Friday, June 30, 2017

The Popes Pedophile

Andrew Sullivan New York Magazine


Well into Pope Francis’s pontificate, one of his closest aides, the third-highest official in the Catholic Church, Cardinal George Pell, has now been credibly accused of several acts of sexual assault, including one of rape. Australian police have concluded that the evidence they have is sufficient to move forward, even in cases that happened long ago. Yesterday, Pell was allowed to hold his own press conference at the Vatican to tell us that he spoke with the Pope only a few days ago about a campaign of “character assassination” against him: “I’m very grateful to the Holy Father for giving me this leave to return to Australia.” The Pope’s spokesperson defended the Cardinal by saying that “it is important to recall that Cardinal Pell has openly and repeatedly condemned as important and intolerable acts of abuse committed against minors.” And, of course, we should respect a presumption of innocence before a trial on crimes of this magnitude and depravity.

But it all feels sickeningly familiar. And this denouement comes as absolutely no surprise to anyone who has been following the sex-abuse crisis in the church — including Cardinal Pell’s own behavior — for the last few decades. A cloud has hung over Pell since he was an Episcopal vicar in a parish in the 1970s that has been described as a “pedophile’s paradise and a child’s nightmare.” A full 15 years ago, Pell was accused of molesting a 12-year-old boy but when the church investigated, a retired Supreme Court justice found that there wasn’t enough evidence, even though the victim appeared to be “speaking honestly from actual recollection.” A year later, Pope John Paul II made Pell a cardinal. Several new alleged victims spoke out in a book published only last month.

In 2015, Australia’s Channel 9 ran a 60 Minutes segment that can only be called horrifying. In it, one of Francis’s own appointees to investigate sex abuse, Peter Saunders, described Pell’s record on sexual abuse as “almost sociopathic.” Pell had a “catalogue of denials … a catalogue of denigrating people, of acting with callousness,” Saunders said on camera. “I would go as far to say that I consider him to be quite a dangerous individual.” The report revealed a pattern of concealment of sex-abuse cases, callousness toward the victims, offers of pathetically small settlements, and testimony demonstrating that Pell moved around a pedophile priest for years who was later convicted of 138 counts of indecent assault and child sexual abuse. That priest, the notorious Gerald Ridsdale, even allegedly raped two of his own nephews. Who was his roommate and close friend in the 1970s? Who publicly accompanied him to his trial in a show of support? One George Pell — who has long insisted he hadn’t a clue what his close friend was up to. In fact, Pell once accused the police and an Australian broadcaster of criminal conspiracy against him. As he did yesterday, he responded with outrage that anyone could ever even dream of such a thing.

The evidence is much less conclusive. It emerged, to take just one example, that Pell once told a victim that an internal church investigation had found no evidence of any crime against him, even though it was subsequently revealed that the investigation found the opposite to be true, and Pell knew it. And then there was the testimony of Ridsdale’s nephew, David, before the Royal Commission on sex abuse. It’s hard to get it out of one’s mind.

Under oath, David recalled how, between the ages of 11 and 15, his uncle repeatedly raped him. At one point, in desperation, he reached out to George Pell, a family friend. This is how he described the conversation: “Nine a.m. on the 2nd February, 1993. I rang George from my home in Bentleigh. My partner at the time was sitting in the room when I made the call. I told George I had been abused by Gerald. His first reaction was, ‘Oh, right.’” No shock, just a sense of underlying anger, David recalled. Pell then asked him what it would take to keep him silent. David responded: “Excuse me, George, what the fuck are you talking about?” Pell’s response, according to David: “I want to know what it will take to keep you quiet,” to which David said, “Fuck you George, and everything you stand for,” and hung up. David not only had his partner to witness this conversation, he told two of his sisters immediately about it.

Many historical cases of sex abuse of minors are hard to prove. But it seems to me that multiple accusations of cover-ups and molestations against a Catholic priest from the 1950s through the 1970s should at this point raise, ahem, red flags. Appalling abusers have advanced for years in the church, defending themselves as definitively as Pell has — only to be found guilty. The notorious case of the founder of the Legion of Christ, Marcial Maciel, comes to mind. Protected by Pope John Paul II, coddled by Benedict XVI, he was also defended by an array of theological arch-conservatives as a paragon of virtue. That’s why I find it hard to take seriously George Weigel’s National Review piece yesterday entitled “The Persecution of Cardinal Pell.” Weigel also defended Maciel’s pedophile cult after accusations first emerged.

It has not been easy being a Catholic in the 21st century. For a gay Catholic, it has been close to agony. It comes as no surprise, for example, that Pell has upheld, like Maciel, a highly conservative theology on sexuality — which was why he was so favored by John Paul II and Benedict XVI. He opposed the use of condoms to stop AIDS in Africa, refused to give communion to openly gay people, campaigned strenuously against marriage equality, and described the church sex-abuse scandal as not a function of minor abuse and cover-up but of allowing homosexuals to be priests (a ban on gay seminarians remains formally in place). In his own words: “80 percent of the abuse is with young boys. So I mean it’s obviously connected with the problem of homosexuality … We’ve got to see that [homosexuality] is not tolerated amongst clergy and religious orders.” To which I have to echo David Ridsdale: “Fuck you, George, and everything you stand for.”

What I cannot understand is why Pope Francis chose to advance this man under this cloud so high up the hierarchy. If Pell is found guilty, Francis will have advanced an accused abuser of children to the highest echelon in the Vatican. Far from cleaning the church of this evil, he will have contaminated it at its very apex. That’s why this case is indeed a watershed for Catholicism and Francis himself. If Francis can turn a blind eye to this, we can trust no one.

We were told that this Pope’s overriding theme was mercy. It would be a tragedy if the exception to this rule were to be any youngster whose life has been ruined, body violated, and soul raped by one of the Pope’s own right-hand men.

Concerning POTUS Potty mouth...

The polls remain dreadful for this joke of a president; the contradictions of Republicanism are being savagely exposed; the legislative agenda of an all-Republican government is careening. And yet I have the sinking feeling that the strategy we’re seeing from the resistance is defeating itself.

Some of this has to do with the usual Democratic mediocrity. Pelosi has no ability to project a coherent message; Schumer seems entirely reactive; and the base has fixed its sights on a Russian-collusion fantasy that may eventually be revealed as a vegan nothing-burger. Can you imagine the victory tour Trump would have then? I just don’t know why we cannot simply let Mueller get on with his job, keep our mouths shut for a while, and wait for whatever results.

But it’s the cultural symbolism that is the most damaging. Yes, I know, Fox News would be scouring the earth for morsels of loony-left excess whatever liberals did. But do they have to make Tucker Carlson’s job so easy? Did you notice the role Kathy Griffin played in the recent Georgia special election? Congrats, too, to Johnny Depp for his equally insightful remarks at Glastonbury last week: “When was the last time an actor assassinated a president?” he asked, alluding to John Wilkes Booth. “I want to clarify, I am not an actor. I lie for a living. However, it has been a while and maybe it is time.”

And, look, I’m a huge defender of experimental theater — but did Shakespeare in the Park’s Julius Caesar have to be so crude? Credit also goes to the spoiled, cultish children of Evergreen State College whose racist intimidation of a progressive Jewish professor gave every Trump voter who might be feeling a small spasm of regret another reason to stick with their “side.” And an honorary mention to the lesbian group whose Dyke March in Chicago banned a rainbow flag with the Star of David on it — while hailing Muslim countries where gay people are lucky not to be lynched every day.

It doesn’t help matters that violence is also now associated with resistance. Middlebury’s postmodern mob resonated with every anti-intellectual fiber among the Trumpians. Ditto Berkeley’s. And it certainly doesn’t help that the New York Times has now given Sarah Palin a genuine case for libel and CNN has all but handed Trump a Russian bouquet of actual fake news. I have little doubt, moreover, that Trump will prevail in the Supreme Court on his immigration ban — because the president, for good or ill, has extraordinary authority over immigration in the U.S. Constitution.

The lack of any magnanimity among the victors of the culture war was also one of Trump’s aces last year. It took two decades to relentlessly persuade the American middle of the benefits of marriage equality — and now half of young evangelicals support those civil rights and support is at an all-time high. But when people who have never been engaged on transgender issues or met trans people have a visceral reaction to the idea of a girl with a dick in a high-school girls’ locker room, they’re suddenly hateful bigots? Please. Check your leftist privilege. And is it really necessary to coerce an evangelical baker to write a message on a cake that violates his conscience?

The excrescence in the White House is, I know, enough to make anyone lose self-control. But if resistance is going to work, it has to be disciplined. Too much is at stake to fumble this. Make an actual case on issues people care about, as the Labour Party did in Britain, surprising the world. Yes, expose his madness at every turn. But if he is going to become a cautionary experiment that America will never try again — as he must — it’s the middle of the country we have to persuade. And we won’t do that by offending, alienating, and insulting them.

A short update on Trump’s mental health. I’m not entirely sure if the unraveling is intensifying or if there was anything raveled in the first place. But it’s important to keep stating the obvious. The great difficulty of living with someone who is seriously delusional is that you eventually acclimate to it, find yourself responding to it, and thereby eventually lose any solid sense of reality itself. So let me just say that there is something profoundly unhinged about someone who creates a fake Time magazine cover about himself, and has the photo framed and hanging in several of his properties, and, when this is revealed, refuses to say anything about it. It’s a delusional, absurd form of pathological narcissism and deceit that should, in any sane country, lead to his removal from office. It’s of a pattern with his completely psychotic statements about his inaugural crowds, Obama’s alleged wiretapping, the various health-care plans he has no understanding of, the tweeting “foreign policy” that is fast destroying the credibility of his own secretary of State, the invention of “intelligence” about North Korea, and the simply whack-job, misogynistic attacks on Mika Brzezinski and Joe Scarborough.

There is no precedent for this behavior in the Oval Office in American history, even in Nixon’s deranged final days. The case for impeachment seems to me, at this point, far less salient than the invocation of the 25th Amendment. If someone this unstable, this delusional, and this unwell cannot be removed from office, who can?

Tuesday, June 27, 2017

Mass Incarceration’s Dangerous New Equilibrium

By Peter Temin INET Economic


A new model probes why the US leads the world in jailing and imprisoning people, and what it will take to reverse course
Mass incarceration in the United States has mushroomed to the point where we look more like the authoritarian regimes of Eastern Europe and the Middle East than the democracies of Western Europe. Yet it vanished from political discussions in campaigns in the 2016 election. In a new INET Working Paper, I describe in detail how the US arrived at this point. Drawing on a new model that synthesizes recent research, I demonstrate how the recent stability in the number of American prisoners indicates that we have settled into a new equilibrium of mass incarceration. I explain why it will hard to dislodge ourselves from this damaging and shameful status quo.

Mass incarceration started from Nixon’s War on Drugs, in a process described vividly by John Ehrlichman, Nixon’s domestic-policy adviser, in 1994:

The Nixon campaign in 1968, and the Nixon White House after that, had two enemies: the antiwar left and black people. You understand what I’m saying? We knew we couldn’t make it illegal to be either against the war or black, but by getting the public to associate the hippies with marijuana and blacks with heroin, and then criminalizing both heavily, we could disrupt those communities. We could arrest their leaders, raid their homes, break up their meetings, and vilify them night after night on the evening news. Did we know we were lying about the drugs? Of course we did.

This was the origin of mass incarceration in the United States, which has been directed at African Americans from Nixon’s time to today, when one third of black men go to prison (Bonczar, 2003; Baum, 2016; Alexander, 2010).

Federal laws were expanded in state laws that ranged from three-strike laws to harsh penalties for possession of small amounts of marijuana. The laws also shifted the judicial process from judges to prosecutors, from the courtroom to offices where prosecutors pressure accused people to plea-bargain. The threat of harsh minimum sentences gives prosecutors the option of reducing the charge to a lesser one if the accused is reluctant to languish in jail awaiting trial—if he or she is unable to make bail—and then face the possibility of long years in prison. And the shift of power was eased by the pattern of financing. Prosecutors are paid by localities, while the costs of prisons are borne by states. The trip to the penitentiary does not cost prosecutor at all. “Instead of juries and trial judges deciding whether this or that defendant merits punishing, prosecutors decide who deserves a trip to the nearest penitentiary (Stuntz, 2011, 286; Pfaff, 2017, 127).”

In a recent book, Pfaff minimized the role of drug laws in mass incarceration on the grounds that most state prisoners were convicted of violent crimes; only federal prisoners were predominantly convicted of drug violations. But the importance of public prosecutors and plea bargains contaminates this inference because the listed crimes in state prisons were produced in plea bargains. Since drug laws contain so many minimum sentences, plea bargains were driven toward lesser charges that did not fall under the drug laws. The results of the plea bargains do not indicate why prisoners were originally arrested and charged (Pfaff, 2017).

Both political parties were engaged at different times in legislation that gave rise to mass incarceration. It would seem likely that they could get together to try to reduce the rate of incarceration, but the prospects are not good in our current political impasse. The reduction of incarceration always has some risks, and political figures are very risk averse. Some people want to reduce the cost of prisons to help fund other government programs, but they have not produced many proposals to accomplish this goal or how to allocate the gains.

As Todd Clear stated in his 2007 book, Imprisoning Communities: How Mass Incarceration Makes Disadvantaged Neighborhoods Worse: 

Imprisonment in America is concentrated among young, poor—dominantly minority—men and (to a lesser extent) women who come from impoverished communities. The way these young people cycle through our system of prisons and jails, then back into the community, leaves considerable collateral damage in its wake. Families are disrupted, social networks and other forms of social support are weakened, health is endangered, labor markets are thinned, and—more important than anything else—children are put at risk of the depleted human and social capital that promotes delinquency. After a certain point, the collateral effects of these high rates of incarceration seem to contribute to more crime in these places. Crime fuels a public call for ever-tougher responses to crime. The increasing way in which the face of criminality is the face of person of color contributes to an inarticulate public sense that race and crime are closely linked. The politics of race and justice coexist malignantly, sustaining an ever-growing policy base that guarantees new supplies of penal subjects in a self-sustaining and self-justifying manner (Clear, 2007, 175).

We seem to be in a new equilibrium. It took forty years to get to this point, and it may take at least that long to get back to what we can consider a normal incarceration rate typical of advanced economies. We have not yet started down that road. 

Alexander, Michelle, The New Jim Crow: Mass Incarceration in the Age of Colorblindness (New York: New Press, 2010).

Tuesday, June 20, 2017

Would a White British Community Have Burned in Grenfell Tower?

Would a White British Community Have Burned in Grenfell Tower?

By DAWN FOSTER NY Times/London Guardian


LONDON — If it hadn’t been Ramadan, even more people would have died, firefighters told me on the scene at Grenfell Tower, the apartment building in West London that went up in flames on June 14 and is believed to have left more than 80 people dead.

The building had a high number of Muslim residents, and when the fire began, in the early morning hours, many people were returning from prayers or were awake, breaking their fast, and were able to raise the alarm. None of the survivors I spoke to, or saw interviewed in the media, had heard a fire alarm: Instead they were woken by smoke, screams or their neighbors hammering on doors to wake them before escaping themselves.

The tower and the area around it are ethnically diverse, with many families from Moroccan and Somali backgrounds. One of the first people confirmed dead was Mohamed al-Haj Ali, a 23-year-old Syrian refugee.

In the evening on the day of the fire, survivors, volunteers and locals held an iftar meal to break the Ramadan fast. Many of the volunteers I spoke with were exhausted from carrying donations and supplies on a hot day while they abstained from food and water.
U.K. Officials Said Material on Tower Was Banned. It Wasn’t. JUNE 19, 2017
The residents of the Lancaster West Estate, the development that envelops the Grenfell Tower, are typical of the modern British metropolitan working class. While there still exists a widespread nostalgia among some quarters for a beleaguered white working class, the truth is different. Poverty rates are lowest among the white population — at about 20 percent — while 50 percent of people of African descent live in poverty. Overall, two-fifths of ethnic minorities live in a household earning below average income.

Indeed, Britain’s racial politics are the key to understanding the Grenfell Tower fire. It’s difficult to imagine this disaster — caused by a huge dereliction of duty and refusal to listen to residents’ concerns — befalling a community of white Britons.

Tabloid media and political parties like the nationalist U.K. Independence Party have attacked the changing demographics of urban Britain: Salacious, false rumors circulate on the far right of “no-go” areas in London and Birmingham, areas where deadly crime makes walking the streets unsafe or where patrols enforce Shariah law on a neighborhood. The truth is that these neighborhoods, though poor, are often tight knit, with a sense of solidarity overriding any supposed lack of ethnic cohesion.

Community centers ringing the towers were deluged with donations, and volunteers of many different faiths arrived from across London and further afield. Two young Sikh men told me they’d driven nearly an hour from Slough with friends from their temple. Many volunteers wore green T-shirts stating they were working for the Muslim Aid charity. Christian vicars and Catholic priests opened their churches to the relief effort.
Survivors and former residents told me many of the tenants did not speak English as a first language, and felt this meant their concerns were dismissed during and after a refurbishment project that, it now seems clear, exacerbated the fire.

The former chair of the Grenfell Tower residents’ association, David Collins, told me many residents received threatening letters from lawyers for the contractor completing the building work, and they felt intimidated by visits and complaints from managers of the company.

The blaze happened after a years long attack by the Conservative government on low-income housing. The amount of public housing being built has dropped for more than two decades, even more drastically since 2012 to reach a 24-year low. Meanwhile, more and more is being sold off and demolished, even though demand is higher than it has been in decades.

Many local councils have been desperate to build, but have instead had their funding slashed, meaning they are closing homeless shelters when they want to build more homes. As well as funding cuts, changes in the classification of homelessness have seen more families turned away when they need help: Over 100,000 children in England are currently in temporary accommodation, while single adults are routinely turned away.

The reported failings in the run up to the disaster have a clear class element, but also a racial one. White tenants said their concerns were ultimately ignored, but officials were more likely to listen to them. Black and South Asian survivors told me they felt the implicit message from everyone they contacted before the fire for help with the building was “you are a guest in this borough, and a guest in this country, you have no right to complain.”

The local authority the estate sits in, the Royal Borough of Kensington and Chelsea, is the richest borough in Britain. Houses there routinely sell for several million pounds — many times higher than the average in Britain. “If someone in those houses complained about their rubbish bins, the council would sort it out immediately,” one Grenfell resident told me. “But because we weren’t white, no one cared when they said their homes were dangerous.”

In London in particular, gentrification has seen a rise in redevelopment projects on public housing estates that, more often than not, involve evictions and the land the demolished houses stand on being sold for hefty sums to developers. The evicted tenants are usually poor, and often from diverse ethnic backgrounds, similar to the community in Grenfell Tower.

When Prime Minister Theresa May visited the site last week, she refused to meet residents, citing “safety concerns.” (Meanwhile, both the queen and Jeremy Corbyn, the leader of the Labour Party, met with Grenfell tenants.) On Sunday, Mrs. May had a few survivors visit her at Downing Street — but only after she was forced to flee angry protests by locals a few days earlier.

Fixing Britain’s public housing crisis will not be easy. And it’s not likely to happen as long as Mrs. May and her Conservatives are in charge of the government. But the level of public anger right now since the Grenfell disaster is forcing people here to confront the issues of class and race, gentrification and public policy that, it is now clear, can be deadly.

Wednesday, June 14, 2017

Generation Putin

Why Russian youth has disappointed hopes for democratic change


NATALIA ZORKAYA EUROZINE June 2017
Russia’s younger generation have failed to build upon the democratic achievements of their predecessors of the 1990's. Surveys show a reversion to Soviet-era conformism, whether as passivity and cynicism, or individualism and status obsession.

At the beginning of the 1990', prospects for modernization and democratic change in Russian society were linked to the younger generation. Sociologists identified the bearers of new values not only in the educated classes, or in the modern, more complex social environment of large cities and mega cities, but first and foremost among the youth. At the beginning of the 1990's, young people stood out from other generations for their inclination towards liberal-democratic values, civil rights and freedom, their openness towards the West and their attitude towards social achievement and success. Even at the start of the economic reforms, when – after a short period of euphoric expectation that things would rapidly change for the better – the majority of the population was plunged into a state of frustration and confusion and increasingly took the view that any changes in the country were imposed from above, young people demonstrated a more positive attitude and were more content with their own lives.

Hopes that young people would be able to quickly adopt western ideas and democratic principles were also characteristic of the liberal and democratic parties and social movements of the 1990s. Ideas about how Russian society and its economy might be modernized emerged directly from the educated classes – primarily residents of large cities and youth – and involved complex ideas of justice, human rights, a democratic state, the independence of the judiciary, the protection of private property and so on. These social environments were expected to encourage the institutional consolidation of the values of democratic rule-of-law state, civil rights and freedoms and the displacement of former Soviet stereotypes and complexes. The new opinions expressed by youth and other socio-demographic groups, which were clearly recorded in polls conducted by the Levada Center, were interpreted as evidence of changes taking place in society. Indeed, in the early 1990s, the polling responses from young people differed to the general population, suggesting an allegiance to democratic rights and freedoms and endorsement of the values of economic liberalism, success and achievement, as well as a greater openness towards the West.

By the mid-1990's, however it became apparent that it had been wishful thinking to describe the younger generation as modernizers and bearers of new liberal democratic values that were devoted to the western political and economic model. Comparative analysis of data on generations revealed that the “pro-Western” orientations of young people were mostly declarative and unstable. In other words, as they mature, young people increasingly fit into the structure of basic values still connected with the Soviet past. The general negative sentiment that prevailed in public opinion right up to the early 2000s only increased adolescents’ susceptibility towards typical complexes, stereotypes and prejudices inherent in the Soviet Union. In the 1990's, the Soviet period was still positively mythologized in the public consciousness, as if this was a massive traumatic reaction to the disintegration of the USSR and the consequences of the radical reforms. These sentiments were picked up by the reoriented media and later reflected in official rhetoric.

Two generations of post-Soviets

Most people perceived the changes of the 1990's as forced, imposed, incomprehensible and lacking in positive goals. This determined people’s most common type of adaptation – namely downwards adaptation, which amounted to a struggle for survival. Roughly speaking, only one-tenth of all respondents felt that the changes opened up new opportunities for using their strengths and abilities for personal development and success. This meant that, on the whole, short-lived hopes for rapid, large-scale improvements were replaced by much more limited aspirations concerning the resolution of everyday, routine problems.

Most people survived the dramatic changes of the 1990's by turning to Soviet ideas, proclivities and behavioral patterns. The elites were weak and unprepared for serious social and political transformations and failed to implement democratic reforms in politics and the public sphere. In most people’s eyes, the state consigned its citizens to their fate. The only experience that the generation of “parents” was able to pass on to their children in this era of change was that of individual survival and passive adaptation. In post-Soviet society, unlike in the West, a value-based conflict of generations never arose. A “working through” of such a conflict could have become a means of genuine social transformation. But all manner of problems inherited from the Soviet past remained unreflected, which made the alteration of Soviet mentality difficult.

The collapse of the Soviet institutional system, meant that the welfare state ceased to function; that educational, healthcare, science and media institutions deteriorated; that power became increasingly arbitrary and that corruption increased; and that the legal system and courts became more and more reliant on the authorities. Under these conditions, a significant responsibility for the new generation’s socialization and adaptation to the changing reality fell on the family. One of the family’s main challenges was to ensure the possibility of a “better life” for children. At the same time, the passive adaptation to changes by “adults” themselves, by lowering their own demands and expectations, led to a general narrowing and simplification of the notion of “the future” and a focus on everyday problems. The well being of children was, as many years of polling have shown, seen as compensation for what generations of parents felt they had lacked in terms of material security and relative freedom from everyday burdens.

Values, self-perceptions, prospects

Surveys of young people in the mid-2000s and 2010's show that youngsters growing up in the post-Soviet period tended to regard personal success (understood primarily as material well being and status) as a priority and to seek entry into the power hierarchy, but cared little about social recognition of personal achievements, the desire for self-improvement, social and civic responsibility and political participation.

According to surveys of urban youth conducted in the 2000s, the overwhelming majority (as much as four-fifths) believed that they had already been successful in life. Given the uncertain future for the majority of young people, one needs to bear in mind that the notion of “success” in the youth environment is associated not so much with real achievements as with self-identification. “Success” in this context is nothing more than a sign of belonging to a collective “we”, those who are alright. There is an overriding opinion that in order to achieve success one needs help and support from influential people (the equivalent of the Soviet “blat” – “old boys” network). Moreover, instrumental and immoral activity is regarded as something good in order to achieve one’s goal.

In the list of qualities that ensure success, young people place “ambition” and “assertiveness” – those qualities crucial for someone career-oriented – fairly low down. These were traditionally perceived as negative in paternalistic and egalitarian-collectivist Soviet society and today are still seen with suspicion. Young people, especially among the least adapted sections of society, put a greater emphasis on external factors of success (such as support networks) and at the same time see “successful people” negatively and with envy. The very fact that young people list, as important requirements for success, phenomena usually evaluated negatively in mass consciousness – old boys networks, the use of power, connections, cynicism, selfish calculation, pragmatism – testify to a decline in the value of professional success as such. Young people’s view of the requirements for achieving success morally justifies a passive attitude and prevents them from striving for more or from building a career, since the aforementioned means are unsuitable for an “honest person”.

It is worth noting that young people have no clear idea of a “big” future, despite their confidence in their own situation, their satisfaction with life and their high opinion of their own success. Polls have shown that about 80 per cent of Russians have no long-term plans. Even by the end of the “prosperous” first decade of this century, the majority of young people in cities believed that they could plan their lives no more than a year or two ahead. Long term planning of the future remained important only among groups of young people who, for professional reasons, are included in social contexts that involve more complex interaction.

This indifference concerning one’s own future (combined with satisfaction with one’s own life and “achievements”) can be seen as an attitude inherited from the parents’ generation, whose dependence on the Soviet system was accompanied by a strong feeing of lacking perspectives and control over one’s own life. It is no coincidence that, even among the most prosperous and successful young people, the majority admit that they cannot (and do not want to) change the political situation, that they are unable to defend their rights, and that they are incapable of opposing the arbitrariness of power.

Career, status, aspiration

Over the past twenty years, young people have not only demonstrated their preference for western forms of entertainment, but also have high income expectations. Requests for high entry salaries are often incommensurate with their real knowledge, skills and abilities. The majority of respondents consider higher education vital for a successful career. A significant number of young people believe that a formal qualification alone will open the door to high earnings. The specific preparation for a future profession is often seen as less important than the diploma itself. Students typically have very vague ideas about their future professions. Studies show that up to two-fifths do not plan to work in the profession in which they are being trained. For most young people, acquiring further knowledge of their respective profession after completing their degree seems unimportant; they prefer to break into established economic niches where there is “big money”. For these reasons, individual achievement and personal endeavor are devalued in education.

Another trend is the growing tendency towards western levels of expenditure on costly, modern leisure activities. Mainly young and fairly well-to-do people take part in such urban leisure and entertainment activities; most older adults are satisfied with “domestic” ways of spending their free time – watching television and videos; carrying out household tasks or communicating with neighbours and relatives. Since the majority of young people – including those that are married, which is on average 70 per cent of young respondents – live with their parents or other relatives, we can assume that they run a common household with them. And since young people, especially those living in big cities, are expressly geared towards spending money on boosting their “status” and modern leisure activities, this sows the seeds for a generational conflict and an increase in internal tensions and mutual misunderstanding.

The origins of the youth’s disregard of everyday “adult” concerns lies in Soviet “child-centrism” and its consequences. Parents’ discontent with and resentment of their children, which sociologists capture in the data, also demonstrates a lack of mutual understanding between the generations. Most parents of young adults have an almost neurotic notion of “life for the sake of children”. This self-sacrificing attitude among the Soviet generation of parents is linked to the survival of the attitude described above. The parents’ generation has made an enormous effort to maintain a “normal life” for their family and children in order “to help them on in life”, but this sacrifice is not necessarily appreciated by their children, who often see it as something that should just happen naturally.

Thus, over the past two decades, young people, especially those living in large cities, have adapted relatively quickly to social and political changes, and have distinguished themselves from the disoriented masses (whose dissatisfaction is exploited politically by the left or a national-patriotic parties). Over time, young people, who in the early 1990s were seen as the bearers of new values, began to consider themselves as a special, more valuable group than other generations, while not showing any special achievements in social, civil or political life. Rather, they saw their “privileged” position as something natural, having received freedom and opportunities in a “readymade” form that had not been available to older people. Freedom was therefore treated by them not as a value, but as a given. Hence the younger generation, as the Russian society in general, failed to adopt the new ideas and values necessary for democratization and modernization.

Politics

Until around 1998, the overall political climate in Russia remained relatively liberal and the plurality of opinion persisted. During that period, young people’s political positions were fairly outspoken and polarized: they were ready to support both liberal, pro-western parties and right wing nationalist politicians such as Vladimir Zhirinovsky. (The latter was initially supported by the down-and-out youth in small depressed towns.) Over time, however, the popularity of liberal politicians fell and public criticism of the Soviet system was practically forgotten by a society preoccupied with the problems of everyday survival.

Since the late 1990s, with the strengthening of authoritarianism, the control of power over the media, the decline of democratic institutions and rising corruption in society, the role of specific, pre-modern, traditional values has increased. There has been a massive rise in archaic, traditionalist sentiments, and the political instrumentalisation of such sentiments by the Kremlin. There has been an increase in support for “Putin’s power hierarchy”, primarily amongst young people – i.e. those who are “cut off from the past” and who isolate themselves from politics.

In the early 2000s, young people, like the other generations, generally accepted the creation of an external enemy – a hostile and mercenary West – brought back from the Soviet past without much resistance. The concept of the besieged fortress became the basis for negative mass mobilization. This was accompanied by the exclusion of young people from the public sphere and by the decreasing importance of alternative positions among different political groups, of expert opinions and of public criticism of the authorities. There was a mass anti-westernism of the young, and, to an even greater extent anti-Americanism; mass xenophobia combined with the growth of Russian nationalism. The revival of great power sentiments is combined with an ostentatious “westernization” among the most successful, wealthy and adapted urban youth. This group demonstrate new standards of consumption and modern forms of entertainment and leisure, which, as before, are unavailable to the overwhelming majority of young people.

Russia’s youth cannot be called completely apolitical. Young people follow politics no less than older generations, and use more diverse channels of information – the internet, and in recent years, social networks. But only a minority use alternative sources of information in order to develop their own assessment of current affairs. For young people, like most of the population, it is normal to take on the position of a passive spectator who prefers to take on trust what national media or tabloids offer them.

In general, the last ten years of surveys indicate a declining interest in and growing ignorance about politics among young people. This pertains particularly to information provided by independent media that interpret events in Russia and the world from democratic and liberal positions, a development that could already be observed after the suppressed protests between 2011 and 2013, and that became obvious after the annexation of Crimea and the beginning of the war in the Donbas. Even when, during the aforementioned political protests, a string of repressive laws were adopted that aimed at suppressing civil and political activities, only around a third of young people surveyed were critical. Finally, after the annexation of Crimea, there was almost universal, unanimous approval of the regime’s actions, not only against external enemies, but also against internal enemies known to “rock the boat”. Russian society and its youth faction, having previously refused to actively participate in political life, fast became a fertile breeding ground for patriotic propaganda about Russia as a “great power”.

Today, the majority of young people in Russia represent the most passive group in terms of political participation – no more than 4 to 5 per cent of young people under 24 are socially and civilly active. Of course, this development started earlier. In the 2000s, sociologists observed among 20 and 30-year-olds a significant decline in interest in political events in both the country and the world and a growing lack of interest in the history of Russia, especially in relation to the changes in the 1980's and 1990's. Democratic or liberal positions also started to become marginalized. Differences between political positions narrowed, political choice was typically rejected and the values of solidarity and compassion were replaced by cynicism.

Attitudes towards the Orange Revolution in Ukraine are telling of Russian youth in the first decade of this century. More than a third (37 per cent) of young people surveyed in 2005 followed the events that unfolded on Kiev’s Maidan square. Among them, 24 per cent believed that the protests did Ukraine neither harm nor good and 25 per cent found it difficult to formulate an opinion on this subject. Only 3 per cent of young respondents agreed that the protests “were very useful for Ukraine”. This means that half of the young people following the events in Ukraine saw no “meaning” in them and developed no independent assessment of such an important event in the post-Soviet space. The most popular answer to the question of the protesters’ motives at that time was that “the participants were paid money”. This motive was cited by 52 per cent of young people (another 25 per cent considered this the second most important motive). They thereby followed the explanation that had been spun by political strategists in the Kremlin. Idealistic motives were considered most important by only 30 per cent of young people following the events. The hypertrophied fears of the Russian authorities regarding the “orange threat”, however, seemed unfounded: 72 per cent of young respondents “definitely would not like it” if the “Orange Revolution” were to take place in Russia.

It was important for the Kremlin to support the cynical and indifferent reaction of the majority of young people. Against this backdrop, anti-orange performances by the “Nashi” youth movement became acceptable. After the victory of the second Maidan protest, an aggressive anti-Ukraine campaign was unleashed on an unprecedented scale. Amidst the general anti-Ukrainian hysteria, young people differ from other respondents only by their greater tendency to skip certain answers related to the annexation of Crimea and the Russo-Ukrainian war in the Donbas, while at the same time mirroring the majority of the population in their almost universal approval of the Kremlin’s actions in Ukraine.

The exception to the trend

The generation of young people who grew up in the Putin era is a generation without a memory, which accepts, without much resistance, ideological interpretations of recent Soviet history, as dictated by the regime and supplied by its media. The youth milieu lacks incentives for understanding and carrying out productive criticism of the democratic changes that occurred in the 1990's. Today, 90 per cent of young people do not know about the August Coup of 1991 and the victory of the democrats, which was backed by the overwhelming majority of the population. A significant number have no opinion about the events that took place in the 1990's, about the Soviet era or the crimes that occurred under Stalin.

A generation has grown up accustomed to thinking the same as the majority of the population. Today, this manifests itself most keenly in the overwhelming support for the president (as manifested by the expression “Putin’s youth”), for the ruling United Russia party, and for the authorities more generally. Such strong support for the political regime among young people (here we’re talking 18–24 year-olds) is concomitant with the lowest level of political participation of all generations.

Nevertheless, a democratically and liberally-minded minority of young people does exist, especially in large cities (according to our estimates, it is between 5 and 7 per cent). These are the most educated, qualified, successful members of that generation, who demonstrate a responsible and active civil position in relation to events in Russia. It is in this environment that the idea of a common social good is beginning to emerge, evoking an interest and sympathy for socially disadvantaged groups, which in turn has led to various civil initiatives and voluntary movements.

It was this milieu that largely triggered the 2011–2013 protest movement, in response to massive fraud in the Duma elections. The fraud was revealed by a self-organized group of observers largely made up of young people. However, from rally to rally, the participation of young protesters has decreased. The Levada Center’s surveys on the “Bolotnaya Square case” showed that the age composition of the participants is increasingly approaching the average. Young people in the towns and cities were the catalyst that ignited the protests, but their activities did not translate into broad youth movements. It seems particularly significant when comparing protests in Russia with events in Ukraine that there was no mass participation of students in the former. The repressive political regime quickly deprived youth protests of their energy and plunged the liberal-minded part of society into a state of growing apathy and demoralisation.

Moscow, February 2017

Postscript

On 26 March 2017, after this article was written, a new wave of protests against corruption in the Russian government swept through many Russian cities. Triggered by an investigative video about Medvedev’s secret assets in Russia and abroad, published on YouTube by Alexei Navalny’s Foundation for Fighting Corruption, the protests attracted an unusually high number of youth. They included not only university but also high school students. These young people, born during the Putin era and subjected to “patriotic education” in schools, caught sociologists by surprise. The phenomenon was explained with the use of social networks and the innovative mobilization strategies of Navalny and his team. It remains to be seen if the protests will continue. While the pro-Putin majority among the younger generation and in Russian society in general is unlikely to be challenged in the near future, tensions are also likely to rise. Politically engaged small groups of young people can potentially become an agent of change after all.

PUBLISHED 7 JUNE 2017
© Natalia Zorkaya / IWM / Eurozine
Russia in global dialogue

Europe’s current debate on Russia is focused on what the country lacks – democracy, rule of law, modernization. At the same time, Russia is far from immune to conspiracy theories attempting to explain the modern world. With Moscow’s recent return to power politics and the fear of a new Cold War there is an urgent need for the Western public to re-engage with the complexity of Russia. This focal point – in cooperation with the Institute for Human Sciences (IWM) – is an attempt to answer this need.


Monday, June 12, 2017


The Long, Lonely Road of Chelsea Manning 


Her disclosure of classified documents in 2010 ushered in the age of leaks. Now, freed from prison, she talks about why she did it — and the isolation that followed.

BY MATTHEW SHAER NY TIMES

On a gray morning this spring, Chelsea Manning climbed into the back seat of a black S.U.V. and directed her security guard to drive her to the nearest Starbucks. A storm was settling over Manhattan, and Manning was prepared for the weather, in chunky black Doc Martens with an umbrella and a form-fitting black dress. Her legs were bare, her eyes gray blue. She wore little makeup: a spot of eyeliner, a smudge of pink lip gloss.

At Starbucks, she ordered a white-chocolate mocha and retreated to a nearby stool. Manning has always been small (5 foot 4), but in her last few months at the United States Disciplinary Barracks at Fort Leavenworth, she jogged religiously, outside in the prison yard and around the track of the prison gym, and her body had taken on a lithe sharpness, apparent in the definition of her arms and cheekbones. She looked healthy and fit, if a little uneasy, as people who have served long spells in prison often do.

She had been released only eight days earlier, after serving seven years of a 35-year sentence. Her crime, even in hindsight, was an astonishing one: handing WikiLeaks approximately 250,000 American diplomatic cables and roughly 480,000 Army reports from the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. Collectively the largest leak of classified records in American history, the disclosures cleared a path for Edward Snowden and elevated the profile of Julian Assange, then little known outside hacker circles. “Without Chelsea Manning,” P.J. Crowley, an assistant secretary of state from 2009 to 2011, told me recently, “Julian Assange is just another fringe actor who resents what he sees as American hegemonic hubris.” To an extraordinary extent, Manning’s actions, in the words of Denver Nicks, the author of a book on her case, represented the “beginning of the information age exploding upon itself”: a new era in which leaks were a weapon, data security was of paramount importance and privacy felt illusory.

In January 2017, after being locked up at five different facilities, in conditions a United Nations expert called “cruel” and “inhumane,” Manning had received a surprise commutation by President Barack Obama. Four months later, she was free, trying to adjust to life in a world she helped shape. Finishing her coffee, she fished her iPhone out of her purse and asked her security guard for a lift back to the apartment where she was staying while in Manhattan. The one-bedroom was furnished sparsely, with a wide glass table and a tan couch, opposite which Manning had set up an Xbox One video-game console. The art was of the anodyne motel variety — an old-masters-esque tableau, a canvas of a zebra standing in a forest. We were many floors up, suspended in the storm clouds, and through the window, I could see the spires of the skyscrapers on the other side of the Hudson River.


‘I Am a Female,’ Manning Announces, Asking Army for Hormone Therapy AUG. 22, 2013

Manning, who is 29, tapped an unplugged microwave next to the door and asked me to place my laptop inside: The Faraday cage in the microwave would block radio waves, she explained. But the unplugged microwave was already full of devices, including two Xbox controllers. “You can put it in the kitchen microwave,” Manning said; then, intuiting the strangeness of the request, she added with a shrug, “You can’t be too careful.”

‘From my perspective, the world’s shaped me more than anything else. It’s a feedback loop.’
She recalled that she last gave an in-person, on-the-record interview to a journalist in 2008, on the occasion of a marriage-equality march in New York. For almost a decade after that, barred by prison officials from communicating directly with the public, she remained silent as her story was told in books, an opera, an Off Broadway play and countless magazine articles, almost all of them written before Manning had come out as transgender. “It wasn’t the whole story,” she told me, “my whole story.”

Absent her own voice, a pair of dueling narratives had emerged. One had Manning, in the words of President Donald Trump, as an “ungrateful traitor.” The other positioned her as transgender icon and champion of transparency — a “secular martyr,” as Chase Madar, a former attorney and the author of a book on her case, recently put it to me. But in Manning’s presence, both narratives feel like impossible simplifications, not least because Manning herself is clearly still grappling with the meaning of what she did seven years ago. When I asked her to draw lessons from her journey, she grew uneasy. “I don’t have. ... ” she started. “Like, I’ve been so busy trying to survive for the past seven years that I haven’t focused on that at all.”

But surely, I pressed, she must have some sense of the impact she had on the world. “From my perspective,” she responded, “the world’s shaped me more than anything else. It’s a feedback loop.”

As far back as Chelsea Manning can remember, to her earliest days in Crescent, on the far edge of the Oklahoma City metro area, she suffered from a feeling of intense dislocation, something constant and psychic that she struggled to define to herself, much less to her older sister, Casey, or her parents, Brian and Susan. During one of our interviews, I mentioned that I heard a clinical psychologist compare gender dysphoria to a “giant, cosmic toothache.” Manning flushed. That was it exactly, she agreed: “Morning, evening, breakfast, lunch, dinner, wherever you are. It’s everywhere you go.”

At the age of 5, Manning recalled, she approached her father, an I.T. manager for Hertz, and confessed that she wanted to be a girl, “to do girl things.” Brian responded with a lengthy and awkward speech on the essential differences in “plumbing.” But Manning told me, “I didn’t understand how that had anything to do with what you wore or how you behaved.” Soon she was sneaking into her sister’s bedroom and donning Casey’s acid-washed jeans and denim jackets. Seated at the mirror, she would apply lipstick and blush, frantically scrubbing off the makeup at the slightest stirring from downstairs.

“I wanted to be like [Casey] and live like her,” Manning said.

When she was still in elementary school, she came out as gay to a straight male friend. The friend was understanding; the other kids at school, less so. Manning tried, unsuccessfully, to retract her confession, but the teasing continued. “I would come home crying some days, and if my dad was there, he’d say: ‘Just quit crying and man up. Like, go back there and punch that kid in the face,’ ” she said. It was the late 1990s, when the trans movement was very much on the fringes of American society. “The closest I came to knowing anything was from the portrayal of drag-queen-style cross-dressing on sensational TV shows” like Jerry Springer’s, Manning told me. She spent more time inside, on the computers that her father was always bringing home, playing video games and dabbling in basic code.

Her parents had issues of their own. When Manning was about 12, Susan swallowed an entire bottle of Valium. Casey called 911, only to be told that the nearest ambulance was a half-hour away. Casey loaded her mother into the car; Brian, who Manning says was too drunk to drive, sat shotgun, leaving a terrified Chelsea in the back to make sure her mother kept breathing. She told me the incident was formational. “I grew up very quickly after that,” she said. (Brian could not be reached for comment.)

In Susan’s native Wales, where Manning moved with her in 2001 after her parents split, Chelsea says she took over full control of the household, paying bills and handling much of the shopping. There was freedom there, too: She could buy her own makeup at the convenience store, wear it for a few hours in public and jam it into a waste bin on her way home. She passed many evenings on her computer, in L.G.B.T. chat rooms. Her worldview shifted. While in Crescent, Manning had imbibed her father’s conservative politics — “I questioned nothing,” she told me. But at Tasker Milward, a school in the town of Haverford west, she studied the civil rights movement, the Red Scare, the internment of Japanese-Americans during World War II. In a term paper for a history class, she expressed skepticism about the rationale for the American invasion of Iraq.

When Manning returned to the United States in 2005 to live with Brian and his new wife in Oklahoma City, she was a changed person, if not a wholly transformed one: She wore eyeliner and grew out her hair and dyed it black. “I thought, Maybe I want to just eradicate this gender thing and be gender neutral, like androgynous,” she told me. She found a job at an internet start-up and, through a matchmaking site, met her first boyfriend, who lived 70 miles away in the town of Duncan. But her stepmother, Manning said, forbade her from setting foot in the kitchen: “She felt that I was unclean.”

Manning confided to no one what she was increasingly coming to understand: that she wasn’t gay, wasn’t a cross-dresser. She was a woman. In the summer of 2006, she and her boyfriend parted ways, and she lit out from Oklahoma for good, all her belongings piled high in the cab of her red Nissan pickup truck. A spell of itinerancy followed — out to Tulsa, Okla., to work at a pizza parlor; up to Chicago to work at Guitar Center; east to the suburbs of Washington to live with her aunt, with whom she enjoyed a connection she never shared with her parents. She did four sessions with a psychologist, but got no closer to unburdening herself than she had with friends or family members. “I was scared,” Manning said. “I didn’t know that life could be better.”

Brian Manning had often fondly recounted for Chelsea his days in the military: It had given him structure and grounding, he said. Manning hadn’t been ready to listen then. Now she was. Enlisting might be the thing to “man her up,” to rid her of the ache. Besides, while her ideas about American foreign policy had become more nuanced, she still considered herself a patriot — in the Army, she could use her analytical skills to help her country. “I remember sitting in the summer of 2007 and just every single day turning on the TV” and seeing the news from Iraq, she told me. “The surge, the surge, the surge. Terrorist attacks. Insurgents. ... I just felt like maybe I could make a difference.”

That fall, Manning reported for basic training at Fort Leonard Wood in the Missouri Ozarks; within a few days, she had suffered injuries to her arm. “The drill sergeants were acting like I was malingering or something,” she said. “But I was like: ‘No, I’m not trying to get out of anything. I just really can’t feel my right hand.’ ” A soldier who spent time with Manning in Missouri later recalled for The Guardian that Manning was routinely called a “faggot.” “The guy took it from every side. He couldn’t please anyone. And he tried. He really did,” the soldier said.

The Army, in need of more bodies to fight the insurgencies in Afghanistan and Iraq, allowed Manning another shot at boot camp. In 2008, she graduated to intelligence school at Fort Huachuca in Arizona, which to her felt like a kind of community college. There, she was trained to sort what the military terms “Sig Acts,” or significant actions — the written reports, photos and videos of the confrontations, explosions and firefights that form the mosaic of modern war. Manning told me she fit in well with the intelligence types at Fort Huachuca, who shared her intrinsic geekiness. “There were more like-minded people there,” she said, adding, “It wasn’t ‘Rah, rah, you need to do this.’ They encouraged us to speak up. They encouraged us to have opinions, to make our own decisions.”

At her first official duty station, Fort Drum in upstate New York, Manning was charged in part with helping to build a digital tool that would automatically track and sort Sig Acts from Afghanistan, where Manning’s unit initially expected to be deployed. For hours a day, she watched spectral night-vision video and read reports from distant battlefields. Already, she was being exposed to the bloodshed that would serve as inspiration for her leaks. But she was handling the material at a spatial and emotional reserve: She remained, she told me, “eager” to get to the front lines. “I was hungry.”

Through a gay dating site, she met a bookish Brandeis student named Tyler Watkins. She started driving to visit Watkins in the Boston area, where she became a regular at Pika, a Massachusetts Institute of Technology co-op, and visited Boston University’s Builds, a hub of the local hacking community. At the Pika gatherings, she found friends that approached coding the same way she did: as outlet, pastime and calling. She often stayed up late into the night talking. Yan Zhu, then an undergraduate student at M.I.T., remembers Manning as “obviously intelligent,” if “nervous.” It was clear to Zhu that Manning was “haunted by something.” But she never had a chance to find out what: That fall, Manning’s unit was deployed to Iraq.

In October 2009, Manning hopped a Black Hawk from Baghdad to Forward Operating Base Hammer, 30 miles east of the city. In the cabin, strapped into the chopper’s jump seats, she began putting names to places that had long been digital abstractions. “I had seen imagery for nine or 10 months prior,” Manning recalled, “I knew the landscape so well from the air that I recognized these neighborhoods, and it woke me up to see people walking around and to see people driving and to see the buildings and the trees below.”

Ringed by desert, the low-slung buildings of F.O.B. Hammer baked in the summer and coursed with mud in the fall. Every night, Manning rose from her bunk at 9 p.m., dressed in standard-issue visual camouflage and grabbed her rifle. After quickly eating dinner for breakfast, she walked to a Sensitive Compartmented Information Facility, or SCIF, to report for duty. Manning’s SCIF was a glorified “plywood box” with lousy airflow, situated on a basketball court. She sat at the free-throw line, in a reclining office chair, where she spent her overnight shift facing three laptop computers. Manning’s isolation took on a new form: Hidden away in the darkened SCIF, she would work for eight hours at a stretch, sifting through reports filed securely by American troops in the field, making sense of the raw data for senior-level intelligence officers. She remained sealed off from actual conflict, though she could hear the shudder of car bombs and sometimes ran into soldiers, dazed and dusty, on their way back from a firefight.

At that early juncture, Manning told me, she was too busy to give much thought to the larger import of what she was seeing. “Doing my job, you couldn’t even really read all the files,” she said. “You have to skim, get a sense of what’s relevant and what’s not.” Still, to an extraordinary extent, she had a more comprehensive view of America’s role in Iraq than the infantry in the field did — often, literally, a sky-level view — and as October ground into November, she found herself increasingly dismayed by a lack of public awareness about what seemed to be a futile, ceaselessly bloody war. “At a certain point,” she told me, “I stopped seeing records and started seeing people”: bloody American soldiers, bullet-ridden Iraqi civilians.

On rare reprieves from the SCIF, Manning accompanied senior officers to meetings with the Iraqi military and the Iraqi federal police, sit-downs that further entrenched her disillusionment. “There would be these tea sessions, where you’ve got the Iraqi federal police in their blue uniforms, you’ve got Iraqi Army in, like, the old chocolate-chip camouflage and the Americans in our smeared green digital camouflage,” Manning said — everyone speaking in different languages, frequently at cross-purposes. “I’d come in thinking things would be black and white. They weren’t.”

Manning told me she heard the name WikiLeaks for the first time in 2008, at a computer security training course at Fort Huachuca. By the end of 2009, she had started logging on to internet relay chat conversations devoted to the site. (I.R.C., a semisecure protocol, was then the preferred method of communication for hackers.) Initially, she was an observer: She was intrigued by the work that Julian Assange and his team were doing, if not quite ready to endorse their argument for total transparency. She told me that she believed then, and believes now, that “there are plenty of things that should be kept secret.” “Let’s protect sensitive sources. Let’s protect troop movements. Let’s protect nuclear information. Let’s not hide missteps. Let’s not hide misguided policies. Let’s not hide history. Let’s not hide who we are and what we are doing.”

She was edging closer to acting but said nothing about the I.R.C. channel to her friends at F.O.B. Hammer, nor about her own personal tumult. She was now fighting to keep what amounted to two life-altering secrets. She couldn’t discuss her identity openly: The “don’t ask, don’t tell” policy was still in effect, and it would be years before transgender people were allowed to openly enlist. “I binge watched TV shows on the internet,” she said. “I was smoking heavily. I was drinking an enormous amount of caffeine. I was going to the dining facility and eating as much as I could. Just any little tiny escape or way to feel like I’m not there anymore.” Her boyfriend was little help: Manning could feel him slipping away. “I was in denial about it, but I had a sense ... that I was being forgotten,” she told me.

Manning had a two-week leave coming up. She planned to spend time in Boston, trying to patch things up with Watkins, and in the suburbs of Washington with her aunt. She dreamed about using the occasion to come out to her family and friends as trans. “I kept having this moment in my head,” she told me, “where I just yell it at the top of my lungs.” But she knew, in her heart, that she’d never be able to go through with it.

Before leaving F.O.B. Hammer, Manning downloaded, from the government’s Combined Information Data Network Exchange, almost every Sig Acts report from the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq and burned a compressed version of the data onto CD-RW discs, one of which was labeled “Lady Gaga.” She did it in full view of her fellow soldiers. But what she did next violated the most important precepts she was taught at Fort Huachuca, along with the Oath of Enlistment she swore in 2007: She uploaded the contents of the discs onto the personal laptop she planned to take home to the United States. She had not decided what she would do with the data.

Days later, Manning put on a blond wig and ran in a low crouch from the side door of her aunt’s house, out of view of the neighbors, and drove to the train station. She wore a dark coat and, under it, business-casual woman’s wear she bought at a local department store; she claimed it was for her friend who needed it for a job interview. In Washington, she went to a Starbucks, ate lunch at a busy restaurant and wandered through the aisles of a bookstore; later, she climbed back on the Metro and rode it aimlessly around. She took great pleasure in being seen as she knew she was and comfort in how easily she passed — rarely did anyone give her a second glance.

“Before I deployed, I didn’t have the guts,” Manning, who was then privately referring to herself as Brianna, told me. But her time in Iraq was changing her. “Being exposed to so much death on a daily basis makes you grapple with your own mortality,” she went on. She no longer wanted to hide.

The expedition was the high point of a disappointing two-week leave. The Army had bumped up her departure from F.O.B. Hammer, and her family hadn’t had time to readjust their schedules: Manning’s aunt was on a trip abroad, and her sister had just had her first child — it would be tricky to carve out time for Chelsea. Manning took a train up to see Watkins at his home in Waltham, in Massachusetts, but she couldn’t shake the feeling that he didn’t really want her there, so she cut her stay short by three days.

At that point, it would have been possible for Manning to return to Iraq with the files unshared — her actions had been illegal, if reversible. But Manning told me that being in the United States had prompted an epiphany. At home, she says, she realized how invisible the wars had become to most civilians, whose awareness of Iraq extended as far as the occasional newspaper article or chyron on cable news. “There were two worlds,” she said. “The world in America, and the world I was seeing [in Iraq],” She went on, “I wanted people to see what I was seeing.”

‘Let’s protect sensitive sources. ... Let’s protect nuclear information. Let’s not hide missteps. Let’s not hide misguided policies.’
A blizzard hit Washington. Manning’s aunt still wasn’t back from vacation. Alone, Manning transferred parts of the files to a small memory card and prepared an anonymous text file she wanted to accompany the information. “This is possibly one of the more significant documents of our time removing the fog of war and revealing the true nature of twenty-first century asymmetric warfare,” she wrote. “Have a good day.”

Manning told me her decision to provide the information to WikiLeaks was a practical one: She originally planned to deliver the data to The New York Times or The Washington Post, and for the last week of her leave, she dodged from public phone to public phone, calling the main office lines for both papers, leaving a message for the public editor at The Times and engaging in a frustrating conversation with a Post writer, who said she would have to know more about the files before her editor would sign off on an article. A hastily arranged meeting with Politico, where she hoped to introduce herself to the site’s security bloggers, was scrapped because of bad weather. “I wanted to try to establish a contact in a way that it couldn’t be traced to me,” Manning told me. But she was running out of time. She describes a clearheaded sense of purpose coming over her: “I needed to do something,” she told me. “And I didn’t want anything to stop that.”

On Feb. 3, 2010, Manning signed onto her laptop and, using a secure file-transfer protocol, sent the files to WikiLeaks.

Back at F.O.B. Hammer, time sped up; everything seemed to be happening at once. Manning had been away two full weeks, and there was a lot to catch up on — “I had to triple my work,” Manning told me. There had been no sign that WikiLeaks received her files, nor any indication that the Army knew anything was amiss. She remembers being in a perpetual state of heightened anxiety. She slept less, smoked more.

In mid-February, on break from the SCIF, she noticed an interesting thread on the WikiLeaks I.R.C. channel, where participants were discussing the financial crisis in Iceland — a collapse that Manning, reading through the library of secure diplomatic cables available to her as an analyst, concluded was roiling onward because of the inaction of the United States and what she described as diplomatic bullying by the Netherlands and Britain. “From my perspective, it appeared that we were not getting involved due to the lack of long-term geopolitical benefit to do so,” she would later testify. Following the same steps as before, she leaked several diplomatic cables pertaining to the Iceland crisis to WikiLeaks; this time, within hours, WikiLeaks published the documents. Manning was thrilled: If the cables had reached WikiLeaks, the much larger leak of Sig Acts had almost certainly made it, too.

Around this time, Manning had several I.R.C. conversations with a person whom Manning identified in her online address book as “Nathaniel Frank,” after the author of the book “Unfriendly Fire: How the Gay Ban Undermines the Military and Weakens America.” Frank was almost certainly Assange, although Manning declined to discuss the matter with me — the bulk of the chats are classified and could be used in future legal actions against Assange.

Manning followed the transmissions of the Sig Acts and the Iceland cables with a leak that was harder to ignore. Published by WikiLeaks under the title “Collateral Murder,” the three-year-old video, captured by a camera mounted on an American helicopter, showed two gunships approaching a group of men in an area where there had been reports of small-arms fire. The helicopter crew repeatedly requests permission to engage — “Let us shoot!” a voice is heard saying — before receiving it and opening fire. In total, at least a dozen people were killed in the 2007 strike, including several civilians and two staff members of the Reuters news agency. Manning says she knew that Reuters, under the Freedom of Information Act, had asked the United States government for a copy of the video but never received it. This was symptomatic, she said, of the worst impulses of a government obsessed with blanket classification. “It makes sense to keep some information secret for a few days, maybe a few years,” she told me. “The problem is, more and more, everything is secret by default.”

In long chat threads, Manning’s relationship with Nathaniel Frank deepened. She warmed to the role of truth-teller, handing over a small library of Detainee Assessment Briefs, or D.A.B.s, from the American holding facility at Guantánamo Bay. “Living such an opaque life, has forced me never to take transparency, openness and honesty for granted,” she wrote the former hacker Adrian Lamo, whom Manning had reached out to as a confessor and who was, unknown to Manning, already working with government investigators.

Privately, however, she was coming apart. Army investigators looking into her case would later detail several episodes of what they termed “bizarre behavior,” including blank stares and an incident in which Manning was found on the floor of a supply room, having carved the words “I WANT” into a nearby chair. She recalled that the unit, as a whole, was “on edge,” breaking out into verbal arguments and brawls. Their deployment was coming to an end, “and that’s when people start getting sick of each other and the personal animosity breaks out.”

In April, Manning emailed an Army superior a photo of her as Brianna that she took in Washington while on leave. “Now I knew who I was,” Manning told me. “But the people I’m around the most didn’t.” She titled the email “My Problem.” The issue of her gender identity was “not going away,” she wrote. “Now, the consequences of it are dire.” (Manning said her captain confirmed receipt of the email but “swept it under the rug.”)

Manning told me that she had resolved, in May, to go public with her role as whistle-blower, even as she was wrestling with how to express her gender identity. She was never able to settle on an approach. At the end of May, she was summoned to a conference room, where two agents from the Army Criminal Investigation Division were waiting. Manning was terrified, but she tried not to show it: “I was focused inward at that time: who I am, what my values are,” she recalled. She retreated “inside [her] head.” Days later, she was shackled, flown to Camp Arfijan in Kuwait and locked in a large steel cage. Kneeling down, she read the engraved words on the bars: Made in Fort Wayne.

Seven years later, it remains difficult to overstate the impact of the Afghan and Iraq war logs, or the later publication of the diplomatic cables. “The material touched on virtually every relationship the United States had around the world,” Crowley, the former State Department official, says of the cables. Repercussions came swiftly: Carlos Pascual, the United States ambassador to Mexico, resigned over cables in which he cast doubt on the effectiveness of the Mexican war on drugs, a revelation that poisoned Pascual’s relationship with the Mexican president. Ambassador Gene Cretz was recalled from Libya after his cables detailed the peculiar workings of the regime of Col. Muammar el-Qaddafi, including a squad of female Ukrainian bodyguards. The release of cables regarding the Tunisian strongman Zine el-Abidine Ben Ali are often credited with helping to inspire the uprising in that country.

The Afghan and Iraq documents brought home, in exactly the way that Manning had hoped, the messiness of the two conflicts. “These war logs,” The Guardian wrote in an introduction that the release of the material from Afghanistan revealed a war in stark contrast with the “tidied up and sanitized ‘public’ war, as glimpsed through official communiqués as well as the necessarily limited snapshots of embedded reporting.”

American officials, caught off guard by the leaks, were furious. Elizabeth Dibble, a State Department official, later testified that the release of the cables prompted “horror and disbelief that our diplomatic communications had been released and were available on public websites for the world to see.”

The issue of whether American interests had been adversely affected by the release of the cables remains a charged one. In the full text of the Afghan war logs that appeared on the WikiLeaks site, Julian Assange made only partial redactions, leaving intact the names of some of the Afghans who had collaborated with coalition forces. (He showed what CNN later described as a “much heavier hand in redacting” names from the Iraq war logs.) In 2010, Representative Mike Rogers, a Michigan Republican, said that “we know for a fact that people will likely be killed because of this information being disclosed.” Subsequent reviews by The Associated Press and McClatchy found this risk to be “overstated,” and at Manning’s sentencing, government witnesses testified that no American deaths could be attributed to the leaks. Still, Crowley said, a lack of evidence of fatalities was not the same thing as a lack of damage: “She burned a number of intelligence sources,” he said. “She placed Afghans in danger who were telling us what the Taliban was doing in their villages.”

In her cage in Kuwait, Manning registered none of the fallout. “I was completely isolated,” she said. “ At a certain point, she concluded, “I’ve been forgotten about, and I’ve just disappeared.” She figured that Lamo had turned her in, but she wasn’t sure if word of her involvement in the leaks had been made public. It was the start of the hot season in Kuwait, and dust swirled in from outside, lodging in her teeth. Her only human contact was with the guards who brought her meals. “I had told the detention center when I got there that I was trans,” Manning told me. “ ‘I’m a woman,’ I said matter-of-factly. They laughed.” In utter isolation, Manning found herself consumed with rage and sadness. Officials observed what Manning’s attorney called an episode of “yelling uncontrollably, screaming, shaking, babbling, banging your head against your cell and mumbling.”

Manning told me: “I was afraid I was going to be in that little cell or something like that little cell for the rest of my life. And that bad things were going to happen to me.” After a week, she fashioned a noose from bedclothes and made what she told me was a “halfhearted attempt” at suicide. “I kind of knew it wasn’t going to work.” It got the staff’s attention, and according to a medical evaluation later obtained by Manning’s legal team, a military doctor would diagnose anxiety, depression and “probable gender identity disorder.” She was given an antidepressant, which made her nose bleed and caused serious nausea. She couldn’t eat. Her skin eventually turned sallow. In late July, four days after the Afghan logs appeared in The Guardian and other papers, Manning was shackled and loaded onto a chartered military flight. She said that previously, guards had told her she would be “whisked away to a Navy cruiser” for months; now her escorts said she was going to Guantánamo. Halfway through the flight, the story changed a final time: She was going to the brig at the Marine base at Quantico, in Virginia.

It was there, on arrival, that she learned the world knew who she was. “So you’re Manning!” a heavyset Marine said with unnerving enthusiasm. Manning was all over Fox News, he added. In transferring Manning to Quantico, the government said it was providing Manning with facilities better suited to her fractured mental state. But a 2011 military investigation, undertaken in part as a response to Manning’s treatment, would reveal the opposite: At Quantico, Manning spent 23 hours a day in a 6-by-8-foot cell, for nearly nine months, much of it on Prevention of Injury, or P.O.I., status, in conditions that a United Nations special rapporteur later said could qualify as torture. While on P.O.I. watch, Manning wore what’s known as a “suicide smock,” a white nylon garment that is all but impossible to twist or rip into a noose. She had no pillow, no sheets. She was required to give regular verbal confirmation during the day that she was O.K. (After the investigation, the military ordered that Quantico’s whole pretrial confinement area be shut down.) 

When I asked Manning this spring to describe those conditions, she answered in the present tense. “Emotions can be more intense,” she said. “There isn’t any release for them. A mean comment by a guard” — commonly a gibe about her gender — “can set you off. Completely off. I know I have stood in a cell at times, locked down with nowhere to go, pacing with anger and frustration. It just stews inside of you, and you’re helpless,” she went on. “I just start yelling, at no one in particular, or singing at the top of my lungs.”

But Manning could occasionally receive outside visitors, and her aunt came to the brig. “Even though it was behind a Plexiglas window and we couldn’t talk without recording equipment around,” Manning told me, “it was one of the most powerful meetings I’d ever had.” They whispered to each other. “We love you,” her aunt told her. “We miss you.” They made plans to hire an independent attorney, eventually selecting David Coombs, a forceful lawyer in his early 40s who had served more than a decade in the Army’s Judge Advocate General’s Corps.

Word of Manning’s treatment in Kuwait and Quantico had begun to filter out, reaching legal eminences like Laurence Tribe and Kwame Anthony Appiah, who signed an open letter criticizing what they described as “conditions that are illegal and immoral.” In the spring of 2011, the government transferred Manning again, this time to the Midwest Joint Regional Correctional Facility at Fort Leavenworth. In Kansas, she was released into general population; it was, Manning recalled, “an utter shock to the system, because I had been in shackles everywhere I went or in a small room or a cage.”

At the facility, inmates weren’t required to work, so she spent her time in the library, helping Coombs and his assistants prepare her case. She faced a staggering number of violations, 22 in all, from circumventing security mechanisms to aiding the enemy, an offense that carried with it the possibility of life in prison. For two months that spring, with Manning moved to a civilian prison outside Fort Meade, in Maryland, Coombs sparred with government lawyers, highlighting what he termed the general “lawlessness” of Manning’s unit and the poor security protocols in place in her SCIF. He eventually argued that Manning’s gender dysphoria — and the inability of the Army to provide treatment — might have affected Manning’s mental capacity and judgment. A few days later, the judge found Manning guilty on all but two counts. Manning was spared a conviction for aiding the enemy and avoided a life sentence. Manning told me that she was relieved, and not only for the obvious reasons: She worried that an aiding-the-enemy charge would set a frightening precedent for the prosecution of whistle-blowers. “I still worry about how that charge can be misused,” Manning said.

She herself had resolved not to make her own gender identity public during the court-martial, worried that it would complicate an already unwieldy trial. But listening to the testimony of Lauren McNamara, a transgender friend who testified at the sentencing hearing, she found she had reached a breaking point. “I was tired of pretending,” she told me. She wrote a statement identifying herself as Chelsea, a name she used as a child for her handle on the Sims video game. On Aug. 22, David Coombs appeared on NBC’s “Today” show. The co-host Savannah Guthrie read from the statement: “As I transition into the next phase of my life, I want everyone to know the real me. I am Chelsea Manning. I am female.” Manning didn’t see the segment or the reaction to it. She was on a plane, on her way to the United States Disciplinary Barracks at Fort Leavenworth.

The U.S.D.B. lies at the far northern end of Fort Leavenworth, not far from the headquarters of the 40th Military Police Internment and Resettlement Battalion. The maximum-security complex, with its 515 beds, is reserved for the military prisoners serving the longest sentences, housing offenders like Robert Bales, the Army staff sergeant convicted in 2013 of slaughtering 16 Afghan civilians. For almost the entirety of her time there, Manning lived on the second floor. Her cell was narrow and small; there was a cot, a toilet, a mirror and a sink. The one window faced north, affording her a view of the surrounding landscape. In the vacuum of prison, the weather became theater: The snow that piled up against the cyclone fencing. The forked lightning that spidered the sky, sending deer and rabbits skittering for cover.

At Manning’s court-martial, Coombs had introduced as evidence the photo his client emailed to a superior in 2010. The image was later distributed to the news media, and by the fall of 2013, it had appeared alongside hundreds of articles on Manning’s transition. To Manning, the idea that it should come to define her was painful. “It was just so far from her experience at Leavenworth,” Evan Greer, a trans activist and friend, told me. “And I think some people saw that image, that luscious wig, and figured she was given that kind of freedom behind bars.”

In reality, every aspect of Manning’s appearance was being governed by Army rules, from her briefs to her hair, which she was required to wear, per Section 670-1 of Army regulations, in a “neat and conservative style.” Manning was in a position that can be difficult for non-trans people to understand: She had come out as female but was still being addressed and treated as if she were male — often pointedly, by the Leavenworth staff. Vincent Ward, one of Manning’s attorneys, recalls observing the way the prison guards treated his client. Ward, a former military lawyer, said he knew “who these people were. I knew the personality types. From the minute that you walked in, you could sense the bullying, the smirks, the comments.” It is a kind of isolation that can induce drastic action: Clinical psychologists who work with trans prisoners have documented high levels of suicide and depression in inmates not given appropriate medical treatment. In worst-case scenarios, prisoners have tried to alter their own genitalia by hand.

To friends and the members of her legal team, Manning spoke regularly, and with despair, of feeling “poisoned” by the testosterone in her body and of a ghostlike invisibility: If people couldn’t see her as she actually was, what use was living? On entering the U.S.D.B. in 2013, Manning requested access to the regimen of estrogen and anti-androgen drugs prescribed to people undergoing a male-to-female transition. She was refused: The Army did not yet sanction hormone therapy for soldiers, let alone for prisoners. Manning’s treatment would be limited to antidepressants and counseling sessions with a psychotherapist. “Permitting Mr. Manning to live as female, much less begin to feminize his body, will create operational challenges as the inmate population respond to these changes,” prison administrators wrote in an internal memo later obtained by the A.C.L.U.

The prison was unbending in its stance for nearly a year. Meanwhile, one of Manning’s lawyers — Chase Strangio, who himself is trans — grew increasingly worried that his client might try to hurt herself again; eventually, he filed a lawsuit against the Department of Defense. The suit cited a clinical evaluation from the psychologist Randi Ettner and said Manning was “experiencing significant distress and is at high risk for serious medical consequences, including self-castration and suicide.” In the summer of 2014, the Army agreed to send women’s underwear to Manning’s cell — a first for any branch of the military. (A civilian judge in Leavenworth County had granted Manning’s request to change the name on her birth certificate to Chelsea Elizabeth Manning.) Hormone therapy followed in early 2015, with the drugs distributed in pill form from a medical dispensary near the cafeteria.

To Manning, the early stages of hormone therapy were deeply fulfilling: her skin softened, her body hair thinned. But with the welcome physical changes came unnerving intellectual ones. “I’d built all these defenses and walls around my emotions over the years, since being a teenager,” Manning told me. “When my testosterone levels plummeted, I suddenly became more vulnerable emotionally. I could no longer just hide my emotions: I had to deal with them, usually right there and then.” And the emotions often came faster than Manning could process: “Good ones, like confidence, and a sense of connection with my friends, mixed in with a lot of bad ones, like doubt, loneliness, uncertainty and loss.” For support, Manning spoke regularly to others in the trans community: Strangio and Annie Danger, a trans artist and activist. Danger listened as Manning experimented with her voice, “putting it in different pitches in an effort to find out what felt right,” Danger told me. “I tried to talk her through that searching process, that evolutionary process, which can be so important. You’re literally finding your voice.”

At the U.S.D.B., Manning’s days took on a mundane, lulling rhythm. Most mornings, she woke up at 4:30 a.m. and, shrugging off the green sheets, dressed in the light of the bare bulb that hung above her bed: the white sports bra; the oversize prison uniform that hung, scarecrow-like, off her thin frame; the Army-issue boots. “O.K.,” she would say, examining herself in the mirror. “You can do this.” After a quick breakfast in the cafeteria, it was down to the prison wood shop, where she and a crew of inmates built, from scratch, the furniture sold at the base commissary. On the invitation of another prisoner, she joined a weekly Dungeons & Dragons game, playing as Esvele Dundragon, a female noble.

Manning told me that even as she transitioned, she never felt physically threatened by the other prisoners, as she did the staff. “Of all the people in my entire experience” in government custody, she said, the ones “who have been consistently good to me were the other inmates — like, I’m not saying they were excited or happy or approved of me or anything.” Manning says she counted a handful of inmates among her close friends, among them Clint Lorance, an Army platoon leader convicted of second-degree murder for ordering his men to open fire on three unarmed Afghan civilians. “Remember that all these folks were active military before they were incarcerated,” David Hammond, a lawyer assigned to Manning by the Army’s Defense Appellate Division, said in describing the dynamic to me. “The discipline carries over.”

In April 2014, the Army denied Manning’s clemency application, choosing to uphold, in full, her 35-year sentence. There remained the distant possibility of a presidential pardon or commutation, but Manning had no reason to expect one: The White House had condemned the leaks, as had the secretary of state, Hillary Clinton. The best option, Manning knew, lay in the formal appeal. But Manning’s fight with the prison authorities was grinding into its third year, and she was tired. Her hair was still being cut to male standards. The guards were relentless. “If you were trying to get them to be more gender neutral, they would make a point of being very gender specific,” Manning's said. And a request for gender reassignment surgery had been met with silence. (According to Manning’s lawyers, the Army approved the surgery last September, but set no timeline for its completion.) The U.S.D.B., in her mind, was “creating, often deliberately and knowingly, situations that cause high levels of stress on any given number of people. This breaks people down. Good people break down.”

In July 2016, one of Manning’s closest friends at the U.S.D.B., Anthony Raby, was seated at a bench in the embroidery shop, sewing name tapes for Army recruits, when a fellow prisoner dropped a note onto his table. “It’s from your girlfriend,” the man said. Raby didn’t have to ask who the man was referring to.

A former Army specialist serving three decades for the rape of a young child, Raby had first met Manning in 2013, shortly after her arrival at the U.S.D.B. It was his first encounter with a transgender person; he recalls thinking Manning resembled a “sad, strange little man.” In a letter from the U.S.D.B., Raby wrote: “The idea that someone could believe they were a gender other than what they were born was akin to believing a chicken was a hat. I just didn’t understand. However, as a Christian, I fully believe in showing everyone love and compassion, so we talked.”

Raby admired Manning’s intelligence, her wit, her unapologetic weirdness. “I’m all right with the weird,” Raby wrote. Manning visited his cell frequently to talk or vent or cry — taking care not to stay too long and violate the prison policy of one person to a unit. Raby, more than anyone else at the U.S.D.B., seemed to understand the toll that incarceration was taking on Manning. “Prison isn’t the best place for anyone who actually has actual emotions besides hate, anger, bitterness, apathy or indifference,” he wrote.

Now his worst fears were confirmed. Unfolding the note, which was folded and sealed shut with spare adhesive from a stamp book, Raby read the header: “Chelsea E. Manning, re: My Final Letter.” He scanned the first page. Manning wrote that she would kill herself after the base’s Fourth of July fireworks display came to a close. The fireworks had ended at 10 p.m. It was already 12:25 a.m.

‘I am not Bradley Manning. I really never was. I am Chelsea Manning.’
Raby notified a guard in the embroidery shop and handed over Manning’s letter. “About 1 a.m., I heard an announcement over the guard’s radio about an alert in Manning’s housing unit,” Raby told me. “I was pacing like a madman, sure they had not gotten to her in time.” Not wanting to aggravate the staff, Raby struggled to keep his composure. Around 3:30 a.m., he was approached by an Army investigator: Manning was alive.

Officials have declined to provide details about the incident, and Manning told me she only remembers waking up in an ambulance. But people with knowledge of the situation said Manning tried to hang herself and was recovered by guards, breathing but unresponsive. Manning told me that in the days leading up to the suicide attempt, she felt unusually low and alone. She had been determined to push through to the end of the long weekend, when her psychologist would be back on base. “I didn’t make it,” she said.

In early September, she embarked on a hunger strike to protest what she called the “constant and overzealous administrative scrutiny by prison and military officials.” She ended the hunger strike when the prison vowed to provide her with gender-reassignment surgery, an unprecedented accommodation

By the end of September, Manning was sentenced to an additional two weeks in solitary, with one week suspended. Her crime was conduct that threatens the orderly running of the barracks — her suicide attempt.

If prison, as Manning has said, made her feel like a ghost — alive in her supporters’ thoughts but unable to be with them physically — then her time in solitary was akin to erasure. Isolation “changes you; it makes you angry,” she said. “You start to forget about the world outside — it’s not relevant or relatable anymore. The darkest part of solitary confinement is that you start to forget about cars, and jobs, and families, and weather, and politicians, and all the things that make up a society.”

Manning again tried to kill herself, but a guard spotted her before she lost consciousness. A week later, she was returned to general population. She was beside herself with anger and fear. She was also, she told me, most likely suffering from post-traumatic stress disorder — from Iraq, from Quantico.

It was during her second stretch in solitary that Manning experienced an episode that the Army has no record of, and that, on the heels of the suicide attempts, seems to be indicative of severe mental anguish. In a legal brief, Manning details a vivid kind of fever dream that she still puzzles over — hearing “several reports of suppressed or silenced shots from a pistol” and listening as a group of strangers described their plans to remove her from the U.S.D.B. She refused to leave her cell, she says, and the next morning, the staff carried on as if nothing had happened.

To Manning’s attorneys, it was obvious that their client was running out of time. “Chelsea needs help, and she’s not getting it,” Strangio told me this winter. He viewed a commutation application, filed in November, as Manning’s best hope. In the petition, Manning’s lawyers appended a letter from Manning. “I am not Bradley Manning,” she wrote. “I really never was. I am Chelsea Manning, a proud woman who is transgender and who, through this application, is respectfully requesting a first chance at life.”

On the afternoon of Jan. 17, Manning was in the prison workshop, covered head to toe in wood shavings. She remembers looking up to see a team of security personnel enter the room. “I’m like, Oh, God, I’m in a lot of trouble,” Manning told me. “I don’t even know what the hell I’ve done now.”’ The prison’s head of security told her to come with them.

“Am I coming back?” she asked. No, she was told.

She grabbed her belongings and followed the guards to the Special Housing Unit. Assuming she was going back to solitary, she started to take the shoelaces out of her boots. The lead officer shook his head: She was headed for Protective Custody. In the common area, a television was playing CNN. She saw the banner on the screen: Manning’s sentence commuted, it read.

Manning told me she went numb. She never let herself think about a commutation, lest she be thrown back into a deeper darkness. “It was so hard for me to process and deal with it,” Manning recalled. Obama later addressed the decision with an implicit rebuke to Edward Snowden and Julian Assange. “Let’s be clear: Chelsea Manning has served a tough prison sentence, so the notion that the average person who was thinking about disclosing vital classified information would think that it goes unpunished, I don’t think would get that impression from the sentence that Chelsea Manning has served,” he said.

Four months later, on the morning of May 17, Manning was marched out the front door of the U.S.D.B. and loaded into a Ford Explorer. The driver steered the S.U.V. up a short slope and onto the curved road that winds south, past the gates of the overgrown U.S.D.B. cemetery, where 14 executed German prisoners of war were buried in 1945. A constellation of brick buildings appeared in the distance. Close to 1 a.m., the Explorer drew to a halt in a parking lot, where Strangio and Hollander were waiting. Manning was so eager to hug the two attorneys that she clocked Strangio in the face with her elbow.

The week I spent with Manning in New York felt like a moment of suspended animation: the days between all the chaos of her life before and whatever was going to come next. In her final months at the U.S.D.B., Manning put together 300 pages of memoir, and she’s acquired an agent to shop the draft around. This fall, she will appear in a documentary called “XY Chelsea,” produced by Laura Poitras. Her attorneys, meanwhile, continue to work on her appeal. Even if she is exonerated, it is hard to know how comfortable her life will be in the years to come, given that some of the nation will never likely reconcile itself to what she did.

But she is determined not to dwell on her reputation, and for that week in Manhattan, she seemed happy being free. We trudged, unnoticed, through busy city streets, ordered chicken nuggets at McDonald’s, ate in restaurants and cafes and went to a weekend screening of “Alien: Covenant.” On the way into the theater, the man collecting the tickets asked to check Manning’s bag. I held my breath, thinking she would be recognized. But kneeling, Manning unzipped the main compartment, revealing her laptop. She was waved through: The famous whistle-blower and former military prisoner had become just another Sunday evening theatergoer.

It occurred to me that if Manning sometimes seemed to have difficulty interpreting the effect her actions had on the world, it was in part a result of the extraordinary isolation she had experienced even before her arrest, in her childhood in Crescent, when she longed for a solution for her pain. Later, in solitary in Kuwait or Quantico, or in the special housing unit at the U.S.D.B., that isolation had been made physical: The “feedback loop” she had spoken of to me had been torn. Now she had the ability to live publicly and openly as she always knew she was, and she was adjusting to the idea, sinking into it as if it were a cold pond. More than once, as we walked the streets of New York, I felt I was in the presence of someone coming fully alive for the very first time. Manning told me she understood that her identity and the actions that led to her arrest have long been tangled up in the public imagination, sometimes in uncomfortable ways: An appellate brief filed last year by Manning’s legal team implied that the Army’s inability to treat Manning’s gender dysphoria was a contributing factor in the leaks. Manning didn’t want to discuss “hypotheticals,” what would have happened if circumstances were different, but she was adamant on one thing: “What I can tell you,” she said, “is that my values would have been the same. The things I care about would have been the same.”


One morning, at the end of an interview, Manning handed me a white envelope. Inside was a note from a 14-year-old trans boy. “I just wanted to say that I’m glad you’re gonna be free in a few months,” the boy had scrawled in pen, “and that I’m proud of you (is that weird thing to say?). You’re an inspiration.” Manning placed the note back in the envelope. If she was being honest, she said, she never particularly wanted to be a role model. I asked if Manning’s life would have been different if she’d had such a person. She stared down at her hands. “I don’t know how,” she said finally, “but it would have been better.”

From David A Fairbanks;

What can you say about this woman? Remarkable? A Traitor? Future generations will decide. If there is a lesson here it is that someone has to face down "Power and authority" because history has warned us that no government should ever be permitted to hide behind self-serving rules. Manning has the audacity to step up and say "Enough!" within a modern technology state. 

Rosewood