of relying on patent monopolies for financing prescription drug research has enormous costs. These costs take exactly the form economists predict from a government intervention in the market. The main difference with patent monopolies on drugs is that the intervention is far larger than most other forms of intervention that arise in policy debates like tariffs on trade or various excise taxes and subsidies. Furthermore, since drugs are often essential for people’s lives and health, the costs take a different form than paying higher prices for items like shoes or furniture. These costs are likely to rise in the years ahead as the gap between the patent-protected prices and free market prices grow ever larger.

For this reason, we should be considering alternative mechanisms for supporting prescription drug research. I have argued that a system of direct government funding, which relies on private companies working on long-term contracts, is likely to be far more efficient than the current system. By paying all research costs upfront, drugs could be sold at free market prices without monopoly protections, just like most other products. Also, since a condition of receiving public money is that all findings would be fully public as soon as is practical, doctors will be able to make more informed decisions in prescribing drugs. In addition, research is likely to advance more quickly in a context of openness than secrecy.

For these reasons, we should be looking for alternatives to patent-financed drug research. There is much room for improvement. 

Rosewood